

## Chapter 10: Transport

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## 1 **Executive summary**

2 **Transport GHG had a three-fold increase from 1970 and grew 29% between 2010 and 2016.**  
3 **This is now needing to be a bigger area of focus if climate change goals are to be met. It is an**  
4 **area that relates to almost all the SDG's and is a big part of government economic planning in**  
5 **the developed and developing world. 75% of transport emissions came from on road, 3% from**  
6 **rail and this need to shift the load further remains a theme from AR5. But 22% of emissions**  
7 **come from aviation and shipping (split evenly), and are the fastest growth areas, so for the first**  
8 **time this Chapter has a strong focus on decarbonizing aviation and shipping. Since AR5 there**  
9 **has been a developing split between the decarbonization options for light vehicle systems such as**  
10 **bikes, autorickshaws, cars, buses and trains that lend themselves to electrification, and heavy**  
11 **vehicle systems like trucks, ships and planes that have only complex options that all require**  
12 **R&D.**

13 The Chapter has reviewed the recent literature on the systemic parts of transport that can help with  
14 Avoid-Shift-Improve strategies, such as urban form, behaviour, smart systems that influence transport  
15 choice and electric recharging that shapes the roll-out of electric vehicles. It then examines the new  
16 technology options for vehicles and fuels with electrification now well ahead of other decarbonization  
17 opportunities followed by hydrogen, biofuels, synthetic hydrocarbons and advanced ICE. The  
18 application to Land-Transport, Aviation and Shipping presents detailed Life Cycle Analysis and  
19 Readiness Levels that confirm the mainstreaming of electrification on land transport and the  
20 complexity of options for sea and air.

21 Scenarios using bottom-up models and top-down models are joined into the perspectives generated  
22 from the scientific overview to shape transport outcomes into Business-As Usual, Incremental and  
23 Transformative. In order to enable the better decarbonization scenarios a Multi-Level Perspective  
24 shows that: heavy vehicle systems remain at the micro-level (where governments mostly can only set  
25 long term targets and facilitate R&D with trials); light vehicle systems are moving from meso to  
26 macro-level (where mainstreaming requires facilitating markets and especially recharge facilities).  
27 Governance of international shipping and aviation will need continual evaluation and considerably  
28 more ability to provide R&D. The Chapter ends by surveying literature on the value of people-based  
29 programs that enable creative inputs to scenarios, building shared economy approaches to behaviour,  
30 and climate pledges (including transport) at various levels of human activity.

31

## 1 10.1 Introduction and overview

2 This Chapter will examine the context for transport’s increasingly significant role in climate change  
 3 mitigation, the systemic aspects of transport that go beyond the technology of vehicles and fuels,  
 4 before an understanding is provided of how these technologies are providing options for  
 5 decarbonizing transport. The Chapter will then focus on new trends and developments in the systems  
 6 of land-based transport, aviation and shipping to show their decarbonization potentials, before  
 7 bringing these together into scenarios for the future and how they can be enabled.

8 This first section (10.1) will look at the context for how transport relates to virtually all the SDG’s, the  
 9 trends and drivers making transport a big player in greenhouse gas emissions, the impacts climate is  
 10 having on transport that can be addressed as part of mitigation, and the emerging transport disruptions  
 11 of electrification, shared transport and autonomous transport that are shaping the future.

### 12 10.1.1 Transport and the sustainable development goals

13 The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the United Nations has renewed  
 14 international efforts to pursue and accurately measure global actions towards sustainable development  
 15 (United Nations, 2015). The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out the overall goals  
 16 which are further specified by 169 targets. To monitor progress at national and regional levels, one up  
 17 to three SDG indicators have been developed per target, summing up to 232 indicators (United  
 18 Nations, 2017). To monitor the sustainable development actions of companies, the Global Reporting  
 19 Initiative and the UN Global Compact have developed a “Business Reporting on the SDGs”  
 20 containing 800 business disclosures (GRI & UN Global Compact, 2017).

21 Sustainable transport is a cross-cutting theme and supports the achievement of several of the 17  
 22 SDGs. According to an analysis of Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) and global stakeholder  
 23 consultations, transport is particularly linked to SDGs 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13 (WBA, 2019)  
 24 (SLoCaT, 2019) (Move Humanity, 2018) (ITF International Transport Forum, 2019a). This matches  
 25 quite well with an analysis of corporate sustainability reports (Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  
 26 reports) of the largest automotive manufacturers, container shipping companies, airlines, and aircraft  
 27 manufacturers. Table 10.1 summarizes transport-related topics for these SDGs and corresponding  
 28 research.

29 **Table 10.1 Main transport-related SDGs**

SDG	Transport-related topics	Exemplary references
SDG 3: “Good Health and Well-Being”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to healthcare</li> <li>• Diseases from air pollution</li> <li>• Injuries and deaths from traffic accidents</li> </ul>	(Peden & Puvanachandra, 2019); (Cheng et al., 2018); (SLoCaT, 2019); (Grant, Goldsmith, Gracy, & Johnson, 2016); (Haines et al., 2017); (Nieuwenhuijsen, 2018); (Sofiev et al., 2018)
SDG 7 “Affordable and Clean Energy”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Share of renewable energy use</li> <li>• Energy efficiency of vehicles</li> </ul>	(SLoCaT, 2019); see particularly following Chapters
SDG 8 „Decent Work and Economic Growth“	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Role of transport for economic and human development</li> </ul>	(Grzelakowski, 2018); (ICAO, 2019); (ATAG, 2018)
SDG 9 “Industry, Innovation, and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainable transport infrastructure</li> </ul>	(S. Jones, Lidbe, & Hainen, 2019); (SLoCaT, 2019); (Weiss

Infrastructure”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Affordable transport access for all</li> </ul>	et al., 2018); (Xu, Bai, & Chen, 2019)
SDG 11 “Sustainable Cities and Communities“	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sustainable transport systems for cities</li> <li>Universal access to public transport</li> </ul>	(Peden & Puvanachandra, 2019); (Brussel, Zuidgeest, Pfeffer, & van Maarseveen, 2019); (SLoCaT, 2019); (Bruun & Givoni, 2015); (Mohammadi, Elsaid, & Amador-Jiminez, 2019)
SDG 12 “Responsible Consumption and Production”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Material consumption during production of vehicles and their operations</li> </ul>	(Stephan & Crawford, 2016); (G. Harper et al., 2019); (Onat, Kucukvar, & Tatari, 2018); (Sen, Onat, Kucukvar, & Tatari, 2019); (Hao, Qiao, Liu, & Zhao, 2017); (F. E. K. Sato, Furubayashi, & Nakata, 2019)
SDG 13 “Climate Action”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduction of GHG emissions</li> </ul>	(Farzaneh, de Oliveira, McLellan, & Ohgaki, 2019); see particularly following Chapters

1 Besides these major contributions of sustainable transport towards achieving the SDG targets, it has  
2 also strong indirect effects regarding poverty reduction (SDG 1): by improving access to education  
3 (SDG Targets 4.2, 4.3), safe drinking water (6.1.), financial services (8.3), and by increasing  
4 agricultural productivity (2.3) (S. Jones et al., 2019) (SLoCaT, 2019).

5 Sustainable transport can promote gender equality (SDG 5), by proper design “of costs and access to  
6 transport, as women and girls make more trips and change more frequently than men“ (Reckien et al.,  
7 2017). Access to green transport technologies such as electric vehicles or vehicle-to-grid is gendered,  
8 along with preferences and values concerning public transport and sustainable mobility (Sovacool,  
9 Kester, Noel, & Zarazua de Rubens, 2019).

### 10 **10.1.2 Trends, drivers and the critical role of transport in GHG growth**

11 The transport sector is a fundamental part of global GHG mitigation strategies as it is the fastest  
12 growing emitting sector in the world and, represents the third-largest source of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions after  
13 the power and industry sectors. Transport sector carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) direct emissions increased 29%  
14 (from 5.8 Gt to 7.5 gigatonnes (Gt)) between 2000 and 2016, at which point transport produced about  
15 23% of global energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and (as of 2014) 14% of GHG emissions (Hasan,  
16 Frame, Chapman, & Archie, 2019) (Shah, Dawood, Jalil, & Adnan, 2019) (Xie, Huang, Tian, & Fang,  
17 2019) (Avetisyan, 2018) (Halim, Kirstein, Merk, & Martinez, 2018) (Sudhir Gota, Huizenga, Peet,  
18 Medimorec, & Bakker, 2019a) (Makan & Heyns, 2018).

19 75% of transport emissions came from on road, 3% from rail and this need to shift the load further  
20 remains a theme from AR5. But 22% of emissions come from aviation and shipping (split evenly),  
21 and are the fastest growth areas, so for the first time this Chapter has a strong focus on decarbonizing  
22 aviation and shipping.

23 Passenger and freight transport emissions increased by 36% and 75%, respectively, between 2000 and  
24 2015. Freight transport industries are the major causes for increasing the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions within the  
25 supply chain (Makan & Heyns, 2018). Freight emissions are now growing much faster than  
26 passenger transport emissions, and the freight emission share in total transport CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
27 increased from 35% in 2000 to 41% in 2015. Road transport is the largest contributor to global CO<sub>2</sub>  
28 emissions from transport, accounting for three quarters of transport emissions in 2015 (Yeh et al.,  
29 2017a). Passenger cars, two-and-three wheelers and mini buses contribute about 75% of passenger

1 transport CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, while public transport (bus and railways) generates about 7% of the  
2 passenger transport CO<sub>2</sub> emissions despite covering a fifth of passenger transport globally (SLoCaT,  
3 2018) (Sudhir Gota et al., 2019a) (Halim et al., 2018) (Sheng, Shi, & Su, 2018a) (Rodrigue, 2017).

4 Available evidence suggests that transport CO<sub>2</sub> emissions would need to be restricted to about 2 to 3  
5 Gt in 2050 (1.5°C scenario (1.5DS), B2DS), or about 70 to 80% below 2015 levels to meet the targets  
6 set in the Paris Agreement (Sudhir Gota et al., 2019a) (IPCC, 2018). Mitigation from passenger and  
7 freight show similar potential, while the road sector offers the largest magnitude of mitigation  
8 potential (Halim et al., 2018) (Taptich, Horvath, & Chester, 2016a).

9 A low carbon scenario for the transport sector should ideally be a balanced combination of ‘Avoid-  
10 Shift-Improve’ strategies applicable uniformly across passenger and freight movement, including:  
11 policies that avoid (or reduce) the need for transport trips; avoiding unnecessary motorized trips;  
12 promoting a shift towards more efficient and low-carbon travel modes; reducing the lengths of trips;  
13 improving the carbon intensity of modes of transport; and increasing performance of vehicles and  
14 fuels (S. Gota, Huizenga, Peet, & Kaar, 2015) (Lutsey and Speling, 2008). These will all be pursued  
15 in the Chapter though the Chapter has found a growing split between options for heavy vehicle and  
16 light vehicle systems.

### 17 **10.1.3 Climate impacts on the transport sector**

18 Climate changes such as extreme high temperatures, intense rainfall leading to flooding, more intense  
19 winds and/or storms and sea level rise (SLR), can seriously impact transport infrastructure,  
20 operations, mobility and carbon emissions for subsectors of road, rail, shipping and aviation. Studies  
21 since AR5 confirm that serious challenges to transport infrastructure are increasing, with consequent  
22 delays or derailing (Miao, Feeney, Zhang, Welch, & Sriraj, 2018) (Pérez-Morales, Gomariz-Castillo,  
23 & Pardo-Zaragoza, 2019) (Moretti & Loprencipe, 2018). Roads are directly exposed to the  
24 environment and are, as such, environmentally sensitive infrastructure. Flexible pavements are  
25 particularly vulnerable to extreme high temperatures that can cause permanent deformation (Qiao,  
26 Santos, Stoner, & Flinstch, 2019) (Underwood, Guido, Gudipudi, & Feinberg, 2017).

27 Most countries are examining what to do, for example the UK (Wang et al., 2019), but few are using  
28 the need to mitigate climate change through transport emissions reductions, as the basis for adaptation  
29 action also (Thornbush et al, 2013). For example, greater use of rail passengers and freight will  
30 reduce road pressures and reducing urban sprawl will reduce impacts on new infrastructure, often in  
31 more vulnerable areas (IPCC, 2019; Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2017).

32 Global sea level rise, due to climate change, may exceed 24 cm in 2050 and 48 cm in 2100, even if  
33 global temperatures are stabilized at 1.5 °C (Rasmussen et al., 2018) (Noland, Wang, Kulp, & Strauss,  
34 2019). Noland et al. (2019) with worst-case scenarios of more than six ft (1.8 m) of global mean sea  
35 level rise by end of century, progressively making coastal flood events more frequent and severe with  
36 large impacts on people and the economy. Where retreat is attempted the opportunity is there to  
37 rebuild with lower emissions options.

38 Shipping and aviation are being impacted through coastal flooding (Yang et al, 2018; Pérez-Morales  
39 et al. 2019). The main climate change threats to port operations are due to both sea level rise and  
40 extreme storms, high waves and high winds damaging port facilities and leading to coastal erosion.  
41 Aviation is impacted by more frequent heat waves that can affect runways (heat buckling) and aircraft  
42 lift, resulting in payload restrictions and disruptions (Coffel, Thompson, & Horton, 2017) Monioudi et  
43 al. 2018). Burbidge (2018) discussed how additional potential climate impacts may affect airport  
44 operations and infrastructure in Europe and other areas of the world, and suggests that is important to  
45 think about “cascading effects” e.g. if one element in the system or actor is impacted how does that  
46 impact the rest of the system or other actors, both in-sector and between sectors. Adaptations can  
47 again be used to build new low emissions aviation systems at airports.

1 In developing countries, such as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), transport infrastructure and  
2 related operations that are situated at the coast are likely to be seriously affected by the impacts of  
3 climate variability and climate change (Monioudi et al., 2018).

#### 4 **10.1.4 Transport disruption**

5 Sprei (2018) suggests there are three converging disruptions in transport: electrification of vehicles,  
6 shared mobility and autonomous vehicles. All three are discussed in this Chapter as options that are  
7 likely to be transformative and hence can be labelled as disruptive due to their rapid adoption and  
8 impacts on the whole transport system.

9 The biggest disruption in transport since AR5 has been the rapid adoption of Lithium Ion batteries as  
10 a cost-effective way to produce electric vehicles (Brown, 2017) (Perry, Kredell, Perry, & Leonard,  
11 2018) (Arbib & Seba, 2017) ;International Energy Agency, 2017b). The production of EV's is now  
12 occurring very rapidly, though mostly China is the leader (Gao & Newman, 2018). This growth  
13 means that battery production is also increasing exponentially and is expected to continue (SLoCaT,  
14 2018) (Sheng, Shi, & Su, 2018b) (Sun, Zhang, & Wandelt, 2017) (Bachmann, 2017) (Tanabe,  
15 SHIBASAKI, & Kato, 2016). Electrification of passenger transport is therefore well underway but the  
16 detailed adoption and mainstreaming of this process will be needed for transport to achieve the  
17 necessary shift away from petroleum fuels as outlined in Chapter 3 and detailed further below.

18 Shared mobility is another potential transport disruption; it is expanding but literature is still very  
19 unsure how much it will contribute to decarbonization or make it worse as it may take from transit  
20 (ITF, 2018). Asia represents the largest carsharing region (58% of worldwide membership and 43% of  
21 global fleets deployed) followed by Europe, the world's second largest carsharing market which  
22 accounts for 29% of worldwide members and 37% of vehicle fleets (Shaheen, Cohen, & Jaffee, 2018).

23 Smart city technologies are a disruption moving into transport with autonomous vehicles and the  
24 digitalization of transport (presented in Section 10.2). Intelligent transport systems (ITS's), are  
25 expected to be one of the major building blocks of future cities, but there is no guarantee this will  
26 include zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Angelidou et al., 2018) (Menouar et al., 2017) (Komninos, 2016)  
27 (Newman & Kenworthy, 2015b).

28 These issues will be further explored in the Chapter as they are all part of systems that may be  
29 disrupted positively or negatively in terms of the climate agenda.

## 30 **10.2 Systemic changes in the transport sector**

31 This section will focus on system level trends that affect the demand, operation, and emissions from  
32 the transport sector. Systems impacting on transport emissions can be defined as drivers that influence  
33 the use of vehicles and fuels rather than the isolated vehicle technologies and fuels that are outlined in  
34 section 10.3 without any specific context. These systemic drivers are set out below in four  
35 overlapping components: physical geography and urban form; behaviour and modal choice; smart  
36 systems that influence transport choice and electric recharging that shapes the roll-out of electric  
37 vehicles. As will be elaborated in section 10.8 on the policy enabling conditions for transport  
38 emissions, these four factors can be changed for each of the potential technology systems (set out in  
39 section 10.3) in three stages or levels (Micro niches, Meso regimes and Macro landscapes) as defined  
40 by Geels et al 2017 and set out in general in Chapter 1.

### 41 **10.2.1 Physical geography and urban form**

42 Transport is needed to move people and goods between origins and destinations defined by physical  
43 geography, both intercity and intracity movements.



1 *Intercity*. Transport for freight and people can be generally predicted using gravity models based on  
 2 the size of populations but beneath is a rationale for why certain locations have higher densities of  
 3 people. The geography of agriculture and industry and mining determine where settlements have  
 4 grown and their ports, generally at the mouths of rivers, are linked across the world in an increasingly  
 5 global market (Berry, 2010). Both time and economic cost determine the modes of transport for both  
 6 freight and people, called the generalised cost of transport (Scafer, 2009; ICMF, 2003; Koopmans et  
 7 al, 2013). The most recent data (Sun et al, 2017) suggest these have increasingly favoured:

- 8 • aviation for light loads plus increasingly competitive high-speed rail (K. Sato & Chen, 2018)  
 9 (Jiang & Zhang, 2014) (Prussi & Lonza, 2018) (D'Alfonso, Jiang, & Bracaglia, 2016).
- 10 • trucks, trains and ships for heavy loads (ERTRAC, 2019).

11 *Intracity*. Time and cost also influence movement within cities and over time create the physical  
 12 urban form around the modes (Ausubel and Marchetti 2004) (Newman & Kenworthy, 2015a). As  
 13 outlined in Chapter 8 cities developed three main urban fabrics that were based on a fixed travel time  
 14 budget of around one hour (Schafer et al, 2009) and which also shapes their transport outcomes  
 15 thereafter:

- 16 • High density walking fabric over the past several millenia with time and space favouring  
 17 walking and active transport but travelling only a few kms in any direction;
- 18 • Medium density transit fabric since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century with time and space favouring trains  
 19 and trams over 20-30 kms of corridors;
- 20 • Low density automobile fabric since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century with time and space favouring cars  
 21 over 50-60 kms distances.

22 The systemic effect of city form and transport emissions is shown in Table 10.2 where the three  
 23 fabrics are outlined along with their associated transport emissions and other co-benefits (Newman et  
 24 al. 2016) (Thomson & Newman, 2018).

25 **Table 10.2 The systemic effect of city form and transport emissions**

Transport Emissions and Co-Benefits	Walking Urban Fabric	Transit Urban Fabric	Automobile Urban Fabric
Transport Emissions	Low	Medium	High
Health benefits from walkability	High	Medium	Low
Equity of location	High	Medium	Low
Waste generated in construction	Low	Medium	High
Water consumption	Low	Medium	High
Economics of infrastructure and transport operations	High	Medium	Low

26 Source: (Newman et al. 2016) Thomson & Newman, 2018)

27 Urban design is increasingly seen as a major way to influence the structural dependence on cars  
 28 (automobile dependence also known as automobility) thus influencing the lock-in or path dependency  
 29 of transport options with their greenhouse emissions (Newman and Kenworthy, 1989; 1999; 2015;  
 30 Haas, 2012; Urry, 2016).

31 The reported trend to peak car in AR5 showing a revival of walking and transit fabric (Salvo et al.,  
 32 2017) (Colenbrander et al., 2017) (Sudhir Gota, Huizenga, Peet, Medimorec, & Bakker, 2019b) (P  
 33 Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2017) is now more highly contested as new data on cities shows some

1 cities reaching peak car use per capita with new ones emerging such as Shanghai and Beijing (Gao &  
2 Newman, 2018) but others in the USA again increasing in personal vehicle use due to use of smart  
3 systems (see below) that favour car-based fabric and reduced transit (Florida, 2017). Infrastructure  
4 investments can favour automobile fabric or walking/transit fabric, depending on the infrastructure  
5 and urban planning outcomes prioritized (Heinen, Harshfield, Panter, Mackett, & Ogilvie, 2017a)  
6 (Sudarmanto Budi Nugroho et al., 2018).

## 7 **10.2.2 Behavior and new demand factors**

8 Behaviour continues to be a major source of interest in the decarbonization of transport as it directly  
9 addresses demand, but there are also some new concepts that impact indirectly on demand including  
10 circular economy, dematerialization and decoupling.

### 11 **10.2.2.1 Behaviour**

12 Behaviour is about people's actions and there is much new literature suggesting that primarily time  
13 and cost continue to dominate in transport behaviour as measured by elasticities of demand for  
14 transport services (Ahmad & Oliveira Puppim de, 2016; Capurso, Hess, & Dekker, 2019; He, Zhao, &  
15 Gou, 2020). However, there is also evidence of a role for personal values, and in particular  
16 environmental values, shaping choices within these structural limitations (Bouman & Steg, 2019). For  
17 example, individuals are more likely to drive less when they care about the environment (De Groot,  
18 Steg & Dicke, 2008; Abrahamse, Steg, Gifford & Vlek, 2009; Jakovcevic & Steg, 2013; Hiratsuka,  
19 Perlaviciute & Steg, 2018; Unal, Steg & Granskaya, 2019). Moreover, emotional and symbolic factors  
20 affect the level of car use (Steg, 2005) (Steg, 2007). Differences in behaviour may also result due to  
21 differences in gender, age, norms, values and social status. For example, women are more sensitive to  
22 parking pricing than men (Simićević et al., 2019). A survey in Nanjing found women had more  
23 diverse travel purposes than men resulting in a higher acceptance of electric bikes (Lin, Wells, &  
24 Sovacool, 2017). Individuals are more likely to adopt an electric vehicle when they think this benefits  
25 the environment, and when they think this says something positive about them to self and others  
26 (Noppers et al., 2014; 2015).

### 27 ***Choice of modes for urban transport***

28 Choice modelling and elasticities of demand for transport services show that household income and  
29 price have a strong influence on the demand for transport fuels (Bakhat, Labandeira, Labeaga, &  
30 López-Otero, 2017) (Wadud, 2017). Income elasticities for transport for typical households in the UK  
31 was 1.2 (Bergantino, Capurso, & Toner, 2018). Recent studies for the Scandinavian transport sector  
32 estimated long-term elasticities of cars, mopeds and motorbikes were 1.28, while those for buses were  
33 lower (1.1) (Salvucci et al., 2019). These also vary by income, between urban and rural households  
34 and in the case of external factors such as recession (Bergantino et al., 2018). Transit elasticities  
35 depend on a number of factors including the type of users, nature of the trip, mode route, type of  
36 transit, type and direction of price change, geography of the city and time period (Litman, 2019). A  
37 survey in 98 Indian cities showed income as the main factor influencing travel demand and mode  
38 choice with only the top income quintile showing positive elasticity of transport with income (Ahmad  
39 & de Oliveira, 2016). In response to the changing climate, people may enhance thermal comfort with  
40 more cooling or heating or change travel behaviour through more travel or no travel at all (van  
41 Ruijven, De Cian, & Sue Wing, 2019).

### 42 ***Intercity travel***

43 There is significant interest in understanding public behaviour regarding mode choice for intercity  
44 travel, especially between high speed rail and aviation. Literature on mode competition reveals the  
45 influence of various factors. While cost of travel is a significant factor (Zhang, Yao, & Sun, 2017),  
46 sensitivity decreases with increasing income as well as when the cost of the trip was paid by someone

1 else (Capurso et al., 2019). Price elasticities for air travel range from 0.53 to 1.91 depending on  
2 various factors such as purpose of travel (business or leisure), season and month and day of departure  
3 (Morlotti et al., 2017). Price reduction strategies such as discounted fares could enhance the share of  
4 high speed rail (He et al., 2020). Both air fares and frequency impact HSR ridership (Rui Zhang,  
5 Johnson, Zhao, & Nash, 2019). Airline companies reduce fares on routes which are directly  
6 competing with HSR (Bergantino, Capozza, & Capurso, 2015) and charge excessively high fares on  
7 non HSR routes (Xia & Zhang, 2016). On the Rome-Milan route, better frequency and connections,  
8 and low costs of HSR resulting from competition between HSR companies has significantly reduced  
9 air travel and shares of buses and cars (Desmaris & Croccolo, 2018). In addition to fares, choice  
10 modelling studies show travel time to be a significant influencing factor as people prefer faster modes  
11 over slower ones (Capurso et al., 2019). A choice modelling study comparing air travel with  
12 hypothetical HSR on the Seoul-Jeju route showed business travellers were more likely to opt for a  
13 safer transport while for leisure passengers other factors such as availability of duty free shops was  
14 important (Lee, Yoo, & Song, 2016). In Turkey, where the share of HSR trips has grown sizeably  
15 since its introduction in 2009, for short to medium distances HSR trips have replaced road based  
16 modes including buses and private cars (Celikkol-Kocak, Dalkic, & Tuydes-Yaman, 2017). Socio-  
17 economic profiles of travellers influence the choice of modes. In China, older and wealthier  
18 populations continued to show preference for car travel (Yang, Feng, Dijst, & Ettema, 2019) while  
19 younger and low-income travellers sought variety in transport modes (Song, Hess, & Dekker, 2018).  
20 A higher number of subway lines and diversity of land use around HSR stations is associated with less  
21 car use for business travellers (Yang, Tsai, & Chang, 2015).

#### 22 **10.2.2.2 New demand concepts**

23 Demand, as covered by Chapter 5's framework of 'Avoid, shift and improve', suggests that structural  
24 and behavioural choices which are driving transport emissions such as time and cost based on  
25 geography of freight and urban fabric, are likely to continue as major factors. But there is also a  
26 variation within each structural choice that is based around personal demand factors related to values  
27 that indirectly change choices in transport. There are some new demand values that are possibly  
28 shaping transport emissions since AR5, including the shift to a circular economy, to dematerialization  
29 and to a shared economy all of which lead to decoupling (transport choices change without economic  
30 activity suffering).

31 **Circular Economy.** The problem of resources and their environmental impacts is driving the move to  
32 a circular economy (Van der Voet, Van Oers, Verboon, & Kuipers, 2018). Circular economy  
33 principles including light weighting (use of less material for the same level of service), re-using or  
34 extending product lifetimes can reduce the demand for steel and aluminium bringing about substantial  
35 emission reduction opportunities (Dhar, Pathak, & Shukla, 2019). For the transport systems this  
36 means there is increased political pressure to create a greater proportion of recycled materials saving  
37 natural resources and energy. LCA's that demonstrate how a whole transport system impacts on  
38 greenhouse emissions are the main tool in enabling circular economy actions (Ma, Rong, Mangalagiu,  
39 Thornton, & Zhu, 2018). Recycling end-of-life vehicles, re-using spare parts and recycling materials  
40 save natural resources, energy and related GHG. There is a connection between circular economy and  
41 transport efficiency due to optimization in freight managing vehicle loading, avoiding empty return  
42 journeys and reducing the weight and volume of packaging (Akeb, Moncef, & Durand, 2018)  
43 (Wiercx, van Kalmthout, & Wiegman, 2019).


