

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Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity amid Protracted Crisis

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I. Introduction

Recent large-scale disasters in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa have once again drawn the attention of international media and policy makers to the plight of millions of vulnerable households facing severe consequences of drought and other impacts of climate change. However, all too often, the public response to such catastrophes fails to acknowledge that widespread famine and death in such situations are not solely due to weather-related anomalies but rather, are the result of complex interactions between political, economic, social and environmental factors.

An extensive amount of research has been carried out by policy makers, humanitarian organizations, and academic institutions on the underlying causes of hunger and poverty in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It clearly demonstrates that vulnerable populations in both these regions have experienced prolonged periods of food and livelihood insecurity resulting from consecutive, severe drought, food and fuel price increases, rapid population growth, environmental degradation, public health concerns (HIV/AIDS, cholera, malnutrition), cross-border and inter-ethnic conflict, insufficient access to infrastructure and public services (transportation, health, education), and largely ineffective government policies.[1-6]

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) attempted to inform dialogue surrounding humanitarian policy and programming in such environments by focusing its 2010 SOFI report on *Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crisis*. Simultaneously, academic researchers, affected governments, and humanitarian policy makers have taken a renewed interest in the concept of resilience for helping disaster-prone populations adapt to rapidly changing natural, social and economic environments in a manner that contributes to longer-term food and livelihood security. This paper will build on both these efforts by focusing on the distinct challenges, trends, opportunities and lessons learned for building resilience in countries experiencing protracted crisis.

II. Why Resilience?

Consensus for 'resilience programming' has steadily grown among governments, donors and humanitarian policy groups who have repeatedly witnessed substantial allocations of financial and human resources in response to recurrent emergencies. Unfortunately, the collective responses to these emergencies have exposed the shortcomings of international aid practices and national/regional policies concerning humanitarian assistance. An overarching concern is that while responses to humanitarian disasters have saved lives, they have not done enough to enable affected populations to withstand shocks and avert future crises.[7] Nor have they effectively addressed the underlying causes of vulnerability that regularly threaten the lives of millions in the event of natural and/or human-caused shocks.

The increasing attention being paid to resilience has led to multiple definitions of the properties, principles, and processes that strengthen resilience at the individual, household, community, institutional and ecosystem levels.[8,9] For this paper, the following definition of resilience will be used:

The ability of countries, communities, and households to efficiently anticipate, adapt to, and/or recover from the effects of a potentially hazardous occurrences (natural disasters, economic instability, conflict) in a manner that protects livelihoods, accelerates and sustains recovery, and supports economic growth.

It is important to emphasize that resilience is not synonymous with coping capacity. Whereas coping capacity typically refers to the ability of households to return to their previous state in the wake of disaster, resilience programming must focus on strengthening the adaptive capacity of vulnerable households. In the context of protracted crisis, this entails taking incremental steps to reduce their exposure to a variety shocks so that they can eventually escape poverty and continually improve their wellbeing.

The conceptual framework for resilience (Figure 1) integrates a livelihoods framework, a disaster risk reduction framework, and elements of a climate change approach to address the underlying causes of vulnerability. It also helps users to understand how long-term trends (e.g., institutional, economic, socio-political or environmental factors) affect livelihoods security and exposure to risk and formulate policies and programs to address critical needs. [10,11]

Figure 1: Resilience Framework



TANGO 2012. Adapted from DFID Disaster Resilience Framework (2011), TANGO Livelihoods Framework (2007), DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (1999) and CARE Household Livelihood Security Framework (2002).

Box 1: Elements of the Resilience Framework

Context **–** environmental, political, social, economic, historical, demographic, religious, conflict and policy conditions that affect, and are affected by adaptive capacity (ability of HHs, communities, and governments to cope with shocks).

Level of aggregation **–** the unit of analysis for determining resilience of what or whom (the individual, household, community, institution, government, or ecosystem). The relationships between various levels is a 'nested hierarchy', i.e., resilient individuals and HHs are the foundation for resilient communities. It is critical to note that resilience at one level does not automatically result in resilience at higher levels, i.e., resilient households do not necessarily result in resilient communities.

