188.8.131.52 Environmental effectiveness
Environmentally effective international agreements lead to reductions in global GHG emissions and/or concentrations or to decreased climate impacts. The literature suggests that to achieve such success, agreements must provide incentives or deterrents to both State and individual behaviour in order to achieve a specific outcome. However, at the international level, there is some dispute as to whether agreements change trends, or merely codify actions already underway.
An additional critical element in the effectiveness of an international agreement is that of the implementation context: The relevant literature shows that agreements tend to be more successful in countries with both a high level of domestic awareness and resources and a strong institutional and legal framework and where there is clear political will. Where global agreements are designed using only blue-print approaches to instruments, these instruments may ultimately ignore the specific cultural and institutional contexts within which they are designed to function and may actually not work as well (see conclusions of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Agreements that promote ancillary objectives, such as reductions in ordinary air pollution levels, also have a higher chance of success.
An agreement that includes a limited group of countries (particularly if they are not major emitters) may be less effective – and this weakness may be exaggerated when emissions of non-participating countries increase by the migration of emission-intensive industries. Conversely, additional benefits may accrue due to technology spillover that may enhance environmental effectiveness (see Section 184.108.40.206).
The timing of an agreement’s provisions may also affect its effectiveness: Focusing only on longer term emission reductions (as suggested under some forms of technology agreements) may preclude the possibility of reaching low climate stabilization levels, as many lower levels require immediate emission reductions.