188.8.131.52 Qualitative insights into interactions between mitigaton, adaptation and development
Until recently, a main focus in the policy and integrated assessment literature has been on comparing mitigation costs and avoided damages. Since the TAR, attention has shifted towards the interaction between mitigation and adaptation in reducing damages in a risk-management framework. This has accompanied a growing realization that some climate change in the coming decades is inevitable.
Limited treatment of adaptation in climate policy assessments is still a problem and a number of reasons explain this. First, the focus of the international climate change negotiations has largely been on mitigation (perhaps because attention to adaptation could be viewed as ‘giving up’ on mitigation) even though the importance of adaptation is underlined in Article 4 of the UNFCCC and Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol. Second, adaptation is largely undertaken at the local scale, by individual households, farmers, companies or local governments; it is thus difficult to target through coordinated international incentives, and is more complicated to handle quantitatively by models in global scenarios. Third, it is difficult to generalize the ways that individuals or communities are likely to adapt to specific impacts. However, the literature is evolving quickly and recent work is available in a number of regions; for example, in Finland (Carter et al., 2005), the UK (West and Gawith, 2005), Canada (Cohen et al., 2004) and the USA (e.g. California, Hayhoe et al., 2004).
Despite the scarcity of global systematic assessments (Tol, 2005a), some interesting insights into the interaction between adaptation and mitigation emerge from recent regional-scale studies. Some adaptation measures are ‘no-regret’ measures and should be undertaken anyway (Agrawala, 2005), such as preservation of mangroves in coastal zones, which provide a buffer for increased coastal flood risk due to climate change and help to maintain healthy marine ecosystems (Nicholls et al., 2006). A few may be synergistic with mitigation (Bosello, 2005) such as investing in more efficient buildings that will limit human vulnerability to increasingly frequent heatwaves and also reduce energy use, hence emissions. But many adaptation options involve net costs with a risk of committing to irreversible and misplaced investment given the considerable uncertainty about climate change at a local scale. Given this uncertainty, and the fact that learning about adaptation to climate change imposes some costs and takes time (Kelly et al., 2005), mis-allocation of investments may occur, or the rate of long-term investment in adaptation strategies may slow (Kokic et al., 2005; Kelly et al., 2005).
Finally, the interactions between adaptation and mitigation are intertwined with development pathways. A key issue is to understand at what point (over)investment in mitigation or adaptation might limit funds available for development, and thus reduce future adaptive capacity (Sachs, 2004; Tol, 2005a; Tol and Yohe, 2006). Another issue concerns the point at which climate change damages, and the associated investment in adaptation, could crowd out more productive investments later and harm development (Kemfert, 2002; Bosello and Zhang, 2005; Kemfert and Schumacher, 2005). The answer to these questions depends upon modelling assumptions that drive repercussions in other sectors of the economy and other regions and the potential impacts on economic growth. These are ‘higher-order’ social costs of climate change from a series of climate-change-induced shocks; they include the relative influence of: a) the cross-sectoral interactions across all major sectors and regions; b) a crowding out effect that slows down capital accumulation and technical progress, especially if technical change is endogenous. These indirect impacts reduce development and adaptive capacity and may be in the same order of magnitude, or greater than, the direct impact of climate change (Fankhauser and Tol, 2005; Roson and Tol, 2006; Kemfert, 2006).
Both the magnitude and the sign of the indirect macro-economic impacts of climate change are conditional upon the growth dynamics of the countries concerned. When confronted by the same mitigation policies and the same climate change impacts, economies experiencing strong disequilibrium (including ‘poverty traps’) and large market and institutional imperfections will not react in the same way as countries that are on a steady and high economic growth pathway. The latter are near what economists call their ‘production frontier’ (the maximum of production attainable at a given point in time); the former are more vulnerable to any climatic shock or badly calibrated mitigation policies, but symmetrically offer more opportunities for synergies between mitigation, adaptation and development policies (Shukla et al., 2006). On the adaptation side for example, Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) demonstrate that there is significant potential to reduce vulnerability to the spread of malaria in Africa. In some circumstances, mitigation measures can be aligned with development policies and alleviate important sources of vulnerability in these countries, such as dependency on oil imports or local pollution. But this involves transition costs over the coming 10–20 years (higher domestic energy prices, higher investments in the energy sector), which in turn suggests opportunities for international cooperative mechanisms to minimize these costs.
Bosello (2005) shows complementarity between adaptation, mitigation and investment in R&D, whilst others consider these as substitutes (Tol, 2005a). Schneider and Lane (2006) consider that mitigation and adaptation only trade off for small temperature increments where adaptation might be cheaper, whereas for larger temperature increases mitigation is always the cheaper option. Goklany (2003) promotes the view that the contribution by climate change to hunger, malaria, coastal flooding, and water stress (as measured by populations at risk) is small compared to that of non-climate-change-related factors, and that through the 2080s, efforts to reduce vulnerability would be more cost-effective in reducing these problems than mitigation. This analysis neglects critical thresholds at the regional level (such as the temperature ceiling on feasibility of regional crop growth) and at the global level (such as the onset of ice sheet melting or release of methane from permafrost), and, like many others studies, it neglects the impacts of extreme weather events. It also promotes a very optimistic view of adaptive capacity, which is increasingly challenged in the literature (Tompkins and Adger, 2005). An adaptation-only policy scenario in the coming decades leads to an even greater challenge for adaptation in decades to follow, owing to the inertia of the climate system. In the absence of mitigation, temperature rises will be much greater than would otherwise occur with pusuant impacts on economic development (IPCC, 2007b, Chapter 19.3.7; Stern 2006). Hence adaptation alone is insufficient to avoid the serious risks due to climate change (see Table 3.11; also IPCC, 2007b, Chapter 19, Table 19.1).
To summarize, adaptation and mitigation are thus increasingly viewed as complementary (on the global scale), whilst locally there are examples of both synergies and conflicts between the two (IPCC, 2007b, Chapter 18). Less action on mitigation raises the risk of greater climate-change-induced damages to economic development and natural systems and implies a greater need for adaptation. Some authors maintain that adaptation and mitigation are substitutes, because of competition for funds, whilst others claim that such tradeoffs occur only at the margin when considering incremental temperature change and incremental policy action, because for large temperature changes mitigation is always cheaper than adaptation.
Table 3.9: Global mean temperature increase at equilibrium, greenhouse gas concentration and radiative forcing. Equilibrium temperatures here are calculated using estimates of climate sensitivity and do not take into account the full range of bio-geophysical feedbacks that may occur.
|Equilibrium temperature increase in ºC above pre-industrial temperature ||CO2-eq concentration and radiative forcing corresponding to best estimate of climate sensitivity for warming level in column 11,2 ||CO2-eq concentration that would be expected to limit warming below level in column 1 with an estimated likelihood of about 80% 3 |
|CO2-equivalent (ppm) ||Radiative forcing (W/m2) |
|0.6 ||319 ||0.7 ||305 |
|1.6 ||402 ||2.0 ||356 |
|2.0 ||441 ||2.5 ||378 |
|2.6 ||507 ||3.2 ||415 |
|3.0 ||556 ||3.7 ||441 |
|3.6 ||639 ||4.5 ||484 |
|4.0 ||701 ||4.9 ||515 |
|4.6 ||805 ||5.7 ||565 |
|5.0 ||883 ||6.2 ||601 |
|5.6 ||1014 ||6.9 ||659 |
|6.0 ||1112 ||7.4 ||701 |
|6.6 ||1277 ||8.2 ||768 |