

Annex C: Scenarios and modelling methods

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1 **Preamble**

2 The use of scenarios and modelling methods are key pillars in IPCC WG III Assessment Reports. Past
3 WG III assessment report cycles identified knowledge gaps about the integration of modelling across
4 scales and disciplines, mainly between global integrated assessment modelling methods and bottom-up
5 modelling insights of mitigation responses. Future research also recognised the need to improve the
6 transparency of model assumptions and enhance the communication of scenario results.

7 This annex on *Scenarios and modelling methods* aims to address some of these gaps by detailing the
8 modelling frameworks applied in the WG III AR6 chapters and disclose scenario assumptions and its
9 key parameters. It was been explicitly included in the Scoping Meeting Report of the WG III
10 contribution to the AR6 and approved by the IPCC Panel in the 46th Session of the Panel.

11 The annex includes two parts: Part I. on *modelling methods* summarises methods and tools available to
12 evaluate sectorial, technological and behavioural mitigation responses as well as integrated assessment
13 models (IAMs) for the analysis of “whole system” transformation pathways; Part II on *scenarios* sets
14 out the portfolio of climate change scenarios and mitigation pathways assessed in the WG III AR6
15 chapters, its underneath principles and interactions with scenario assessments by WG I and WG II.

16 [To be updated before FGD submission.]

17

1 **Part I Modelling methods**

2 **I.1. Overview of modelling tools**

3 Modelling frameworks vary vastly amongst themselves, and several key characteristics can be used as
4 basis for model classification (Scricciu et al. 2013; Hardt and O'Neill 2017; Capellán-Pérez et al. 2020;
5 Dodds et al. 2015). One of the most basic aspects of a modelling tool is how it approaches the system
6 modelled from a solution perspective. **Simulation models** are based on the evaluation of the dynamic
7 behaviour of a system (Lund et al. 2017). They can be used to determine the performance of a system
8 under alternative options of key parameters in a realistic manner. Most often, simulation models require
9 comprehensive knowledge of each parameter, in order to choose a specific path under several
10 alternatives. On the other hand, **optimisation models** seek to maximise or minimise a mathematical
11 objective function under a set of constraints (Iqbal et al. 2014; Baños et al. 2011). Most often, the
12 objective function represents the total cost or revenue of a given system or the total welfare of a given
13 society. One major aspect of optimisation models is that the solution is achieved by simultaneously
14 binding a set of constraints, which can be used to represent real life limitation on the system, such as:
15 constraints on flows, resource and technology availability, labour and financial limitations,
16 environmental aspects, and many other characteristics that the model may require (Fazlollahi et al.
17 2012; Cedillos Alvarado et al. 2016; Pfenninger et al. 2014). Specifically, when modelling climate
18 mitigation responses, limiting carbon budgets is often used to represent future temperature level
19 pathways (Gidden et al. 2019a; Rogelj et al. 2016; Millar et al. 2017; Peters 2018).

20 Another major distinction amongst modelling tools is related to the solution methodology from a
21 temporal perspective. They can have a perfect foresight intertemporal assumption or a recursive-
22 dynamic assumption. Intertemporal optimisation with **perfect foresight** is an optimisation method for
23 achieving an overall optimal solution over time. It is based on perfect information on all future states
24 of a system and assumptions (such as technology availability and prices) and, as such, today's and future
25 decisions are made simultaneously, resulting in a single path of optimal actions that lead to the overall
26 optimal solution (Keppo and Strubegger 2010; Gerbaulet et al. 2019). Such modelling approach can
27 present an optimal trajectory of the set of actions and policies that would lead to the overall first-best
28 solution. However, real-life decisions are not always based on optimal solutions (Ellenbeck and
29 Lilliestam 2019) and, therefore, solutions from perfect foresight models can be challenging to be
30 implemented by policymakers (Pindyck 2013, 2017). For instance, perfect foresight implies perfect
31 knowledge of the future states of the system, such as future demand on goods and products and
32 availability of production factors and technology.

33 **Recursive-dynamic** models, also known as myopic or limited foresight models, make decisions over
34 sequential periods of time. For each time step, the solution is achieved without information of future
35 time steps. Therefore, the solution path is a series of solutions in short trajectories that, ultimately, are
36 very unlikely to achieve the overall optimal solution over the whole time period considered (Fuso Nerini
37 et al. 2017). Nonetheless, the solution represents a set of possible and plausible policies and behavioural
38 choices of the agents that could be taken in short-term cycles, without perfect information (Hanna and
39 Gross 2020; Heuberger et al. 2018). In between, some models consider **imperfect or adaptive**
40 **expectations**, where economic decisions are based on past, current and imperfectly anticipated future
41 information (Keppo and Strubegger 2010; Löffler et al. 2019; Kriegler et al. 2015a). Modelling tools
42 can also be differentiated by their level of representation of economic agents and sectors (Section I.2).
43 Full economy models, such as **general equilibrium** models, have a full representation of all agents of
44 the economy and their interactions with each other. Such models are valuable for assessing first and
45 second-order effects of policies, technological changes or other impacts over time (Babatunde et al.
46 2017). **Partial equilibrium** models focus on the representation of a subset of economic sector and
47 agents. Typically, partial equilibrium models have a more detailed representation of a specific sector,

1 such as policies packages and technology portfolio (Cheng et al. 2015; Hanes and Carpenter 2017;
2 Sanchez et al. 2018; Guedes et al. 2019; Pastor et al. 2019).

3 Due to their own limitations, it is common for general equilibrium models and partial equilibrium
4 models to be used in a **hybrid modelling framework**. This allows for partial equilibrium model to
5 incorporate macroeconomic impacts of policies and changes in a specific agents or sectors, such as
6 changes in prices and demands. On the other hand, general equilibrium models can take advantage of a
7 more detailed model for assessing changes in this sector, such as resources and technology changes or
8 specific agent behavioural patterns (Section I.2 Economic modelling).

9 The most basic aspect to differentiate models is their main objective function, which include the detail
10 at which they represent key sectors, systems and agents. This affects the decision on methodology and
11 other coverage aspects. Several models have been developed for different sectorial representation, such
12 as the energy (Section I.3 Energy system modelling), buildings (Section I.4 Building sector models),
13 transports (Section I.5 Transport models), industry (Section I.6 Industry sector models), and land use
14 (Section I.7 Land use modelling).