44 **Dematerialization.** Dematerialization is where technology is created that incorporates a range of  
45 functions previously taken up by several different products. The best example is a smart phone. This  
46 process is also enabled by the move to declutter lifestyles instead of consuming more and more  
47 (Kondo, 2016) (Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Nash, 2017). McKinnon (2007) applied the idea to freight  
48 transport and an assessment for the transport sector in EU-27, showed higher materialization

1 (increasing energy consumption) until 2007 followed by a reversing trend with higher  
2 dematerialization between 2008 to 2010 (Ziolkowska & Ziolkowski, 2015). In the UK, transition to a  
3 service economy resulted in dematerializing some freight transport (Alises, Vassallo, & Guzmán,  
4 2014) but new evidence is showing that freight can increase due to on-line shopping deliveries (Fix  
5 2019; Laghaei et al. 2016); Visser et al. 2014)). Whether or not such practices achieve  
6 dematerialization could be ascertained only through a full lifecycle emissions accounting, including  
7 supply chains, energy of ICT, travel behaviour and the overall macro structure of global production  
8 and consumption (Coroama, Moberg, & Hilty, 2015; Van Loon, McKinnon, Deketele, & Dewaele,  
9 2014). Strategies to reduce these emissions include improving efficiency of freight operations through  
10 better routes, type of packaging and enhancing awareness of customers (Patricia Van Loon, Deketele,  
11 Dewaele, McKinnon, & Rutherford, 2015). A literature review of LCA on e-commerce so far shows it  
12 is saving energy in the total process (Palsson et al, 2017). However, this is not yet a significant  
13 enough process to achieve the kind of decoupling of economic growth rates from escalating use of  
14 natural resources (Bringezu, 2015). For sustainable use of global resources by 2050, the average  
15 material intensity of consumption per capita needs to be reduced from the forecasted 8–17 tonnes to  
16 6–8 tonnes per capita per year (RP (2018).

17 **Shared Economy.** The values of creating a more shared economy are related to both of the above  
18 values as well as the notion of community well-being associated with the act of sharing instead of  
19 simply owning for oneself (Sharp, 2018) (Maginn, Burton, & Legacy, 2018). Shared mobility is  
20 arguably the most rapidly growing and evolving sector of the sharing economy. Bike sharing,  
21 carsharing, on-demand mobility (the use of a car, bike or transport mode as needed) (Greenblatt &  
22 Shaheen, 2015). Ride sourcing and carpooling systems are amongst the many new entrants in the  
23 short-term shared mobility options. On-demand transport options complemented with technology in  
24 recent years has enhanced the possibility of upscaling (Alonso-González, Liu, Cats, Van Oort, &  
25 Hoogendoorn, 2018). Car sharing could provide the same level of service as taxis, however the taxis  
26 could be three times more expensive (Cuevas, Estrada, & Salanova, 2016). The sharing economy, as  
27 an emerging economic-technological phenomenon (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010) (Wang & Zhang,  
28 2012) is likely to be a key driver of demand for transport of goods though data shows increasing  
29 container movement due to on line shopping (Suel & Polak, 2018).

30 There is growing evidence that this more structured form of behaviour change through shared  
31 economy practices, supported by a larger group than a single family, has a much higher potential to  
32 save transport emissions especially when complemented with decarbonised grid electricity  
33 (Greenblatt & Shaheen, 2015; Sharp, 2018). However, the use of local shared mobility systems such  
34 as on-demand transport may create more transport emissions if there is an overall modal shift out of  
35 transit (ITF, 2018; Schaller 2018). Successful providers compete by optimising personal comfort and  
36 convenience rather than enabling a sharing culture (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2015) and concerns have been  
37 raised regarding the wider societal impacts of these systems and for specific user groups such as older  
38 people (Fitt, 2018). Concerns have appeared about the financial viability of demand responsive  
39 transport systems (Ryley, Stanley, Enoch, Zanni, & Quddus, 2014), how the mainstreaming of shared  
40 mobility systems can be institutionalized equitably, and the operation and governance of existing  
41 systems that are only mode and operator-focused (Akyelken, Banister, & Givoni, 2018; Jittrapirom,  
42 Marchau, van der Heijden, & Meurs, 2018; Pangbourne, Mladenović, Stead, & Milakis, 2019).

43 **Decoupling.** Decoupling is a concept examined through UNEP processes that enables environmental  
44 improvements to happen without loss of economic activity (UNEP, 2011; 2013). Demand has been  
45 seen in the past as inherently connected to growth in fossil fuels so decoupling has emerged as the  
46 concept to show that economic activity can be positive while decarbonization accelerates (Newman,  
47 2017). As set out in Figure 10.1 the G20 nations have shown decoupling in a range of indicators about  
48 greenhouse emissions.



1

2

**Figure 10.1 Key Indicators on the G20 transition to a low-carbon economy: trends between 1990 and 2014**

3

Source: Climate Transparency (2017)

4

There are many aspects of policy and behaviour choices that can lead to decoupling including the three demand factors outlined above. There is evidence of decoupling for both developed and developing countries with many cities demonstrating decoupling of transport-related emissions from urban economic activity (Newman, Beatley and Boyer, 2017; Loo and Banister 2016).

8

### 10.2.3 Smart city technology and autonomous transport

9

The process and practices of assimilation of ICTs and other sophisticated hi-technology innovations into transport are increasingly referred to as the Smart Mobility paradigm (Noy and Givoni, 2018). Smart mobility can be used to influence transport behaviour and hence can be seen as a systemic factor (Benevolo, Dameri, & D'Auria, 2016). The synergies of emerging technologies (ICT, IOT, Big Data) and shared economy could overcome some of the challenges facing the adoption of emerging technologies such as EVs (Taiebat & Xu, 2019) (Chen et al., 2016a) (Weiss et al., 2018) (Marletto, 2014).

16

In Box 10.1 the main smart technologies being adopted rapidly by cities across the world are outlined.

17

#### Box 10.1 Smart city technologies and transport

18

*Information and Communication Technology (ICT):* The use of ICT can help cities by providing real time information on mobility options for cars or for transit users or those using bikes and pedestrians. ICT can help with ticketing and payment for transit or for road user charges (Gossling 2017; Tafidis et al, 2017).

22

*Internet of Things (IoT) Sensors:* These sensors can be used for road safety along roads to ensure cars do not lose their direction and smart tyres equipped with sensors helps to slightly improve fuel efficiency and reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Kubba and Jiang, 2014; Kavitha et al, 2018). Or, the IoT can be used to create safety for a fast-moving Trackless Tram and its associated last mile connectivity shuttles as part of a Transit Activated Corridor (Newman et al, 2019).

26

1 *Mobility as a Service (MaaS)*: New, app-based mobility platforms will allow for the integration of  
2 different transport modes (such as last mile travel, shared transit, and even micro-transit such as  
3 scooters or bikes) into easy to use platforms. By integrating these modes, users will be able to easily  
4 navigate from A to B based on what modes are most efficient and all necessary bookings or payments  
5 can be made through the one service. With smart city planning, these platforms can steer more users  
6 towards shared and rapid-transit (which should be the centre-piece of these systems), rather than  
7 encourage more people to opt for the perceived convenience of booking a single-passenger ride. In  
8 low density car dependent cities however MaaS services such as the use of electric scooters/bikes are  
9 less effective as the distances are too long and they do not enable the easy sharing that can happen in  
10 dense station precincts (Jittrapirom, 2017).

11 *Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data Analytics*: These technologies are used together to enable  
12 decisions about what kind of transport planning is used down particular corridors. Options such as  
13 predictive congestion management of roads and freeways along with advanced shared transit  
14 scheduling can provide value to new and existing transit systems Toole, et al, 2015; Anda et al, 2017;  
15 Milne and Whatling, 2019).

16 *Blockchain or Distributed Ledger Technology*: Blockchain can be the basis of MaaS or any local  
17 shared mobility as it facilitates shared activity. As the future city is going to have distributed solar  
18 energy it can be applied to that and to how urban regeneration along a TAC can be sharing mobility  
19 opportunities, especially the payments for tickets on a transit system and its last mile connectivity  
20 shuttles. This technology can also be used for road user charging along any corridor and by businesses  
21 accessing any services and in managing freight (Green and Newman, 2016; Jin et al, 2019; Charter  
22 and Koh, 2018; Nguyen, et al, 2019).

23 Smart technologies can improve competitiveness of transit and active transport, and reverse logistics  
24 in trucking can lead to GHG savings as set out below; smart technologies also provide transport  
25 efficiency as optimizing traffic by providing more competitive opportunities for transit and active  
26 transport over personal vehicle usage, and in freight by managing vehicle loading, avoiding empty  
27 return journeys and reducing the weight and volume of packaging. Evaluations of actual GHG savings  
28 from such applications include Palsson et al (2017).

29 Autonomous vehicles are the other emerging transport technology that has the potential to  
30 significantly improve the value of each mode of transport. Planes and high-speed trains are already  
31 largely autonomous as they are guided in all their movements, especially coming into stations and  
32 airports, however that does not mean they are driverless. This principle is also being used in new on-  
33 road transit systems like Trackless Trams (Newman et al, 2019). Private vehicles are being fitted out  
34 with more and more levels of autonomy and many are being trialled as driverless in cities though with  
35 mixed results (Aria, Olstam, & Schwietering, 2016) (Skeete, 2018).

36 There is a growing body of literature about the effect of smart city technology (including sensors  
37 guiding vehicles) on demand for transport services as it is unclear what is the direction of the effect  
38 (Lenz and Heinrichs, 2017; Debnath et al, 2014). Smart city technologies can be used to improve  
39 competitiveness of transit and active transport or favour even more private vehicle movement, even  
40 when it is being shared. Some work suggests that shared vehicles such as Uber and Lyft and also  
41 vehicle autonomy is leading to increased vehicle kms travelled (Schaller, 2018) (Tirachini & Gomez-  
42 Lobo, 2019).

43 Heavy haulage trucks in the mining industry are already autonomous (Price et al, 2019) and long-haul  
44 trucks may happen sooner than automation of LDVs though how they will be allowed to move  
45 through cities is yet to be worked out as they will be an impenetrable barrier (Hancock et al, 2019).  
46 Drones are being presented as a potential major freight device in cities for light parcels and even

1 people, however the implications for disturbance of neighbourhoods and airspace are likely to limit  
2 this application (Stolaroff et al., 2018).

3 The impact of these new technologies will be determined by how they are managed in terms of  
4 demand. It is likely that different parts of the city will be enabled to use autonomous vehicles more  
5 than others – automobile city fabric for example will be more able to accommodate AV's than in  
6 transit city fabric and walking city fabric where fast-moving autonomous vehicles would not be  
7 economically and socially acceptable due to pedestrian priority. There are also going to be some parts  
8 of society who will find it very helpful, eg marginal groups such as the elderly, people with  
9 disabilities, and those who cannot drive, stakeholders who have expressed concerns over being  
10 excluded already in the transition to battery electric vehicles (Sovacool, Kester, Noel, & de Rubens,  
11 2019). Local shared mobility systems can be used to integrate with fast transit corridors and local  
12 shopping and services centres, enabling much reduced demand for private vehicles overall (Hancock  
13 et al 2019; Newman et al, 2020).

14 Some commentators are optimistic that smart and autonomous technologies can transform the  
15 greenhouse emissions from the transport sector (Rivkin, 2019) (Seba, 2014). Others are more  
16 sanguine unless policy interventions can enable the technologies to be used for purposes that include  
17 zero carbon and the SDG's (Hancock et al, 2019).

#### 18 **10.2.4 Integrating electric mobility and grid management with V2G**

19 Recharge of EV's has been an issue often discussed as 'range anxiety' concerning drivers and also  
20 grid destabilization for utility management (Pearre & Ribberink, 2019) (Zheng, Niu, Shang, Shao, &  
21 Jian, 2019). As this is also a behavioural issue it has been classified here as a systemic factor. Since  
22 AR5 there has been a growing literature on how to intelligently integrate electric utility grid  
23 operations with electric vehicles to both reduce range anxiety and also to manage electric grids. They  
24 have termed this integration vehicle-to-grid (V2G) (Noel, Kester, Rubens, & Sovacool, 2019) (Ercan,  
25 Noori, Zhao, & Tatari, 2016), grid-integrated vehicles (GIV) (Sovacool, Noel, Axsen, & Kempton,  
26 2018), and vehicle-grid-integration (VGI) (California Independent System Operator, 2014). These  
27 connected concepts describe efforts to link transport and electricity systems in ways that may provide  
28 synergetic benefits to both. V2G and VGI has more recently developed as a sort of umbrella term to  
29 encompass unidirectional integration efforts, such as "smart" or "controlled" charging (now  
30 sometimes called V1G), as well as bidirectional integration, namely V2G (Sovacool, Axsen, &  
31 Kempton, 2017) and even V2X or vehicle-to-everything (Wang, 2019).


32 For electric utilities, V2G can provide back-up power, support load balancing, reduce peak-loads  
33 (Noel et al., 2019), reduce the uncertainty in forecasts of daily and hourly electrical load (Peng, Liu,  
34 & Jiang, 2012), allow greater utilization of existing generation capacity (Hajimiragha, Canizares,  
35 Fowler, & Elkamel, 2010) (Madzharov, Delarue, & D'haeseleer, 2014) and of distribution  
36 infrastructure (Bedir, Ogden, Yang, & Ogden, 2015). V2G has been characterized as a comparatively  
37 advantageous means of peak load shaving, assuming peak shaving events lasted one hour or less per  
38 day (Zhuk, Zeigarnik, Buzoverov, & Sheindlin, 2016). Another specific application is spinning  
39 reserves, noting that such an application outweighed the cost of additional load from PEV charging  
40 (Mirmoradi & Ghasemi, 2016).

41 In terms of climate benefits, V2G-capable PEVs can result in lower total emissions, particularly when  
42 compared to other alternatives (Reddy, Panwar, Kumar, & Panigrahi, 2016). Climate change benefits  
43 can accrue via the general electrification of transport, controlled charging to avoid high carbon  
44 electricity sources, decarbonisation of the ancillary service markets, or peak shaving of high carbon  
45 electricity sources. Noel et al. analyze V2G pathways in Denmark, and note that at an optimal  
46 penetration rate of 75% by 2030, \$34 billion in social benefits would be accrued (through things like  
47 displaced pollution) or a cost savings of \$1200 per vehicle (XIV). V2G-capable PEVs had the



1 potential to reduce carbon emissions compared to a conventional gasoline vehicle by up to 59%,  
 2 assuming optimized charging schedules (Hoehne & Chester, 2016). However, these benefits are not a  
 3 given. In some electricity grids with higher CO<sub>2</sub>-intensity electricity and no climate policy, V2G  
 4 providing load shaving services might actually increase total carbon emissions (Hoehne & Chester,  
 5 2016).

6 Despite these uncertainties, projections suggest V2G will come to play a significant role in future  
 7 transport systems. One assessment simulated the future penetration of decentralized, flexible power  
 8 systems (including renewable energy and storage) and concluded that V2G offered the *most storage*  
 9 potential in Europe compared to other options such as standalone batteries, compressed air energy  
 10 storage, or pumped hydro (see Figure 10.2) (Després et al., 2017). Another study calculated that V2G-  
 11 enabled PEVs could provide much needed assistance to transmission operators in the United States as  
 12 they maintain reliability and operating standards, and it estimated the value of those electric services  
 13 at up to \$12 billion per year, some of which would flow to PEV owners (Kempton & Tomić, 2005). A  
 14 2016 study by the Transport Research Board reported that vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) systems,  
 15 where vehicles utilize communication devices to share information with the components that support  
 16 a country's highway system, could be utilized by about 460 million vehicles globally by 2030;  
 17 vehicle-to-retail (V2R) systems, where cars communicate directly with fuel or automotive parts  
 18 retailers, by another 406 million vehicles by 2030 globally; and another 50 million vehicles globally  
 19 offering active V2G services by 2030 (Mohaddes & Sweatman, 2016). For perhaps reasons such as  
 20 these, the Parker-Project (2018) documented at least 50 V2G projects across 14 countries, although  
 21 most of these are still only at the pilot stage (Parker-Project, 2018).



22  
 23 **Figure 10.2 Installed capacities (left) and hours of utilization (right) in the operation of different**  
 24 **optimized energy storage technologies for Europe, 2000-2100**

25 Source: (Després et al., 2017)

26 Note: V2G = vehicle-to-grid. CAES = Compressed Air Energy Storage.

### 27 **10.3 Transport technology innovations for decarbonisation**

28 This section will focus on technology innovations in four key technologies - batteries, hydrogen fuel-  
 29 cells, biofuels and advanced ICE. They can be applied for land-based transport, shipping and aviation  
 30 and have the potential for decarbonization of the transport system. The development of these  
 31 technologies will affect other sectors such as energy, industry, buildings but the review is more from  
 32 the perspective of their application in the transport sector. The trends in these technologies will



1 contribute to the later discussions on alternative technologies within sections on land-based transport,  
2 aviation and shipping.

### 3 **10.3.1 Battery-electric technologies**

4 Battery technologies can be divided into primary and rechargeable batteries. Rechargeable batteries  
5 are of interest for applications within the transport sector, with a range of mature and emerging  
6 chemistries able to support the electrification of vehicles.

#### 7 *10.3.1.1 Development of battery technology*

8 Lithium-ion batteries (LIB) were discovered in the 1980s and have since become the default choice  
9 for providing driving power for automotive vehicles (Placke et al. 2017) and are expected to play a  
10 dominant role in the near term (International Energy Agency 2019a). A large-scale diffusion of  
11 batteries will, however, depend on improvements in energy density (energy stored per unit volume),  
12 specific energy (energy stored per unit weight) and the costs of batteries (Cano et al. 2018). These  
13 improvements will occur in LIBs, as well as battery chemistries which go beyond LIBs - also referred  
14 to as post-LIBs (Placke et al. 2017).

##### 15 *10.3.1.1.1 Pre-LIB batteries*

16 The pre-LIB phase occurred prior to the 1990s before the large-scale diffusion of LIBs. Four types of  
17 rechargeable batteries were available during this phase: lead-acid batteries, nickel batteries, high-  
18 temperature sodium batteries and redox flow batteries (Placke et al. 2017). Lead-acid batteries were  
19 the most common batteries used for automotive auxiliary power applications, however, their low  
20 specific energy (Andwari et al. 2017) limited their application for providing driving power in  
21 automobiles - though they have been used in smaller automotive vehicles e.g. e-scooters and e-  
22 rickshaws (Dhar et al. 2017) due to their low cost. Nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) has a better energy  
23 density than lead-acid batteries. For this reason, they were the battery of choice for hybrid EVs and  
24 are well-optimised for regenerative braking (Cano et al. 2018), however, due to a rapid cost reduction  
25 they are now being replaced by LIBs. Ni-Cadmium (NiCd) batteries have energy densities lower than  
26 NiMH batteries (Table 10.3) and cost around ten times more than lead-acid batteries. For this reason,  
27 they do not have major prospects within automotive applications. There are no examples of high-  
28 temperature sodium batteries being used within automotive applications.

##### 29 *10.3.1.1.2 Lithium-ion batteries (LIB)*

30 LIBs came into existence in 1980s (Placke, et al. 2017) and were initially used within electronics  
31 applications. By 2010 the cumulative capacity of LIBs in electronics was 98 GWh (Schmidt et al.  
32 2017). This large-scale diffusion in electronics resulted in significant innovations within LIB  
33 chemistries. Commercial application of LIBs in automotive applications started around 2000 when the  
34 price of LIBs was more than 1000 USD per kWh (Schmidt et al. 2017). By 2017 the cumulative  
35 battery capacity for automotive applications was around 60 GWh and in 2018 the cost had come down  
36 to around 176 USD per Kwh (Goldie Scot, 2019). Further improvements in LIBs, with respect to  
37 specific energy, energy density (Placke et al. 2017) (Nykqvist and Nilsson 2015) and cost (Schmidt et  
38 al. 2017) is expected when LIB design is further optimised (Table 10.3) see LIB energy optimised).  
39 These advancements are expected to lead to electric vehicles with even longer driving ranges, further  
40 supporting the uptake of LIBs for transport applications (Cano et al. 2018). Schmidt et al. (2017),  
41 using experience learning curves, project that the cost of LIBs will be close to 100 USD per kWh in  
42 2030 (Table 10.3), however, given the rapid rate at which LIB prices have fallen in recent years some  
43 estimates are putting prices at closer to 80 USD per kWh by 2030 (International Energy Agency  
44 2019a). Price parity between EVs and equivalent combustion engine vehicles is expected at LIB  
45 prices of around 100 USD per kWh.

46 The state-of-the-art LIBs available in 2019 are superior to alternative cell technologies in terms of  
47 battery life, energy density, specific energy and cost (Table 10.3). The expected further improvements

1 in LIBs (optimised) suggest these chemistries will remain superior to alternative battery technologies  
2 in the medium-term, and therefore LIBs will continue to dominate the automotive market.

3 For EVs sold in 2018, the material demand was about 11 kilotonnes (kt) of lithium, 15 kt of cobalt, 11  
4 kt of manganese and 34 kt of nickel (International Energy Agency 2019a). IEA projections for 2030  
5 in the EV 30@30 scenario show that the demand for these materials would increase by 30 times for  
6 lithium and around 25 times for cobalt. Concerns about these widespread crustal elements have been  
7 addressed by International Resources Panel (2019), World Bank (2018) and Sovacool (2020).

8 A wide variety of materials or material combinations can be used in LIBs (Placke et al. 2017). In  
9 terms of cathodic materials being used currently, these are based on a combination of nickel,  
10 manganese and cobalt and in short are referred to as NMC. In the future, LIBs will increasingly use  
11 chemistries that are less dependent on cobalt, such as NMC 622, NMC 532, NMC 811 instead of  
12 NMC 111 in the NMC family (International Energy Agency 2019a) or move on to alternative  
13 chemistries (Placke et al. 2017). These changes in cathodic materials will also contribute towards the  
14 reduction of costs for LIBs (International Energy Agency 2019a). However, dependence on lithium  
15 will remain and this is a cause of concern for some (You & Manthiram, 2018; Oliveti et. al., 2017). At  
16 the same time, lithium demand from electric vehicles was only around 11 kt in 2018 (International  
17 Energy Agency 2019a); much lower than reserves of 14,000 kt globally (IBRD & World Bank,  
18 2017). This suggests that resource concerns may be overstated.

19 Externalities from resource extraction is another concern, however, other metals (steel, aluminium,  
20 etc) - for which production was around 900 million tonnes in 2017 - is a greater concern. Lithium was  
21 not even mentioned in the global resource outlook of UNEP (UNEP, 2019). Nonetheless, it is  
22 important to manage demand and limit externalities. since demand for Lithium is going to increase  
23 many fold in future. Reuse of LIB used in EVs for stationary applications can help in reducing the  
24 demand of LIBs however the main challenges are the difficulty in accessing information on health of  
25 batteries to be recycled and technical difficulties in remanufacturing the batteries for their second life  
26 (Ahmadi et. al., 2017). Recycling of lithium from used batteries could be a possible supply source  
27 (Winslow et al. 2018), however, most of the efforts to recycle lithium are currently at a laboratory  
28 scale and with further effort required for commercialisation (Ling et. al., 2018). The main challenges  
29 to recycling is a lack of standardisation of battery designs and no focus on recyclability (Harper et. al.,  
30 2019) which make it difficult and expensive to recycle LIBs.

### 31 *10.3.1.1.3 Post-LIB batteries*

32 There are several next-generation battery chemistries which are often referred to as post-LIBs (Placke  
33 et al. 2017). These chemistries include metal sulfur, metal-air, metal ion (besides Li) and All-Solid-  
34 StateBatteries (ASSB). The long development cycles of the automotive industry (Cano et. al., 2018)  
35 and the advantages of LIBs in terms of energy density, cycle life, etc, mean that it is unlikely that  
36 post-LIB technologies will replace LIBs in the next decade, however, Lithium-sulfur, Lithium-air and  
37 Zinc-air have emerged as potential alternatives for LIBs (Cano et al. 2018).

#### 38 10.3.1.1.3.1 Lithium-sulphur batteries

39 These batteries have a lithium metal anode which has a higher theoretical capacity compared  
40 to Lithium-ion anodes and much lower cost sulfur cathodes relative to typical Li-ion insertion  
41 cathodes (Manthiram et al. 2014). Due to these factors, these batteries are much cheaper than LIB to  
42 manufacture and have a higher energy density (Table 1.3). Conversely, these batteries face several  
43 challenges from sulfur cathodes which affect the cycle life of the battery (Cano et al. 2018).

#### 44 10.3.1.1.3.2 Lithium-air batteries

45 These batteries offer a further improvement in specific energy and energy density above Li-S  
46 batteries owing to their use of atmospheric oxygen as a cathode in place of sulfur. However, their

1 demonstrated cycle-life is much lower (Table 1.3). The Lithium-air have a low specific power which  
 2 means they require a complimentary battery for practical purposes (Cano et al. 2018).

3 10.3.1.1.3.3 Zinc-air batteries

4 Zinc–air batteries seem more likely to be used in future EVs because of their more advanced  
 5 technology status and higher practically achievable energy density (Fu et. al, 2017). Like Li–air  
 6 batteries, their poor specific power and energy efficiency will probably prevent them from being used  
 7 as a primary energy source for EVs; however, they could be promising when used in a dual-battery  
 8 configuration (Cano et al. 2018).

9  
 10  
 11

**Table 10.3 Overview of technologies for rechargeable batteries**

Battery Type	Stage w.r.t LIB	Electrolyte	Technology Maturity	Life Span (Cycles)	Ref	Energy Density (Wh/L)	Specific Energy (Wh/Kg)	Ref	Price (USD/kwh) in 2017	Ref	Price (2015 USD/kwh) in 2030	Ref
Lead Acid	Pre-LIB	Liquid	High	300-800	5	302-306	38-60	5	70-160	5	343	7
NiMH	Pre-LIB	Liquid	High	600-1200	5	220-250	42-110	5	210-365	5	254	7
NiCd	Pre-LIB	Liquid	High	1350	2	100	60	2	700			
High-temperature Na batteries	Pre-LIB	Liquid	High	3000	5		80-120	1				
LIB State of art	Lithium Ion Battery (LIB)	Liquid	High	3000-6000	5	200-680	130-230	3	175	6	117	7
LIB energy optimized	Lithium Ion Battery (LIB)	Liquid	Under Development			600-850	300-440	3				
Classic Li Metal (CLIM)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development			800-3030	420-530	3				
Metal Sulfur (Li/S)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Near Commercialisation	300-300	5	350-680	360-540	3,9	36-130	5		
Metal Sulfur (Na/S)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
Metal Sulfur (Mg/S)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
Metal Air (Li/air)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development	20-100	5		470-900		470-200	5		
Metal Air (Mg/air)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
Metal Air (Zn/air)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development	250-450	5		200-410		470-160	5		
Metal Air (Na/air)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
Metal Air (Al/air)	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
K ion	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
Na ion	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development	500	8		600	8				
Mg ion	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
Ca ion	Post-LIB	Liquid	Under Development									
All Solid State Battery	ASSB	Solid	Under Development				278-479	3				

12

13 Source : 1. Andwari et. al., 2018; 2. Manzetti & Mariasiu, 2015; 3. Placke et. al., 2017; 4. Nykvist &  
 14 Nilsson, 2015; 5. Cano et. al., 2018; 6. Blomberg Energy Finance, 2019; 7. Schmidt et. al., 2017; 8.  
 15 You & Manthiram, 2018; 9. Fotouhi et. al., 2017

16 **10.3.1.2 Technology readiness of batteries**

17 The technological readiness of a battery is adjudged as a crucial parameter in the advancement of  
 18 Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) (Manzetti and Mariasiu 2015). Energy density, power density, cycle  
 19 life, calendar life, and the cost per kWh are considered as the pertinent parameters for comparing the  
 20 technological readiness of various battery technologies (Andwari et al. 2017) (Manzetti and Mariasiu  
 21 2015) (Lajunen et al. 2018). A summary of alternative battery technologies has been presented in  
 22 Table 1.3 in terms of these parameters.


