Most agreements (including those on climate change such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol), include specific goals to guide the selection of actions and timing as well as the selection of institutions. Goals can provide a common vision about both the near-term direction and the longer term certainty that is called for by business. In this discussion, goals are distinguished from targets: the former are long-term and systemic, while the latter relate to actions that are near-term and specific. Targets are described under the ‘Targets’ section (18.104.22.168.1) below.
The choice of the long-term ambition level significantly influences the necessary short-term action and, therefore, the design of the international regime. For example, if the goal is set at high stabilization levels (e.g. stabilizing concentrations at 750 ppmv CO2-eq, scenario category D of Chapter 3 of this report), a technology-focused approach that defers emissions reduction to the future would be sufficient for the time being. For low stabilization goals (e.g. 450 ppmv CO2-eq, category A1, or 550 ppmv CO2-eq, category B), short-term emission reductions would be necessary in addition to technological development programmes.
International regimes can incorporate goals for the short and medium term and for the stabilization of GHG concentrations. One option is to set a goal for long-term GHG concentrations or a maximal temperature rise (such as the 2°C goal proposed by the EU). Such levels might be set based on an agreement of impacts to be avoided (see Den Elzen and Meinshausen, 2005) or on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis (see Nordhaus, 2001). A number of authors have commented on the advantages and disadvantages of setting long-term goals. Pershing and Tudela (2003) suggest that it may be difficult to gain a global agreement on any ‘dangerous’ level due to political and technical difficulties. Conversely, Corfee-Morlot and Höhne (2003) believe such goal-setting is desirable as it helps structure commitments and institutions, provides an incentive to stimulate action and helps establish criteria against which to measure the success of implementing measures.
An alternative to agreeing on specific CO2 concentration or temperature levels is an agreement on specific long-term actions (such as a technology-oriented target, such as ‘eliminating carbon emissions from the energy sector by 2060’). An advantage of such a goal is that it might be linked to specific actions. While links between such actions, GHG concentrations and climate impacts can be made, there are uncertainties in the precise correlation between them. Additionally, several different targets would have to be set to cover all climate-relevant activities (Schelling, 1997; Pershing and Tudela, 2003).
Another option would be to adopt a ‘hedging strategy’ (IPCC, 2001, chapter 10), which is defined as a shorter term goal on global emissions, from which it is still possible to reach a range of desirable long-term goals. One example of such a strategy is the California goal of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and then reducing them to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Once the short-term goal is reached, decisions on subsequent steps can be made in light of new knowledge and decreased levels of uncertainty. To implement this option, the international community could agree on a maximum quantity of permissible GHG emissions in, for example, 2020 (Corfee-Morlot and Höhne, 2003; Pershing and Tudela, 2003; Yohe et al., 2004).
Another proposal would be to aim at formulating reductions step by step, based on the willingness of countries to act, without explicitly considering a long-term perspective. While such an approach does meet political acceptability criteria, it poses the risk that the individual reductions may not add up to the level required for certain stabilization levels. Some stabilization options may then be out of reach in the near future (see Chapter 3.3, Figure 3.19).