15 Modelling exercises vary considerable in terms of key characteristics, including geographical scales,
16 time coverage, environmental variables, technologies portfolio, and socioeconomic assumptions. A
17 detailed comparison of key characteristics of global and national models used in this report is presented
18 in Section I.9. Geographical coverage ranges from sub-national (Cheng et al. 2015; Feijoo et al. 2018;
19 Rajão et al. 2020), national (Vishwanathan et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019; Sugiyama et al. 2019; Schaeffer
20 et al. 2020; Baptista et al. 2020), regional (Vrontisi et al. 2016; Hanaoka and Masui 2020) and global
21 models (McCollum et al. 2018a; Gidden et al. 2018; Krieglger et al. 2018a; Rogelj et al. 2019b; Drouet
22 et al. 2020). Even models with the same geographical coverage can still be significantly different from
23 each other, for instance, due to the number of regions within the model. Models can also have spatially
24 implicit and explicit formulations, which in turn can have different spatial resolution. This distinction
25 is especially important for land use models, which account for changes in land use and agricultural
26 practices (see Section I.7 Land use modelling). The time horizon, time steps and time resolution are
27 major aspects that differ across models. Model horizon can range from short- to long-term, typically
28 reaching from a few years to up until the end of the century (Fujimori et al. 2019b; Rogelj et al. 2019a;
29 Ringkjøb et al. 2020; Gidden et al. 2019b). Time resolution is particularly relevant for specific
30 applications, such as power sector models, which have detailed representation of power technologies
31 dispatch and operation (Soria et al. 2016; Abujarad et al. 2017; Guan et al. 2020).

32 Furthermore, technology representation varies greatly for each model. Not only the level of detail,
33 which can be specific for a given sector or region, but also how technological change is accounted for.
34 There are two approaches: exogenous and endogenous technological change. They primarily differ on
35 how policy and investment decisions affect technological development and diffusion.

36 Finally, **Integrated Assessment Model (IAM)** are simplified representations of the complex physical
37 and social systems, focusing on the interaction between economy, society and the environment (see
38 Section I.9 Integrated assessment modelling). They represent the coupled energy-economy-land-
39 climate system to varying degrees. In a way, IAM differ themselves in all the topics discussed in this
40 section: significant variation in geographical, sectorial, spatial and time resolution; rely greatly on
41 socioeconomic assumptions; different technological representation; partial or general equilibrium
42 assumptions; differentiated between perfect foresight or recursive-dynamic methodology. The
43 difficulty in fully representing the extent of climate damages in monetary terms may be the most
44 important and challenging limitation of IAMs and it is mostly directed to cost benefit IAMs. However,
45 both categories of IAMs present important limitations (see Section I.9 Integrated assessment
46 modelling).

47

1 I.2 Economic modelling

2 Several types of economic models can be distinguished, as introduced in Section I.1. **General**
3 **equilibrium models** in a broadest sense – often referred to as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
4 models – represent the full economy through the economic interdependencies between multiple sectors
5 and agents, and the interaction between supply and demand on multiple markets (Robinson et al. 1999).
6 They capture the full circularity of economic flows through income and demand relationships and
7 feedbacks including the overall balance of payments. Most CGE models are neoclassical supply-led
8 models with market clearing based on price adjustment. Representative agents usually seek to minimise
9 production costs or maximise utility under given production and utility function, although optimal
10 behaviours are no preconditions per se. Most CGE models also include assumptions of perfect markets
11 with full employment of factors although market imperfections and underemployment of factors (e.g.
12 unemployment) can be assumed (Babiker and Eckaus 2007; Guivarch et al. 2011). CGE models can
13 either be static or dynamic and represent pathways as a sequence of equilibria in the second case.

14 On the contrary, **partial equilibrium models** only represent a subset of economic sectors and markets
15 disconnected from the rest of the economy. They basically represent sectoral market balance and
16 adjustments – energy markets for instance through supply and demand interaction - under ceteris
17 paribus assumptions about other markets (labour, capital, etc.), income, etc. ignoring possible
18 feedbacks.

19 **Macro-econometric models** have the same full economy coverage and sector interdependence
20 including balance of payments than general equilibrium models, and are sometimes considered a subset
21 of them. They differ from standard neoclassical CGE models in the main that economic behaviours are
22 not micro-founded optimising behaviours but represented by macroeconomic and sectoral functions
23 estimated through econometric techniques (Barker and Scricciu 2010). In addition, they usually adopt
24 a demand-led post-Keynesian approach where final demand and investment determine supply and not
25 the other way around. An important consequence is that investment in a given sector (e.g. low carbon
26 energy) does not crowd-out investment in other sectors contrary to supply-led models. Finally, prices
27 do not instantaneously clear markets and adjust with lag.

28 **Macro-economic growth models** are derived from aggregated Solow or Ramsey growth models. They
29 are based on a single macroeconomic production function combining capital, labour and sometimes
30 energy to produce a generic good for consumption and investment. They are used as the macroeconomic
31 component of cost benefit IAMs (Nordhaus 1993) and some detailed-process IAMs.

32 The **coverage of economic actors and sectors and their interaction** differ across models. A main
33 distinction is between models based on full Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and compact growth
34 approaches. On the one hand, SAM-based models – such as CGE and macroeconometric models -
35 follow a multisector approach distinguishing from several to a hundred of different economic sectors
36 or production goods and represent sector specific value-added, final consumption and interindustry
37 relationships through an Input-Output framework of intermediary consumption (Robinson 1989). They
38 also represent individual economic agents (firms, households, public administration, etc.) with specific
39 behaviours and budget constraints. On the other hand, compact growth models are reduced to a single
40 macroeconomic agent producing, consuming and investing a single macroeconomic good without
41 considering interindustry relationships. In some detailed process IAMs, the compact growth approach
42 is combined with a detailed representation of energy supply and demand systems that surmises different
43 economic actors and subsectors. However, the energy system remains driven by a compact
44 macroeconomic growth engine (Bauer et al. 2008). Partial equilibrium models usually distinguish
45 several subsectors and economic agents for supply and demand of energy.