23 LIBs dominate the other battery types in a comprehensive manner and are at a readiness level where  
 24 they can be applied for most transport applications except medium-long haul aviation, ocean going

1 ships and heavy-duty trucks. LIBs will not, however, significantly replace the lead acid batteries  
 2 which have been used extensively till now for auxiliary power applications and in some low-cost  
 3 electric vehicles (e.g., e-rickshaws, e-scooters, etc) (Cano et. al., 2018). In fact, the cumulative  
 4 capacity of lead-acid batteries is expected to increase from 8,867 GWh in 2010 to 10,630 GWh in  
 5 2030 (Schmidt et al. 2017). There are many innovations underway with LIBs which are likely to  
 6 improve their energy density, specific energy and also bring down the costs (Placke et. al., 2017).

7 There are a number of battery technologies under development (Table 1.3) however Li-S, Li-air and  
 8 Zn-air are three battery chemistries hold the highest potential (Cano et. al., 2017). All three of these  
 9 technologies rely on making use of elements that are relatively inexpensive. This can help in bringing  
 10 down battery costs (Cano et. al., 2017). The main challenge these technologies face is in terms of the  
 11 cycle life. Out of the three Li-S has already been used for applications within unmanned aerial  
 12 vehicles (Fotouhi et. al., 2017) due to relatively high specific energy (almost double of state of art  
 13 LIBs). Even with low cycle life Li-air and Zn-air hold good prospects for commercialisation as range  
 14 extender batteries for long-range road transport (Cano et. al., 2017) for vehicles that are normally used  
 15 for in the city driving.

16 **10.3.1.3 Infrastructure for charging**

17 In order to accelerate the uptake of EVs globally, robust and reliable charging infrastructure networks  
 18 are required to build confidence in the technology, and overcome the often-cited barrier of ‘range  
 19 anxiety’ (She et al. 2017). Range anxiety is where consumers do not have confidence that an electric  
 20 vehicle will be capable of meeting their driving range requirements. As a consequence, the provision  
 21 of public charging infrastructure is seen as one avenue for alleviating range anxiety and facilitating  
 22 longer distance travel in electric vehicles. While there is some level of variation in the expected  
 23 required ratio of public charging infrastructure points to electric vehicles - see Figure 10.3- a  
 24 comprehensive network of public charging infrastructure - with good coverage - will be required to  
 25 support the transition to an electric vehicle fleet (Gnann et al. 2018).



26

1 **Figure 10.3 Public charging infrastructure and electric vehicle registrations per million population by**  
2 **metropolitan area, with size of circles indicating total electric vehicles**

3 Source: (Hall and Lutsey 2017b)

4 Beyond simply the number of EV chargers, this infrastructure must be fit-for-purpose, and meet the  
5 needs of consumers. In particular, it must be: accessible, close to amenities, safe, and affordable  
6 (Hardman et al. 2018). In order to deliver ‘fit-for-purpose’ public charging infrastructure, many  
7 stakeholders must coordinate efforts including: charging station operators, charging station  
8 manufacturers, automakers, electricity utilities, landowners, and policy makers. Policy makers, in  
9 particular, can play a central role in ensuring that charging infrastructure is not only deployed in high  
10 demand locations, but is also spread broadly to enable a comprehensive network that supports long-  
11 distance electric driving, and adoption of this technology in regional and rural communities. Proactive  
12 planning of charging infrastructure can also drive down costs.

13 *10.3.1.3.1 Charging infrastructure levels and types*

14 Electric vehicles can charge at different speeds depending on both the external charging hardware  
15 capabilities, and the on-board vehicle charging capabilities. Different charging speeds are often  
16 referred to as charging ‘Levels’. Charging infrastructures can be differentiated on the basis of their  
17 level (power output range of charger), the type of socket and connector and the mode of  
18 communication protocol between the vehicle and charger (International Energy Agency 2019a).

19 There are three levels of charging, Level 1 charging having an conventional AC plug with a power  
20 output up to 3.7 kW, Level 2 charging having a dedicated AC wall charger with a power output  
21 between 3.7 kW and 22 kW and a Level 3 charger that can have a AC 3 phase plug with a power  
22 output between 22 kW and 43.5 kW or DC plug and till now the maximum power output installed is  
23 400 kW (International Energy Agency 2019a). Level 1 chargers are basically electrical wall socket at  
24 homes, Level 2 are referred as slow charger and Level 3 as the fast chargers.

25 Each charging level has different implications for the electricity grid. Level 1 and 2 charging requires  
26 a lower electricity load, compared to Level 3, however, it tends to be uncontrolled, adhoc, and  
27 unplanned - particularly at the residential level - making it hard for utilities to safeguard the stability  
28 of low voltage networks. Conversely, while Level 3 charges require much higher loads, they tend to  
29 be more planned - given the approvals required to connect to the electricity grid - and as such, utilities  
30 can more easily plan for and manage this infrastructure.

31 In addition to standard plug-in charging infrastructure, wireless charging technologies are also  
32 emerging, allowing vehicles to be charged autonomously while parked and/or in-motion - if wireless  
33 charging is built into the road pavement (IRENA, 2019). Other forms of road electrification also may  
34 have potentially, particularly for heavy freight where load demand is higher. Road electrification can  
35 take the form of a charging rail built into the road pavement, running along the side the road, or  
36 overhead through catenary power lines - similar to electrical infrastructure used for light and/or heavy  
37 rail.

38 Separate to charging levels, there are also several types of charging connectors, differing for AC  
39 (Level 1/2) and DC (Level 3) charging. While initially several connectors were deployed in each  
40 market, in recent years there has been a level of standardisation occur across most markets - similar to  
41 charging plugs for other electrical appliances. Europe/Australia has converged on the Type 2 (AC)  
42 and CCS-2 (DC) charging standard; North America has converged on the Type 1 (AC) and CCS-1  
43 (DC) charging standard (with the exception of Tesla which use a proprietary connector in North  
44 America), Japan has converged on the Type 1 (AC) and CHAdeMO (DC), while China has converged  
45 on its own standard for AC/DC charging, known as GB/T (International Energy Agency 2019a).

### 1 10.3.1.3.2 Charging locations

2 Electric vehicle charging occurs at four primary locations:

- 3 1. At or near home
- 4 2. Workplace or commuter carpark
- 5 3. Public destinations e.g. shopping centres, tourist attractions.
- 6 4. Along travel corridors during long-distance travel.

7 In terms of the current electric vehicle market, the majority of charging (75-90%) has been reported to  
8 be carried out at or near homes (Figenbaum 2017) (Webb et al. 2019) (Wenig et al. 2019). It has been  
9 found that access to charging at home is a significant factor in the adoption of EVs, with consumers  
10 less willing to purchase an EV without home charging (Nicholas, Tal & Hybrid, 2017; (Funke and  
11 Plötz 2017) (Bailey et al. 2017) (Bailey et al. 2017). Consumers can be supported in installing home  
12 charging infrastructure by automakers, utilities and/or policy-makers (Hardman et al. 2018).  
13 Apartment dwellers may face specific challenges in installing charging infrastructure, highlighting the  
14 need for supporting planning policy, and availability of charging infrastructure nearby these forms of  
15 residential developments.

16 Combined, these efforts will be particularly important for encouraging the uptake of electric vehicles  
17 in a timeframe that is congruent with required emission reduction targets.  
18 Charging infrastructure at workplaces and commuter car parks is also important, particularly given  
19 many vehicles are parked at these locations, for many hours, during peak renewable energy generation  
20 periods i.e. the middle of the day. Around 15-30% of EV charging occurs at these locations  
21 (Figenbaum 2017) (Webb et al. 2019) (Wenig et al. 2019). Ideally, this would be increased further  
22 through policy support in order to absorb excess solar energy generated during the day (Hardman et  
23 al. 2018).

24 Of the remaining approximately 10% of charging, this occurs at public locations, is roughly split  
25 equally between AC (slower) and DC (fast) charging (Figenbaum 2017) (Webb et al. 2019) (Wenig et  
26 al. 2019). Slower AC charging is available at destinations when EV owners are expected to spend a  
27 number of hours, and would like to get a top-up charge during this time. This form of charging is  
28 largely discretionary, and is not generally relied upon for daily or long-distance travel. Conversely,  
29 DC fast charging is essential for extending the range of EVs, particular for long-distance travel along  
30 highway corridors. DC fast charging allows consumers to get a quick recharge during rest stops (15-  
31 45 mins), and be able to drive for several hundred miles/kilometres before having to charge again.  
32 This form of charging, however, is not the primary form of charging given it is generally more  
33 expensive than home/work/destination charging, and is also not as convenient as charging at locations  
34 when vehicles are already parked for several hours at a time. Nonetheless, this form of charging  
35 infrastructure is critical for addressing range anxiety.

36 It should also be noted that while the current charging profile of EV owners is skewed towards slower  
37 AC charging at home/work, this may change as EV technology continues to evolve, and market  
38 preferences shift. Particularly for those consumers who do not have regular access to a parking space  
39 with EV charging e.g. apartment dwellers, they will become increasingly reliant on using DC fast-  
40 chargers in cities to recharge as required, at quicker, more convenient speeds. There are also potential  
41 synergies between the siting of this type of infrastructure in cities, and establishment of e-Mobility  
42 hubs near/at public transport interchanges, to encourage multi-modal transport, including the use of  
43 EVs by ride- and car-sharing providers.

44 *Placeholder-Para on capacitors will be added in SOD.*

## 45 10.3.2 Hydrogen fuel cell-electric technologies

46 Low carbon hydrogen in fuel cells (and associated synthetic fuels) are an emerging option to power  
47 heavy duty-transport that are 'battery-challenged' (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
48 2018). Hydrogen can also directly be used as a substitute for diesel. Hydrogen is therefore seen as one  
49 of the important potential fuels to solve decarbonization for the heavy vehicle transport system

1 (International Energy Agency 2019b) (Tokimatsu et al. 2016) (International Energy Agency, n.d.-a)  
 2 (Tokimatsu et al., 2016). However, significant advancements in technological and economic maturity  
 3 will be required in order for hydrogen fuel cells to play more than a niche role.

#### 4 **10.3.2.1 Technology development and demonstration**

5 During the last decade, fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) have attracted growing attention and have made  
 6 significant technological progress. The power density of the internationally advanced electric reactor  
 7 has reached 3.1kW/L, the service life of passenger vehicle systems has generally reached 5000 hours,  
 8 and that of commercial vehicles has reached 20,000 hours.

9 Vehicle fuel cell system engines cost 80 to 95 percent less than they did in the early 2000s and cost  
 10 \$49 per kW (based on 500,000 units per year), which is getting close to \$30 per kW for internal  
 11 combustion engines (White paper:H2 and FCV in China (2019) P5~6, International Energy Agency  
 12 2019b). By 2018, there were 369 hydrogen stations in operation worldwide, 273 of which were open  
 13 to the public, and the rest belonged to the internal hydrogen stations of the institute/enterprise who  
 14 manages them. Europe currently has 152, Asia 136 and North America 78 (LBST, 2019,  
 15 H2stations.org). The global installed capacity of hydrogen fuel cells had exceeded 2091 MW,  
 16 however, the sales of passenger vehicles totalled only about 9,900 – 0.0005% of the global fleet. Fuel  
 17 cell buses have been used in demonstration projects in various countries, such as the Clean Hydrogen  
 18 in European Cities project and the fuel cell bus project for the 2022 Winter Olympics in China  
 19 (Annual Report on the Development of Automotive Hydrogen Industry in China 2019). Hydrogen  
 20 applications in aircraft, ships and trains have progressed on the technology R&D stage in the last  
 21 decade (van Biert et al. 2016; Hydrogen Roadmap Europe, 2019).

22 The number of countries with policies that directly support investment in hydrogen technologies is  
 23 increasing, along with the number of sectors they target. By mid-2019 the total number of targets,  
 24 mandates and policy incentives in place globally to directly support hydrogen was around 50  
 25 (International Energy Agency 2019b).

#### 26 **10.3.2.2 Technology readiness**

27 Fuel cell technology is still relatively immature with low reliability and significant R&D still required  
 28 but the first attempt to estimate readiness is set out in Table 10.4. The Table shows that the future  
 29 competitiveness of hydrogen fuel cell cars depends on fuel cell costs, hydrogen fuel costs and  
 30 hydrogen refuelling stations while for trucks the priority is to reduce the delivered price of hydrogen.  
 31 While battery electric alternatives are starting to emerge in the short-haul shipping and aviation  
 32 sectors, long-haul shipping and aviation have limited low-carbon fuel options available. These sectors  
 33 represent key opportunities for hydrogen-based fuels in an effort to reduce transport emissions but  
 34 remain firmly in the non-commercial arena, unlikely to cost effective until 2030 while others argue  
 35 that in the EU it may be possible to achieve serial production of fuel cell heavy-duty trucks by the  
 36 mid-2020s, and comparable costs to diesel vehicles by 2030. Fundamental to this is the recharging  
 37 facilities which remain a major issue (see below). For air and sea transport, hydrogen-based synthetic  
 38 fuels hold some promise, but on a longer time horizon (beyond 2030).

39 **Table 10.4 Current performance of key technologies of H2**

<i>Application</i>	<i>Power or capacity</i>	<i>Efficiency *</i>	<i>Initial investment cost</i>	<i>Life time</i>	<i>Maturity</i>
<i>Part 1: Key technologies of H2 conversion, T&amp;D, storage</i>					
Alkaline FC	Up to 250 kW	~50% (HHV)	USD 200-700/kW	5 000-8 000 hours	Early market
PEMFC stationary	0.5-400 kW	32%-49% (HHV)	USD 3 000-4 000/kW	~60 000 hours	Early market
PEMFC mobile	80-100 kW	Up to 60%	USD ~500/kW	<5 000 hours	Early market

		(HHV)			
SOFC	Up to 200 kW	50%-70% (HHV)	USD 3 000-4 000/kW	Up to 90 000 hours	Demonstration
PAFC	Up to 11 MW	30%-40% (HHV)	USD 4 000-5 000/kW	30 000-60 000 hours	Mature
MCFC	KW to several MW	More than 60% (HHV)	USD 4 000-6 000/kW	20 000-30 000 hours	Early market
Compressor, 18 MPa	-	88%-95%	USD ~70 /kWh <sup>2</sup>	20 years	Mature
Compressor, 70 MPa	-	80%-91%	USD 200-400/kWh <sup>2</sup>	20 years	Early market
Liquefier	15-80 MW	~70%	USD 900-2 000/kW	30 years	Mature
FCEV on-board storage tank, 70 MPa	5 to 6 kg H <sub>2</sub>	Almost 100% (without compression)	USD 33-17/kWh (10 000 and 500 000 units produced per year)	15 years	Early market
Pressurised tank	0.1-10 MWh	Almost 100% (without compression)	USD 6 000-10 000/MWh	20 years	Mature
Liquid storage	0.1-100 GWh	Boil-off stream: 0.3% loss per day	USD 800-10 000/MWh	20 years	Mature
Pipeline	-	95%, incl. compression	Rural: USD 300 000-1.2 million/ km Urban: USD 700 000-1.5 million / km (dependent on diameter)	40 years	Mature
<i>Part 2: Key technologies of H<sub>2</sub> conversion, T&amp;D, storage</i>					
Fuel cell vehicles	80 - 120 kW	Tank-to-wheel efficiency 43-60% (HHV)	USD 60 000-100 000	150 000 km	Early market introduction
Hydrogen retail stations	200 kg/day	~80%, incl. compression to 70 MPa	USD 1.5 million-2.5 million	-	Early market introduction
Tube trailer (gaseous) for hydrogen delivery	Up to 1 000 kg	~100% (without compression)	USD 1 000 000 (USD 1 000 per kg payload)	-	Mature
Liquid tankers for hydrogen delivery	Up to 4 000 kg	Boil-off stream: 0.3% loss per day	USD 750 000	-	Mature

1 \* Unless otherwise stated, efficiencies are based on lower heating values (LHV).

2 \*\* All power-specific investment costs refer to the energy output.

3 Notes: HHV = higher heating value; kg = kilogram; kW = kilowatt.



1 Source: For part 1: IEA data; Decourt et al. (2014), *Hydrogen-Based Energy Conversion, More than Storage: System*  
2 *Flexibility*; Elgowainy (2014), “Hydrogen infrastructure analysis in early markets of FCEVs”, IEA Hydrogen Roadmap  
3 North America Workshop; ETSAP (2014), *Hydrogen Production and Distribution*; Iiyama et al. (2014), “FCEV  
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5 Delivery Analysis Meeting, 8-9 May; NREL (2014), *Hydrogen Station Compression, Storage and Dispensing - Technical*  
6 *Status and Costs*; NREL (2012a), *National Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Learning Demonstration Final Report*; US DOE  
7 (2010a), *Hydrogen Program 2010 Annual Progress Report - Innovative Hydrogen Liquefaction Cycle*; US DOE (2010b),  
8 *DOE Hydrogen Program 2010 Annual Progress Report - Technology Validation Sub-Program Overview*; Yang and Ogden  
9 (2007), “Determining the lowest-cost hydrogen delivery mode”, *International Journal of Hydrogen Energy*, pp. 268-286.


10 For part 2: IEA data; Blum et al. (2014), “Overview on the Jülich SOFC development status”, 11th European SOFC & SOE  
11 Forum, Lucerne; Decourt et al. (2014), *Hydrogen-Based Energy Conversion, More Than Storage: System Flexibility*;  
12 ETSAP (2014), *Hydrogen Production and Distribution*; IEA AFC IA (2015), *International Status of Molten Carbonate Fuel*  
13 *Cells Technology*; NREL (2009a), “Scenario development and analysis of hydrogen as a large-scale energy storage  
14 medium”, RMEL Meeting; NREL (2010), *Molten Carbonate and Phosphoric Acid Stationary Fuel Cells: Overview and Gap*  
15 *Analysis*; NREL (2009b), *Scenario Development and Analysis of Hydrogen as a Large-Scale Energy Storage Medium*; Saur  
16 (2008), *Wind-To-Hydrogen Project: Electrolyzer Capital Cost Study*; Schaber, Steinke and Hamacher (2013), “Managing  
17 temporary oversupply from renewables efficiently: electricity storage versus energy sector coupling in Germany”;  
18 Stolzenburg et al. (2014), *Integration von Wind-Wasserstoff-Systemen in das Energiesystem – Abschlussbericht*; US DOE  
19 (2014b), *Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Program Record*; US DOE (2014d), *DOE Fuel Cell Technologies Office Record – Fuel*  
20 *Cell System Costs*; US DOE (2013), *Fuel Cell Technology Office Record - Onboard Type IV Compressed Hydrogen Storage*  
21 *Systems – Current Performance and Cost*.

### 22 **10.3.2.3 Hydrogen refuelling infrastructure**

23 Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) are reliant on the development of widespread and convenient  
24 refuelling infrastructure if they are to play more than a niche role in the transport sector. There are  
25 four main components of hydrogen refuelling infrastructure (see Figure 10.4):

- 26 1. Supply & Delivery: on-site hydrogen production versus off-site production
- 27 2. Compression: to achieve pressure required for economic stationery and vehicle storage
- 28 3. Storage: liquid versus gaseous
- 29 4. Dispensing: connection between hydrogen refueling station (HRS) and vehicle.

30 The technological and economic development of each of these components continues to be developed.



1

2

**Figure 10.4 Schematic overview of typical hydrogen refuelling station components**

3

Source: (FCHJU, 2017).


4

Most existing HRS globally today have been designed to refuel less than 250 kilograms of hydrogen per day, on average. This would be enough to support up to approximately 15 city buses. For FCVs to be a viable option in the future, HRS need to support the refuelling of several hundreds of vehicles per day, implying a fuel requirement of more than 1,500 kilograms per day.

8

A summary of HRS costs, compiled by ICCT, 2017, suggests that at a capacity of 600 kilograms of hydrogen per day, the capital cost (excluding on-site production capital costs) of a single HRS would be approximately \$US1.8 million. An HRS producing 1,000 kg of hydrogen per day (100,000 kilometres in a light FCV), including on-site hydrogen generation, is expected to cost approximately EUR 16 million to construct (FCHJU, 2017) – see Figure 10.5. These costs do not include the maintenance and operating costs associated with a HRS of this capacity. Some argue that while HRS costs are high today, through improvements and an increase in production volumes, these costs may fall.

15



1

2

**Figure 10.5 - Forecast of HRS costs, including on-site hydrogen production**

3

(Source: FCHJU, 2017).


4

The dispensed cost of hydrogen is highly correlated with scale of production and the cost of electricity, when produced using water electrolysis. As outlined, and again shown in Figure 10.6, the economic competitiveness of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles is highly dependent on increased volume of production, as well as securing low-cost, ideally renewable electricity.

5

6

7



1  
2 **Figure 10.6 Modelled HRS capital, maintenance and operating costs when including on-site hydrogen**  
3 **production.**

4 (Source: FCHJU, 2017).

5 Even with optimistic improvements in the future, the required capital investment in HRS for FCVs to  
6 become economically competitive, and convenient, will remain significant and will require strategic  
7 planning.

8 **10.3.2.4 Future perspectives including key batteries**

9 There are currently many barriers, including technology uncertainty, infrastructure system  
10 construction, public acceptance, to be overcome before hydrogen-powered transport can be realized in  
11 a commercial market (International Energy Agency 2019b).

12 How low-carbon hydrogen will compete in the future is unclear. This makes it difficult to compare  
13 potential future hydrogen prices with those of alternatives. In the case of fuel cells, the speed of cost

1 reduction is a key factor, yet experts disagree on the relationship between the scale of fuel cell  
2 demand, cost and performance improvements (Cano et al, 2018).

3 Infrastructure, such as pipeline and delivery networks (which has higher capacity and longer transport  
4 distance than trailer pathways, see Table 10.5) is of particular importance for a new energy carrier  
5 such as hydrogen. In the case of hydrogen use for road transport, where a network of refuelling  
6 stations will be a precondition for widespread adoption of FCVs, the current pace of infrastructure  
7 development is one of the barriers to adoption. In some cases, these investments will also need to be  
8 co-ordinated across borders, requiring international collaboration at a level not yet seen for hydrogen.

9 **Table 10.5 Qualitative overview of hydrogen T&D technologies for hydrogen delivery in the transport**  
10 **sector**

	<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Transport distance</i>	<i>Energy loss</i>	<i>Fixed costs</i>	<i>Variable costs</i>	<i>Deployment phase</i>
Gaseous tube trailers	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Near term
Liquefied truck trailers	Medium	High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium to long term
Hydrogen pipelines	High	High	Low	High	Low	Medium to long term

11 Source: Adapted from (International Energy Agency 2015)

12 Public acceptance must also be secured in order to create demand for FCV technology. Deployment  
13 of large-scale hydrogen infrastructure with carbon capture & storage (CCS) technology would be  
14 premature, as some of the key technical issues that are still being worked on, such as fuel cell  
15 operating conditions, hydrogen on-board storage options, and the safety risks of hydrogen usage may  
16 have a considerable impact on the choice of hydrogen production, distribution and refuelling  
17 (International Energy Agency, 2015) (Cristina Galassi et al., 2012) (van Biert, Godjevac, Visser, &  
18 Aravind, 2016).

19 There are also other challenges preventing the large-scale application of hydrogen in the transport  
20 sector. Issues include: the significant quantity of renewable energy that would be required for  
21 hydrogen production, being diverted away from other uses where emissions reductions maybe higher;  
22 water scarcity as hydrogen electrolysis, paired with renewables could deliver emissions reductions,  
23 but is both energy and water intensive and therefore will need to be used strategically; the significant  
24 volumes of energy also required to support the compression or liquefaction of hydrogen for delivery;  
25 and the environmental impacts of hydrogen fuel cells, in particular, the use of platinum as a catalyst in  
26 fuel cells, as well as carbon fibre in the hydrogen storage tanks (Elgowainy et al., 2018a) (Simons &  
27 Bauer, 2015a) (Lee, Elgowainy, Kotz, Vijayagopal, & Marcinkoski, 2018).

### 28 **10.3.3 Biofuels**

#### 29 **10.3.3.1 Climate mitigation potentials of biofuels**

30 A broad understanding of the impacts on the climate associated with global biofuel deployment  
31 scenarios warrants the combination of a set of comprehensive modelling approaches (Andrews, Betts,  
32 Booth, Jones, & Jones, 2017; Davies-Barnard, Valdes, Singarayer, Pacifico, & Jones, 2014; Monier et  
33 al., 2018). There is broad agreement in the literature that the most important factors in determining the  
34 mitigation potential of biofuels are the land use and land use change characteristics associated with  
35 biofuel deployment scenarios, in addition to the life-cycle greenhouse gases emissions (e.g., Daioglou  
36 et al. 2017; Elshout et al. 2015). The land use characteristics can be separated into two main elements:  
37 i) what type of land use and land use change is associated with the different biofuel deployment

1 scenarios, and ii) what are the climate forcings associated with these land use transitions, typically  
2 associated with biogeochemical and biogeophysical feedbacks.

3 From the Earth system model and regional climate modelling literature, we know that in order to  
4 understand the climate impacts of land use and land use change, we need models that encompass the  
5 full suite of biogeophysical and biogeochemical feedbacks associated with the land use and land use  
6 change as an interactive part of the climate system. Examples of such models include CESM (the  
7 Community Earth System Model of global resolution) (Hurrell et al. 2013, Gettelman et al. 2012) ) and  
8 WRF (Weather Research and Forecasting regional model) (Skamarock et al. 2008; Warrach-Sagi et al.  
9 2019). See Chapter 7 and 12 WGIII and Chapter 3,5,7 in WGI as well as the SRL for details.

10 The combination of land use models with integrated assessment modelling approaches provides  
11 insights that allows for comprehensive analysis ensuring consistency between land use to support  
12 scenarios for future demands of food, fibres and energy across the economic sectors (Daifoglou,  
13 Doelman, Wicke, Faaij, & van Vuuren, 2019; Hanssen et al., 2019; Humpenöder et al., 2018; Popp et  
14 al., 2017; Roe et al., 2019; Stehfest et al., 2019; van Vuuren et al., 2017; Van Vuuren et al., 2018). A  
15 smaller segment of the literature concerns the unique combination of the latter type modelling with  
16 Earth system or reduced climate models (Monier et al. 2018; Hallgren et al. 2013; Davies-Barnard et  
17 al. 2014; Jones et al. 2015). This allows for state-of-the-art integrated analysis that captures both the  
18 full suite of climate forcings as well as cross sectoral demands for food, fibre and bioenergy and the  
19 related land use and land use change. This literature alert to the fact that biogeochemical and  
20 biogeophysical components of large-scale land use changes may have contrasted contribution to  
21 temperature and climate; and these effects may even compensate each other at global level. For  
22 example, the CO<sub>2</sub>-induced (biogeochemical) temperature increase associated with historical land-use  
23 change is found to have the same order of magnitude to the globally-averaged biogeophysical cooling  
24 resultant from the same land-use change (Simmons & Matthews, 2016). Similarly, the impacts of  
25 large-scale biofuels expansion scenarios on climate are found to be negligible at the global scale  
26 (Hallgren et al., 2013) or even for some specific value chains when considering the combinations of  
27 biogeophysical and biogeochemical effects, e.g. (Caiazzo et al., 2014). However, these impacts are  
28 region dependent, and spatially differentiated mitigation strategies may therefore be advantageous.  
29 (Andrews et al., 2017; Davies-Barnard et al., 2014; Muri, 2018). For example, global land use  
30 strategies that protect tropical forests could dramatically reduce warming (Hallgren et al. 2013; Muri  
31 2018, Sonntag et al. 2016 ), while middle latitude afforestation may lead to net warming due the large  
32 biogeophysical effect of decreasing albedo (Davies-Barnard et al., 2014). However, these climate  
33 implications from climate mitigation strategies should certainly be balanced against the other  
34 important co-benefits of forest for ecosystems and humans, including biodiversity, income generation,  
35 flood control, and improving soil, air and water quality must be considered (Gilroy et al., 2014;  
36 Griscom et al., 2017; A. B. Harper et al., 2018).

