19.4.1 Adaptation as a response strategy
How much can anticipatory and autonomous adaptation achieve? What is the potential for, and limitations of, adaptation to reduce impacts and to reduce or avoid key vulnerabilities?
The scientific literature on these questions is less well developed than for mitigation, and the conclusions are more speculative in many cases. It is clear, however, that there is no simple comprehensive response to the adaptation question, and that the answers are often place-specific and very nuanced, and are likely to become more so as research advances.
In agriculture, for example, previous IPCC assessments have generally concluded that, in the near to medium term, aggregate world food production is not threatened (IPCC, 1996, 2001a). However, considerable regional variation in impacts and adaptive capacity suggests that severe impacts and food scarcity could occur in some regions, especially at low latitudes, where large numbers of poorer people are already engaged in agriculture that is not currently viable (see Section 5.4.2). In global terms, agriculture has been extremely resilient and world food production has expanded rapidly to keep pace with world population growth. Of course, there is debate on the sustainability of these trends, as they depend in part on the growing demand for meat and meat products as well as potential competition between agricultural resources for producing food versus those used for producing energy. Nevertheless, even where shortages have occurred, the reasons are rarely to be found in an absolute lack of food but are more due to lack of purchasing power and failures of the distribution system.
Attention to adaptation in agriculture has tended to focus on specific measures at the farm level, and some progress is being made in the incorporation of climate risks into agricultural practices. On the other hand, the processes of globalisation and technological change are placing adaptation more in the hands of agri-business, national policy-makers, and the international political economy, including such factors as prices, tariffs and subsidies, and the terms of international trade (Apuuli et al., 2000; Burton and Lim, 2005).
The record of past success in agriculture is often seen in other sectors, particularly in developed countries and, in many regions it is evident that current climate variability falls largely within the coping range (Burton and Lim, 2005). One possible exception is in the case of extreme events where monetary losses (both insured and uninsured – Munich Re, 2005) have been rising sharply, although mortality has been falling. In such cases, adaptation has not been so successful, despite major improvements in understanding the risks and in forecasts and warnings (White et al., 2001). One reason is the decline in local concern and thus a reduced propensity to adopt proactive adaptation measures, as the memory of specific disaster events fades. Related to this lack of appreciation of possible risks is that governments and communities can still be taken by surprise when extreme events occur, even though scientific evidence of their potential occurrence is widely available (Bazermann, 2005). Economic damage and loss of life from Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the European heatwave of 2003, and many other similar events are due in large measure to a lack of sufficient anticipatory adaptation, or even maladaptation in some cases. So while the overall record of adaptation to climate change and variability in the past 200 or so years has been successful overall, there is evidence of insufficient investments in adaptation opportunities, especially in relation to extreme events (Burton, 2004, Burton and May, 2004; Hallegatte et al., 2007). While economic losses have increased, there has been considerable success in reducing loss of life; and despite the recent spate of deadly extreme weather events, the general trend in mortality and morbidity remains downwards.
It is clear that in the future there is considerable scope for adaptation, provided that existing and developing scientific understanding, technology and know-how can be effectively applied. It might be expected that the slower the rate of climate change, the more likely it is that adaptation will be successful. For example, even a major rise in sea level might be accommodated and adjusted to by human societies if it happens very slowly over many centuries (Nicholls and Tol, 2006). On the other hand, slow incremental change can still involve considerable costs and people might not be sufficiently motivated to take precautionary action and bear the associated costs without some more dramatic stimulus. Paradoxically, therefore, the full array of human adaptation potential is not likely to be brought to bear when all the market, social, psychological and institutional barriers to adaptation are taken into account.
In terms of the key vulnerabilities identified in Table 19.1, it is clear that adaptation potential is greater the more the system is under human management and control. Major geophysical changes leave little room for human-managed adaptation. Fortunately these changes are likely to unfold relatively slowly, thus allowing more time for adaptation to their eventual impacts. There is somewhat greater adaptive capacity in biological systems, but it is still very limited. Biodiversity and ecosystems are likely to be impacted at a much faster rate than geophysical systems without a commensurately larger adaptive capacity for such impacts. It seems likely, therefore, that the greatest impacts in the near to medium term, where adaptation capacity is very limited, will occur in biological systems (Leemans and Eickhout, 2004; Smith, 2004; see Chapter 4). As we move into human social systems and market systems, adaptive capacity at the technical level increases dramatically. However, the understanding of impacts, adaptive capacity, and the costs of adaptation is weaker in social systems than in biological systems, and the uncertainties are high. This is especially the case for synergistic or cross-cutting impacts. Considered in isolation, the potential for agricultural adaptation may appear to be good. When related impacts in water regimes, droughts and floods, pest infestations and plant diseases, human health, the reliability of infrastructure, poor governance, as well as other non-climate-related stresses are taken into account, the picture is less clear.
A general conclusion on the basis of the present understanding is that for market and social systems there is considerable adaptation potential, but the economic costs are potentially large, largely unknown and unequally distributed, as is the adaptation potential itself. For biological and geophysical systems, the adaptation potential is much less than in social and market systems, because impacts are more direct and therefore appear more rapidly. A large proportion of the future increase in key vulnerabilities is likely to be recorded first in biological systems (see Chapter 1). This does not mean that key vulnerabilities will not occur in social and market systems. They depend on biological systems, and as ecosystems are affected by mounting stresses from climate change and concomitant factors such as habitat fractionation, and the spread of plant diseases and pest infestations, then the follow-on, second-order effects on human health and safety, livelihoods and prosperity, will be considerable (*/**).