1 In most models the treatment of **economic growth** follows Solow or Ramsey growth approach based
2 on the evolution through time of production factors endowment and productivity. Classically, labour
3 endowment and demography are exogenous, and capital accumulates through investment. Partial
4 equilibrium models do not model economic growth but use exogenous growth assumptions derived
5 from compact growth models. Factors productivity evolution is assumed exogenous in most cases i.e.
6 general technical progress is assumed to be an autonomous process. A few models feature endogenous
7 growth aspects where factor productivity increase with cumulated macroeconomic investment. Models
8 also differ about the content of technical progress and alternatively consider un-biased total factor
9 productivity improvement or labour specific factor augmenting productivity. In multisector models
10 aggregated economic growth is also the result of the endogenous sectoral composition of GDP known
11 as structural change. **Structural change** is the result of the interaction between differentiated changes
12 of productivity between sectors – through sector specific technical progress or substitution – and the
13 structure of final demand as income grows (Herrendorf et al. 2014). If general technical progress is
14 mostly assumed exogenous and autonomous at an aggregated level, **innovation in relation to energy**
15 **demand and technical systems** follow more detailed specifications. Energy efficiency can be assumed
16 an autonomous process at different levels – macroeconomic, sector or technology level – or energy
17 technical change can be endogenous and induced as a learning by doing process or as a result of R and
18 D investments (learning by searching) (Löschel 2002).

19 Multi region models consider interactions between regions through **trade** of energy goods, non-energy
20 goods and services (energy goods only for partial equilibrium energy models) and emission permits in
21 the context of climate policy. For each type of goods trade is usually represented as a common pool
22 where regions interact with the pool through supply (exports) or demand (imports). A few models
23 consider bilateral trade flows between regions. Traded goods can be assumed perfectly substitutable
24 between regions of origin (Heckscher-Ohlin assumption) such as is often the case for energy
25 commodities like oil or imperfectly substitutable (represented as Armington goods most of the time)
26 for non-energy goods. The representation of trade and capital imbalances at the regional level and their
27 evolution through time vary across model and imbalances are either not considered (regional current
28 accounts are balanced at each point in time), or a constraint for intertemporal balance is included (an
29 export surplus today will be balanced by an import surplus in the future) or else trade imbalances follow
30 other rules such as a convergence towards zero in the long run (Foure et al. 2020).

31 **Strategic interaction** can also occur between regions especially in the presence of externalities such as
32 climate change, energy prices or technology spill-overs. Intertemporal models can include two types of
33 strategic interaction: i) a cooperative Pareto optimal solution where all externalities are internalised and
34 based on the maximisation of a global discounted welfare with weighted regional welfare (Negishi
35 weights), or ii) a non-cooperative solution that is strategically optimal for each region (Nash
36 equilibrium) (Leimbach et al. 2017b).

37 Models cover different **investment** flows according to model type. Partial equilibrium sectoral models
38 compute energy system and/or sectoral (transport, building, industry, etc.) technology specific
39 investment flows associated with productive capacities and equipment. Full economy models compute
40 both energy system and macroeconomic investment, the second being used to increase macroeconomic
41 capital stock. Full economy multi-sector models compute sector specific (energy and non-energy
42 sectors) investment and capital flows with some details about the investments goods involved.

43 Financial constraints are usually not represented in partial equilibrium models and all investment needs
44 are automatically satisfied. Full economy models differ in the representation of macro-**finance**. In most
45 CGE and compact growth models' financial mechanisms are only implicit and total financial capacity
46 and investment is constrained and driven by savings. Such models usually represent full crowding-out
47 of investments. In other models such as macroeconometric models, macro-finance is sometimes
48 explicit, and investments can be financed by credit on top of savings. They also usually include limited

1 crowding-out of investments (Mercuri et al. 2019). In both partial and full economy models the
2 financial environment of investment decisions is usually based on a weighted average cost of capital
3 (WACC) modelled as a discount rate which can be region, sector or technology specific.

4 Models compare economic flows and costs over time through discounting, which is standard practice
5 in economics. Discounting first enables to compare costs and benefits of climate mitigation in the
6 context of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). In this case the choice of discount rate is crucial for the balance
7 of mitigation costs and avoided climate damages occurring over the very long run. In the context of
8 cost-effectiveness and mitigation analysis, discounting allows to estimate the intertemporal policy costs
9 to reach a given objective such as respecting a carbon budget. The choice of the appropriate discounted
10 rate is highly debated and two general approaches are commonly used. Based on ethical principles, the
11 first states that the discount rate should reflect how costs and benefits supported by different generations
12 should be weighted, which usually leads to the lowest discount rates. The second approach identifies
13 the discount rate to the rate of return to capital or the interest rate as observed in the real economy which
14 yields higher values. The choice of discount rate influences the mitigation schedule and tempo in
15 economic models, interplays with capital inertia and technical change, and determines the extent of
16 negative emissions used in the modelled pathways.

18 **I.3 Energy system modelling**

19 **I.3.1 Modelling electricity system operation with large scale penetration of renewables**

20 Integration of high penetration of variable renewable energies (VRE) in the grid imposes a major
21 challenge to electricity system operation. Unlike conventional fossil generation, VRE plants cannot
22 provide firm capacity as the balance between demand and supply needs to be maintained in real time
23 (e.g. seconds timescale), while output of renewable generation is variable and there may be long periods
24 with very low output (Miranda et al. 2017; Buttler et al. 2016; Hoicka and Rowlands 2011).
25 Furthermore, large penetration of VRE, which are inverter-based power generation, will significantly
26 reduce system inertia requiring considerably greater amount of various ancillary services, including
27 both operating reserve and frequency regulation services, in order to maintain system stability (as
28 system inertia, reserve and frequency regulation services have been widely available by thermal
29 generation as by-products of energy production). The key modelling challenge is related to the need to
30 incorporate grid dynamic stability requirements (quantified by differential equations) in the system
31 optimisation framework (expressed by algebraic equations), aimed at quantifying the operation cost of
32 managing large scale penetration of renewable generation (Esteban et al. 2018; Lin and Chen 2013).