37 The outcomes of scenarios obtained using integrated assessment models (IAMs) indicate that non-  
38 negligible amounts of biofuels will be needed considering the different climate mitigation targets.  
39 Earth System Model Inter-comparison studies (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, CMIP6),  
40 including for a range of anthropogenic and natural climate forcings as well as feedbacks for selected  
41 SSP reference scenarios will be discussed here.

42 The projected amounts of biofuels to be used in the transport sector vary across the future scenarios.  
43 However, since many biofuel options are easy to adapt and implement with existing technologies,  
44 they appear as an attractive climate mitigation option. The question how to prioritize, whatever  
45 amounts that may be produced in a sustainable manner towards different mitigation targets, is  
46 therefore in any case of relevance. In the following section we review the bottom up studies to see  
47 what insights the scientific literature offers in this regard.

### 1 **10.3.3.2 *Prioritization of biofuel use in transport sector***

2 Projections from the oil industry indicate that the largest portion (about 90%) of the growth in the  
3 biofuels use at global level in the period up to 2040 will be used for road transport, followed by an  
4 small increase in the biofuel use in the aviation sector (BP, 2019). The literature evaluating the  
5 avoided life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of biofuels substituting fossil fuel also identified road  
6 passenger transport as the use with highest mitigation potential. For example, an analysis addressing  
7 the optimal use of global bioenergy resources to offset fossil fuels has shown that biofuel offsetting  
8 light distillate liquid fossil fuels (e.g. gasoline, naphtha) have higher climate mitigation potential at  
9 global level in comparison to biofuels offsetting middle (e.g. kerosene, jet fuel, diesel) and heavy (e.g.  
10 heavy fuel oil) liquid distillate fossil fuels for different scenarios of biomass availability (Staples,  
11 Malina, & Barrett, 2017a). However, these results are subject of many methodological assumptions  
12 regarding biomass availability and readiness of conversion technologies. The authors indicate that an  
13 optimal deployment of bioenergy resources to maximize greenhouse gases reductions requires a mix  
14 of bioenergy end-uses and, notably, this mix consists of uses that are not necessarily the most  
15 effective, initially or on average, including drop-in middle distillate fuels such as aviation biofuels.  
16 Therefore, there is low agreement and low confidence in the optimal biomass allocation to substitute  
17 light distillate fossil fuels will deliver highest climate mitigation potential at global level, considering  
18 the energy demands from all the economic sectors.

19 When specific targets of climate change stabilization at low levels are considered, the use of biofuels  
20 for heavy transport, aviation and marine gain more prominence. For example, IEA established a set of  
21 global scenarios with different energy technology and policy pathways for a low-carbon energy  
22 system in the period up to 2060 (IEA, 2017). These scenarios consider the existing and planned  
23 energy and climate-related commitments by countries as well as the feasibility of accelerating clean  
24 energy technology deployment in pursuit of more ambitious climate goals, among other factors.  
25 Results indicate that biofuels will play a key role in the decarbonisation of long-haul transport modals,  
26 complementing measures aimed at constraining the sector's energy needs and the enhanced role of  
27 electrification and other measures in urban and other shorter-haul transport applications. Biofuels are  
28 expected to provide about 40% of aviation transport fuel in 2060, and 30% of fuel for shipping.  
29 However, the lack of a supportive regulatory environment for biofuels is identified as one of the  
30 barriers to their adoption in both aviation and marine transport (IEA, 2017). The new emission  
31 reduction targets established by aviation and shipping sectoral organizations may help to accelerate the  
32 adoption of biofuels in these transport modals (Hsieh & Felby, 2017; Scheelhaase, Maertens, Grimme,  
33 & Jung, 2018). Likewise, some oil industry scenarios for future energy demands aiming at achieving  
34 the Paris Agreement also project a rapid electrification of passenger vehicle fleet with increased  
35 biofuel use for shipping and aviation (Shell, 2018). Analyses addressing the future biofuel use  
36 projections of the energy demands under more stringent climate mitigation targets show high  
37 agreement and high confidence that biofuels will likely have key role for decarbonizing aviation,  
38 marine and heavy-duty transport.

39 The top-down analyses of SSP scenarios calculated using integrated assessment models (IAM) o  
40 indicate increasing importance in the use of biofuels for heavy road transport and aviation (van  
41 Vuuren et al., 2017). The projection for the transport system in the SSP scenarios shows a dominant  
42 position of electric and hydrogen-fuelled drive-trains in SSP1 in road transport. For aviation and  
43 heavy road transport, biofuels are the most important fuel option. Similar trends occur in the SSP2  
44 and SSP3, but a smaller scale due relatively slower technology development in these scenarios (van  
45 Vuuren et al., 2017). In another example, (Rochedo et al., 2018) used an IAM developed for Brazil to  
46 explore different 2 °C compliant carbon emission scenarios related to alternative environmental  
47 governance in the country. Their findings support that a more stringent decarbonization scenario will  
48 require rapid electrification in the road passenger transport, complemented to higher use of biofuels to

1 decarbonize freight transport and aviation, for which there are fewer alternatives available. Energy-  
 2 dense liquid fuels are likely to remain the preferred energy source for long-distance transport services  
 3 (Davis, Lewis, Shaner, Aggarwal, Arent, Azevedo, Benson, Bradley, Brouwer, & Chiang, 2018).  
 4 Literature using IAMs to illustrate societal changes needed to achieve specific temperature  
 5 stabilization targets have high agreement and high confidence that use of biofuels will be mostly  
 6 needed for heavy transport and aviation. However, most of the policies regarding renewable liquid  
 7 transport fuels have been geared towards the road transport sector, while mandates promoting the use  
 8 of renewables for shipping and aviation transport have been lagging (Hsieh & Felby, 2017).

### 9 **10.3.3.3 Biofuel conversion technologies and readiness levels**

10 Many studies have addressed the life-cycle emission of biofuel conversion pathways for road, aviation  
 11 and marine applications, e.g. (Robert Edwards et al., 2017; Staples, Malina, Suresh, Hileman, &  
 12 Barrett, 2018a; Tanzer, Posada, Geraedts, & Ramírez, 2019). While some biofuels options such as  
 13 ethanol from fermentation of sugars and biodiesel from oil crops have already achieved commercial  
 14 scale in many countries, there has been slow technology development to produce biofuels derived  
 15 from lignocellulosic feedstocks (Table 10.6).

16 **Table 10.6 Ranges of efficiency, GHG emissions and relative costs of selected biofuel conversion**  
 17 **technologies for road, marine and aviation biofuels.**

Main application	Conversion technology	Energy efficiency of conversion <sup>a</sup>	GHG emissions of conversion (gCO <sub>2eq</sub> /MJ <sub>fuel</sub> )	Relative cost of conversion (1-3)
Road	Lignocellulosic ethanol	35% <sup>b</sup>	5 <sup>c</sup>	2
Road/Aviation	Gasification and Fischer-Tropsch synthesis	57% <sup>d</sup>	<1 <sup>c</sup>	3
Road	Ethanol from sugar and starch	60-70% <sup>e</sup>	1 - 31 <sup>c</sup>	1
Road	Biodiesel from oil crops	95% <sup>f</sup>	12 - 30 <sup>c</sup>	1
Marine	Upgraded pyrolysis oil	30 - 61% <sup>g</sup>	1-4 <sup>g</sup>	2
Aviation/Marine	Hydro-processed esters and fatty acids	80% <sup>h</sup>	3 <sup>h</sup>	2
Aviation	Alcohol to jet	90% <sup>i</sup>	<1 <sup>j</sup>	3
Road	Biomethane from residues	60% <sup>k</sup>	n.a.	1
Marine	Hydrothermal liquefaction	35-69% <sup>g</sup>	<1 <sup>g</sup>	3
Aviation	Sugars to hydrocarbons	65% <sup>l</sup>	15 <sup>l</sup>	3

18 Source: <sup>a</sup>Calculated as liquid fuels output divided by energy in feedstock entering the conversion  
 19 plant; <sup>b</sup>(Olofsson, Barta, Börjesson, & Wallberg, 2017); <sup>c</sup>(Robert Edwards et al., 2017); <sup>d</sup>(Simell et al.,  
 20 2014); <sup>e</sup>(de Souza Dias et al., 2015); <sup>f</sup>(Castanheira, Grisoli, Coelho, Anderi Da Silva, & Freire, 2015);  
 21 <sup>g</sup>(Tanzer et al., 2019); <sup>h</sup>(Klein et al., 2018); <sup>i</sup>(Narula, Davison, & Keller, 2017); <sup>j</sup>(de Jong et al.,  
 22 2017a); <sup>k</sup>(Salman, Schwede, Thorin, & Yan, 2017); <sup>l</sup>(Moreira, Gurgel, & Seabra, 2014).



1 Within the aviation sector there is optimism that jet fuels produced from biomass resources could  
2 offer a viable means to reduce emissions under the right policy circumstances. Despite the growing  
3 interest in aviation biofuels, both demand and production volumes remain negligible compared to  
4 conventional fossil aviation fuels. Nearly all flights powered by biofuels have been using fuels  
5 derived from vegetable oils and fats (Mawhood, Gazis, de Jong, Hoefnagels, & Slade, 2016).  
6 Although many technology routes for these biofuels are consolidated, the potential to scale-up of  
7 aviation biofuel volumes is severely restricted by the lack of low cost and sustainable feedstocks.  
8 Lignocellulosic feedstocks, however, are considered to have greater potential for production of  
9 sustainable and financially competitive RJF in many regions. In addition, production facilities involve  
10 significant capital investment and estimated levelized costs are typically more than twice the selling-  
11 price of conventional petroleum jet fuel, and in some cases (notably for vegetable oils), the price of  
12 the raw feedstock is already greater than that of the fossil jet fuel (Mawhood et al., 2016). Some  
13 promising technological routes for producing RJF from lignocellulosic feedstocks are below TRL 6  
14 (pilot scale) with just a few players involved in the development of these technologies (Figure 10.7).

15 In comparison to the aviation sector, advances in technology deployment are not far behind for the  
16 shipping sector. The advantage of shipping fuels is that marine engines have a much higher  
17 operational flexibility on a mix of fuels, and shipping fuels do not need to undergo extensive refining  
18 processes as road and aviation fuels. However, the use of biofuels in marine engines has only been  
19 tested at an experimental stage or in small-scale applications, leaving doubts about the scalability of  
20 the operations. In addition, having an abundant feedstock supply and reliable processing technologies  
21 to produce price-competitive biofuel at a large scale remains a challenge for the maritime sector  
22 (Hsieh & Felby, 2017). Other drawbacks include industry concerns about oxidation, storage, and  
23 microbial stability for less purified or more crude biofuels. Assuming that biofuels are technically  
24 developed and available for the maritime sector in large quantities, a wider initial introduction of  
25 biofuels in the sector is likely to depend upon increased environmental regulation of particulate and  
26 greenhouse gases emissions. More extensive use of marine biofuels will most likely be first  
27 implemented in inner city waterways, inland river freight routes and coastal green zones. Given the  
28 high efficiency of the diesel engine, a large-scale switch to a different standard marine propulsion  
29 method in the near-midterm future seems unlikely. Thus, much of the effort has been placed to  
30 develop biofuels compatible with diesel engines. So far, biodiesel blends of up to 20% look promising  
31 as it has been done in the road transport sector. Hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO) is also a technically  
32 good alternative and is compatible with current engines and supply chain, but the introduction of  
33 multifuel engines may open market for ethanol fuels (Hsieh & Felby, 2017).





Figure 10.7 Commercialisation status of selected biofuels conversion technologies.

Source: Based on (IEA, 2017; Mawhood et al., 2016; Skeer, Boshell, & Ayuso, 2016)

### 10.3.4 Advanced internal combustion engines

Internal combustion engines (ICE) remain the dominant vehicle technology used for transport. In the medium-term, it is likely these engines will continue to account for a significant share of vehicles used worldwide. Research is thus ongoing to identify opportunities improve efficiency and reduce carbon emissions from ICE.

Two types of ICE are widely used around the world. Spark ignition engines, which typically run on gasoline, operate at break thermal efficiencies of 30-36% (Liu et al., 2018). Compression ignition engines, which typically run with diesel, can reach break thermal efficiencies of 40-47% (Liu et al., 2018). Current efficiencies represent improvements in ICE technologies. Indeed, a recent report suggests that the average fuel economy of new vehicles sold globally decreased by 2% between 2005 and 2017 (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019). Figure 10.8 shows the average fuel economy of new registered light-duty vehicles (LDV) in select countries for which data are available between 2005 and 2017. The figure shows that the fuel economy has increased in all countries. However, the efficiency improvements diverged between countries and regions. Furthermore, these observed improvements in fuel economy of LDV fall short of the efficiency improvements required to reach a target fuel economy of 4.4 liters of gasoline equivalent (Lge) per 100 kilometers (km) set through the Global Fuel Economy Initiative (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019).




1  
2 **Figure 10.8 Average fuel economy of new LDV in 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2017**

3 Source: (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019)

4 Efficiency improvements in ICE for all vehicle applications (light-duty, heavy-duty, and rail) can be  
5 obtained via several strategies that include improvements in engines and transmission technologies, as  
6 well as changes in weight, aerodynamics, tires, and auxiliary power systems. 1.7 shows the efficiency  
7 gains of strategies available to improve the efficiency of a mid-size gasoline car and a mid-size diesel  
8 car. The figure also shows the direct costs associated with the deployment of these technologies. The  
9 figure highlights that existing technologies are available to increase the fuel efficiency of a mid-size  
10 ICE vehicle by up to 50% at costs below US\$5,000 (National Research Council, 2015). Additional  
11 efficiency gains are possible through the use of improved transmission technologies (using a shift  
12 optimizer, for example), the use of electrified accessories technologies (electric power steering, for  
13 example), and hybridization technologies. Finally, mass reductions can also lead to fuel economy  
14 improvements. For example, a 25% reduction in the mass of a mid-size car could result in a 15%  
15 incremental fuel consumption reduction (National Research Council, 2015).

16 In addition to improving the efficiency of ICE, the use of alternative fuels in these engines could  
17 result in reduced carbon emissions. Alternative fuels to replace gasoline in spark ignition engines  
18 include liquified petroleum gases (LPG), compressed natural gas (CNG), liquified natural gas, alcohol  
19 fuels like methanol and ethanol produced from natural gas or biomass, or hydrogen produced from  
20 fossil fuels or through electrolysis (Bae & Kim, 2017; Brynolf, Taljegard, Grahn, & Hansson, 2018;  
21 Davis, Lewis, Shaner, Aggarwal, Arent, Azevedo, Benson, Bradley, Brouwer, Chiang, et al., 2018).  
22 Biodiesel and biomass-based alcohols could be used in compression ignition engines to replace diesel  
23 (Bae & Kim, 2017). Finally, synthetic hydrocarbons with characteristics similar to those of oil-based  
24 gasoline and diesel can be produced through the Fischer-Tropsch process using coal, natural gas,  
25 captured CO<sub>2</sub>, or biomass (Brynolf et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2016b). Figure 10.9 shows the different  
26 production pathways for fuels that can be used in ICE. The carbon mitigation potential of these fuels  
27 varies significantly. Coal-based fuels, for example, would not provide emission reductions compared  
28 to petroleum-based fuels (Hao, Liu, Zhao, Du, & Chen, 2017; Kong, Dong, & Jiang, 2018; H. Zhou,  
29 Qian, Kraslawski, Yang, & Yang, 2017). The carbon reduction potential of natural gas-based fuels for

1 use in ICEs is also limited (F. Tong, Jaramillo, & Azevedo, 2015; Fan Tong, Jaramillo, & Azevedo,  
 2 2015). Finally, there is significant variability in the emission reduction potential of bio-based fuels  
 3 used in ICE depending on the feedstock used and production process. Section 10.4 includes a review  
 4 of emission abatement potential and costs of different fuels.




5  
 6  
 7 **Figure 10.9 Cumulative fuel consumption reductions versus cumulative direct manufacturing costs of**  
 8 **technologies to improve efficiency of an example mid-size gasoline vehicle (a) and an example mid-class**  
 9 **diesel vehicle (b).**

10 Source: : (National Research Council, 2015)

11 **10.4 Decarbonization of land-based transport**

12 Land-based transport is a crucial component of the global transport system. Land-based transport  
 13 includes the movement of people (passenger transport) as well as the movement of goods (freight  
 14 transport), as shown in Figure 10.10. Historically, petroleum-based fuels have been the primary  
 15 source of energy for land-based transport. Gasoline and diesel, in particular, have been the major fuel  
 16 used in light-duty vehicles, buses that provide passenger mobility, as well as medium-and-heavy duty  
 17 truck and rail that provide freight services. Low carbon technologies for land-based transport of  
 18 people and goods will be increasingly important to meet decarbonization goals, as demand for these  
 19 services will continue to grow in the future. This section summarizes the state of the knowledge about  
 20 low-carbon technologies for land-based transport. Specifically, this section includes information about  
 21 the greenhouse gas emissions abatement potential, abatement cost, and feasibility of deploying these  
 22 low-carbon technologies for land-based transport of people and goods.




1  
2 **Figure 10.10 Motorized land-based transport options**

### 3 **10.4.1 Light-duty vehicles for passenger transport**

4 Light duty vehicles (LDVs) represent the main mode of transport for private citizens, and currently  
 5 represent the largest share of transport emissions globally (International Energy Agency, 2019b).  
 6 Currently, powertrains depending on gasoline and diesel fuels remain the dominant technology in the  
 7 LDV segment (International Energy Agency, 2019a). Hybrid electric and fully battery electric  
 8 vehicles (BEVs), however, have become increasingly popular in recent years (IEA, Global EV  
 9 Outlook 2019). Correspondingly, the number of life cycle assessment (LCA) studies investigating  
 10 these and fuel cell electric vehicles have increased. While historically the focus has been on the  
 11 tailpipe emissions of LDVs, LCA studies demonstrate the importance of including emissions from the  
 12 value chain, particularly for alternative powertrain technologies. LCAs also reveal the trade-offs of  
 13 different types of environmental impacts. However, studies examining prospective climate  
 14 performance of vehicles remains somewhat sparse.

15 Furthermore, a significant bulk of the studies reviewed rely on a select few studies that are based on  
 16 primary data (Ellingsen, et.al 2016; Miotti et.al 2017; Evangelisti et al. 2017; Dai et al. 2018;  
 17 Zackrisson, Avellán, and Orlenius 2010; Majeau-Bettez et.al 2011; Notter et al. 2015, 2010; Bauer et  
 18 al. 2015; Kim et al. 2016; Simons and Bauer 2015).



1

2 **Figure 10.11 Life cycle greenhouse emissions for light-duty vehicle and fuel technologies.** All emissions are  
 3 presented in g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm. Bars represent the median of the reviewed values. GHG life-cycle emissions are  
 4 measured as intensity per vehicle-km driven, normalized over 180 000 km for LDVs

5 Figure 10.11 presents the life cycle emissions and mitigation costs for selected powertrain  
 6 technologies and fuel chain combinations for light duty vehicles. The figures in the table and the  
 7 section below are gathered from the academic literature and grey literature reviewed thus far (Bauer et  
 8 al., 2015; Benajes, García, Monsalve-Serrano, & Martínez-Boggio, 2020; Cox & Mutel, 2018;  
 9 Cusenza, Bobba, Ardente, Cellura, & Persio, 2019; de Souza et al., 2018; Elgowainy et al., 2018b; L.  
 10 A. W. Ellingsen et al., 2016; Evangelisti et al., 2017; Hawkins, Singh, Majeau-Bettez, & Strømman,  
 11 2013; Hoque, Biswas, Mazhar, & Howard, 2019; Kim et al., 2016; Lombardi, Tribioli, Cozzolino, &  
 12 Bella, 2017; Mercedes-Benz, 2013, 2015, 2018, 2019; Messagie, Boureima, Coosemans, Macharis, &  
 13 Mierlo, 2014; Miotti et al., 2017; Rosenfeld, Lindorfer, & Fazeni-Fraisl, 2019; Wu et al., 2019). The  
 14 vehicle manufacturing emissions (including disposal emissions for some studies) are presented  
 15 separately from the fuel chain and tailpipe emissions (operation emissions). The tailpipe emissions  
 16 and fuel consumption reported in the literature generally do not use empirical emissions data, nor the  
 17 relatively newly developed World-harmonised Light Vehicles Test Cycles (WLTC), which is  
 18 intended to more realistically represent actual driving conditions (Tsiakmakis et al., n.d.). Rather, they  
 19 tend to report fuel efficiency from the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) or analogous testing  
 20 cycles. As a result, the operating emissions reported in literature are therefore likely somewhat  
 21 underestimated in comparison to actual emissions (Tsiakmakis et al., n.d.). The extent of these  
 22 underestimations, however, vary between powertrain types and engine sizes. Emissions from fossil  
 23 fuel, hydrogen and electricity production in the operation phase are derived from (Acar & Dincer,  
 24 2014; Bhandari Ramchandra A4 - Trudewind, Clemens A. A4 - Zapp, Petra, 2014; Bicer & Dincer,  
 25 2017, 2018; Bruckner et al., 2014; Burmistrz, Chmielniak, Czepirski, & Gazda-Grzywacz, 2016; R  
 26 Edwards, Larive, Rickeard, & Weindorf, 2013; Hake et al., 2017; Khojasteh Salkuyeh, Saville, &  
 27 MacLean, 2017; Mehmeti, Angelis-Dimakis, Arampatzis, McPhail, & Ulgiati, 2018; Ozbilen, Dincer,  
 28 & Rosen, 2013; Suleman, Dincer, & Agelin-Chaab, 2015).

29 Current average life cycle impacts of midsize ICEVs span from approximately 145 to 255 g CO<sub>2</sub>-  
 30 eq/vkm, while sport utility vehicles (SUVs) have life cycle emissions in the range of 180 – 370 g  
 31 CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm. Regardless of the size, fuel consumption dominates the life cycle emissions of ICEVs,

1 with approximately 80% of these emissions arising from the tailpipe and fuel chain. However, the  
2 trend towards increasing vehicle size and engine power within segments, and consumer preferences  
3 towards the larger SUV classes, would result in higher overall emissions from the LDV fleet  
4 (International Energy Agency, n.d.-b). On a global scale, SUV sales have been constantly growing in  
5 the last decade, with 39% of the vehicles sold in 2018 being SUVs (International Energy Agency,  
6 n.d.-b). The transition from smaller vehicles to SUVs, in turn, may lead to increases in the emissions  
7 intensity of LDV fleet due to the higher life cycle emissions of SUVs compared to smaller vehicles  
8 (International Energy Agency, n.d.-b). However, the trend towards bigger and heavier vehicles, with  
9 consequently higher use phase emissions, can be offset by improvements in powertrain design, fuel  
10 efficiency, light weighting and aerodynamics (Gargoloff et al., 2018). Alternative fuels such as those  
11 described in 10.3.7 may also provide some mitigation potential for ICEVs.

12 There is an increasing trend for light weighting using advanced materials such as high-strength steel,  
13 aluminium, carbon fibre and polymer composites (Hottle, Caffrey, McDonald, & Dodder, 2017).  
14 These materials reduce the mass of the vehicle and thereby the fuel or energy consumption required to  
15 drive. Light weighted components often have higher production emissions than the components they  
16 replace due to these advanced materials, however, the reduced fuel consumption over the life cycle of  
17 the light weighted vehicle provides a net mitigation effect in comparison to the non-light weighted  
18 vehicle (Hottle et al., 2017; Kim & Wallington, 2013). In addition, these advanced materials may be  
19 challenging to recycle while maintaining their high technical performance (Meng, McKechnie,  
20 Turner, Wong, & Pickering, 2017).

21 Hybrid (HEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) vary in terms of degree of powertrain  
22 electrification. HEVs mainly rely on regenerative braking for charging the battery. On the other hand,  
23 PHEVs combine regenerative braking with external power sources for charging the battery. Operating  
24 emissions intensity is highly dependent on the degree to which electrified driving is performed, which  
25 in turn is user-dependent, and for PHEVs, on the source of the electricity for charging. Generally, life  
26 cycle emissions intensity will lie somewhat between that of equivalently sized ICEVs and BEVs  
27 charged with the same electricity mix, although their production impacts are comparable to the  
28 emissions generated for producing ICEVs. Current HEVs may help reducing the emissions of ICEVs  
29 of about 9-20%, yielding life cycle intensities varying between 115 and 235 g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm. The GHG  
30 emissions of PHEVs, on the other hand, range between 25 and 315g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm with 100% electric  
31 driving and electricity produced from wind and coal, respectively. Within this wide range, all the  
32 combinations of electric/fossil driving can be found, as well as the life cycle intensity for driving  
33 100% on fossil fuel. HEVs and PHEVs are the most sold class of electric vehicles, due to life cycle  
34 costs comparable to equivalently sized ICEVs (International Energy Agency, 2019a). Because HEVs  
35 cannot harness low-carbon energy carriers, they offer limited mitigation opportunities. In contrast,  
36 PHEVs have greater opportunities to reduce the use phase emissions, due to the possibility of  
37 charging the battery with low-carbon electricity and the ability to drive in full-electric mode for longer  
38 distances. However, driving patterns, consumer behaviour and access to renewable electricity for  
39 charging strongly affect the total operational impacts (Wu et al., 2019).

40 Currently, BEVs have higher manufacturing emissions than equivalently sized ICEVs, with 7 – 16 t  
41 CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm against approximately 3.5 - 7 t CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm of their mid-sized fossil-fuelled  
42 counterparts. The higher current-day production emissions of BEVs are largely attributed to the  
43 battery cell manufacture, which is currently performed in countries with relatively carbon-intensive  
44 electricity (L. A.-W. Ellingsen et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2016). As a result, the production emissions of  
45 BEVs are sensitive to the energy capacity of the battery, as illustrated by the larger range of  
46 production emissions intensity over ICEVs. Due to the higher energy efficiency of the electric  
47 powertrain, BEVs may compensate for these higher production emissions in the driving phase,  
48 however the mitigation ability of this technology relative to ICEVs is highly dependent on the

1 electricity mix used to charge the vehicle. As a consequence of the wide variety of energy sources  
2 available today, BEVs have a wide range of potential life cycle impacts, ranging roughly between 20  
3 to 355 g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm with electricity generated from wind and coal, respectively. The highest  
4 mitigation effects are achieved when charging the battery with electricity generated through low-  
5 carbon energy sources. Operational phase impacts of BEVs charged with low-carbon technologies can  
6 range from 2 to 10 g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm, for wind and solar respectively. Due to the lack of tailpipe  
7 emissions, BEVs reduce the amount of local air pollutants that are responsible for human health  
8 complications, particularly in densely populated areas (Hawkins, Singh, Majeau-Bettez, et al., 2013;  
9 Ke, Zhang, He, Wu, & Hao, 2017). State-of-the-art lithium ion batteries contain graphite and cobalt,  
10 which are listed as EU critical materials and may have associated supply risks (EC—European  
11 Commission, 2017). Of the materials in traction batteries, only cobalt, copper, aluminum and nickel  
12 are actively recovered in the recycling process (as of today), whereas lithium is not always recovered  
13 due to lacking economic incentives under current conditions (Hache, Seck, Simoen, Bonnet, &  
14 Carcanague, 2019; Zeng, Li, & Singh, 2014). Future battery chemistries may achieve lower costs,  
15 higher power and energy densities, leading to decreased battery mass, making vehicles lighter and  
16 consequently decrease the energy required for driving (Cano et al., 2018). Furthermore, potential  
17 cobalt-free technologies might reduce production cost and the mass of critical materials employed in  
18 BEVs. Additionally, as the technology develops, the lifetime of batteries, and consequentially BEVs,  
19 may increase. This in turn, would reduce the life cycle emissions intensity (g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm).