Disturbance **-** may come in the form of rapid onset or slow onset *shocks* (e.g., earthquakes or droughts) or longer-term *stresses* (e.g., environmental degradation, political instability). Experience shows that it is typically easier to mobilize resources for rapid onset shocks than slow onset shocks and stresses. In assessing resilience it is important to acknowledge that some disturbances are idiosyncratic (affecting only certain individuals or households) whereas others are covariate (affecting an entire population or geographic area). Also resilience to one type of shock (e.g., drought) does not ensure resilience to others (e.g., food price increases, conflict).

Exposure **–** a function of the magnitude, frequency, and duration of shocks

Adaptive Capacity – the nature and extent of access to and use of resources in order to deal with disturbance. Adaptive capacity both affects and is affected by the larger context and is comprised of three basic, but interrelated elements – livelihood assets; transforming structures and processes; and livelihood strategies.

- *Livelihood Assets* **–** tangible and intangible assets that allow individuals and households to meet their basic needs. Livelihood security depends on a sustainable combination of six assets/capitals: financial; physical; political; human; social; and natural. Certain assets are interdependent on others. Asset levels and quality can be improved and/or repaired. Landscapes can be restored, soils improved, new skills and abilities can be learned, and new markets can be developed or accessed. Livelihood assets can and should be grown and improved.
- *Structures and processes* – these are embodied in the formal and informal institutions that enable or inhibit the resilience of individuals, households and communities. Examples include national, regional, and local governments; civil society; religious institutions; trade associations; resource networks; shared customs and norms; informal/traditional governance structures; policies and laws.
- *Livelihood strategies* – represent the distinct or combined strategies that individuals and households pursue to make a living and cope with shocks. It is critical to note that different livelihood strategies have various risks associated with potential shocks and that certain coping strategies may have negative and permanent consequences with respect to resilience.

Sensitivity **–** is a cumulative outcome of the previous element that determines the degree to which an individual, household or community will be affected by a given shock or stress. Greater sensitivity implies a lower degree of resilience whereas lower sensitivity implies greater resilience.

Resilience and Vulnerability Pathways **–** the term 'pathways' underscores the idea that both vulnerability and resilience are properly viewed as processes rather than static states. Households or communities that are able to use their adaptive capacity to manage the shocks or stresses they are exposed to and incrementally reduce their vulnerability are less sensitive and are on a resilience pathway. Households that are not able to use their adaptive capacity to manage shocks or stresses are sensitive and are likely to go down a vulnerability pathway.

Box 1: Elements of the Resilience Framework

Livelihood Outcomes **–** these are the needs and objectives that households are trying to realize. Resilient individuals, communities and households will be able to meet their food security needs, will have access to adequate nutrition, their environment will be protected, they will have income security, health security, will be able to educate their children, and they will be able to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. Vulnerable households experience deficits, or a high risk of deficits in each of these aspects.

The overall objective of the resilience framework is to enable policy makers and practitioners to consider processes across different societal levels to holistically strengthen resilience by addressing gaps in key livelihood assets, enhancing the structures and processes of key institutions, and diversifying the livelihood strategies of vulnerable households. The extent to which communities and households are able to do so results either in increased vulnerability or increased adaptive capacity and resilience over time.[i]

III. Resilience: A New Paradigm for Situations of Protracted Crisis

Frustration has grown as evidence mounts that previous efforts have not substantially reduced the numbers of chronically vulnerable households in disaster-prone regions. While there is growing debate over the specific means of achieving resilience in various contexts, there is a general consensus that in order to have a sustainable impact, approaches to building resilience must somehow transcend the pitfalls and false distinctions made among humanitarian assistance efforts, longer-term development initiatives and social protection programs.