33 A number of advanced grid modelling approaches have been developed, such as robust optimisation
34 (Jiang et al. 2012), interval optimisation (Dvorkin et al. 2015), and stochastic optimisation (Meibom et
35 al. 2011; Monforti et al. 2014) to optimally schedule the operation of the future low carbon systems
36 with high penetration of VRE. Advanced stochastic models demonstrated that this would not only lead
37 to significantly higher cost of system management but may eventually limit the ability of the system to
38 accommodate renewable generation (Badesa et al. 2020; Hansen et al. 2019; Perez et al. 2019; Bistline
39 and Young 2019). Modelling tools such as European Model for EMPIRE¹ (Skar et al. 2016), REMix²
40 (Scholz et al. 2017), EUCAD³ (Després 2015) also investigated these issues. Furthermore, advanced
41 modelling tools have been developed for the purpose of providing estimations of system wide inertial
42 frequency response that would assist system operators in maintaining adequate system inertia (Sharma

FOOTNOTE: ¹ Power system Investment with Renewable Energy

FOOTNOTE: ² Renewable Energy Mix for Sustainable Electricity Supply

FOOTNOTE: ³ European Unit Commitment And Dispatch model

1 et al. 2011). Furthermore, advanced modelling analysis has been informing the development of security
2 standards related to frequency stability, by using the concept of Value of Lost Load (VoLL) as the
3 security measure, so that optimal balance between the cost associated with the provision of various
4 ancillary services against the benefit related to reduced cost associated with demand curtailment, can
5 be determined (Teng and Strbac 2017).

6 These innovative models also provided fundamental evidence regarding the role and value of advanced
7 technologies and control systems in supporting cost effective operation of future electricity systems
8 with very high penetration of renewable generation. In particular, the importance of enhancing the
9 control capabilities of renewable generation and applying flexible technologies, such as energy storage
10 (Hall and Bain 2008; Obi et al. 2017; Arbabzadeh et al. 2019), demand side response (DSR)
11 interconnection (Aghajani et al. 2017) and transmission grid extensions (Schaber et al. 2012) for provide
12 system stability control, is demonstrated through novel system integration models (Sinsel et al. 2020;
13 Lund et al. 2015). A novel modelling framework is proposed to deliver inertia and support primary
14 frequency control through variable-speed wind turbines (Morren et al. 2006), including quantification
15 of the value of this technology in future renewable generation dominated power grids (Chu et al. 2020).
16 Furthermore, innovative modelling of advanced control strategies for PVs that can provide frequency
17 regulation (including DC link capacitors and storage) are proposed (Waffenschmidt and Hui 2016; Liu
18 et al. 2017). Advanced models for controlling distributed energy storage systems to provide an effective
19 virtual inertia have been developed, demonstrating the provision of virtual-synchronous-machine
20 capabilities for storage devices with power electronic converters, which can support system frequency
21 management following disturbances (Hammad et al. 2019; Markovic et al. 2019).

22 In the context of DSR, alternative methods for controlling residential loads to provide frequency support
23 have been developed, while not compromising on service quality delivered to consumers (Weckx et al.
24 2013). Demand-based frequency support in grids with a high penetration of distributed generation, both
25 from the technical and economic perspectives is investigated (Black and Ilic 2002). Furthermore, novel
26 modelling approaches demonstrated that a critically important concept for the provision of frequency
27 regulation in future renewable dominated systems, is the concept of Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) (Alhelou
28 and Golshan 2016; Aunedi and Strbac 2020). Regarding the application of interconnection for exchange
29 of balancing services between neighbouring power grids, alternative control schemes for High Voltage
30 Direct Current (HVDC) converters have been proposed demonstrating that this would reduce the cost
31 of balancing (Tosatto et al. 2020).

32 33 **I.3.2 Modelling the interaction between different energy sectors**

34 Several integrated models have been developed in order to study the interaction between different
35 energy vectors and whole system approaches. This includes the Integrated Energy System Simulation
36 model (IESM) (NREL 2020), the Integrated Whole-Energy System (IWES) model (Strbac et al. 2018),
37 the UK TIMES (Daly and Fais 2014), Calliope (Pfenninger and Pickering 2018), the Open Energy
38 Modelling Framework (Hilpert et al. 2017), among others.

39 IESM is an approach in which the multi-system energy challenge is investigated holistically rather than
40 looking at each of the systems in isolation. NREL (2020) capabilities include co-optimisation across
41 multiple energy systems, including electricity, natural gas, hydrogen and water systems. These provide
42 the opportunity to perform hydro, thermal, and gas infrastructure investment and resource use
43 coordination for time horizons ranging from sub-hourly (markets and operations) to multi-year
44 (planning).

45 IWES model incorporates detail modelling of electricity system, modelling of heating technologies
46 including district heating, heat network, heat pumps (air/ground source, hybrid) and a module that
47 optimises the hydrogen infrastructure. Overall, IWES model includes electricity, gas, transport,

1 hydrogen and heat systems and captures the complex interactions across those energy vectors. The
2 IWES model also considers the short-term operation and long-term investment timescales (from
3 seconds to years) simultaneously and covering both local district and national/international level energy
4 infrastructure, including energy-flow interactions via interconnectors. This functionality is essential
5 since those aspects are complexly intertwined and required to be analysed simultaneously in the whole-
6 system concept. In order to provide sufficient spatial granularity to capture the regional characteristics;
7 Each region has two (or more) distribution network models representing different distribution network
8 characteristics (e.g. urban and rural systems). The distribution network modelling is also essential, e.g.
9 for the district heating modelling, as it can capture the length of heat network which is the primary
10 component of district heating costs. However, one of the challenges remained in the whole system
11 modelling is to increase the spatial and temporal granularity. In the IWES model, the stochastic
12 scheduling model presented in Teng and Strbac (2017), is used to approximate the inertia level and
13 corresponding real time requirements for frequency regulation, also capturing changes in demand
14 renewable generation outputs.

15 In the context of innovative energy vectors, such as hydrogen, the IWES model is used to optimise the
16 required capacity of hydrogen production from different technologies, e.g. steam methane reforming
17 (SMR) with CCUS, electrolysis, BECCS, and hydrogen storage. This considers the cost of production,
18 transport and/or CCS facilities. This enables the optimisation and analysis of the cost of different
19 locational distributions of hydrogen sources. In order to investigate the physics of hydrogen transport
20 through the gas infrastructure, the stochastic model developed in Shabazbegian et al. (2020) based on
21 the Combined Gas and Electricity Network model (Chaudry et al. 2008), is capable to analyse hydrogen
22 transport in transmission and low, medium and high-pressure gas distribution networks. This model
23 provides fundamental evidence regarding the ability of the existing gas transmission and distribution
24 gas networks to deliver hydrogen in time by taking into account the operational uncertainties associated
25 with renewables