20 As with BEVs, current fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) have higher production emissions than  
21 similarly sized ICEVs and BEVs, generating approximately 6.5 – 16 t CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm. Since water  
22 vapour is the only tailpipe emission generated during the FCEV use phase, the hydrogen fuel chain is  
23 the only factor influencing the operational phase impacts of the technology. FCEVs can therefore  
24 reduce the local air pollution issues caused by ICEVs. To date, the most common method of hydrogen  
25 production is steam methane reforming from natural gas, which is relatively carbon intensive,  
26 producing approximately 130 g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm. Current literature covering life cycle impacts of the  
27 FCEVs show that vehicles fuelled with hydrogen produced from steam methane reforming through  
28 natural gas offer little or no mitigation potential over ICEVs. Other available hydrogen fuel chains  
29 vary widely in carbon intensity, depending on the synthesis method and the energy source used  
30 (electrolysis or steam methane reforming; fossil fuels vs. renewables). The least carbon-intensive  
31 production pathways for hydrogen are the use of electrolysis with electricity either produced with  
32 solar (27 g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm) or wind (12 g CO<sub>2</sub>-eq/vkm). Compared to ICEVs and BEVs, FCEVs are at a  
33 lower technology readiness level. Current R&D efforts aim to reduce platinum usage to the same  
34 levels as ICEVs (approximately 12 g/car), longevity of the vehicles and cost reduction (Pollet, Kocha,  
35 & Staffell, 2019).

36 Two-wheelers, consisting mainly of lower-powered mopeds and higher-powered motorcycles, are  
37 popular for personal transport in densely populated cities. Studies performing LCAs for this class of  
38 vehicles are uncommon in contrast to LDVs. We see, however, that the results available for two-  
39 wheelers exhibit similar trends for the different powertrain technologies as the LDVs, with electric  
40 powertrains having higher production emissions, but generally lower operating emissions, depending  
41 on the fuel chain. Life cycle emissions intensity for two-wheelers is also generally lower than LDVs  
42 on a vehicle-kilometer basis, however, generally have less carrying capabilities than LDVs, so this  
43 may change on a passenger-kilometer basis.

44 Current policies focus on reducing tailpipe emissions, however as alternative powertrains gain  
45 popularity, considering the emissions from the entire life cycle, including vehicle manufacturing and  
46 fuel production, will become increasingly important. Advanced ICEV, HEV and PHEV technologies  
47 powered by fossil fuels have limited potential for further reduction of GHG emissions. The mitigation  
48 potential of battery- and fuel cell vehicles is strongly dependent on the carbon intensity of their



1 production and the energy sources fueling operation. Consequently, BEVs and FCEVs have no or low  
2 climate mitigation effects when carbon intensive energy is used in production and operation phases. In  
3 contrast, using low-carbon energy sources in manufacturing and operation maximizes the high climate  
4 mitigation potentials of these powertrain technologies.

#### 5 **10.4.2 Transit technologies for passenger transport**

6 Buses provide urban and peri-urban transport services to millions of people around the world.  
7 Historically, buses have been powered with diesel fuel. However, a growing number of transport  
8 agencies around the world are exploring alternative-fueled buses. Alternative technologies to  
9 conventional diesel-powered buses include diesel hybrid-electric buses; buses powered with  
10 compressed natural gas (CNG), biodiesel, ethanol, dimethyl ether, and propane; battery electric buses;  
11 hydrogen fuel cell electric buses; and hydrogen fuel cell hybrid buses.

12 Passenger rail is another alternative mode of passenger transport that could support decarbonization of  
13 land-based passenger mobility consistent with strong climate mitigation targets. Rail systems can  
14 provide urban services (metro systems), as well as longer distance transport. Rapid increases in metro  
15 rail have occurred in Asian cities (Asian Development Bank, 2018) (Asian Development Bank, 2019)  
16 following Japanese and European robust inter-city and intra-city railway networks (Glazebrook &  
17 Newman, 2018). Metro systems around the world typically use electric regenerative braking for  
18 greater efficiency. Recent work suggests alternative propulsion systems like electric battery multiple  
19 units and fuel cell multiple units could become more useful in intra-urban connector services (Peter  
20 Newman et al., 2019). Intercity rail transport is increasingly powered with electricity, however, diesel  
21 is still prevalent for long-distance rail freight transport.

22 The carbon abatement potential, abatement costs, and technology readiness for these buses and  
23 passenger rail differ. For example, buses powered with compressed natural gas would have higher life  
24 cycle carbon emissions than battery electric vehicles charged with low carbon electricity. However,  
25 the life cycle cost of CNG buses is currently lower than the life cycle costs of battery electric buses.  
26 Future changes in technology readiness and economies of scale could change the cost differential of  
27 these bus types. Similarly, robust inter-city rail networks could offer opportunities to replace long-  
28 distance bus transport with electric locomotives.

29 *Placeholder- In the second order draft, this section will include a summary of the life cycle*  
30 *greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation costs, and feasibility of motorized options for passenger transit.*

#### 31 **10.4.3 Land-based freight transport**


32 Medium and heavy-duty trucks are a crucial mode for the inland movement of goods. Diesel fuel has  
33 been the traditional fuel used to power these trucks, but there is growing interest in alternative fuels  
34 that could reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the U.S. for example, there has been growing interest  
35 in using natural gas-based fuels for medium and heavy-duty trucks. Specifically, natural gas could be  
36 used directly as CNG or liquified natural gas, or it could be used to generate electricity or to produce  
37 hydrogen that could then fuel the trucks. However, natural gas-based fuels may not lead to drastic  
38 reductions in greenhouse gas emissions compared to diesel. Decarbonization of medium and heavy-  
39 duty trucks would likely require the use of low-carbon electricity in battery-electric trucks, low-  
40 carbon hydrogen in fuel-cell trucks, or bio-based fuels used in trucks with internal combustion  
41 engines(Fan Tong et al., 2015).

42 Freight rail is also a major mode for the inland movement of goods. Trains are more energy efficient  
43 (on the basis of tonne-km) than trucks, so expanded use of rail system (particularly in developing  
44 countries where demand for goods could explode) could provide carbon abatement opportunities.  
45 While diesel-based locomotives are still the major propulsion used in freight rail, interest in low-

1 carbon propulsion technologies is growing. Such technologies may include biofuels, natural gas,  
2 electricity, or hydrogen.

3 Figure 10.12 presents a review of life cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from land-based freight  
4 technologies (heavy and medium-duty truck, and rail), as reported in recent literature (since 2015).  
5 Each panel within the figure represents data in GHG emissions per ton-km of freight transported by  
6 different technology and/or fuel types, as indicated by the labels to the left. The data in each panel  
7 came from a number of relevant scientific studies (Cai, Burnham, Chen, & Wang, 2017; Cooper,  
8 Hawkes, & Balcombe, 2019; Lajevardi, Axsen, & Crawford, 2018; Mojtaba Lajevardi, Axsen, &  
9 Crawford, 2019; Nahlik, Kaehr, Chester, Horvath, & Taptich, 2016; Otten, Hoen, & Boer, 2016;  
10 Quiros, Smith, Thiruvengadam, Huai, & Hu, 2017; Quiros et al., 2016; Rupp et al., 2018; H. Song,  
11 Ou, Yuan, Yu, & Wang, 2017; Taptich, Horvath, & Chester, 2016b). The black square markers  
12 correspond to data from studies that only report deterministic life cycle GHG emissions for different  
13 technology/fuel categories, while the red bars represent similar data from studies that report a range  
14 (minimum and maximum) instead of a single value. Results from multiple studies are reported in each  
15 panel causing some overlap of the ranges (i.e. bars) reported for a single technology/fuel type. The  
16 dark red areas on the bars represent this overlap. Placeholder-*In the second order draft, we will*  
17 *expand Figure 10.12 to include information about mitigation costs and feasibility indicators for each*  
18 *of these vehicle/fuel technologies.*

19 There are some caveats to the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions values reported in this figure. Some  
20 of the values in the figure were taken directly from the papers reviewed. Other papers did not include  
21 final values in the appropriate functional unit (tonne-km). We thus made some conversions based on  
22 other values obtained from the paper. Finally, none of the values reported in the figure have been  
23 harmonized for consistency in assumptions. To address biases resulting from different assumptions,  
24 10.12 shows percentage reductions in emissions for each vehicle/fuel combination. These reductions  
25 were calculated separately for each value from the literature based on the baseline emissions reported  
26 in the corresponding paper for conventional diesel technologies. The figure only includes data for  
27 medium and heavy-duty trucks as there wasn't enough data available in the papers reviewed for  
28 freight rail. As in Figure 10.12, the black square markers correspond to data from studies that only  
29 report deterministic life cycle GHG emissions for different technology/fuel categories, while the red  
30 bars represent similar data from studies that report a range (minimum and maximum) instead of a  
31 single value. Results from multiple studies are reported in each panel causing some overlap of the  
32 ranges (i.e. bars) reported for a single technology/fuel type. Not surprisingly, the literature suggests  
33 that electric vehicles and hydrogen vehicles would provide the greatest reductions in the life cycle  
34 greenhouse gas emissions of land-based freight compared to freight vehicles powered with  
35 conventional diesel today.




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**Figure 10.12 Life cycle greenhouse emissions for land-based freight technologies from the literature.** Each panel within the figure represents data in GHG emissions per ton-km of freight transported by different

1 technology and/or fuel types, as indicated by the labels to the left. Note that the scale in the x-axis in the three  
 2 panels is different.



3  
 4 **Figure 10.13 Life cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction potential from land-based freight**  
 5 **technologies and fuel types, as reported in recent literature (since 2015).** Each panel within the figure  
 6 represents data in % reduction in GHG emissions compared to conventional diesel, per ton-km of freight  
 7 transported by different technology and/or fuel types, as indicated by the labels to the left.

#### 1 **10.4.4 Conclusions**

2 This section summarized the state-of-the-knowledge about the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of  
3 such vehicle technology and fuels for light-duty passenger transport, transit technologies for  
4 passenger transport, and land-based freight. There is a relatively large variety of low-carbon  
5 technologies and fuels for light-duty vehicles, which have been widely documents in the life cycle  
6 analysis (LCA) literature. Of the available technologies and fuels, vehicle electrification offered the  
7 greatest opportunity for decarbonization of personal passenger transport. Indeed, as noted in section  
8 10.3, electric light-duty vehicles are gaining market share. Furthermore, the integrated assessment  
9 models and global transport models reviewed in section 10.7 also show the market share of electric  
10 vehicles growing in the most ambitious climate stabilization scenarios. However, vehicle  
11 electrification will only provide carbon mitigation benefits in so far electricity generation transitions  
12 to low-carbon technologies.

13 As noted earlier in the Chapter, modal shifts from passenger vehicles to transit systems could improve  
14 the efficiency of passenger mobility and support decarbonization efforts. Diesel fuel has been the  
15 dominant fuel used in buses. Increasingly, municipalities throughout the world are showing interest in  
16 hybrid-electric or battery-electric buses. Natural gas-based fuels could also provide some carbon  
17 benefits relative to diesel-powered buses, but these technologies will not lead to deep decarbonization  
18 of the bus fleets. Urban and peri-urban rail can also benefit from electrification.

19 The technological choices for decarbonizing freight transport are more limited than for passenger  
20 transport. Electrification of medium and heavy-duty trucks is an option, but there are still challenges  
21 associate with technology and infrastructure (Çabukoglu, Georges, Küng, Pareschi, & Boulouchos,  
22 2018). Electrolytic hydrogen could also support decarbonization of truck-based freight transport.  
23 Hydrogen as a fuel is likely more viable for freight applications than for passenger vehicles (Moriarty  
24 & Honnery., 2019). Rail transport is an important mode for the movement of goods and less research  
25 about low-carbon technologies is available in the LCA literature for freight rail. Some of the work  
26 reviewed in this section suggests electrification of freight rail may be an option, but some of the  
27 technical challenges for electric trucks are also a concern for electric freight rail. Technological  
28 innovations are likely needed to enable deep decarbonization of freight transport.

29 Finally, the LCA literature reviewed in this section focused on technologies that can support  
30 decarbonization of land-based transport. Other, non-technical strategies may also support efficiency  
31 gains and decarbonization of this transport sector. Section 10.2, for example, includes a discussion of  
32 systemic changes that would affect the carbon intensity of land-based transport. Other strategies not  
33 discussed in section 10.2 that may be of particular relevance for land-based transport include logistic  
34 optimization of freight as well as shared transport of passengers and goods (Beirigo, Schulte, &  
35 Negenborn, 2018; Gatta, Marcucci, Nigro, Patella, & Serafini, 2018; Masson et al., 2017; Pimentel &  
36 Alvelos, 2018; Serafini, Nigro, Gatta, & Marcucci, 2018). Placeholder-*In the SOD we will aim to*  
37 *include mitigation potential, abatement costs, and feasibility of these strategies.*

38 *Placeholder-In the SOD this summary will also include a discussion about abatement costs and*  
39 *feasibility for low-carbon technologies for freight transport.*

40 *-Throughout the text for this section we have pointed out additional text we will add for the SOD. In*  
41 *particular, we aim to include a detailed review of the carbon abatement costs of the technologies/fuels*  
42 *included in the section. Additionally, the SOD will include a detailed discussion about the feasibility*  
43 *of these technologies. To synthesize such information, we propose to modify the figures included in*  
44 *this FOD following the example Table 10.7 below.*


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- 1 Placeholder for SOD-Table 100.7 WGIII contribution to AR6 cycle Caption above the table
- 2 Placeholder for SOD-Table 10.7 Proposed structure for summarizing carbon intensity, mitigation cost, and feasibility of land-based transport technologies in SOD
- 3

Life Cycle Carbon Intensity (g CO <sub>2</sub> -eq/vkm)	Mitigation cost (US\$2015/t CO <sub>2</sub> )	Feasibility (Work in progress)	
		Adaptation indicators	Mitigation indicators
ICEV Midsize Gasoline	~100	↑ ICEVs (diesel and gasoline): Micro- and Macro-economic viability; Technical resource availability	↑ ICEVs (diesel and gasoline): Cost-effectiveness; Technical scalability; Maturity; Global spread
		↓ Risks mitigation potential; Social co-benefits	↓ Social co-benefits, Reduction of air pollution, Improved biodiversity
PHEV 2030 (if data available) Current El. Coal	~100	↑ HEVs: Micro- and Macro-economic viability; Technical resource availability	↑ HEVs: Maturity; Technical scalability;
		↓ Risks mitigation potential;	↓ Social co-benefits
LDV BEV Current El. Coal El. NG El. Wind El. Solar El. Coal + CCS El. NG + CCS	~100	↑ BEVs: Micro- and Macro-economic viability; Technical resource availability	↑ BEVs: Maturity; Technical scalability; Legal & administrative feasibility; Social co-benefits; Reduction of air pollution
		↓ Risks mitigation potential;	↓ Limited use of scarce (geo)physical resources
FCEV Current Electrolysis (PV) Electrolysis (wind) H2 SMR H2 SMR + CCS	~100	↑ BEVs: Micro- and Macro-economic viability; Technical resource availability	↑ BEVs: Maturity; Technical scalability; Legal & administrative feasibility; Social co-benefits; Reduction of air pollution
		↓ Technical resource availability;	↓ Limited use of scarce (geo)physical resources
ICEV 2030 (if data available) Current Gasoline	~100	↑ FCEVs: Social co-benefits; Physical feasibility; Risks mitigation potential; Social co-benefits	↑ FCEVs: Reduction of air pollution; Technical scalability; Social co-benefits
		↓ Technical resource availability; Micro- and Macro- economic viability	↓ Cost-effectiveness; Maturity;
2-wheeleders BEV Current El. Coal El. Wind	~100		
FCEV 2030 (if data available) Current Electrolysis (PV) Electrolysis (wind) H2 SMR H2 SMR + CCS	~100		

4



5  
6 **Figure 10.14 Alternative fuel pathways for Internal Combustion Engines**

7 Notes: Black boxes represent feedstocks. Dark grey boxes represent production processes. Light grey  
8 boxes represent final products.

## 1 **10.5 Decarbonization of aviation**

2 Aviation is widely recognized as a ‘hard-to-decarbonize’ sector (Sudhir Gota, Huizenga, Peet,  
3 Medimorec, & Bakker, 2019c) (Committee on Climate Change, 2019) having a high dependency on  
4 liquid fossil fuels and an operational and technology infrastructure that has long ‘lock-in’ timescales,  
5 resulting in slow fleet turnover times and long technology development timescales. Alternative lower-  
6 carbon footprint fuels have been certified for usage over recent years, principally from bio-feedstocks  
7 but are not yet widely available at economic prices yet (Kandaramath Hari, Yaakob, & Binitha, 2015).  
8 In addition, alternative fuels from bio-feedstocks have variable carbon footprints because of different  
9 life-cycle emissions associated with different production methods and associated land-use change (de  
10 Jong et al., 2017b) (Staples, Malina, Suresh, Hileman, & Barrett, 2018b) (Witcover, Yeh, & Sperling,  
11 2013) (Staples, Malina, & Barrett, 2017b) – see section 10.3.3. The complex options emerging will be  
12 reviewed.

### 13 **10.5.1 Historical and current emissions from aviation**

14 The principal greenhouse gas from aviation is CO<sub>2</sub>, although aviation has a number of other effects on  
15 climate through its non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (see section xx). Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> are calculated under  
16 UNFCCC reporting requirements as being either domestic or international; however, a number of  
17 methodologies are used by states according to facilities and data availability such that the global data  
18 are less reliable for assessment purposes. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)  
19 emissions estimation uses more complex greenhouse gas emissions models (tier 3 models, IPCC,  
20 2006) and datasets of real aircraft movements, where available, and probably represents the best  
21 inventory available for spot years (e.g. 2006, 2013). However, ICAO focusses on international  
22 emissions and there are some known sources of underestimation. Historical data are required for  
23 assessment of CO<sub>2</sub> impacts and this has been estimated from International Energy Agency (IEA)  
24 statistics of aviation fuel (Jet-A1, AvGas) production and usage (Sausen & Schumann, 2000) (Lee et  
25 al., 2009) (Lee et al., 2020).

26 Domestic aviation emissions are attributable to states and are included under their NDCs towards the  
27 Paris Agreement goals, whereas international emissions are non-attributable to states (similar to  
28 international shipping emissions). International emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> from aviation are not specified  
29 under the Paris Agreement (unlike the Kyoto Protocol), however, the respective UN agencies of  
30 ICAO and the International Maritime Organization are still pursuing measures for limiting and  
31 reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.

32 In 2018, emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> from global aviation were just over 1 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub> and have been steadily  
33 increasing at rates of around 2.5% yr<sup>-1</sup> over the last two decades although the period 2010 to 2018 saw  
34 a sharper increase of +27% in total. International emissions of aviation are calculated by ICAO to be  
35 65% of global emissions and projected to increase both in absolute terms and as a relative proportion  
36 to total aviation (Fleming & Lepinay, 2019). Current (2018) total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from aviation  
37 represent approximately 2.4% of total anthropogenic emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, including land use change, on  
38 an annual basis (using IEA data, IATA data and global emissions data, Le Quéré et al., 2018).

### 39 **10.5.2 Short lived climate forcers and aviation**

40 Aviation emits a number of gases and aerosol particles that contribute towards its total fraction of  
41 anthropogenic climate forcing of approximately 3%, from its historical emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> and other  
42 emissions of water vapour, particles from soot and sulphate (from S in the fuel), and nitrogen oxides  
43 (NO<sub>x</sub>, =NO + NO<sub>2</sub>), with its 2018 total being ~98 mW m<sup>-2</sup> (Lee et al., 2020). The non-CO<sub>2</sub> effects of  
44 aviation on climate fall into the category of short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs). Emissions of water  
45 vapour and soot particles can trigger the formation of contrails, if the atmosphere is supersaturated  
46 with respect to ice, and below a critical threshold temperature condition (Kärcher, 2018). These linear

1 contrails can spread to form extensive contrail cirrus cloud coverage, which is estimated to have a  
2 combined effective radiative forcing (ERF) of around  $50 \text{ mW m}^{-2}$  (Lee et al., 2020), some 51% of the  
3 current ERF of global aviation. Emissions of  $\text{NO}_x$  result in an enhancement of short-lived  $\text{O}_3$  (a  
4 positive ERF) and a reduction of ambient  $\text{CH}_4$ , which represents a negative ERF; the  $\text{CH}_4$  reduction  
5 also results in negative ERFs from reductions in stratospheric water vapour (Myhre et al., 2007) and  
6 background  $\text{O}_3$  (Holmes, Tang, & Prather, 2011), which together results in a net  $\text{NO}_x$  ERF of  $\sim 18 \text{ mW}$   
7  $\text{m}^{-2}$  (Lee et al., 2020).

8 Additional effects from aviation from aerosol-cloud interactions are thought to exist but the  
9 magnitude of these are highly uncertain, with no best estimates available. Soot emissions from  
10 aircraft, either deposited directly in the atmosphere or sublimed from contrail cirrus may increase  
11 cloudiness, and the forcing from this cloudiness may be strongly negative or positive, depending on  
12 critical atmospheric parameters (C. Zhou & Penner, 2014) (C. Zhou, Penner, Lin, Liu, & Wang,  
13 2016), or possibly closer to a zero net effect (Gettelman & Chen, 2013) (Pitari et al., 2015). Sulphur  
14 from the fuel is largely emitted as  $\text{SO}_2$  with a small fraction ( $\sim 3\%$ ) emitted as  $\text{H}_2\text{SO}_4$  (Petzold et al.,  
15 2005). The  $\text{SO}_2$  oxidises in the background atmosphere to form sulphate particles, and these particles  
16 are thought to contribute to the secondary indirect effect on warmer low-level liquid clouds, resulting  
17 in a net negative forcing of uncertain magnitude (Righi, Hendricks, & Sausen, 2013) (Kapadia et al.,  
18 2016).

19 The net warming from aviation's non- $\text{CO}_2$  SLCFs is  $\sim 64\%$  of aviation's total warming and as such is  
20 the subject of discussion for reducing its impacts. However, the issues are complex, potentially  
21 involving technological, operational and atmospheric trade-offs with  $\text{CO}_2$  (see section X). Moreover,  
22 the impacts of aviation  $\text{NO}_x$  emissions perturbing the chemical composition of the atmosphere are not  
23 independent of background emissions from surface sources (ozone precursor emissions of  $\text{NO}_x$ ,  $\text{CO}$ ,  
24  $\text{CH}_4$  and NMHCs) and need to be accounted for in assessing future changes in ERF and mitigation  
25 potential (Skowron et al., 2020).

### 26 **10.5.3 Mitigation potential of fuels, operations, energy efficiency and market-based** 27 **measures**

#### 28 **Technology options (engine/airframe)**

29 The principal GHG of importance from aviation is  $\text{CO}_2$ , emitted at a ratio of  $3.16 \text{ kg CO}_2$  for every kg  
30 of fuel combusted. Other emissions that impact on aviation's non- $\text{CO}_2$  effects on climate are water  
31 vapour, particles, and  $\text{NO}_x$  (10.5.1). Engine and airframe manufacturers primary objective after safety  
32 issues is to reduce direct operating costs, i.e. fuel burn so much investment has gone into engine  
33 technology and aerodynamics to improve fuel burn per km. there have been major step changes in  
34 engine technology over time, e.g. from early 'jet' (turbojet) engines, to larger turbofan engines, and  
35 second-generation turbofans. Airframes have had improved performance over the years with wing  
36 design and incorporation of 'winglets' on the wing-tips. However, the basic configuration of an  
37 aircraft has remained more or less the same for decades.

38 As a result of this continuous improvement, large incremental gains have become much harder as the  
39 technology has matured, although twin-aisle aircraft have seen greater improvement rates in their lift  
40 to drag ratio than those of single-aisle aircraft (Cumpsty et al., 2018). The principal opportunities for  
41 fuel reduction come from improvements in aerodynamic efficiency, aircraft mass reduction, and  
42 propulsion system improvements. In terms of the future, Cumpsty et al.'s (2018) comprehensive  
43 assessment suggested that the highest rate of fuel burn reduction achievable for new aircraft was about  
44  $1.3\%$  per year, which short of ICAO's aspirational goal of  $2\%$  global annual average fuel efficiency  
45 improvement. Hence, the case established in the technology assessment of the IPCC (1999) report on  
46 Aviation and the Global Atmosphere is that growth continues to greatly outpace emission reductions  
47 from improved efficiency, which is why alternative approaches have been sought to reduce aviation's



1 climate impact by, e.g. alternative lower-carbon fuels on a life cycle basis (next section). More radical  
2 solutions have been suggested to modify the current air traffic system, e.g. by ‘formation flying’ (Xu  
3 et al., 2014), which has the potential to reduce fuel burn by up to ~8%. However, this would require  
4 increased capability onboard safety systems for wake sensing (Hemati et al., 2014) and ground-based  
5 air traffic control.

### 6 **Operational improvements (navigation)**

7 Aircraft navigation, from a global perspective is relatively efficient, with many long-haul routes  
8 travelling along great circle trajectories, or as close to possible, avoiding headwinds that increase fuel  
9 consumption (e.g. the north Atlantic flight corridor). In more densely populated and trafficked  
10 regions, aviation is more constrained; often by military airspace, congestion or adverse weather (e.g.  
11 Europe, North America). Few independent assessments are available of the potential for operational  
12 improvements. The ICAO ‘trends assessment’ exercise (Fleming & Lepinay, 2019), projects global  
13 improvements introduced by operational improvements (air traffic management) by an unspecified  
14 amount by 2050<sup>1</sup>. In contrast, such projections have to be balanced against detailed assessments of the  
15 challenges of operating in more congested airspace: for example, EUROCONTROL (2018) projected  
16 in their ‘most likely’ growth scenario, ‘Regulation and Growth’, that the majority of en-route airspace  
17 will face an increase of demand over 2017 levels by between 50% and 80% by 2040.

### 18 **Fuels (alternative biofuels, synthetic fuels and liquid hydrogen)**

19 The development of bio-based ‘sustainable alternative fuels’ has been widely addressed in recent  
20 years as a ‘drop in’ alternative fuel to reduce aviation’s carbon footprint. This obviates difficulties  
21 over developing radical new or alternative technologies in terms of engines and airframes, which  
22 would still utilize fossil-based kerosene aviation fuel. The cost of replacing the 2012 global aviation  
23 fleet was estimated at a trillion dollars, taking at least 14 years highlighting the difficulties associated  
24 with fleet replacement for new technologies (Hileman and Stratton, 2014). Thus, alternative fuels that  
25 can be utilized with current technologies, is an attractive proposition for CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation. Alternative  
26 aviation fuels to fossil-based kerosene have to be certified to the same standard as Jet-A for a variety  
27 of parameters associated with safety issues. Currently, the American Society for Testing and Materials  
28 (ASTM International) has certified five different types of sustainable aviation fuels with maximum  
29 blends ranging from 50% to 10% (Chiaramonti, 2019).

30 Bio-based fuels can be created by a number of feedstocks including cultivated feedstock crops, crop  
31 residues, municipal solid waste, waste fats, oils and greases, wood products and forestry residues  
32 (Staples et al., 2018). Each of these different sources can have different associated life-cycle  
33 emissions, such that they are not net zero-CO<sub>2</sub> but have associated emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> or other GHGs  
34 from their production and distribution. There are many challenges and barriers to widespread  
35 development of sustainable alternative fuels (SAF), the primary one being the current cost of fossil  
36 fuel vs SAF production (SAF is currently around three times the price of kerosene, Hari et al., 2015),  
37 which is a constraint on commercial development and viability. Other factors include cost effective  
38 production, feedstock availability, and certification costs (Hari et al., 2015). In addition, associated  
39 land use change emissions can be as large, or larger than the other life cycle emissions, depending  
40 upon crop type and location and represent a constraint in biofuel mitigation potential (Staples et al.,  
41 2017) and have inherent large uncertainties (Plevin et al., 2009). Other sustainability issues include  
42 food vs fuel arguments, water resource usage, and impacts on biodiversity.

43 Nonetheless, bio-based SAFs have been estimated to achieve life-cycle emissions reductions ranging  
44 between approximately 2% and 70% under a wide range of scenarios (Staples et al., 2018). For a set  
45 of European aviation demand scenarios, Kousoulidou and Lonza (2016) estimated that the demand in

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<sup>1</sup> Estimated from their Figure 4 as a saving of approximately 7% fuel over a baseline, by 2050.