Previously, researchers and practitioners often discussed a model of 'relief to development' that envisioned a continuum where progression from disaster to stability, 'early recovery', rehabilitation and eventually livelihood security would follow in a continuum, provided the correct steps were taken. However, experience in situations of protracted crisis demonstrates that extended periods of relative tranquility and improvement can, and often are interrupted by sporadic setbacks ranging from droughts and floods, to dramatic price fluctuations, to unpredictable outbreaks of violent conflict. In order to build resilience in such situations, it's much more appropriate to conceive of interventions within a 'contiguum' where various stages of development and disaster response can be operating at the same time, in overlapping juxtaposition. [12]

Resilience thinking represents another important break from previous efforts at reform within the development community. Promotion of a 'development relief' approach to humanitarian development assistance was largely focused on changing an aid architecture that created artificial funding and programming barriers which prevented effective coordination between emergency and development policy initiatives. Alternatively, strategies for resilience focus on enhancing the capacity of crisis-affected populations and institutions to adapt to continual change. While this may ultimately

[i] Previous research findings also reveal that households can have overly diversified livelihood strategies. This happens when investments in human and financial resources are spread so thinly across multiple activities that no single activity can provide a reliable means of income generation or asset accumulation to protect households against potential shocks.

lead to adaptation of institutional policies or processes, analysis of resilience to food security must always start at the ground level, with people who are food insecure. [13]

Obviously, designing, implementing and monitoring programs aimed at enhancing household and community resilience in such environments is especially challenging. In situations of protracted crisis, the continual interaction of factors contributing to vulnerability is dynamic and inherently complex. Achieving greater resilience in these environments requires that actors at multiple levels closely coordinate their efforts in a manner that is often difficult, if not impossible, under the current architecture of international development aid. Most importantly, effective resilience programming requires that external aid agencies readily adapt to rapidly changing circumstances so that they can enable beneficiary communities to do the same without relying on negative coping strategies (e.g. sale of assets, skipping meals, migration, etc.).

Addressing the underlying causes of environmental, social and economic constraints in such contexts calls for regular and comprehensive assessment of vulnerability to different shocks and greater synergy between emergency assistance and longer-term development initiatives. It also requires more flexible funding mechanisms that enable programming of adequate scale and duration. In these environments, achievement of resilience among chronically vulnerable groups will largely depend on the proper sequencing and combination of interventions and enabling conditions that include support for healthy ecosystems, effective formal and informal governance, engagement of the private sector, and provision of social safety nets.

Given the range of actors involved – households, communities, informal institutions, civil society governments, donors, private sector – it is important for humanitarian organizations to retain proper perspective on their role as facilitators, rather than directors of change. This distinction draws from previous lessons learned through the provision of external assistance. There are numerous examples that demonstrate the limited sustainability of externally-derived initiatives, and the importance of directly empowering local actors to develop context-specific solutions to long-standing development challenges . Wherever possible, external aid organizations should seek means of working through institutions while strengthening their technical capacity to design, implement and monitor resilience programming.

The fact that certain regions and nations of the world are more prone to food and livelihood insecurity than others has prompted donors, humanitarian organizations, the private sector and research institutions to focus on achievement of resilience at the national scale. At the same time, individual organizations will typically have comparative advantages or institutional objectives that focus on specific sectors. Ideally, national strategies for building resilience will ensure that each of these key livelihood resources are strengthened among food insecure households. This will often require strategic coordination among institutional partners with complementary capacities. [14] Understandably, this perspective has prompted considerable discussion of the institutional structures

and processes, the access to resources, and the capacities necessary for developing nations to achieve greater resilience.

Convergence of multi-sectoral strategies among a range of stakeholders at multiple scales is particularly important for building resilience in situations of protracted crisis. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that in most protracted crisis situations, all the necessary conditions for building resilience (e.g. functional institutions, good governance, productive infrastructure, healthy natural resource base) will not be present. In such cases it may not be possible to achieve resilience at higher levels and efforts may need to focus on enhancing the resilience of communities and/or households. In the most unstable environments – such as those where formal government remains fragile or absent and/or those experiencing ongoing violent conflict – resilience building may be impossible unless and until basic minimum conditions are present.[15]

Figure 2: Building Resilience across Sectors and Scales



Source: Adapted from DfID 2012

Fortunately, research has identified a range of instances in which diverse groups of actors have come together to establish promising initiatives for enhancing the resilience of populations experiencing protracted crisis. The following cases were selected for this paper because each describes promising attempts to build resilience at different scales – regional, national and local. They include a regional approach to addressing undernutrition in the Sahel, putting in place the building blocks for longer-term livelihood security in war-torn South Sudan, and a program aimed at enhancing the resilience of conflict-affected pastoralists in southern Ethiopia. These cases demonstrate efforts to build resilience undertaken at different levels (local, national and regional).