26 The UK TIMES Model is an integrated MARKAL-EFOM model. It portrays the UK energy system,
27 from fuel extraction and trading, to fuel processing and transport, electricity generation and all final
28 energy demands (Taylor et al. 2014; Daly and Fais 2014). The model generates scenarios for the
29 evolution of the energy system based on different assumptions around the evolution of demands, future
30 technology costs, measuring energy system costs and all greenhouse gases (GHGs) associated with the
31 scenario. UKTM is built using the TIMES model generator: as a partial equilibrium energy system and
32 technologically detailed model, is well suited to investigate the economic, social, and technological
33 trade-offs between long-term divergent energy scenarios. TIMES is generally used to generate
34 vertically integrated models of whole energy systems, regional, national or global, but can also be used
35 to study elements of an energy system in isolation. For the region being modelled, the user provides
36 projections of baseline energy service demands (lighting, heating, car travel etc.) as well as a description
37 of the existing stock of energy technologies (efficiencies, retirement profiles, inputs and output fuels,
38 operational costs), the characteristics of future technologies available, and a projection of future energy
39 supply and trade (Li et al. 2018; Fais et al. 2016; Pye et al. 2017; McGlade et al. 2018). TIMES uses a
40 linear optimisation objective function to choose the level of investment and operation of energy system
41 technologies and fuel supply/trade in order to minimise total system cost (or maximise the total
42 discounted producer and consumer surplus) subject to technical, environmental and economic
43 constraints (Hall and Buckley 2016). The participants of this system are assumed to have perfect
44 foresight, in that decisions are made with the full inter-temporal knowledge of future policy,
45 technological and economic developments. Hence, under a range of input assumptions, which are key
46 to the model outputs, TIMES delivers an economy-wide solution of cost-optimal energy market
47 development (see Section I.9 Integrated assessment modelling).

48

1 **I.3.3 Modelling of energy systems in context of large-scale economy**

2 To study the impact of low carbon energy systems on the economy, numerous integrated assessment
3 modelling tools are applied, such as the World Energy Model (WEM) (IEA 2020a), the National Energy
4 Modelling System (NEMS) (EIA 2009), and the General Equilibrium Model for Economy-Energy-
5 Environment (GEM-E3) (Capros et al. 2013).

6 The WEM is a simulation model covering energy supply, energy transformation and energy demand.
7 The majority of the end-use sectors use stock models to characterise the energy infrastructure. In
8 addition, energy-related CO₂ emissions and investments related to energy developments are specified.
9 The model is focused on determining the share of alternative technologies in satisfying energy service
10 demand. This includes investment costs, operating and maintenance costs, fuel costs and in some cases
11 costs for emitting CO₂. The main exogenous assumptions are related to the demographics,
12 socioeconomic development pathways and technological developments. Consumption of the main oil
13 products is modelled individually in each end-use sector (e.g., industry and agriculture) and the refinery
14 model links it with the demand for individual products. Demand for primary energy serves as an input
15 for the supply modules. Complete energy balances are compiled at a regional level and the CO₂
16 emissions of each region are then calculated using derived CO₂ factors. The time resolution of the model
17 is in annual steps over the whole projection horizon. The model is each year recalibrated to the latest
18 available data. Estimates are based on updates of the Global Energy Review reports which relies on a
19 number of sources, including the latest monthly data submissions to the IEA's Energy Data Centre,
20 other statistical releases from national administrations, and recent market data from the IEA Market
21 Report Series that cover coal, oil, natural gas, renewables and power.

22 The NEMS is an energy-economy modelling system applied for the U.S.A. through 2030. NEMS
23 projects the production, imports, conversion, consumption and prices of energy, subject to assumptions
24 on macroeconomic and financial factors, world energy markets, resource availability and costs,
25 behavioural and technological choice criteria, cost and performance characteristics of energy
26 technologies, and demographics. NEMS was designed and implemented by the Energy Information
27 Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy. NEMS is used by EIA to project the energy,
28 economic, environmental, and security impacts on the United States considering alternative energy
29 policies and assumptions related to energy markets. The projection horizon is approximately 25 years
30 in the future. This time period is one in which technology, demographics, and economic conditions are
31 sufficiently understood in order to represent energy markets with a reasonable degree of confidence.
32 NEMS provides a consistent framework for representing the complex interactions of the U.S. energy
33 system and its response to a wide variety of alternative energy program assumptions and policy
34 initiatives.

35 GEM-E3 is a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model that covers the interactions
36 between the economy, the energy system and the environment. It is especially designed to evaluate
37 energy, climate and environmental policies. GEM-E3 can evaluate consistently the distributional and
38 macro-economic effects of policies for the various economic sectors and agents across the countries /
39 regions.

40

41 **I.4 Building sector models**

42 The three modelling approaches used to assess mitigation pathways in the building sector include
43 bottom-up, top-down and the hybrid approaches.

44


1 I.4.1. Modelling approaches of mitigation potentials in the building sector

2 Mitigation potentials in the building sector are modelled using either a top-down approach, a bottom-
 3 up one or a hybrid approach which combines both bottom-up and top-down (Figure I.1). The **top-down**
 4 **approach** is based on macroscopic regional/national historical aggregate of energy consumption of the
 5 overall sector, which are very general and have low granularity. Top-down models can be either
 6 econometric models using macro-economic indicators such as income or technological models relying
 7 on data such as ownership. Top-down models are used for assessing economic-wide responses of
 8 building policies.

9 The **bottom-up approach** is based on microscopic data of individual end-uses and the characteristics
 10 of each component of buildings. Geographical Information Systems (GIS) layers can be used to create
 11 datasets of building characteristics (Reinhart and Cerezo Davila 2016). Bottom-up models can be either
 12 physics-based, also known as engineering models; data-driven, also known as statistical models; or a
 13 combination of both, also known as hybrid bottom-up models. Bottom-up models are data intensive and
 14 as such require long computing time. Machine learning techniques allow optimising the computing time
 15 (Bourdeau et al. 2019). Bottom-up models are useful to assess the techno-economic potential of the
 16 overall building stock by extrapolating the estimated energy consumption of a representative set of
 17 individual buildings (Duerinck et al. 2008; Swan and Ugursal 2009; Hall and Buckley 2016; Bourdeau
 18 et al. 2019).

19 One way to overcome the drawbacks of the bottom-up and the top-down modelling approaches, is to
 20 combine the two into a **hybrid model** which bridges the gap between the detailed bottom-up end-use
 21 models and the aggregated top-down models. Hybrid models can be either optimisation models or
 22 simulation models (Duerinck et al. 2008; Hall and Buckley 2016; Bourdeau et al. 2019). The latter can
 23 also be agent-based models and could be combined with building performance models to allow for an
 24 assessment of occupants behaviour (Papadopoulos and Azar 2016). Hybrid models are used for
 25 exploring the impacts of resource constraints, investigating the role of specific technological choices as
 26 well as for analysing the impact of specific energy policies.