1 2030 would be ~100 Mtoe in 2030 and biokerosene (HERFA/HVO) penetration would be just over  
2 2% of the total fuel demand at that date.

3 Clearly, for bio-based SAFs to be economically competitive, large adjustments in prices of fossil fuels  
4 or introduction of policies are required. Staples et al. (2018) estimated that in order to introduce bio-  
5 based SAFS that reduced LCA emissions by >50% by 2050, prices and policies were necessary for  
6 incentivization and require 268 new biorefineries per years and capital investment of approximately  
7 22 to 88 billion US\$ (2015 prices) per year between 2020 and 2050.

8 Other pathways have been discussed for the production of SAFs such as power-to-liquid pathways  
9 (Schmidt et al., 2018), sometimes termed ‘electro-fuels’ (Goldmann et al., 2018), or more generalized  
10 power to ‘x’ pathways (Kober et al., 2019). This process would involve the utilization of renewable  
11 electricity, CO<sub>2</sub> and water to synthesize jet fuel. Hydrogen is produced via an electrochemical process,  
12 powered by renewable energy and combined with CO<sub>2</sub> captured directly from the atmosphere and  
13 combined either by the Fischer-Tropsch or methanol synthesis. In comparison to bio-SAF production,  
14 the process is in its infancy but in terms of environmental performance, assuming availability of  
15 renewable electricity, it has much smaller land and water requirements, and potential for large life  
16 cycle emission reductions (Schmidt et al., 2016). No trials have yet been achieved.

17 Liquid hydrogen (LH<sub>2</sub>) as a fuel has been discussed for aeronautical applications since the 1950s  
18 (Brewer, 1991) and a few experimental aircraft have flown using such a fuel. Although the fuel has an  
19 energy density ~3 times greater than kerosene, it has a much lower energy density per unit volume.  
20 Experimental small aircraft have also flown using hydrogen fuel cells. LH<sub>2</sub> is a viable fuel source for  
21 commercial civil aviation passenger aircraft albeit with altered airframe structures to accommodate  
22 the fuel in the fuselage (Klug and Faass, 2001). Bicer and Dincer (2017) found that LH<sub>2</sub>-powered  
23 aircraft compared favourably to conventional kerosene-powered aircraft on a life cycle analysis  
24 (LCA) basis, providing that the LH<sub>2</sub> was generated from renewable energy sources (0.014 kg CO<sub>2</sub>  
25 tonne km<sup>-1</sup> cf 1.03 kg CO<sub>2</sub> tonne km<sup>-1</sup>, unspecified passenger aircraft). However, Pereria et al. (2014)  
26 also made a LCA comparison, and found much smaller benefits of LH<sub>2</sub>-powered aircraft  
27 (manufactured from renewable energy) compared with conventional fossil-kerosene, the two studies  
28 exposing the sensitivities of boundaries and assumptions in the analyses. Harsha (2014) and  
29 Rondinelli et al. (2017) conclude that there are many infrastructural barriers but that the  
30 environmental benefits of renewably-sourced LH<sub>2</sub> would be considerable. Khandelwal et al. (2013)  
31 take a more optimistic view of the prospect of LH<sub>2</sub>-powered aircraft but envisage them within a  
32 hydrogen-oriented energy economy.

33 In conclusion, there are many favourable arguments for LH<sub>2</sub>-powered aircraft both on an efficiency  
34 basis (Verstraete, 2013) and an overall reduction in GHG emissions, even on an LCA basis, but the  
35 major constraint is the infrastructural issues associated with fuel storage and distribution at airports,  
36 which is unlikely to be overcome unless there was a more general move towards a hydrogen-based  
37 energy economy. This is a conclusion for most heavy vehicle systems and the hydrogen option.

### 38 **Technological and operational trade-offs of non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and effects with CO<sub>2</sub>**

39 Since aviation has significant non-CO<sub>2</sub> warming impacts, there has been some discussion as to  
40 whether these can be addressed by either technological or operational means. For example, as aircraft  
41 engines have improved their fuel efficiency, with widescale usage of large high overall pressure ratio  
42 engines with large bypass ratios from large fan-bladed engines, this has tended to increase pressures  
43 and temperatures at the combustor inlet, with a resultant increase in tendency for thermal NO<sub>x</sub>  
44 formation in the absence of combustor technology to reduce this. This represents a potential  
45 technology trade-off whereby NO<sub>x</sub> control may be at the expense of extra fuel efficiency. Estimating  
46 the benefits or disbenefits of fuel and therefore CO<sub>2</sub> vs NO<sub>x</sub> is complex (Freeman, Lee, Lim,  
47 Skowron, & De León, 2018), requiring climate/chemistry model calculations and usage of emissions-

1 equivalency metrics, such as the Global Warming Potential (GWP) or Global Temperature change  
2 Potential (GTP) (see (Dalsøren et al., 2013) for an overview). Any GWP/GTP type emissions  
3 equivalency calculation always involves the user selection of a time horizon, over which the  
4 calculation is made, which is a subjective choice (Fuglestvedt et al., 2010). In general, the longer the  
5 time horizon, the more important CO<sub>2</sub> becomes in comparison with a SCLF.

6 A widely discussed opportunity for aviation non-CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation is the avoidance of contrails.  
7 Contrails only form with the emission of water vapour and soot particles from aircraft into ice-  
8 supersaturated air below a critical temperature threshold (Kärcher, 2018). It is therefore feasible to  
9 alter flight trajectories to avoid such areas conducive to contrail formation, since these ‘moist lenses’  
10 tend to be 10s of km in the horizontal and only a few 100 metres in the vertical extent (Gierens,  
11 Schumann, Smit, Helten, & Zängl, 1997). Theoretical approaches in the literature show that  
12 avoidance is possible on a flight-by-flight basis (Matthes et al., 2017). In case studies, it has been  
13 demonstrated that flight planning according to *trajectories with minimal climate impact* can  
14 substantially (up to 50%) reduce the aircraft net climate impacts despite additional CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
15 (e.g., (Niklaß et al., 2019)). However, such a conclusion of the net benefit or disbenefit depends upon  
16 the choice of metric and time-horizon applied. As for the above example of technological trade-offs,  
17 there is a tendency for additional CO<sub>2</sub> to cause a net disbenefit for all metrics when longer time  
18 horizons are considered.

#### 19 **Market-based measures – EU-ETS, other ETS, ICAO-CORSIA offsetting measure**

20 Market-based measures have been introduced in various regions of the world, based on emissions  
21 trading of CO<sub>2</sub>, notably in Europe but also for domestic aviation in New Zealand. The other major  
22 initiative is within ICAO, the ‘Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation’  
23 (CORSIA), agreed in 2016 to commence in 2020.

24 The European Union (EU) introduced aviation into its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 2012.  
25 This initially included flights between the European Economic Area (EEA) states and non-EEA  
26 states. However, the extension of the scheme to non-EEA states was highly controversial and in 2014  
27 the EU deferred the inclusion these flights under the so-called ‘stop-the-clock’ derogation. Currently,  
28 the EU-ETS for aviation includes all flights within and to and from EEA states. At around the same  
29 time, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) proposed to develop a global offsetting  
30 scheme, which was agreed in 2016 to commence in 2020, the ‘Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme  
31 for International Aviation’.

32 CORSIA has a phased implementation, with with an initial pilot phase (2021–2023) and a first phase  
33 (2024–2026) in which states will participate voluntarily. The second phase will then start (2026–  
34 2035) in which all states will participate unless exempted. States may be exempted if they have lower  
35 aviation activity levels or based on their UN development status. As of 16 July 2019, 81 States,  
36 representing ~77% of international aviation activity, intend to voluntarily participate in CORSIA from  
37 its outset. In terms of routes, only those where both States are participating are included. There is  
38 currently no “third phase” described and the fate of the CORSIA beyond 2035 is unclear.

39 The fate of the EU-ETS running concurrently with CORSIA is unclear at the moment. The EU-ETS is  
40 different to CORSIA in that the former is a cap-and-trade scheme, with airlines purchasing  
41 allowances, whereas CORSIA relies on verified offsetting, and exempts some biofuels. The nature of  
42 offsetting means that reductions are purchased from other sectors that either withhold from an  
43 intended emission, or reforest (Becken & Mackey, 2017), which is unclear that this represents a real  
44 reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

#### 1 **10.5.4 Accountability and governance options**

2 Under Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries were called to “...*pursue limitation or*  
3 *reduction of emissions of GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine*  
4 *bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International*  
5 *Maritime Organization, respectively.*” The Paris Agreement is rather different, in that ICAO (and the  
6 IMO) are not named, so that international aviation emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> do not appear to be covered, in  
7 that the Paris Agreement deals with states, and their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).  
8 This would imply that domestic aviation emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> (currently 35% of the global total) are  
9 covered by NDCs but international emissions are not. A number of states and regions have declared  
10 their intentions to include international aviation in their net-zero commitments including the UK,  
11 France, Sweden, and Norway, with the intentions of the European Union, New Zealand, California  
12 and Denmark being as yet unclear but under consideration (Committee on Climate Change, 2019).  
13 The Paris Agreement is a temperature-based target, such that it is unclear how emissions of GHGs and  
14 other climate forcers that are not included, including those from international aviation would be  
15 accounted for. Clearly, this is a less than ideal situation for clarity of governance of international  
16 GHG emissions from both aviation and shipping.

17 The ICAO CORSIA is a part of ICAO’s aspirational ‘carbon-neutral growth goal, 2020’, such that  
18 through CORSIA and technological and operational improvements, ICAO aims that international  
19 aviation emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> should not grow above 2020 levels. In addition, ICAO has a goal of global  
20 annual average fuel efficiency improvements of 2 percent until 2020 and an aspirational global fuel  
21 efficiency improvement rate of 2 percent per annum from 2021 to 2050. ICAO also regulates  
22 emissions, including those of NO<sub>x</sub>, CO, hydrocarbons (HCs) and non-volatile particulate emissions  
23 (nvPM) from engines, and recently (2017) adopted a whole-aircraft emissions standard for CO<sub>2</sub>. The  
24 emissions regulations of NO<sub>x</sub>, HCs, CO and nvPM are primarily targeted at protecting air quality in  
25 and around airports. However, there has been a working assumption that reducing NO<sub>x</sub> will reduce its  
26 impacts on tropospheric O<sub>3</sub> formation and its subsequent radiative forcing. In addition, emissions of  
27 nvPM or ‘soot’ are part of the early process of contrail formation and reducing the emissions  
28 (number) will reduce the initial number of ice crystal particles in the plume at altitude and reduce the  
29 propensity for contrail and subsequent contrail cirrus formation (Kärcher, 2018).

30 More recently, ICAO has at its 40<sup>th</sup> General Assembly (October, 2019) requested ICAO’s Council to  
31 “...*continue to explore the feasibility of a long-term global aspirational goal for international aviation,*  
32 *through conducting detailed studies assessing the attainability and impacts of any goals proposed,*  
33 *including the impact on growth as well as costs in all countries, especially developing countries, for*  
34 *the progress of the work to be presented to the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly*”. What form this  
35 goal will take is unclear until work is presented to the 41<sup>st</sup> Assembly (Autumn, 2022).

#### 36 **10.5.5 Synthesis: transformation trajectories for the aviation sector**

37 Here, three basic trajectories of development are envisaged that have differing degrees of response to  
38 reductions in GHG emissions. Some of the developments are encompassed by global or regional goals  
39 while some are more speculative.

40 A ‘**business as usual**’ (BAU) scenario largely reflects current and projected rates of technology  
41 development and policies currently in place. So, for aviation, global fleet fuel efficiency improves at  
42 around 1-2% per annum, with operational improvement delivering smaller improvements (since the  
43 system is relatively efficient). Market-based measures continue to operate through to at least 2030 in  
44 the case of the EU-ETS and 2035 in the case of CORSIA. Nonetheless, demand for aviation continues  
45 to increase at rates of somewhere between 5-7% yr<sup>-1</sup> in terms of RPK. Biofuel continues to make  
46 small contributions to aviation energy demand, of somewhere between 2 and 10% by 2050.


1 An **‘incremental scenario’** might be envisaged that sees technology developments similar to BAU,  
2 but with somewhat improved fuel efficiencies achieved from technology development with greater  
3 R&D development but a higher penetration of biofuels and zero-C synthetic fuels from renewables,  
4 resulting from greater private and governmental investment and the widening of ‘net-zero CO<sub>2</sub>  
5 ambitions’ by individual countries.

6 A **‘transformational scenario’** is one that works towards a target of net-zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the  
7 aviation sector. This would be driven by active policies that mandated phase-out of fossil fuel usage  
8 by 2050, considerable private and governmental investment in technologies for zero-C synthetic fuels  
9 produced from widely deployed new fuel production facilities, powered by renewable energy as part  
10 of a wider system promotion and mandating of renewable energy sources, with decommissioning of  
11 the fossil-fuel energy supply system. Short haul aviation would also be potentially powered by all- or  
12 semi-electric powered propulsion systems. Bio-based lower carbon fuels are regarded as an integral  
13 part of such a scenario in the short to medium term, gradually being replaced by zero-C synthetic  
14 fuels from renewable resources. The cost of flying may become considerably higher and subsequent  
15 demand reduced over a BAU scenario. An alternative to widespread usage of zero-C paraffinic fuels  
16 which would equally fall under a transformative scenario is that of LH<sub>2</sub> as a fuel for aviation. This  
17 would equally require the H<sub>2</sub> to be generated from renewable energy sources. However, it could be  
18 likely that such widespread usage is less likely, as this would require complete fleet renewal and  
19 design of airframes and to a lesser degree, the engines, as current airframes could not be converted to  
20 take LH<sub>2</sub> fuel. Moreover, this would also require renewal of fuel supply infrastructure to airports.  
21 Even if the CO<sub>2</sub> impact could be made to be zero under this scenario, the non-CO<sub>2</sub> impacts remain  
22 poorly understood, since the emission index of water vapour would be much higher ( $\times 2.6$ , Ström and  
23 Gierens, 2002) than for conventional paraffinic fuels, and contrail and contrail cirrus formation may  
24 be of a greater incidence although with possibly lower optical thickness with estimates of RF ranging  
25 from  $\times 1.3$  to  $\times 0.7$  when compared with conventional contrail cirrus RF (Marquart et al., 2005).  
26 Potentially, NO<sub>x</sub> emissions would be lower, since combustion temperatures may be lower  
27 (Khandelwal et al., 2013).

## 28 **10.6 Decarbonization of shipping**

### 29 **10.6.1 Historical and current emissions from shipping**

30 Maritime transport volume has increased by 250% over the past 40 years, reaching all time high of 11  
31 billion tons of transported good in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2019). Shipping (international combined with  
32 domestic and fishing) emitted 938 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2012, accounting for 2.6% of global anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub>  
33 emissions (3<sup>rd</sup> IMO GHG Study, Smith et al., 2014). International shipping alone accounted for 805  
34 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2012. The estimated total emissions from maritime transport vary (Fig 10.15) depending  
35 on data set, and converge on 700 – 850 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> per year over the past decade, corresponding to 2-3%  
36 of total anthropogenic emissions, as found by Buhaug et al. (2009), Smith et al. (2014), Olmer et al.  
37 (2017), Johansson et al. (2017), DNV-GL (2019), the EDGAR data by Crippa et al. (2019), and the  
38 CAMS-GLOB-SHIP inventory by Jalkanen et al. (2014) and Granier et al. (2019). The emissions  
39 from international shipping are typically based on AIS data on ship traffic activity. There are a  
40 number of challenges in calculating emissions from the global fleet, explaining the range in the  
41 estimates in Figure 10.15. Such factors include coverage of AIS satellite data, especially further back  
42 in time, neglecting to account weather drag on vessels, in addition to hull fouling, as well as lack of  
43 information on vessels, such as technological specifications.



**Figure 10.15 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Mt / year) from shipping from year 2000 - 2018. Source: Authors**

From anticipated increases in transport demand, emissions have been projected to increase significantly in the coming decades, by 50 – 250 % (Smith et al., 2014). Maritime transport demands increase with international trade and economic activity. Decoupling demand growth and emissions will require very high reduction in fleetwide average emission intensities per ton km. This would be achievable through increasing energy efficiency, improving operations, as well as alternative fuels (See section 10.6.3).

### 10.6.2 Short lived climate forcers and shipping

The short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) like sulphur in fossil maritime fuels, have a fraction of the life time of the warming from the associated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The cooling from the SLCF from a pulse emission will be insignificant after a couple of decades, whilst the warming from the long-lived substances lasts for centuries (see WG1 Ch6). Sulphur emissions contribute towards acidification of the oceans (Hassellöv et al., 2013), and this effect has been shown to be equal to acidification from CO<sub>2</sub> in the major shipping lanes, though the evidence is limited at this stage. Increase in sulphur deposition on the oceans has also been shown to increase the flux of CO<sub>2</sub> from the oceans to the atmosphere. More studies are required to establish confidence in this.

Emissions of SLCF from shipping not only affects the climate, but also the environment and air quality. Maritime transport has been shown to be a major contributor to coastal air quality degradation (e.g. Viana et al., 2014, Zhao et al., 2013, Jalkanen et al., 2013, Goldsworthy et al., 2015, Goldsworthy, 2017). Uncertain impacts of pollutants emitted from ships on the marine environment have been identified as a gap in knowledge and understanding (Blasco et al., 2014). Given this, to fully understand the climatic implications of emissions from shipping, both GHGs and SLCFs should be taken into account.

Pollution control is implemented to varying degrees in the SSPs (Rao et al., 2017), with SSP 1 and 5 assume that increasing concern for health and environment results in more stringent air pollution policies than today. There is a downward trend in SO<sub>x</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from shipping in all the SSPs, in compliance with regulations. The SLCF emission reduction efforts, also within the maritime sector, are contributing towards achieving the UN SDGs as well as climate mitigation.

### 10.6.3 Shipping in the Arctic

Shipping in the Arctic is a topic of increasing interest. The reduction of Arctic summer sea ice increases the access to the northern sea routes (Melia et al, 2015, Smith et al., 2013, Aksenov et al.,

1 2016). This is in parts of the literature and public discourse portrayed as positive (e.g. Zhang et al.,  
2 2016), as it allows for shorter shipping routes, e.g. between Asia and Europe with estimated travel  
3 time savings of 25 – 40% (Aksenov et al., 2016).

4 GHG emissions accelerate Arctic cryosphere melt (cf. WG1 Ch 3.1) and reduced sea ice reduces  
5 surface albedo and amplifies climate warming. Air pollutants on the other hand play different roles  
6 regionally. Arctic particularly sensitive region. Some aerosols, like SO<sub>x</sub>, contributed to offset some of  
7 this effect. Black Carbon (BC) emissions reduce albedo and absorb heat in air, snow and ice (also link  
8 to WG1 Ch 6) (Messner, 2020, Browse et al., 2013), and may pose a threat to local ecosystems (link  
9 to WG2 Ch 3).

10 Changing routing from going through e.g. Suez to the northeastern sea route shifts emissions from  
11 low to high latitudes. This adds complexity to the assessment of the climatic impacts, as the local  
12 conditions are different and the SLCF may have a different impact on clouds, precipitation, albedo  
13 and local environment (Marelle et al., 2016, Fuglestedt et al., 2014, Dalsøren et al., 2013).  
14 Observations have shown that 5-25% of local air pollution stems from shipping in Canadian Arctic  
15 (Aliabadi et al., 2015). Both modelling and observations have shown that aerosol emissions from  
16 shipping can have a significant affect in air pollution, and shortwave radiative forcing (Roiger et al.,  
17 2015, Marelle et al., 2016, Dalsøren et al., 2013, Ødemark et al., 2012).

18 More open waters has invited increased maritime activities in the Arctic over the past two decades  
19 (Pizzolato et al., 2016). This poses increased risks to local marine ecosystems and coastal  
20 communities from invasive species and pollution (IPCC SROCC, 2019). Greater levels of Arctic  
21 maritime transport and tourism have political, as wells as socio-economic implications for trade, and  
22 nations and economies reliant on the traditional shipping corridors. There has been activity increase  
23 from cargo, tankers, supply and fishing vessels in particular (Zhang et al., 2016, Winther et al., 2014).  
24 New trades are also from growing Asian economies, as well as increasing Russian exports.  
25 Projections indicate more navigable Arctic waters in the coming decades (Smith et al., 2013, Melia et  
26 al., 2016) and continued increases in transport volumes through the northern sea routes (Winther et  
27 al., 2014, Corbett et al., 2010), with a particular increase from destination and not transit traffic  
28 (Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011). Emission patterns and quantities, however, are likely to change with  
29 future regulations from e.g. IMO, and depend on technology developments, and activity levels may  
30 depend upon among other; geopolitics, commodity pricing, trade, natural resource extractions,  
31 insurance costs, taxes and tourism demand (Johnston et al., 2017). Arctic environment poses unique  
32 hazards challenges with regards to safe and efficient operations; low temperature challenges,  
33 implications for vessel design, evacuation and rescue systems, communications, oil spills, variable sea  
34 ice and meteorological conditions (e.g. Buixade-Farre et al., 2014).

35 To understand the total implications of shipping in the Arctic a holistic view is needed, with  
36 assessments of impacts on not only the physical climate, but also the local environment and  
37 ecosystems. To furthermore ensure safe operations in the Arctic waters, close monitoring of activities  
38 may be valuable.

39 The figure 10.16 is illustrating the northern sea routes, along the lines of the figure 10.16 below from  
40 Mélia et al. (2015). We propose to include September sea ice edges, based on historical observations,  
41 and RCP projections of sea ice extent (Stephenson et al., 2013).




Figure 10.16 Northern sea routes

### 10.6.4 Mitigation potential of fuels, operations and energy efficiency

A range of vessel mitigation options for the international fleet exist and include:

- Hull design options: vessel size, hull shape, lightweight materials, air lubrication, resistance reduction devices, anti-fouling hull coatings, and ballast water management.
- Operations: weather routing, slow steaming (Psaraftis et al., 2013), capacity utilization.
- Power and propulsion system options: hybrid power /propulsion, power system / machinery, propulsion efficiency devices, on-board power demand, and waste heat recovery systems.
- Alternative fuels (e.g., Brynolf et al., 2014) and energy: biofuels, methanol (Connolly et al., 2014), LNG (Burel et al., 2013), wind power, solar power, cold ironing, fuel cells (van Biert et al., 2016).

The literature describes potentials for reducing emissions from shipping through a number of such measures, typically by optimizing e.g. hull design and vessel shape, power and propulsion systems, and through improved operations. Such measures may decrease emissions by 15 - 40%, though with a broad range in potential found in the literature, as assessed by Bouman et al. (2017). A broad range of measures was reviewed, and it was found an upper bound of 39% emission reductions in 2030, and 73% in 2050, compared to the BAU scenario of the 2<sup>nd</sup> IMO GHG study (Smith et al., 2014).

Alternative fuels, and alternative energy sources, and in the case of switching to sustainable biofuels; as much as 80% of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions may be cut, though such numbers are associated with large uncertainties. Biomass may be used to produce alcohol fuels, such as ethanol, methanol, liquified bio-gas or biodiesel. Though there are concerns regarding large-scale production (see Section 10.3 on biofuels), hence it is questioned whether biofuels will become available at the scales required to decarbonize the shipping and aviation sectors (SSI, 2019, Gilbert et al., 2018). It is projected that the primary energy supply from sustainably sourced biofuels might be of 50-100 EJ / year in 2050 (SSI, 2019), whilst there might be a potential shipping demand of 26 – 60 EJ / year, compared to 10 EJ in 2018. LNG has been found to have a more limited mitigation potential in comparison and may not be



1 considered as a low-carbon alternative, but has a higher availability than biofuels (Gilbert et al.,  
2 2018).

3 Decarbonizing primary energy supply may enable the production of fuels, such as hydrogen and  
4 ammonia, with zero emissions. Unless energy supply is renewable or coupled to CCS, there might be  
5 an upstream shift in emissions in the fuel value chains. Hence a full life cycle perspective of the  
6 decarbonization measure will give a more complete picture of the total emissions from the sector  
7 (Gilbert et al., 2018). Hydrogen and ammonia when produced from renewables or couple to CCS, as  
8 opposed to mainly by fossil fuels today with high life-cycle CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Bhandari et al., 2014),  
9 may contribute to significant emissions reductions of up to 33 - 80% compared to low-sulfur heavy  
10 fuel oil (Bicer and Dincer, 2018, Gilbert et al., 2018), though have their own unique transport and  
11 storage challenges.

12 Literature shows there is a potential for improving the energy efficiency of vessels and by such  
13 reducing fuel consumption (e.g. Traut et al., 2018). Improved efficiency in port operations and  
14 training of crew to handle new technologies may also provide further to the mitigation potentials for  
15 the sector (Viktorelius and Lundh, 2019). The development of autonomy within the sector may also  
16 play a role in mitigation in the future.

17 Considering that more than 40% of transported freight is fossil fuels, a lessened demand for such  
18 products, as well as coal, in low emission scenarios may contribute to reduce the overall maritime  
19 transport needs and hence emissions in the future (Sharmina et al., 2017). An increase in biofuels and  
20 biomass, on the other hand, may increase freight demand (Mander et al., 2014).

21 Literature points to the need for developing technology roadmaps for enabling the maritime transport  
22 sector to get on to pathways for decarbonization early enough to reach the Paris Agreements  
23 temperature goals (Kuramochi et al., 2018). Accounting for the full life-cycle of emissions is required  
24 to meet the overall long-term objectives of cutting GHG and SLCF emissions. The urgency of  
25 implementing measures for reducing emissions is considered to be high, considering the lifetime of  
26 vessels and the IMO target of halving emissions by 2050 (see Section 10.6.3 on governance options).

### 27 **10.6.5 Accountability and governance options**

28 Research has indicated that market forces alone are not enough to drive down emissions from the  
29 sector (e.g. Cullinane and Cullinane, 2013). Regulatory frameworks have hence been developed over  
30 time and will continue to do so through bodies such as the IMO. Recent IMO regulations target a 50%  
31 reduction in emissions from the sector by 2050 compared to 2008 (IMO, 2018). An initial strategy  
32 with implementation of policies is to be developed. It furthermore aims for the sector to become  
33 carbon neutral by the end of the century, in line with the Paris Agreement. The initial strategy for  
34 implementation is to be revised in 2023. As a step towards this goal, the initial strategy is to reduce  
35 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per transport work by 40% by 2030 (IMO, 2018).

36 The Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) by IMO is a legally binding mitigation regulation,  
37 established as a series of baselines for the amount of fuel ships may burn for a particular cargo  
38 carrying capacity. The EEDI differs per ship segment. Ships built in 2025 should be 30% more energy  
39 efficient than in 2014. This legislation aims to reduce GHG emissions in particular. Energy efficiency  
40 may be improved by several of the mitigation options outlined in Section 10.6.3 on mitigation  
41 options. The ship energy efficiency management plan (SEEMP) as the international governance  
42 instrument to improve energy efficiency and hence emissions from ships, is a measure to enable  
43 changes to operational measures and retrofits (e.g. Johnson et al., 2013). This was implemented in  
44 2013 and each vessel develop their individual plan. The combination of EEDI and SEEMP may  
45 reduce emissions by 23% by 2030, cf. 'no policy' (Sims et al., 2014). With regards to accountability,  
46 it is mandatory for ships of  $\geq 5,000$  gross tonnage to collect fuel consumption data, as well as specified  
47 data for e.g. transport work.