Box 2: Regional Approach to Improved Nutrition in the Sahel

In 2007 the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) developed a "Sahel strategy" that promotes short and long-term aid to achieve a sustainable reduction in malnutrition rates in the Sahel.[16] The Plan covers Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Cameroon and provides funding from the Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) budget of ECHO to NGOs and UN agencies for humanitarian food assistance aimed at reducing (through treatment *and* prevention) severe acute malnutrition (SAM). Strategies include support for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), and advocacy to prioritize integration of food and nutrition security into public policies. [17,18] The Plan takes a regional approach, including cross-border learning and cooperation, and advocates among governments and donors for strengthening linkages between relief and development activities to prevent acute malnutrition addressing its underlying structural causes. To more effectively advocate with government and other partners, the Plan places high priority on using Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition surveys (SMART) and Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA). ECHO's 2011 Sahel plan gives priority to 'operations that give emphasis to disaster risk reduction', and aim to assist people 'to strengthen their coping mechanisms and resilience.'[19]

Box 3: Support for Education at the National Level in South Sudan

Much of the insecurity stemming from inter-clan conflict in newly independent South Sudan has been attributed to well-armed youth with little education and limited opportunity for income generation outside of cattle raiding. The situation has been exacerbated by a burgeoning youth population (51 percent of the population of South Sudan is under 18 years of age) and recent droughts which have placed increasing pressure on water and pasture land for predominantly pastoralist communities who have little, if any access to government social services. In a 2012 report on education in South Sudan, the World Bank suggests that the general enrolment rate in the school-aged population increased dramatically from 21 percent in 2000 to 72 percent in 2009. This improvement is largely attributed to success largely attributed to UNICEF's successful 'Go to School' campaign and WFP's school feeding program.[20] It is entirely likely that this investment in the education of poor, rural children will make a direct contribution to the attainment of resilience in South Sudan over the long-term.[21]

Box 4: Building Resilience to Drought among Conflict-Affected Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

After receiving anecdotal evidence from local leaders that drought-affected pastoralist communities that had participated in Mercy Corps' Strengthening Institutions to Peace and Development (SIPED) programme were better able to cope with recent drought than pastoralist groups that had not participated in the programme, Mercy Corps conducted a study to "generate greater insights and evidence on the extent to which peace-building efforts that rely on skills building and sustained dialogue among conflicting parties can serve as an effective form of disaster risk reduction." The peace-building process utilized by Mercy Corps in the SIPED project, funded by USAID, included strengthening government and customary institutions, community dialogues (including clan leaders, elders, women and youths), joint livelihood activities, formation of peace committees, and development of natural resource use plans. In particular, the Negelle Peace Accord was considered by local officials and communities to have played a critical role in reducing conflict and promoting peaceful co-existence among competing clans. By enhancing freedom of movement and access to water, grazing lands, and other natural resources, Mercy Corps' peace-building programme has positively enhanced resilience to drought among participating households.[22]

IV. Core Principles of Resilience Programming for Protracted Crises

Development specialists involved in resilience research have identified a number of core principles to guide practitioners, policy makers and communities in developing and implementing programs in situations of protracted crisis. [23,24] These principles should be used to formulate a shared vision of success among groups of humanitarian actors at the international, regional, national and sub-national levels. Discussing these principles collectively and individually can help such groups of actors to coordinate efforts across technical divides as well as measure specific outcomes for a range of resilience indicators. Prioritization of individual principles should obviously correspond to the specific context of protracted crisis prevailing at the national and local levels.