27



28

29

Figure I.1. Modelling approaches of GHG emissions used in the building sector

30

1 **I.4.2. Assessment of mitigation potentials in illustrative pathways (IPs) (preliminary** 2 **results)**


3 Five, out of the 11, IPs proposed in Chapter 3 (see in Section II.2.2. Illustrative pathways) were
4 considered to assess mitigation potentials in the building sector (Figure I.2). NGFS_Current policies
5 from GCAM 5.2 Model serves as a baseline scenario, while the remaining four scenarios are related to
6 different mitigation action(s) ranging from a moderate scenario (EN_INDCi2030_3000f from IMAGE
7 3.0) to a scenario aiming at 2°C target (CO_Bridge from WITCH 5.0), another aiming at 1.5°C target
8 (DeepElec_SSP2_HighRE_Budg900 from REMIND 2.1) and a scenario aiming at shifting
9 development towards sustainability (SusDev_SDP-PkBudg1000 from REMIND-MAgPIE 2.1-4.2).

10 Due to lack of data, the proposed IPs from chapter 3 were not used for the analysis included in the
11 building chapter. Instead, scenarios considered for the analysis in the chapter are those of the IEA 2019
12 World Energy Outlook (current policies scenario, stated policies scenario and sustainable development
13 scenario) (see Chapter 9, Section 9.3). Similarly, bottom-up scenarios submitted to IASA database
14 were not used for the SOD analysis due to lack of baselines associated with these scenarios. Estimates
15 from bottom-up models were derived as shares of baseline emissions at regional level aggregating
16 estimates from existing national literature (see Chapter 9, Section 9.6).

17 Mitigation potentials of the selected IPs are calculated as a difference between CO₂ emissions in 2030
18 and 2050 of the current policies scenario and the scenario considered. Based on the data available, at
19 the time of the drafting, under the moderate scenario, emissions are projected to increase in all regions
20 except in the developed region of Asia-Pacific where they are projected to remain equivalent to those
21 under the current policies scenario and in South-East Asia and developing Pacific where they are
22 projected to decrease. Emissions are also projected to increase under the 2°C scenario in several regions
23 including Eastern Asia, Europe, South Asia, Middle East, North America, Asia-Pacific developed and
24 Eurasia. Further investigation is needed to understand the expected increase of CO₂ emissions under
25 the 2°C scenario (Figure I.2).

26 Literature suggests that top-down models are pessimistic about the mitigation potentials while bottom-
27 up models are optimistic (Hourcade and Robinson 1996). However, mitigation potentials from the
28 selected IPs show high potentials, up to 99% in 2050, in Europe under SDGs scenario. Europe is also
29 the region with the highest (89%) mitigation potential based on the IEA sustainable development
30 scenario. On the other hand, estimates of mitigation potentials from bottom-up models range between
31 50% and 75%. The largest potential as a share of baseline is in Eastern Asia (75%) and Middle East
32 (70%). In all developed countries, the potential is scaled on a declining baseline; in developing
33 countries, the potential is against sharply growing baselines. The largest potential from bottom-up
34 models in absolute amount is in Eastern Asia and Southern Asia (see Chapter 9, Section 9.6).

35



1

2 **Figure I.2. Direct emissions for residential and non-residential buildings by region as reported in selected**
 3 **IPs.**

4

5 I.5 Transport models

6 I.5.1 Purpose and Scope of Models

7 GHG emissions from transport are largely a function of **travel demand, transport mode, and**
 8 **transport technology and fuel.** The purpose of transportation system models is to describe how future
 9 **demand** for transport can be fulfilled through different **modes** and **technologies** under different climate
 10 change mitigation targets or policies. Within a given transport mode, technologies differ by efficiency
 11 and fuel use

12 Common components of transportation systems models mirror these main drivers of GHG. Models
 13 commonly quantify **transportation mode, or how movement occurs** (e.g. active transit, passenger
 14 vehicles, trucks, boats, planes, etc.). Higher fidelity models provide more nuanced breakdowns of
 15 modes, e.g. by **technologies**. Most models will also quantify **how much movement occurs**, or the
 16 **travel demand** associated with each mode. Higher fidelity models further decompose travel demand
 17 by time and region (e.g. miles or kilometres per hour or year per region). The scope of the model often
 18 determines how much information it provides on **where and when movement occurs**. While larger
 19 scale models typically provide aggregate travel demand, higher resolution travel demand models can
 20 be integrated into transportation system models and provide much more information on origin and
 21 destination of trips, when trips occur, and the route of travel taken. This level of detail is not often
 22 characterised in the output of system models but can be employed as a “base” model to determine how
 23 travel occurs before aggregation (Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; Yeh et al. 2017).

24 A key distinguishing feature between different model types is how they control the above components.
 25 Our review of the transport energy system models can be broadly divided into three main categories: i)
 26 optimisation models, ii) simulation models, and iii) accounting and exploratory models.

27 i) Optimisation models: Identify least cost pathways to meet policy targets (such as CO₂
 28 emission targets of transport modes or economy-wide) given constraints (such as rate of

1 adoption of vehicle technologies or vehicle efficiency standards). For example MessageIX-
2 TransportV5 (Krey et al. 2016) and TIMES (Daly et al. 2014).

3
4 ii) Simulation models: Simulate behaviour of consumers and producers given prices, policies,
5 and other factors by using parameters calibrated to historically observed behaviours such
6 as demand price elasticity and consumer preferences. For example models by Barter et al.
7 (2015), Brooker et al. (2015) and Schäfer (2017).

8
9 iii) Accounting and exploratory models: Track the outcomes (such as resources use and
10 emissions) of key decisions (such as the adoption of advanced fuels or vehicle technologies)
11 that are based on “what-if” scenarios. The major difference between accounting models
12 versus optimisation and simulation models are that key decision variables such as new
13 technologies adoptions typically follow modeler’s assumptions as opposed to being
14 determined by mathematical formulations as in optimisation and simulation models. See
15 models in Fulton et al. (2009), IEA (2020a), Gota et al. (2019) and Khalili et al. (2019).
16

17 Due to the model types’ relative strengths and weaknesses, they are commonly applied to certain
18 problem types (Table I.1). Models can do **forecasting**, which makes projections of how futures may
19 evolve, or **backcasting**, which makes projections of a future that meets a predefined goal such as a
20 policy target of 80% reduction in GHG emissions from a historical level by a certain year. Models
21 often are also used to explore what-if questions, to confirm the **feasibility** of certain
22 assumptions/outcomes, and to quantify the **impacts** of a change such as a policy under different
23 conditions. Enhancing fuel efficiency standards, banning internal combustion engines, setting fuel
24 quality standards, and the impacts of new technologies are the typical examples of problem types
25 analysed in energy system models.