1 In SECAS (sulphur emission control areas), the sulphur cap is 0.10% m/m (mass/mass), as  
2 implemented in 2015 by IMO. This is also in place for particulate matter (PM). The Sulphur  
3 emissions regulations are further tightened by the IMO legislation on reducing marine fuel sulphur  
4 content to a maximum of 0.5% by 2020 outside of SECAS, compared to 3.5% permissible since 2012  
5 (Decided at MEPC 70 in 2016, included in Annex VI to the International Convention for the  
6 prevention of Pollution from ships (MARPOL Convention)). The cap on permissible sulphur aims to  
7 improve environment and health impacts from shipping in ports and coastal communities, in  
8 particular. Ships may meet the SO<sub>x</sub> requirements by using pre-approved measures, such as exhaust  
9 gas cleaning through the use of scrubbers, or indeed low Sulphur fuel options, with fuel switching  
10 being identified as most cost effective for vessels mostly operating outside of ECAs (Carr et al.,  
11 2015). MARPOL Annex VI furthermore prohibits the emissions of other ozone depleting substance;  
12 NO<sub>x</sub>, and VOCs from tankers. NO<sub>x</sub> Tier III: more stringent regulation on diesel engines on ships  
13 constructed since 2016. ECAs have been shown to reduce the impacts of ship emission on health and  
14 environment (Viana et al., 2015). Speed optimisation and rerouting has been projected as a  
15 consequence of ECAs, considering the higher cost low-sulfur fuels (Fagerholt et al., 2015).

16 Policy choices may enable or hinder changes, e.g. the EEDI (e.g.) literature shows there is a gap  
17 between the SEEMP requirements to the shipping companies and the requirements to management  
18 systems, monitoring, and reviews. These gaps in the governance structure may somewhat hinder the  
19 objectives of SEEMP to improve energy efficiency and emissions. Stevens et al. (2015) point out that  
20 the EEDI is encouraging makes shipping companies order vessels with reduced design speeds, rather  
21 than stimulate the use of alternative fuels or new lower-carbon ship engine technologies. Policies may  
22 incentivize investments in necessary changes to the global fleet and related infrastructures. Literature  
23 argues that regulations and incentives that motivates mitigation through slow-steaming, improves ship  
24 efficiency, and retrofits with lower-carbon technologies at a sub-global scale may contribute to  
25 immediate reductions in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the sector (Bows-Larkin, 2015).


26 It has been proposed to make shipping corporations accountable for their emissions by making it  
27 mandatory to disclose their vessel's emissions reductions (Rahim et al., 2016). Market based  
28 mechanisms may encourage ship operators to comply with IMO GHG regulations.

### 29 **10.6.6 Synthesis: transformation trajectories for the maritime sector**

30 As indicated in Figure 10.17, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from shipping go substantially down in the two shared  
31 socio-economic pathways that align with the Paris Agreement's temperature targets, SSP1-1.9 and  
32 SSP1-2.6 (Gidden et al., 2019). By 2050, the emissions are reduced to 30% of the 2015 emissions in  
33 the scenario closest to 1.5°C (SSP1-1.9). On the other hand, 2.0°C (SSP1-2.6) takes a leaner reduction  
34 trajectory with emissions down to 60% of 2015 by 2050. By the end of the century, emissions are  
35 down to 1-40% in 4 of the 8 scenarios considered by ScenarioMIP in CMIP6 (cf. AR6, WG1). The  
36 IMO projections for growth in transport demand (Smith et al., 2014) indicate increases by 3 - 6 times  
37 2015 levels by 2050 for unitized cargo and 2-3 times for non-coal dry bulk. Smith et al. (2014) at the  
38 same time predicts reductions in trade for fossil fuels dependent on decarbonization trajectories.  
39 Based on these aggregate growth and emission trajectories, average fleet wide reductions in GHG  
40 emission per unit transport work in an order of 70% by 2050 may be well aligned with an RCP 2.6  
41 based 2.0°C target. While an RCP 1.9 based 1.5°C target would require further reductions.

42 This points to the scale of change needed in terms of technological transformation of the maritime  
43 sector. Moreover, combinations of measures are likely needed for sustainable transitioning of the  
44 sector to a low-carbon future. From the section above, we see that not one measure alone may enable  
45 low carbon – shipping, as the availability of some solutions and technology is still limited, and there  
46 may be competition for sustainable biofuels from other sectors with unique challenges to mitigate,  
47 such as aviation. The further expected increase in demand for shipping services (Smith et al., 2014),  
48 offers an additional requirement for shipping to increase its energy efficiency and shift to cleaner fuels

1 in order reduce its overall impact on the climate. Both GHG and SLCF emissions are reduced  
 2 significantly in SSP1-1.9 (Rao et al., 2017), where the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global  
 3 warming to 1.5°C compared to the pre-industrial is aimed for in the most sustainable way.



16 **Figure 10.17 CO<sub>2</sub> emission changes from shipping according to the SSPs, relative to year 2015**

17 *Placeholder-Scenarios for BAU, Incremental and Transformative options will be developed for SOD as with*  
 18 *Aviation.*

## 19 **10.7 Transformation pathways for the transport sector**

20 The engineering and LCA literatures have identified numerous options for reducing GHG emissions  
 21 from the transport sector. These options would be embedded within and interact with larger systems.  
 22 To understand the total decarbonization potential of these options, we must capture the larger system  
 23 features and constraints within which the options would be embedded.


24 In this section, we review results of three types of models that combine these options in a systemic  
 25 manner to assess different approaches to generate decarbonization pathways for the transport system:  
 26 i) integrated assessment models (IAMs), ii) global transport sectoral models (GTM), and iii) national  
 27 transport/energy models (Yeh. et al 2017, Edelenbosh et.al 2017). Common assumptions across the  
 28 three model types include trajectories of socioeconomic development, technological development,  
 29 resource availability, policy, and behavioural change. The key difference underlying these models is  
 30 their depth versus scope.

31 IAMs integrate factors from other sectors that interact with the transport system endogenously, such  
 32 as fuel availability and cost. IAMs minimize mitigation costs to achieve a temperature target *across*  
 33 *all sectors of the economy* over a long-time horizon (typically to 2100). GTMs and related regional  
 34 transport sectoral models have more details in transport demand, technology, behaviours, and policies  
 35 than IAMs, but treat the interactions with the other sectors exogenously, potentially missing some  
 36 important interactions such as the fuel prices and carbon intensity of electricity. National models have  
 37 detailed representation of national policies related to transport and energy, sometimes with greater  
 38 spatial resolution. In this section we will synthesize findings across model types with varying  
 39 assumptions to understand what decarbonization pathways exist for the transport system.

1 Greenhouse gas emissions from transport are a function of travel demand, travel mode, transport  
 2 technology, fuel consumption, and energy efficiency. Each emissions driver is a lever that can  
 3 advance decarbonization of the transport system. Our section explores each lever in turn below, but  
 4 begins with an overview of global transport emission trajectories needed to meet varying climate  
 5 targets.

### 6 10.7.1 Global emission trajectories

7 The transport sector accounts for a quarter of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. In 2017, transport emitted 8.0  
 8 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (Joint Research Center, n.d.), a three-fold increase from 1970 (Figure 10.18). Of those  
 9 emissions, 75% came from on road, 22% from aviation and shipping (split evenly), and 3% from rail.  
 10 Emissions are expected to grow 20% to 9-10 GtCO<sub>2</sub> by 2030 and 50% to 12-13 GtCO<sub>2</sub> by 2050 under  
 11 the BAU scenarios without efforts to meet long-term stabilization targets. Growth will be driven by  
 12 the growth in population and GDP and the secondary effects including higher travel service demand  
 13 per capita and increased freight activities per GDP. Though transport efficiencies (energy use per  
 14 passenger-km travelled and per ton-km of delivery) are expected to continue to improve in line with  
 15 the historical trends (see Section 7.4), total transport emissions are expected to grow due to roughly  
 16 constant carbon intensity (Section 7.5) under the BAU.



17  
 18 **Figure 10.18 Direct CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from global transport scenarios**

19 Sources: IAMs —IPCC WGIII AR6 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Sectoral models: MoMo (IEA), EPPA5  
 20 (MIT), Roadmap (ICCT), GCAM (PNL), and MESSAGE (IIASA). The policy scenarios in global transport  
 21 models (GTMs) cover a wide range of “non-BAU” scenarios (to be defined) that are not necessarily designed to  
 22 achieve the targets set in the Paris Agreements.

23 Notes: IAM results are grouped by temperature targets. Sectoral studies are grouped by baseline and policy  
 24 categories because they don’t track global emissions so cannot solve for achieving temperature targets. Numbers  
 25 above the bars indicate the number of scenarios.

26 Figure 10.18 provides an overview of direct CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the transport sector across IAMs  
 27 (colour bars) and selected global transport models (grey bars). The results from the IAMs are grouped  
 28 in bins in accordance with different temperature targets. See Chapter 3 for further detail on the  
 29 definition of these. The transport sector models are generally single sector models and does therefore  
 30 not keep account of total global emissions. This in turn makes it difficult for them to endogenously  
 31 solve for outcomes in terms of global temperature targets. These are therefore grouped into reference  
 32 and policy bins. The results show that in the below 1.6°C and 1.6°C – 2.0°C scenarios, IAMs curb  
 33 transport emissions back down to 2017 levels (median values across scenarios) in 2030 and down by  
 34 22% to 37% (median values across scenarios) of 2017 level in 2050. In comparisons the low  
 35 overshoot 1.5 degree scenarios warranted global cuts in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the range of 40 to 58%  
 36 across all sectors in 2030 and 94% to 107% in 2050 relative to 2010.

37 The scenarios from the GTMs shown in Figure 10.18 and elsewhere suggest that emissions could  
 38 increase to 6.4 to 8.4 GtCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030 for both the Reference and Policy scenarios, and could reach 9-

1 12 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> or higher in 2050 in the Reference scenario and 6 to 7.8 GtCO<sub>2</sub> in the Policy scenario. The  
2 Reference scenario emission pathways from GTMs fall outside of the bound of the above 3.5°C  
3 scenarios from the IAMs and the Policy scenarios are roughly in line with the above 3.5°C emission  
4 pathways. *This suggests that without an explicit temperature target, the transport policy scenarios*  
5 *examined by the GTMs can only bring transport emissions down to a pathway that is consistent with*  
6 *the above 3.5°C increase* (Fisch-Romito & Guivarch, 2019; Sudhir Gota, Huizenaga, Peet, & Kaar,  
7 2016; International Energy Agency, 2017a; Yeh et al., 2017b). The NDCs in the transport sector  
8 include a mix of measures targeting efficiency improvements of vehicles and trucks; improving public  
9 transits services; decarbonizing fuels with alternative fuels and technologies including biofuels, fossil-  
10 or bio-based natural gas, and electrification; intelligent transport systems; vehicle restrictions; etc  
11 (Sudhir Gota et al., 2016). Taken all together, because of the long lag-time for technology turnover,  
12 these measures are not expected to significantly change 2030 emissions but could bring down 2050  
13 emissions to 2030 levels.

14 Several GTMs not (*yet*) included in Figure 10.18 have examined ambitious CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation scenarios.  
15 For example, emissions from transport in the beyond 2°C scenario by the IEA would decrease by 90%  
16 compared to the IEA's BAU scenario. Global transport emissions consistent with 2°C target is  
17 estimated to reach peak transport emissions in 2020 at around 8 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (Sudhir Gota, Huizenga, Peet,  
18 Medimorec, & Bakker, 2019d; International Energy Agency, n.d.-b) and decrease to 5 Gt for 2°C or  
19 below 2.5 Gt for the 1.5°C scenarios by 2050.

20 Low carbon scenarios are also available from national models (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China,  
21 France, Germany, Indonesia, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, UK, USA) with good  
22 coverage of the transport sector. The low carbon scenarios are either defined with respect to a global  
23 climate stabilization target e.g., 2°C /1.5°C Scenario (Dhar et. al., 2018), or a CO<sub>2</sub> target that is more  
24 stringent than what has been considered in the NDCs. These studies have generally used bottom-up  
25 models (TIMES, ANSWER MARKAL, LEAP) for analysis, but in some cases, they are run by  
26 national teams using global models (e.g., GCAM for China, India, etc). National studies show that  
27 transport CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are expected to decline significantly in low carbon scenarios in all the  
28 developed countries reviewed (Bataille et. al., 2015; Kainuma et. al., 2015; Viridis et. al., 2015; Pye et.  
29 al., 2015; Criqui et. al., 2015; Kemfert et. al., 2015; Williams et. al., 2015 & Zhang et. al., 2016) in  
30 2050 from the emissions in 2010 and reductions vary from 65% to 95%. However, in developing  
31 countries reviewed (Altieri et. al., 2015; Buirra et. al., 2015; Dhar et. al., 2018; Teng et. al., 2015;  
32 Lebre La Reovere et. al., 2015; Siagian et. al., 2015; Shukla et. al., 2015; Di Sbroiavacca et. al.,  
33 2015), the emissions are expected to increase in 2050 in the range of 35% - 83% relative to 2010  
34 levels. Transport CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita in the developing countries are much lower in 2010 (vary  
35 from 0.15 to 1.39 tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita) relative to developed countries (vary from 1.76 to 5.95 tCO<sub>2</sub> per  
36 capita). However, by 2050, the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita in developed countries (vary from 0.19 to  
37 1.04 tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita) are much lower than developing countries (vary from 0.21 to 1.7 tCO<sub>2</sub> per  
38 capita).

39 The mean outcomes of the transport scenario literature suggest that the transport sector may take a  
40 less steep emission reduction trajectory than the cross sectoral average and still be consistent with the  
41 2°C target. This is in line with perspectives in the literature suggesting that transport is one of the  
42 most difficult sectors to decarbonize (Davis et al. 2018). There is, however, quite a spread in the  
43 results for 2030 and 2050. For 2100, the median results suggest cuts down to -80% for a 1.5<sup>0</sup>  
44 trajectory.

## 45 **10.7.2 Transport demand and activity**


46 Transport demand for services, generally broken into passenger (in passenger-km or passenger-km per  
47 capita) and freight (in ton-km or ton-km per GDP), is reviewed in this section. Growth in passenger

1 and freight travel demand are generally dependent on population and GDP and the secondary effect of  
 2 increased demand for travel and good consumptions and transport as country GDPs grow.

3 In 2015, transport activities were estimated around 35-50 trillion passenger kilometers (pkm) or  
 4 5,000-7,000 pkm per person per year with significant variations among studies (International Energy  
 5 Agency, 2017a; ITF International Transport Forum, 2019b). The number of vehicles in use has grown  
 6 45% globally from 2005-2015 with the largest growth occurring in Asia and the Middle East (120%,  
 7 in which China alone has grown 540% during such period and 200% in India), Africa (80%), South  
 8 and Central America (80%) and Russia (78%), while the growth in Europe and North America are the  
 9 slowest (21% and 4% respectively) (International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers,  
 10 n.d.). Passenger transport demand is expected to double (relative to 2015) in 2030 and close to tripling  
 11 in 2050 for the above 2 degrees scenarios. The median 2 °C scenario also show a doubling by 2030  
 12 but closer to a factor of 2.5 in growth by 2050. The 1.5 scenarios show much lower demand growth.  
 13 Closer to a factor of 1.5 in 2050 and a factor of 2 in 2050.

14 Globally consistent freight data are difficult to obtain (Mulholland, Teter, Cazzola, McDonald, & Ó  
 15 Gallachóir, 2018) and regional growth rates vary dramatically: over the period 1975–2015, road  
 16 freight activity in India increased by more than 9-fold, 30-fold in China, and 2.5-fold in the US  
 17 (Mulholland, Teter, Cazzola, McDonald, & Ó Gallachóir, 2018). The growth rates for commercial  
 18 vehicles between 2005-2015 are similar to passenger cars (global average of 41%), with slower  
 19 growth in China (160%) and faster growth in North America (36%).freight sector could grow by 2.4-  
 20 fold over the period 2015–2050 in the reference scenario with the majority of growth attributable to  
 21 developing countries. Among the IAM models reviewed, the median scenarios indicate a growth of  
 22 about 30% in 2030 and 15% for the above and 2°C scenarios in 2050. While the median 1.5°C  
 23 scenarios indicate a no growth in 2030 and a reduction of 50% by 2050 (all number relative to 2015).

24 Figure 10.19 shows demand trajectories for freight and passenger transport from the IAMs and GTMs  
 25 reviewed.



26  
 27 **Figure 10.19 Transport activity trajectories for passenger (bottom panel) and freight (top panel)**

28 Source: IPCC AR6 database

1 Notes: Global passenger (billion p-km/yr) and freight (billion t-km/yr) demand projections, 2020 index, based  
2 on integrated models for selected stabilization temperatures by 2100. Also included are global transport models  
3 Ref and Policy scenarios.

4 IAMs indicate passenger transport demand is expected to increase relative to 2015 across temperature  
5 targets. For instance, passenger transport demand doubles (relative to 2015) by 2030 and nearly triples  
6 by 2050 for the above 2°C scenarios. The median 1.5°C and 2 °C scenarios show a doubling or  
7 greater of passenger transport demand by 2050. Unlike passenger demand, freight transport demand  
8 decreases through 2050 relative to 2015 under the median 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios. In all other  
9 temperature targets, freight transport demand grows by 2050.

10 GTMs show broad ranges with respect to future travel demand, particularly for the freight sector.  
11 These results show more dependency on model than on baseline or policy scenario. According to the  
12 most recent ITF Transport Outlook (ITF International Transport Forum, 2019b), global demand for  
13 passenger transport and freight could each triple by 2050 in a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.  
14 Mulholland et al., (2018) suggest the freight sector could grow by 2.4-fold over the period 2015–2050  
15 in the reference scenario with the majority of growth attributable to developing countries. The  
16 International Energy Agency’s Energy Technology Perspectives (International Energy Agency,  
17 2017a) suggests more modest growth in passenger transport, from 51 trillion pkm in 2014 to 110  
18 trillion pkm in 2060, in a reference scenario without climate policies. Furthermore, the IEA estimates  
19 that final energy demand for freight transport could double by 2050 (from 45 EJ in 2014) in their  
20 reference scenario. Under IEA’s most ambitious carbon policy, the beyond 2°C scenario, demand for  
21 passenger travel remains similar to the reference scenario (around 110 trillion passenger-kms by  
22 2050), while demand for land-based freight transport in 2050 is slightly lower in this scenario (116  
23 trillion ton-km) compared to the reference scenario (130 trillion ton-km. In the IEA beyond 2°C  
24 scenario, reductions in emissions would result from efficiency gains and a transition to lower-carbon  
25 fuels. The ITF, however, suggests that an ambitious decarbonization policies could reduce global  
26 demand for passenger transport by 2050, compared to the business-as-usual scenario. This in turn  
27 could reduce emissions from passenger transport by 70% compared to the BAU scenario. Similarly,  
28 under strict carbon policy, the ITF suggests that emissions from freight transport could decrease by  
29 45% compared to the BAU scenario, even though demand would be similar in both scenarios. Others  
30 suggest contributions greater than 25% in average for both passenger and freight in 2030 and 2050  
31 may be needed to achieve very low carbon emission pathways (Fisch-Romito & Guivarch, 2019).

32 The reason many models find small differences in passenger transport demand across temperature  
33 targets is that IAM models treat demand growth exogenously despite the fact that mitigation efforts  
34 would likely increase travel costs and lower transport demand (Runsen Zhang, Fujimori, Dai, &  
35 Hanaoka, 2018). Sectoral models often assume mode shift of activities from the most carbon intensive  
36 modes (driving and flying for passenger travel and trucking for freight) to less carbon intensive modes  
37 (public transit and passenger rails, and freight rail) to lower emissions.


38 Studies have recently begun to explore demand-side solutions to reducing transport demand to  
39 achieve very low carbon scenarios through a combination of culture and low-carbon lifestyle  
40 (Creutzig et al., 2018); urban development and increased vehicle occupancy through mobility-as-a-  
41 service (Grubler et al., 2018); improved logistics and streamline supply chains for the freight sector  
42 (Mulholland et al., 2018); and disruptive innovation (Wilson, Pettifor, Cassar, Kerr, & Wilson, 2019).  
43 However, greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying energy-relevant decisions and  
44 behaviors (Brosch, Sander, & Patel, 2016) and the motivations for sustainable behavior (Steg,  
45 Perlaviciute, & van der Werff, 2015) are critically needed in order to realize these solutions in reality.

46 Overall, we find passenger and freight activity will continue to grow rapidly under BAU, but most  
47 growth will occur in developing countries. Most models indicate reducing travel activity will play  
48 little role in meeting mitigation scenarios, but this is an area of growing and critical research.



1 **Transport mode trajectories**

2 Globally, as the demands of passenger travel grow, the shares of faster modes have continued to  
 3 increase since the last century (Schafer & Victor, 2000; Schäfer, 2017). This pattern is mainly driven  
 4 by two separate trends. First, for the short to medium distance travel, private cars displace public  
 5 transit, particularly in non-OECD countries as consumers’ value of time and the aspirations for  
 6 comfort, status symbols, and convenience increase with GDP growth. Secondly, there is a growing  
 7 demand for the long-distance travel with aviation for both leisure and business travel. There are,  
 8 however, also significant variations among countries and cities. For example, even though the share of  
 9 public transport in UK has dropped from 7% in 1990 to 4.6% in 2016, the opposite trend has been  
 10 observed in countries such as France, Denmark, and Finland during the same period (eurostat, 2019).  
 11 In general, smaller and denser countries/cities with higher/increasing urbanization rate tend to have  
 12 higher success rate in increasing the share of public transport.



13

14

15 **Figure 10.20 Transport activity trajectories for passenger and freight across different modes.** Global  
 16 passenger (billion p-km/yr) and freight (billion t-km/yr) demand projections, 2020 index, based on IAM for  
 17 selected stabilization temperatures by 2100. Also included are global transport models Ref and Policy scenarios.

18 Source: IPCC AR6 database.

19 Figure 10.20 shows activity trajectories for both freight and passenger transport across different  
 20 modes based on the AR6 database for both IAMs and global transport models. The database is under  
 21 development with data being collected from modelling teams. The following paragraphs reflect the  
 22 data currently collected. With respect to road passenger transport in total, both the median from the  
 23 1.6°C scenarios of the IAMs and the policy and reference scenario from the global transport models  
 24 suggest an increase by a factor of around 1.5 to 2 by 2050. In 2100, the spread between the median of  
 25 the scenarios spans from an increase of 2.5 to 3.5. In terms of the different modes, the median across  
 26 the broad set of IAM scenarios project fairly similar trajectories with around a 1.5 - 2 fold increase by  
 27 2050 towards an increase by a factor of 2-3 in 2100. The global transport models yield a much larger



1 span in their scenarios for 2 and 3 wheelers with the policy scenario spanning from mild decline  
2 towards a factor of 2.5 by the end of the century. With respect to bus, we observe a mild increase and  
3 decline, as rail transport increases significantly. For the below 1.6°C set of scenarios, the median yield  
4 a growth in passenger rail transport by a factor of 5 by the end of the century. For aviation, the  
5 reference scenario of the transport models indicates 4-fold median growth relative to 2020, by the  
6 middle of the century, towards an 8-fold growth by the end of the century. The below 1.6°C scenarios  
7 of the IAMs on the other hand suggests a median increase in passenger aviation of a factor of 1.5 by  
8 2050 and up towards 3 fold by the end of the century.

9 The overall demand for freight is also expected to grow significantly. In terms of the land transport  
10 modes, trucking is expected to grow the most (Mulholland et al., 2018). In Figure 10.20 we can  
11 observe that the IAMs predict a growth of around a factor for 2 in 2050 for the below 1.6°C scenarios  
12 while the global transport models expect a somewhat higher growth, closer to around factor of 2.5 for  
13 the same year. International shipping is also expected to grow by a factor of 3 by 2050. As the heavy-  
14 duty truck demand grows the fastest compared to the other modes, trucks gradually become the  
15 largest mode used for freight transport. In terms of freight by aviation, the median of the below 1.6°C  
16 scenarios is around 30% growth by 2050 and 100% growth by 2100.

17 The global transport model yields almost overlapping trajectories for both the policy and reference  
18 scenario with a factor of 2.5 increase by 2050 and around 4 by 2100. The below 1.6°C scenarios all  
19 yield rail freight increase by a factor of 1.6 2050 and around 2 by 2100.

20 Commonly explored mitigation options related to mode change include shift to public transit, shared  
21 mobility, demand reduction through land use and teleconferences for passenger travel (Creutzig et al.,  
22 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Wilson et al., 2019) and improve logistics efficiency, green logistics and  
23 streamline supply chains (Mulholland et al., 2018) for the freight sector. Options that induce  
24 significant co-benefits in addressing air pollution, congestion, and urban development such as bus  
25 improvement or BRTS, metro rail, mobility plan and urban form are commonly the preferred choices  
26 in the NDCs proposed especially from developing countries. Whereas developed countries, given  
27 saturation in demand growth, focus more on technology options such as E-mobility and fuel economy  
28 standards (Sudhir Gota et al., 2016).

29 Driving remains the fastest growing mode for passenger travel giving the significant growth rate in  
30 developing countries. Similarly, trucking is expected to grow the most for the freight. Commonly  
31 explored mitigation options related to mode change include shift to public transit, shared mobility,  
32 demand reduction through land use and teleconferences for passenger travel and improvements within  
33 modes including improve logistics efficiency, green logistics, and streamline supply chains for the  
34 freight sector.

### 35 **Energy intensity**

36 The following section summarizes current data available in AR6 database from IAMs and GTMs on  
37 energy intensities and efficiencies for transport. From this data, across different models and scenarios,  
38 we observe that light-duty vehicles energy efficiency are expected to evolve at 0.5-2% reduction per  
39 year from today's 2.8-3.1 MJ/vkm (1.5-2 MJ/pkm) by 15-50% by 2050 under the Reference scenario,  
40 and steeper reductions to 55-70% percent below today's level to 0.8-2.0 MJ/vkm (or 0.4-1.0 MJ/pkm)  
41 for the mitigation scenarios. Slower magnitudes of reductions are expected for buses (from the current  
42 0.25-0.48 MJ/pkm to 0.2-0.4 MJ/pkm in Reference scenario and 0.19-0.37 MJ/pkm in the mitigation  
43 scenarios by 2050) and airplanes (1.8-2.2 MJ/pkm to 1.0-1.8 MJ/pkm in Reference scenario and 0.8-  
44 1.8 MJ/pkm in the mitigation scenarios by 2050). The energy efficiency reductions are smaller  
45 compared with LDVs for the freight sector in the IAMs and GTMs, from today's 2.1-2.3 MJ/tkm for  
46 heavy-duty trucks to 2 MJ/tkm in Reference scenario and 1.1-1.9 MJ/tkm in the mitigation scenarios

1 by 2050, and 0.15-0.25 MJ/tkm for freight rail to 0.11-0.25 MJ/tkm in Reference scenario and 0.10-  
 2 0.25 MJ/tkm in the mitigation scenarios by 2050.


3 Three key trends insufficiently addressed in existing models could increase the uncertainties of the  
 4 estimates presented in this section: behavioral aspects of passenger transport and freight logistics,  
 5 rapid and unexpected technological innovation; and the rise of automation, big data and AI (see  
 6 Section 10.2).

7 Increasing occupancy rate of passenger transport (Grubler et al., 2018) and reducing empty miles or  
 8 increasing payload in freight deliveries (Gucwa & Schäfer, 2013; McKinnon, 2018) can present  
 9 significant opportunities to effectively improve energy efficiency hence lowering GHG emissions in  
 10 transport. The recent trends of consumer behaviors, however, have shown declining occupancy rate of  
 11 light-duty vehicles in industrialized countries (Schäfer and Yeh, 2020) and the accelerating growing  
 12 preference for SUVs, challenges emissions reductions in passenger car market (International Energy  
 13 Agency, n.d.-b).

14 While the models reviewed in this section include a representation of technologies for  
 15 decarbonization, these models can fail to capture, sudden and unexpected technological  
 16 breakthroughs. For example, electrification has progressed faster than previously expected just a few  
 17 years ago, in other non-LDV mode, including electric scooters, electric buses, electric ferries  
 18 (Thongam, Tarbouchi, Okou, Bouchard, & Beguenane, 2013), or even electric airplanes for domestic  
 19 trips (Schäfer et al., 2019) are receiving increasing attention. A sudden and unexpected breakthrough  
 20 in the electrification of heavy vehicle systems could also provide opportunities to further improve  
 21 energy efficiencies and reduce GHG beyond what the models suggested that we reviewed here.