Box 5: Principles of Resilience Programming for Protracted Crises

- *Support a transition, over time, in the balance of effort and resources from humanitarian assistance toward longer-term disaster risk management, climate change adaptation, livelihood diversification, and social protection;*
- *Recognize and respond to the different needs, capabilities and aspirations of the most vulnerable groups (women, orphans, elderly, displaced, conflict-affected, unemployed/uneducated youth);*
- *Promote healthy ecosystems through ecosystem-based planning, payment for ecosystem services (PES), and support for farmer managed natural regeneration (FMNR);*
- *Support greater investment in human capital to enable households to maintain health, diversify livelihood options, build social capital and exercise their individual and collective rights;*
- *Enable community participation by identifying and engaging customary institutions and valuable forms of traditional knowledge for coping with climate variability, conflict, and food insecurity;*
- *Advocate for and support more effective formal and informal governance, peace-building and conflict mitigation;*
- *Based on thorough risk assessment (including analysis of local political economies and drivers of conflict), facilitate livelihood diversification in response to actual (and potential shocks);*
- *Enable greater gender equity by enhancing women's access to productive assets and strengthening their roles in community and household decision-making;*
- *Improve access to public and productive infrastructure (roads, markets, water infrastructure, power, etc.), access to financial services and greater participation in markets [25];*
- *Strengthen market participation by enabling profitable engagement of smallholders in value chains;*
- *Look for means of developing strategic partnerships (including with the private sector) in order to complement donor funding and provide financial incentives for investment in livelihoods; and*
- *Contribute to improved knowledge management by addressing key knowledge gaps and documenting evidence of promising resilience-building practices.*

V. Challenges to Promoting Resilience in Protracted Crises

The growing consensus for 'resilience building' stems in part from widespread acknowledgement that previous humanitarian responses and development initiatives have failed to adequately address the needs of chronically vulnerable populations. At the same time, policy makers and other development actors are confronted with a range of significant challenges in their efforts to operationalize the principles of resilience programming. Chief among these are the need to respond to the inherent complexity of factors contributing to protracted crisis and the continual challenges of identifying, responding to, and measuring the effects of change. Other specific challenges are described below with respect to the particular level at which they are typically encountered.

Community Challenges

Deforestation, encroachment into fragile ecosystems, overgrazing, and improper land use have resulted in soil erosion, loss of vegetation, and loss of biodiversity characterize the process of **environmental degradation** that is experienced throughout much of the developing world. In poor, rural communities throughout sub-Saharan Africa, depletion of environmental resources has resulted in **insufficient agricultural production** for ensuring food security. In countries experiencing protracted crisis, these factors, when combined, often lead to **dependence on external aid** and periodic **outbreaks of violence**.[26,27]

In many areas characterized by pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood systems, natural resources are owned, managed and used collectively by various entities and are often under different tenure arrangements.[28] Under these arrangements **rights of use and access to land** are often insecure for the poorest, most vulnerable households. Informal land tenure arrangements often constrain the land management options available to users.[29] At the same time, **privatization of communal lands** (due to industrialization and urbanization) poses a growing threat to small-holder farmers in many countries experiencing protracted crisis. In countries experiencing protracted crisis, contested access to land (and water) is often a source of conflict as ethnic communities migrate into rival groups' territories in search of natural resources to sustain livelihoods.

Prevailing social structures and **power relations** that guide dynamic interactions between poor and non-poor households at the community level can create significant challenges for vulnerable households seeking to increase their assets and resilience to shock.[30] Such attempts at upward mobility among poor populations can be viewed as a threat to the status quo and may be resisted by the powerful elite. Poor households seeking to limit their sense of economic and physical sense of insecurity often respond rationally to risk by linking with the non-poor in exploitive relationships.[31] In such relationships, the most vulnerable are often forced to choose a modicum of economic and personal security at the cost of empowerment, asset accumulation and self-reliance.

Protracted crises are often characterized by cyclical interaction between conflict and livelihood insecurity whereby lack of opportunity impels youth to join **armed conflict**, which in turn heightens

livelihood insecurity over the immediate- and longer-term.[32-35] In situations such as Jonglei State in South Sudan, disaffected young men – lacking education and employment opportunities and with ready access to weapons – are often most likely to engage in armed inter-ethnic conflict.[36-38]

Women and girls in most developing countries experience pervasive **gender inequality** in terms of access to and decision-making authority over productive resources, control over use of income, leadership opportunities within their communities, and use of their time.[39] Gender dynamics also play a role in civil unrest experienced in situations of protracted crisis. Women in general (and female heads of household in particular) typically lack the assets and social capital to effectively cope with recurrent food security shocks. Women often bear the brunt of conflict in terms of increased labor requirements and exposure to increased levels of gender-based violence.