26
27 **Table I.1: Taxonomy of transport models.**

Problem Type	Optimisation model	Simulation model	Accounting model	Heuristic model
Backcasting	x			x
Forecasting	x	x	x	
Exploring feasibility space		x	x	x
Impact analysis	x	x	x	

28
29 While these three model types drive the component dynamics in different ways, they commonly include
30 modules that include: learning and diffusion (via exogenous, e.g. autonomous learning, or endogenous
31 learning regarding costs and efficiency: i.e. cost decreases and/or efficiency increases as a function of
32 penetration, and increased diffusion due to lower costs) (Jochem et al. 2018), stock turnover (the
33 performance and characteristics of vehicle fleets including survival ages, mileages, fuel economies and
34 loads/occupancy rates are tracked for each new sales/vehicle stocks), consumer choice (theories of how
35 people decide to spend their money based on their individual preferences given the characteristics of
36 mode or technology) (Daly et al. 2014; Schäfer 2017), or other feedback loops (Linton et al. 2015).

37 IAMs (Krey et al. 2016; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a) are typically global in scope and seek to solve for
38 feasible pathways meeting a global temperature target (see Section I.9 Integrated assessment
39 modelling). This implies solving for mitigation options within and across sectors. In contrast,
40 global/national transport energy system models (GTEM/NTEMs) typically only solve for feasible

1 pathways within the transport sector (Yeh et al. 2017). The range of feasible pathways can be
 2 determined through optimisation, simulation, accounting and exploratory methods as we explained in
 3 Table I.1. Some GTEMs are linked to IAMs model (Krey et al. 2016; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a;
 4 Roelfsema et al. 2020).

5 The key difference between IAMs and GTEM or NTEMs is whether the transportation systems is
 6 integrated with the rest of the energy systems specifically regarding energy and fuel productions and
 7 use, fuel prices, economic drivers such as GDP, and mitigation options given a policy goal. IAMs can
 8 endogenously determine these factors because the transport sector is just one of many sectors captured
 9 by the IAM. While this gives IAMs certain advantages, IAMs sacrifice resolution and complexity for
 10 this broader scope. For example, most IAMs lack a sophisticated travel demand model that reflects the
 11 heterogeneity of demands and consumer preferences, whereas GTEM/NTEMs can incorporate greater
 12 levels of details regarding travel demands, consumer choices, and the details of transport policies.
 13 Consequently, what GTEM/NTEMs lack in integration with other sectors they make up through more
 14 detailed analyses of travel patterns, policies, and impacts (Yeh et al. 2017).

16 I.5.2 Inventory of Models

17 GTEM/NTEMs models included in Chapter 10 are listed below (Table I.2). For IAMs see Chapter 3

18 *[To be updated subject to final submission to the AR6 scenario database]*

20 **Table I.2: GTEM/NTEMs models evaluated in Chapter 10.**

Model names	Organisation	Scope	Resolution	Period	Economy-wide	Method
Mobility model (MoMo)	International Energy Agency (IEA)	Global	Country groups	2040	Soft-link	Accounting model
Global Transportation Roadmap	International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)	Global	Country groups	2050	No	Accounting model
MESSAGE-Transport V.5	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)	Global	Country groups	2100	Yes	Optimisation model

23 I.6 Industry sector models

24 I.6.1. Types of industry sector models

25 Industry sector modelling approaches can vary considerably from one another. Generally, a first-order
 26 differentiation can be made between ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘hybrid’ modelling approaches.

1 *Top-down models* typically cover the total energy system, with industry as one of several subsystems.
2 In these models, energy demand and supply and their changes over time depend on aggregate economic
3 variables, such as economic output, energy prices and price elasticities. Individual technologies and
4 processes are typically represented in a more aggregate form compared to bottom-up models. Studies
5 using top-down models are more capable of representing economic structural change than adopting
6 technology-explicit decarbonisation strategies (Kriegler et al. 2015a; van Vuuren et al. 2009).

7 Studies exploring the technological options for and the related infrastructural needs of strong emission
8 reductions in the industry sector or specific industry sub-sectors typically resort to *bottom-up (or*
9 *'engineering')* models. Especially when these models focus exclusively on the industry sector and on
10 specific countries, they tend to be associated with detailed representations of individual sub-sectors,
11 technologies and processes, and are therefore more explicit than top-down models in depictions of
12 technological change.

13 As bottom-up models generally do not assess the associated implications in a broader spatial or
14 economy-wide context, they are sometimes coupled to integrated assessment models (IAMs) in a
15 *'hybrid' modelling framework* to balance explicitness with broader trends (see Section I.9 Integrated
16 assessment modelling) (e.g. Jochem and Schade (2009)).

17 The studies discussed in detail in Chapter 11 (Section 11.4.2.2 'In-depth discussion and "reality" check
18 of pathways from specific sector scenarios') rely on bottom-up models of the industry sector as the aim
19 of the section is to obtain sector- and technology-specific insights on how far-reaching GHG emission
20 reductions can be realised in key industry sub-sectors.

21 In the following, the modelling approaches for the industry sector used by two of the key studies
22 discussed are introduced, as discussed in Chapter 11. Both of these studies rely on technologically
23 detailed bottom-up models for scenario development. This is followed by a discussion of how the
24 industry sector is typically represented in IAMs.

26 **I.6.2. Industry sector modelling in IEA (2020a)**

27 In the IEA (2020b) study 'Energy Technology Perspectives 2020', the energy-intensive industry is
28 modelled using bottom-up, technology-rich optimisation sub-models for five energy-intensive sectors
29 (iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, cement, pulp and paper, and aluminium). These five sub-
30 models characterise the energy performance of process technologies from each of the energy-intensive
31 sectors, covering 40 countries and regions. The remaining final energy consumption of other industrial
32 sectors is accounted for in a simulation model that estimates energy consumption based on activity
33 level. In each of the five energy-intensive sectors, demand for materials is projected through interaction
34 between an activity model and a stock model. The activity model uses country-level historical data on
35 material consumption to calculate demand per capita, then projects forward total demand using
36 population projections and industry value-added projections.