22 **Fuel energy and technology**

23 Two mechanisms for reducing carbon emissions from the transport sector are fuel switching for  
 24 current vehicle technologies and transitioning to low carbon vehicle technologies. Figure 10.21  
 25 combines data from IAMs and GTMs on fuel shares that reflect technology shares across road,  
 26 aviation, rail and shipping. Oil (fossil), biofuels and gas imply the use of internal combustion engines,  
 27 electricity implies battery electric for road vehicles and direct electric for trains, and hydrogen implies  
 28 a fuel cell-based technology. Since the technologies have different conversion efficiencies, the fuel  
 29 shares do not reflect the share of different technologies among transport services. For example, a  
 30 current battery electric driveline would be 3 or greater times more energy efficient than current  
 31 comparable ICE driveline (see section 10.2 for more details).



32

1 **Figure 10.21 Global shares of final fuel energy in the transport sector in 2030, and 2050** Based on  
2 integrated models grouped by CO<sub>2</sub>eq concentration levels by 2100 and compared with sectoral models (grouped  
3 by baseline and policies) in 2050. Box plots show minimum/maximum, 25th/75th percentile and median.  
4 Numbers above each bar represent the # of scenarios.

5 Source: IPCC WGIII AR6 Database

6 Across model types, Figure 10.21 indicates fuel and technology shifts will be crucial to meet carbon  
7 emission reduction targets (IEA-ETP 2017, Edelenbosh et.al 2017). IAMs and sector models maintain  
8 high shares of fossil fuels in 2030 across emission trajectories. By 2050, the median share of fossil  
9 fuels in IAM trajectories at or below 2.0°C decline to 58-67% of total energy consumption. Driving  
10 this decline, electricity and biofuels increases to 14-18% and 15-16%, respectively. Taking energy  
11 conversion efficiencies into account, in scenarios below 1.6°C, electricity is on average fueling a  
12 similar volume of transport services as fossil fuels in 2050. For the below 1.6°C and 1.6°C-2.0°C  
13 scenarios, we observe a continued decrease of the use of fossil fuels yielding median energy shares of  
14 respectively 16% and 21% in 2100. The residual fuel mix across the median of these scenarios is  
15 covered by a steady increase in electrification and biofuels at about equal levels, while energy from  
16 hydrogen is a bit less than half of that from electricity.

17 In passenger transport, a technology shift towards alternative fuel vehicles, particularly electric and  
18 hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, is the dominant driver of decarbonization. Electrifying passenger  
19 transport leverages decarbonization efforts in the power sector. In many studies, electrification of  
20 light-duty vehicles plays an essential role in meeting carbon targets, so the share of final energy for  
21 electric LDVs increases significantly through 2100. Moreover, due to the higher efficiency of electric  
22 drive, total transport energy consumption can decrease but transport consumption of electricity can  
23 increase. The IEA (ETP 2017) suggests that full LDV electrification would be the most promising  
24 low-carbon pathway to meet the 1.75° target. The MIT Economic Projection and Policy Analysis  
25 (EPPA) model focuses on the future deployment of gasoline versus electric vehicle technologies in  
26 the global LDV stock (Ghandi & Paltsev, 2019). Ghandi and Paltsev forecast that the global stock of  
27 vehicles will increase from 1.1 billion vehicles in 105 up to 1.8 billion by 2050, with a growth in  
28 electric vehicles from about 1 million vehicles in 2015 up to 500 million in 2050. These changes are  
29 driven primarily by cost projections (primarily in battery cost reductions). Similarly, the International  
30 Council on Clean Transport (ICCT) indicates that the technology adoption of electric vehicles in the  
31 light-duty sector can lead to large climate benefits. Their projections reach nearly 100% electrification  
32 of LDVs globally, leading to global GHG emissions ranging from 0% to -50% of 2010 LDV levels in  
33 2050 (Lutsey, 2015). Khalili et al. (2019) forecast transport stocks through 2050 under aggressive  
34 climate mitigation scenarios that nearly eliminate road transport emissions. They find demand for  
35 passenger transport triples through 2050, but emission targets are met through widespread adoption of  
36 battery electric vehicles (80% of LDVs) and, to a lesser extent, fuel cell and plug-in hybrid electric  
37 vehicles. Contrary to these forecasts, the EIA finds small adoption of electrification for LDVs and  
38 instead identifies diffusion of natural gas-fuelled LDVs in OECD and, to a greater extent, non-OECD  
39 countries through 2040. This trend occurs in a reference and a “low liquids” case, which lowers LDV  
40 ownership growth rates and increases preferences for alternative fuel vehicles. A comprehensive  
41 overview of regional technology adoption models across many methodological approaches can be  
42 found in (Jochem, Gómez Vilchez, Ensslen, Schäuble, & Fichtner, 2018).

43 In non-passenger transport, studies indicate a shift toward alternative fuels will need to be  
44 supplemented by efficiency improvements. The IEA suggests efficiency improvements will be key for  
45 decarbonization of trucks, aviation, and shipping in the short-to-medium term, while fuel switching to  
46 advanced biofuels will be needed for decarbonization of freight in the long-term. (Mulholland et al.,  
47 2018) investigated the impacts of decarbonizing road freight in two scenarios: countries complying  
48 with COP21 pledges and a second more ambitious reduction scenario in line with limiting global

1 temperature rise to 1.75 °C. Despite deployment of logistics improvements, high efficiency  
2 technologies, and low carbon fuels, activity growth leads to increase in energy demand for road  
3 freight of 47% and overall GHG increases by 55% (4.8 GTons CO<sub>2</sub>e) from 2015 to 2050 in COP21  
4 scenario. In the 1.75 °C scenario, decarbonization happens primarily through a switch to alternative  
5 fuels (hybrid electric and full battery electric trucks), which leads to overall reductions in GHG  
6 emissions by 60% in 2050 relative to 2015. Khalili et al. (2019) also find substantial shifts to  
7 alternative fuels in heavy-duty vehicles under aggressive climate mitigation scenarios, such that  
8 battery electricity, hydrogen fuel cell, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles constitute 50%, 30%, and  
9 15% of heavy-duty vehicles, respectively, in 2050. They also find 90% of buses will be electrified by  
10 2050.

11 It is clear that any serious attempt at carbon mitigation in the transport sector must examine the uptake  
12 of alternative fuels from fossil gasoline and diesel. Most scenarios we observe in the IAMs and GTMs  
13 decarbonize through electrification, but other fuels such as hydrogen and biofuels may also play a  
14 significant role in decarbonization—particularly in more aggressive climate scenarios that require  
15 near-zero or zero carbon in transport. Shifts towards alternative fuels must occur alongside shifts  
16 towards clean technologies in other sectors as all of the alternative fuels have upstream impacts.  
17 Without considering other sectors, fuel shifts would not yield their full mitigation potentials.

### 18 **10.7.3 Scenario summary**

19 This section provides an updated, detailed assessment of futures transport scenarios given a wide  
20 range of assumptions and under a set policy targets and conditions. The scenario modelling tools are  
21 necessary to aggregate individual options identified in the engineering and LCA literature and  
22 understand how they fit into mitigation pathways from a systems perspective. To meet aggressive  
23 climate targets, transport is a key sector to decarbonize. It accounts for a quarter of global CO<sub>2</sub>  
24 emissions in 2017 and could grow by nearly 50% by 2050 under BAU. To stay below 1.5°C, IAMs  
25 reduce transport systems by 80% in 2100. Such These emission reductions can come from addressing  
26 transport activity, energy intensity (at the technological or system level), or fuel carbon intensity.  
27 IAMs, GTMs, and national transport models generally indicate electrification will be the dominant  
28 driver of decarbonization, followed by biofuels and hydrogen. Adoption of these technologies,  
29 though, will vary across sectors, transport modes, and regions.

30 Finally, these models do not account for the systemic changes discussed in section 10.2, that may  
31 result from such things as increased automation, the use of big data for planning and operations of the  
32 transport system, or the use of blockchain and AI technologies. All of these could affect the variables  
33 that determine the carbon intensity of the sector.

34 *Placeholder-This summary will be completed for SOD after bringing together the three*  
35 *decarbonization sections (based on the approach in Aviation) and this section on bottom up and top*  
36 *down modelling.*

## 37 **10.8 Enabling conditions**

38 This final section draws some conclusions from the Chapter, and the outlines an integrated framework  
39 for enabling the changes that are emerging, also seeing the broader co-benefits with an SDG lens. It  
40 will end with the emerging evidence associated with what people can do as individuals at home, at  
41 work or in their communities.

### 42 **10.8.1 Conclusions**

43 1. Transport is becoming a major focus as its GHG is large and growing faster than other sectors,  
44 especially in aviation and shipping.

1 2. Since AR5 there has been a significant breakthrough in the opportunities to remove transport GHG  
2 in an economically efficient way due to electrification of light vehicle systems. This is mostly in light  
3 duty passenger vehicles but is moving to buses and trucks.

4 3. At the same time an equivalent set of technologies for heavy vehicle systems, especially for  
5 aviation and shipping, remains elusive. However, options are being trialled and breakthroughs may  
6 occur in hydrogen, biofuels, synthetic hydrocarbons or electrification based on different batteries.

7 4. Transport systems are also socio-economic not just technology systems and there are a range of  
8 systemic factors that are developing into potentially important change factors: urban form that  
9 minimises automobile dependence; behaviour change programs that emphasize shared values and  
10 economies; smart technologies that enable better options for transit and active transport as well as  
11 integrated approaches to using autonomous vehicles; new ways of enabling electric recharge systems  
12 to fit into electricity grids that balance grids and reduce range anxiety in EV's; and new concepts for  
13 the future economy such as circular economy, dematerialization, shared economy and decoupling, that  
14 are beginning to change transport GHG.

15 5. Scenarios using bottom-up models and top-down models are joined into the perspectives generated  
16 from the scientific overview to shape transport outcomes into Business-As Usual, Incremental and  
17 Transformative options for the future.


### 18 **10.8.2 Policy framework**

19 The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) of transition theory have become a major way of understanding  
20 how to do effective policy work in complex issues like climate change (Geels, Sovacool, Schwanen,  
21 & Sorrell, 2017) Grubb et al (2014); (Frantzeskaki, Broto, Coenen, & Loorbach, 2017) (Wolfram &  
22 Frantzeskaki, 2016). The MLP proponents have set out a framework and tools for enabling  
23 technological changes that are facing significant cost and systemic barriers but usually can be seen to  
24 offer solutions to broader sustainability concerns that can help achieve other development objectives  
25 (SDGs) (Bulkeley et al., 2011). While the challenge is that climate change is a “wicked problem”  
26 wherein considerable uncertainty prevents easy solutions, a related quandary is that complexity  
27 necessitates combining evidence-based decision-making with experiential knowledge to ensure  
28 solutions are transparent, forward-looking and context-appropriate (Friend et al., 2014).

29 The MLP Framework has three levels:


- 30 1. Micro level where there are technological niches requiring small scale tools relevant to R&D  
31 in organizations and communities.
- 32 2. Meso level where there are a patchwork of socio-technical regimes that influence markets and  
33 pricing and the tools are needed to show how the system can change for the better.
- 34 3. Macro level where the whole landscape or governance system needs to be transformed mainly  
35 involving public authorities resetting the regulations and recreating appropriate institutions.

36 Figure 10.22 and 10.23 set out the three Multi Level Phases and where the two groups of transport  
37 technologies and their associated fuels presently can be located.



1  
2

Figure 10.22 Multi-Level Phases of Transition Theory (Geels, 2018)



3  
4

Figure 10.23 The MLP levels as set out in Chapter 1 with the Heavy and Light Vehicle Systems.

5 The two groups of transport technologies are in different stages in the Multi Level Phases of transition  
6 as set out Figure 10.23. The light vehicles, usually just for passengers in cities, and heavy vehicles for  
7 passengers and freight, especially planes and ships, will be discussed separately using the tools  
8 suggested by Grubb et al, (2014) and elaborated in Chapter 1.

9 *Light Vehicle and Transit Electrification.* Light vehicle electric mobility is at the Meso and Macro  
10 level with technologies that are rapidly maturing as they are brought into cities and regions but there  
11 are tools such as LCA that can help show the benefits to particular places and tools such as subsidies

1 that will enable electric light vehicles to be rapidly adopted. At the Macro level transformational  
2 change will need to resolve the issues of recharging and grid stabilization as well as many issues from  
3 barriers imposed by present markets threatened by the changes. There is a necessity to create more  
4 efficient and effective policy mechanisms that aim to establish self-sustaining markets (Green et al,  
5 2014). Regulatory changes are increasingly barriers that need to be removed as the new grid systems  
6 emerge with batteries and other storage systems for grid stabilization; the role of electric vehicles in  
7 enabling a stable, smart system for recharge and grid enhancement still needs some large-scale testing  
8 and assessment of barriers (Sierzchula, Bakker, Maat, & Van Wee, 2014). The synergies between  
9 emerging technologies and the shared economy applied to transport, can help address some of the  
10 challenges facing EV adoption and the combination of all can offer even greater benefits for EVs,  
11 especially with new public transport systems (Taiebat & Xu, 2019) (G. Wang et al., 2019) (Newman  
12 et al, 2020).

13 *Heavy Vehicles and Fuels.* Heavy vehicle mobility able to achieve major decarbonization is still at the  
14 micro level with complex options and major issues to be resolved over the best options to be adopted  
15 (section 10.4, 5 and 6). R&D programs and trials are the best focus for achieving fuels for such  
16 systems as well as how best to reduce the need for such mobility and to shift to better modes. There  
17 will need to be education about why such changes are needed and how particular solutions can help  
18 with demand (section 10.2, 3, 4 and 5). Small trials of electric trucks in mining as well as urban parcel  
19 delivery and electric buses in several cities, for example, are helping establish a demand and show the  
20 benefits that will enable electric heavy vehicles to be more rapidly adopted (Yang et al., 2018)  
21 (Lajunen & Lipman, 2016) (Lee, Thomas, & Brown, 2013). Regulatory changes need to be made to  
22 ensure barriers are removed in new procurement systems that accommodate uncertainty and risks  
23 inherent in the early adoption of e-buses, e-airport and e-shipping port systems and their  
24 corresponding infrastructures (European Commission, 2017; Sclar et al, 2019; Boren, 2019). Long-  
25 term visions, including creative exercises (see 10.8.4) of cities and regions are needed that begin to  
26 trial the new technologies (Sclar, Gorguinpour, Castellanos, & Li, 2019) (Geels, 2019).

27 Grubb et al (2014) suggest that the economic tools needed are also at three levels based on individuals  
28 or communities, private companies and public authorities with some overlap on the Geels multi-level  
29 perspective. They suggest that the tools of behavioural economics which set up demand patterns can  
30 influence the micro level (as well as the macro level) and the key actors will be small entrepreneurial  
31 organizations, especially if they are funded or financed to do the R&D with demonstrations. This  
32 applies very clearly to heavy vehicles and their potential fuels. The next level needs neoclassical and  
33 welfare economics at the meso scale to enable markets to be generated through mass production. This  
34 is happening to light vehicles as they are being electrified in mass production now and need to go up  
35 to the next level quickly. At the macro level there is a need for evolutionary economics that enables  
36 the transformations to fully mainstream the system of transport in cities and regions for people. This is  
37 likely to be the need for governments and large companies to enable the integration of public and  
38 private goals into a fully developed carbon zero system for light vehicles over the next few years  
39 (Geels, 2019; IEA, 2019).

40 Finding the right level and appropriate tools depends a lot on the level of economic maturity in the  
41 city, region and nation. Developing economies are better placed to leave the micro level R&D-based  
42 work on heavy vehicle mobility to more developed economies but it is possible that lighter vehicle  
43 systems can rapidly be adopted in emerging economies where large growth and lower mobility  
44 provide opportunities to leap frog into the new electric systems (IEA, 2019; European Commission,  
45 2017). China has already shown it can leapfrog developed nations by its rapid development of electric  
46 transport in e-bikes, e-cars, e-buses, e-trains and the new Trackless Trams which are a cross-over  
47 innovation from High Speed Rail (Dans, 2019; Gao and Newman, 2019; Newman et al 2019).



### 1 10.8.3 Tools and strategies

2 All economies will need to find the right tools and strategies to use for both mobility systems. Tools  
3 and strategies are set out in Table 10.9 for both Light Vehicle Systems and Heavy Vehicle Systems.

4 **Table 10.8**

Tools and Strategies	Light Vehicle Systems	Heavy Vehicle Systems
1. Education and R&D	Behaviour change programs are needed as EV's become more mainstream. R&D is mostly needed on the socio-economic structures that impede adoption of EV's and the urban structures that enable reduced car dependence and how EV's can assist grids (Taiebat and Xu, 2019; Newman, et al, 2020)	Less emphasis on education and more on R&D to test the full life cycle costs of various heavy vehicle options (European Commission, 2017)
2. Access and Equity	Significant equity issues with EV's in the transition period require programs to address (IRENA, 2016)	Shipping less a problem but aviation looking heavily to demand management with big equity issues (Bows-Larkin, 2015).
3. Financing Economic Incentives and Partnerships	Multiple opportunities for financing, economic incentives and partnerships with clear economic benefits. The role of value capture in enabling such benefit is being demonstrated. The nexus between EV's and the electricity grid needs demonstration partnership projects (Sierczhula, 2014; Zhang et al, 2014; Mahmud et al, 2018; Newman Davies-Slate and Jones, 2018)	Taking R&D into demonstration projects is the main stage for heavy vehicle options and these are best done as partnerships. Government assistance will greatly assist in such projects as well as an R&D levy on all international transport. Abolishing fossil fuel subsidies and providing carbon taxes are likely to help in the early stages of heavy vehicle transitions (Sclar et al, 2019)
4. Co-benefits and Overcoming Fragmentation	The SDG benefits in zero carbon light vehicle transport systems are being demonstrated and these can now be quantified as nations mainstream this transition. Holistic projects are clearly more able to demonstrate such benefits. New methods for doing Benefit Cost Ratios that make more of health benefits in productivity are now favouring transit and active transport (UK DoT, 2019; Buonocore et al, 2019).	Heavy vehicle systems can also demonstrate SDG co-benefits if formulated with this in mind. Demonstrations of how SDG's can benefit are needed for all options being studied. Such projects need cross-government consideration (Pradhan et al, 2017).
5. Regulation and Assessment	With zero carbon light vehicle systems rapidly growing the need for a full assessment of regulatory barriers needs to be assessed in each city and region as well as different economic opportunities and a sustainable business model (SBM) (Bocken et al, 2016)	Zero carbon heavy vehicle systems need to have regulatory barrier assessments as they are being evaluated in R&D demonstrations (Sclar et al, 2019)



6. Governance and Institutional Capacity	Governance and institutional capacity can now be provided, international exchanges and education programs based on successful cities and nations enabling light vehicle decarbonisation to create more efficient and effective policy mechanism towards self-sustaining markets (Green, 2014; Skjolsvold and Ryghaug, 2019)	Governance and institutional capacity will require significant interventions such as levies or carbon taxes to enable heavy vehicle system transitions away from fossil fuels. Unless a global system of transparent accounting for international transport can be accomplished this part of the transport market will continue to fail in its decarbonization (Makan and Heyns, 2018)
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1

## 2 10.8.4 What can people do?

3 IPCC reports have increasingly shown that there is a role for programs and policies that can better  
4 involve people in helping bring about change. Transport is something that everyone can relate to on a  
5 daily basis. This final section will therefore focus on how people-oriented programs and policies can  
6 help to decarbonize transport for the future.

### 7 Creative foresight

8 Human culture has always had a creative instinct that enables the future to be better dealt with through  
9 imagination (Lent, 2016). Science and engineering have often been preceded by artistic expressions  
10 such as Jules Verne who first dreamed of the hydrogen future in 1874 in a novel *The Mysterious*  
11 *Island*. Autonomous vehicles have regularly occupied the minds of science fiction authors and film-  
12 makers (Braun, 2019). Such narratives, scenario building and foresighting are increasingly being seen  
13 as a part of the climate change mitigation process (Baer, 2015; Vervoort et al, 2018) and to even  
14 ‘liberate oppressed imaginaries’ as suggested by Luque-Ayala (2018). McPherson et al (2016) have  
15 emphasized the important role of positive images about the future instead of dystopian visions that are  
16 simply based around the science of climate change and the impossibility of business-usual futures.  
17 Transport visions need to be a part of this cultural change as well as the more frequently presented  
18 visions of renewable energy (Ruotsalainen, 2017; Wentand, 2016). There are some emerging  
19 technologies (discussed in s10.3.5) like Maglev, Hyperloop, and Drones that are likely to continue the  
20 electrification of transport even further (Kasliwal et al., 2019) and which only recently at the  
21 imagination stage. Decarbonized visions for heavy vehicle systems appear to be a core need from the  
22 assessment of technologies in this Chapter.

23

### 24 Initiatives to induce behavioural change

25 This Chapter has shown there is a growing significance to behaviour change (Creutzig, et al, 2018).  
26 There is emerging evidence on the effectiveness of ‘nudging’ strategies to induce behaviour change  
27 which are set out in Table 10.10. Nudge tools for sustainable transport behaviour could include  
28 changes in physical environment such as infrastructure, clear and simplified information on available  
29 choices, improving existing options and use of descriptive social norms (Lehner, Mont, & Heiskanen,  
30 2016). Shifting to active transport and public transport is enabled by a combination approach  
31 including ‘carrots’ that incentivise a shift away from private transport and ‘sticks’ that disincentivise  
32 car ownership and use (Petrunoff, Rissel, & Wen, 2017) Gao and Newman, 2019).

33 Options to facilitate a switch to public transport could include measures that reduce vehicle ownership  
34 such as high taxes on cars or which reduce vehicle use such as congestion charges, and high parking

1 fees (Ahmad et al., 2016). Parking management is one key to reducing private transport growth,  
 2 however it is difficult to manage unless it is part of a package of other options that are made better by  
 3 parking fees (Richardson, 2017). New transport infrastructure such as busway/trackless tram systems  
 4 complimented by biking and walking infrastructure could lead to behaviour change, especially if they  
 5 involve attractive new walking environments involving biophilic design, walkable urban design and  
 6 behaviour change programs (Soderlund, 2019; Gehl, 2012; (Heinen, Harshfield, Panter, Mackett, &  
 7 Ogilvie, 2017b). Evidence suggests a high potential for bikeshare programs especially if they involve  
 8 an enabling environment which includes other complementary pro-cycling measures (Ricci, 2015).

9 Incentives such as free public transport fares can enhance mobility of low income households (Cats,  
 10 Susilo, & Reimal, 2017). Hourly parking pricing could complement road pricing and other strategies  
 11 to reduce demand, however, when the parking space demand is inelastic, demand may not respond  
 12 directly to the increase in parking price. Recent experiments using mobile phones to generate travel  
 13 behaviour and personal profiles to nudge users to change their mobility behaviour on a personalized  
 14 level have shown positive results (Anagnostopoulou et al., 2018).

15 Recent studies emphasize the need to shift from interventions focusing in the narrower ‘personal  
 16 choice’ space towards a more systems perspective focusing on institutional responsibility (Spotswood  
 17 et al., 2015). This suggests that individuals will respond more if they are part of a group whether this  
 18 is a local community group or neighbourhood (Brog et al, 2007), or at work where their  
 19 organizational culture assists people to make choices that help their active travel arrangements; such  
 20 support has been shown to greatly improve worker productivity (Sallis, 2016). Institutions can  
 21 facilitate change by adopting an organisation culture that motivates sustainable behaviour. Leadership  
 22 support and pro-environment behaviour, initiatives to make walking and cycling options attractive by  
 23 imposing speed limits for motorized vehicles, campaigns such as bike to work and free transport  
 24 passes can influence employee behaviour positively (Blok, Wesselink, Studynka, & Kemp, 2015).  
 25 Similarly, parallel initiatives such as parking charges and eliminating car benefits at workplaces could  
 26 be effective in reducing car use (Christiansen, Engebretsen, Fearnley, & Usterud Hanssen, 2017;  
 27 Metzler, Humpe, & Gössling, 2019).

28 Transport interventions to enable active and transit improvements offer co-benefits (Lecompte & Juan  
 29 Pablo, 2017; Priya Uteng & Turner, 2019; De Vos, Mokhtarian, Schwanen, Van Acker, & Witlox,  
 30 2016; Petrunoff et al., 2017). Lack of methodologies to calculate these benefits often results in an  
 31 undervaluation of health benefits in transport policy evaluations (Brown, Diomedi, Moodie, Veerman,  
 32 & Carter, 2016) and new approaches such as the UK Department of Transport ‘Active Transport  
 33 Appraisal’ are showing dramatic changes in Benefit Cost Ratios towards modes that increase transit,  
 34 walking and cycling.

35 **Table 10.9 Initiatives that facilitate transport behaviour change and their impact on mitigation and SDGs**

Category	Intervention	Behaviour change	SDG impacts	References
IT	User behaviour data to nudge behaviour			(Anagnostopoulou et al., 2018; Klecha & Gianni, 2018; Smidfelt Rosqvist & Hiselius, 2016)
	Transforming travel behaviour related to shopping			
	Smart phone apps to encourage physical activity			
Incentives	Free public transport fares		+++	(Cats et al., 2017)
Pricing	Congestion charging		--	(Christiansen et al., 2017)
	Workplace parking charges			

	Intercity pricing			
	Hourly parking pricing			
	Taxes on cars			
Restrictions	Reducing parking			(Kammerlander et al., 2015)(Mohan, Tiwari, Goel, & Lahkar, 2017)
	Driving restrictions, Odd-even policy		-	(W. Zhang, Chen, Wang, Huang, & Wang, 2017)
Awareness and advocacy	Promotions through campaigns, training and education on cycling, providing information on impacts of car use		++	(Savan et al. 2017; Kammerlander et al. 2015; Nugroho, 2020)
New Transport Infrastructure	Bike sharing, network of bike routes, separate bicycle lanes, safe parking for bicycles, integration of bikes with public transport		+++	(Heinen et al., 2017b; Nematchoua, Roshan, Tchinda, Nasrabadi, & Ricciardi, 2015; Otero, Nieuwenhuijsen, & Rojas-Rueda, 2018; Ricci, 2015)
	Busway systems			
Organisational culture	Campaigns such as Bike to work		++	(Petrunoff et al., 2017; Young et al., 2015)
	Managing parking the at workplace			
	Leadership and organizational commitment		++	
	Management support and training			

1 Behaviour change

SDG impact

2

		<b>Direction/scale</b>	<b>Large</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Small</b>
Large	Moderate	Minor			
		Positive	+++	++	+
		Negative	---	--	-

3

4

5 **Transport Climate Emergency Plans and Local Pledges**

6 The above literature suggests that national, regional and local governments could produce transport  
 7 plans with a climate emergency focus that involve commitments or pledges from institutions such as  
 8 work places, local community groups and civil society organizations that involve behaviour change  
 9 towards more active and low carbon transport. It could also involve pledges from major freight  
 10 companies, airlines and shipping companies with attempts to link their customers to the need for  
 11 action on climate change. Such pledges are increasingly part of climate change legislation including  
 12 the Paris Agreement and at other levels of government such as how regional/provincial governments  
 13 involve local government (e.g. Victorian Government, 2019; Jaeger et al, 2019). These are based  
 14 often around Local Low Carbon Transport Roadmaps which are now happening in India and China as  
 15 well as through the UNCRD’s Environmental Sustainable Transport program (Pathak and Shukla,  
 16 2016; Baeumler et al, 2012; UNCRD, 2010; 2019). Such pledges can be calculated at a personal level  
 17 and applied through multiples at every level of activity (Meyer and Newman, 2019, 2020).  
 18

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