Government Challenges

Ineffectual governance (including inefficient and/or inappropriate policies) poses a clear constraint to achievement of greater household and community resilience in countries undergoing protracted crisis. Notable and common outcomes of policy and governance failures in such situations include conflict over natural resources, inefficient agricultural and livestock marketing, insecure land rights, and inadequate provision of services and infrastructure.[40-42] In situations of protracted crisis the lack of state capacity to deliver services – specifically an effective police force and transparent judicial systems – often enables the continuation of civil unrest and internal conflict. In many of these environments, the weak capacity of the state to provide such services is compounded by the gradual erosion of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.[43]

On a related, but separate note, the **lack of political will**, or in some cases interference by local or national governments in humanitarian and development activities, also compromises the ability of efforts to address the root causes of household and community vulnerability to drought.[44] Often pursuing the priorities of economic growth and poverty eradication, governments may be particularly averse to allocating scarce resources toward development initiatives in destitute, drought-prone, conflict-prone and asset-poor regions of their countries, fearing that such investments do not yield short-term economic returns. Lack of accountability for and transparency in use of development funds at the local, national or regional levels of government undermines programming efforts to build resilience and can lead to conflict (e.g. South SudanWeak governanceand lack of political focus lends itself to corruption and misappropriation of donor resources.[45]

Donor Challenges

The differing programming timelines and procurement processes between humanitarian assistance and development interventions have hampered previous efforts to establish the **long-term, flexible and timely funding mechanisms** necessary to enhance resilience among populations experiencing protracted crises.[46, 47] Experience strongly suggests that flexible funding commitments in the range of

6-10 years will likely be needed to restore livelihoods and address the root causes of vulnerability to livelihood security in disaster-prone and conflict-affected regions.[48]

Trade-offs often complicate building resilience, especially between marginalized groups and economic interests.[49] A common example is competition between small-scale livestock producers, smallholder farmers and larger agricultural interests and industrial users for scarce resources such as land and water. For vulnerable rural households, donors and development actors often promote livelihood diversification in order to reduce exposure to potential shocks. Alternatively, economic growth at the national scale may entail large-scale investment in particular sectors, often with a certain degree of risk. In this sense, building resilience among particularly vulnerable population groups may come at the expense of economic growth at the national level. The multi-sectoral nature of resilience programming also leaves room for potential tension or conflicts over resource allocation between various stakeholders, particularly if the ability of programmes to deliver depends on funding levels.[50] Similarly, achievement of donor impact is often compromised by the **lack of geographic overlap** between emergency and development operations. Development agencies tend to work more closely with governments while the priorities of humanitarian agencies do not always coincide with those of the government. This can be problematic because governments determine their support for interventions on factors other than humanitarian need – i.e. economic development, private sector development, market expansion.

VI. Moving the Resilience Agenda Forward

The concept of resilience holds promise for guiding efforts in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and other regions affected by protracted crisis. In order to have a significant and lasting impact, actors involved in these regions will need to integrate the various elements and enablers of resilience into coherent strategies that address the current and future sources of vulnerability among poor households. Resilience approaches shift the focus from solving problems to building capabilities. Towards this end, several important steps for responding to the ongoing challenges of resilience building have been identified.

Challenge: *Donors and policy makers have limited understanding of how best to prioritize investment in resilience building in light of scarce resources. There is currently little clarity regarding how resilience principles can best be operationalized in protracted crises and what the added value would be compared to other more traditional emergency responses.*

The resilience framework and information gained from comprehensive resilience assessments and conflict analysis will also provide critical insight into the proper **types, sequencing and combination** of distinct activities or interventions. Rather than simply addressing issues as part of a perceived 'continuum' from emergency relief to long-term development, practitioners of resilience programming will likely need to design projects capable of addressing immediate needs *and* longer-term projects simultaneously. All too often, progress made through longer-term development initiatives has been immediately undone due to the effects of rapid-onset disaster on breakout of

conflict. By preparing for these scenarios, donors and implementing agencies can continue to address critical needs in the areas of infrastructure, education, health, and social protection without fearing that periodic shocks (drought, flood, conflict) will have a permanently negative impact on the adaptive capacity of target populations. These assessments will also inform implementing agencies when it is not possible to do resilience programming and/or help them refrain from investment that could do more harm than good.

This will necessarily include close coordination between humanitarian and development actors throughout the entire project cycle, especially through joint needs assessments, and joint programming exercises. In order to attain the flexibility needed to quickly respond to changing conditions, implementing organizations may also consider "built-in" contingency planning mechanisms such as the 'crisis modifiers' utilized by ECHO's DRR program in the HOA. These modifiers enable implementing organizations to shift focus from development programming to humanitarian response when localized early warning systems detect a significant change in conditions. Such crisis modifiers allow both implementing agencies and donors to avoid the critical disruptions that often accompany procurement of emergency funding and retooling of development activities during times of crisis.[51]

Challenge: *The institutional framework for implementing resilience oriented programs needs to be clarified in order to develop integrated, multi-sectoral programs that may not be aligned with the current work of sectoral ministries and related policy frameworks.*

Donors and policy makers should seize the current momentum for building resilience by alleviating current obstacles to coordination across sectoral boundaries and temporal scales. One means of doing this is to **seek consensus on a locally appropriate framework for resilience**, identify the principle constraints to resilience within a particular country or region, and solicit firm commitments to common strategic objectives.

One such effort was initiated at the recent *'Joint IGAD Ministerial and High-Level Development Partners Meeting on Drought Resilience in the Horn of Africa'*. Jointly organized by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development (CAADP) Program, the meeting resulted in a "Common Framework for Risk, Resilience and Growth in the Drylands." The framework is intended to result in a collective agenda that can focus the complementary efforts of governments, development agencies, civil society, and the private sector in order to enhance community and household resilience throughout the Horn of Africa. During the meeting, participants reached consensus on six central areas of concern (or pillars) for the Common Framework. They include: 1) Increased economic opportunity; 2) Strengthened institutions, governance and accountability; 3) Improved security conditions and conflict-management capacity; 4) Improved physical infrastructure; 5) Sustainable natural resource management; and 6) Enhanced innovation and knowledge management.[52] Individual countries within the region are currently drafting their own "Country Program Frameworks" that will be reviewed by technical experts in both

the humanitarian assistance and development communities to ensure coherence and consistency with the regional Common Framework. By directly involving counterparts from multiple sectors, levels of government and civil society, this effort has the potential to deliver an appropriate, coherent and sustainable institutional framework capable of effectively promoting resilience in the HOA.

Challenge: *Governments, donors and the private sector have difficulty prioritizing investments for improved resilience in 'low potential' or highly volatile areas.*

A history of failed attempts to address widespread poverty and food insecurity has discouraged governments, donors, and private interests from making new investments in many disaster-prone, conflict-affected regions of sub-Saharan Africa. **External private investment has been particularly limited** due to a range of negative stereotypes regarding the investment climate in such areas. These include: a lack of physical infrastructure capable of strengthening human capital and enabling sector development; poor access to financial services; limited information on and/or right to environmental resources; physical insecurity; and high trade barriers.

Spurring private investors engage in these areas of protracted crisis will require creation of both **direct and indirect investment incentives**. Governments and donors can do their part to create enabling incentives for greater investment in disaster-prone areas by building infrastructure such as roads. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, major investments in road infrastructure have been made in South Sudan in an effort to connect urban areas in each state. In the immediate term, these actions have directly contributed to social stability and a reduction of violence in conflict-affected communities by enabling greater provision of basic social services, allowing easier access of security forces, and providing linkages with markets and other livelihood opportunities, each of which serve as incentives for private investment.

In terms of allocation of government resources, studies have shown that early response to warnings of impending food security crises are far more cost-effective than large-scale humanitarian responses formulated after an emergency has been declared. Over the long-term, investment in early response and resilience programming has the potential to result in substantial savings for government. For governments experiencing protracted crisis, investment in resilience programming can provide a future foundation for social stability and longer-term economic recovery. [53]

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