37 Each industry sub-model is designed to account for sector-specific production routes for which relevant
38 process technologies are represented in the model. Such technologies include hydrogen-based direct
39 reduced iron for primary steel production or CCS technologies for cement production, as discussed in
40 Chapter 11 (see Section 11.4.1). Industrial energy use and technology portfolios for each country or
41 region are characterised in the base year using relevant energy use and material production statistics for
42 each energy-intensive industrial sector. Demand for materials (as dictated by the activity model outputs)
43 is met by technologies and fuels chosen for the production processes through a constrained optimisation
44 framework, with the objective function set to minimise overall system cost. System cost comprises
45 energy costs and investments.

1 **I.6.3. Industry sector modelling in Material Economics (2019)**

2 The modelling approach in the study ‘Industrial Transformation 2050’ starts from a characterisation of
3 future activity levels. A baseline scenario for demand in 2050 is estimated using a range of bottom-up
4 models. The next step defines a wide range of low-CO₂ production routes. The analysis characterises
5 the technological maturity, investment requirements, energy and feedstock inputs, other operating costs,
6 mass balance, and CO₂ emissions of each process.

7 Alongside primary production, the analysis uses a range of models to explore opportunities for
8 advancing the circular economy, which are often underrepresented in IAMs. This analysis of the
9 potential for improved materials efficiency and increased materials circulation leads to the study’s
10 finding that CO₂ emissions of the steel, chemicals and cement sectors can be cut significantly through
11 circular economy measures. Costs of the identified measures are estimated and compared to primary
12 production.

13 The third component is a characterisation of end-of-life flows of materials and production routes that
14 use these as inputs for new materials production. For steel, for example, a dynamic materials flow model
15 is used to estimate future availability and use of steel scrap. Scrap generation is derived by analysing
16 different steel use cases with their specific quality requirements and the lifetime of products like cars
17 or buildings. Region-specific scrap availability is estimated by assuming future product-specific
18 collection rates and future scrap trade. These three components are put together in a scenario analysis.

19

20 **I.6.4. Industry sector modelling in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs)**

21 As is the case for other end-use sectors, the industry sector is typically modelled in less technological
22 detail in IAMs than in bottom-up models such as those introduced above. However, individual IAMs
23 differ from one another in how detailed their industry sector representation is. In IAMs, demand for
24 basic materials and industry sector energy demand are often implicit functions of population and GDP.
25 While some energy-intensive sectors such as iron and steel or cement are included separately in a
26 generalised manner in most IAMs, typically few if any sector-specific technologies are explicitly
27 represented. Instead, energy efficiency improvements in the industry sector and its subsectors are often
28 either determined by exogenous assumptions or are a function of energy prices. Likewise, fuel switching
29 occurs primarily as a result of changes in relative fuel prices, which in turn are influenced by CO₂ price
30 developments. In IAMs that include specific technologies, fuel switching can be constrained based on
31 the characteristics of those technologies, while in IAMs with no technological detail more generic
32 constraints on fuel switching in the industry sector are embedded (Edelenbosch et al. 2017b).

33

34 **I.7 Land use modelling**

35 Land use related IAM modelling results as presented in Chapter 7 are based on comprehensive land-
36 use models (LUMs) that are either integrated directly, or through emulators into the integrated
37 assessment framework. Given the increasing awareness of the importance of the land use sector to
38 achieve ambitious climate mitigation targets, LUMs and their integration into IAMs systems was one
39 of the key innovations to the integrated assessment over the past decade to allow for an economy wide
40 quantification of climate stabilisation pathways.

41 LUMs allow to project developments in the land use sector over time and assess impacts of mitigation
42 policies on different economic (markets, trade, prices, demand, supply etc.) and environmental (land
43 use, emissions, fertiliser, irrigation water use, etc.) indicators. LUMs can be broadly differentiated
44 between bottom-up partial equilibrium (PE) and top-down computable general equilibrium (CGE)
45 models. Bottom-up PE models are usually characterised by a detailed (spatially explicit) representation

1 of different production activities and management systems considering both biophysical land
2 characteristics and impacts due to their linkage with e.g. dynamic vegetation model such as EPIC or
3 LPJmL. Top-down CGE models tend to have a comparative advantage in assessing economy wide
4 implications and market dynamics including their feedback on the land use sector e.g. from the energy
5 system. In addition, the representation and portfolio of land-based mitigation options varies across
6 LUMs as does the representation of sustainability targets other than climate mitigation. The following
7 models submitted scenarios to the AR6 database: AIM, EPPA, GCAM, IMAGE, MERGE, MESSAGE-
8 GLOBIOM, POLES, REMIND-MAgPIE, WITCH.

9

10 **I.7.1 Modelling of land use and land use change**

11 LUMs represent different land use activities for managed land (agriculture including cropland and
12 pastures, managed forests, and dedicated energy crops) while natural lands (primary forests, natural
13 grasslands, shrubland, savannahs etc.) act as land reserve that can be converted to management
14 depending on other constraints. Typically, the agricultural sector has the greatest level of detail across
15 land use sectors. LUMs include different crop- and livestock production activities, some even at the
16 spatially explicit level and differentiated by production system. Forestry is covered with varying degree
17 of complexity across LUMs. While some models represent only afforestation/deforestation activities
18 dynamically, others have detailed representation of forest management activities and/or forest
19 industries. The models endogenously determine the land allocation of different land use activities as
20 well as land use changes according to different economic principles (land rent, substitution elasticities
21 etc.) and/or considering biophysical characteristics such as land suitability (Popp et al. 2017a; Schmitz
22 et al. 2014).

23

24 **I.7.2 Demand for food, feed, fibre and agricultural trade**

25 LUMs project demand for food, feed, other industrial or energy uses for different agriculture and
26 forestry commodities over time. While PE models typically use reduced-form demand functions with
27 greater level of detail at the commodity level, however limited agriculture and forestry, CGE models
28 represent demand starting from utility functions from which it is possible to derive demand functions,
29 and functional forms for income and price elasticities however for a more limited set of agricultural and
30 forestry commodities but with full coverage of all economic sectors (Valin et al. 2014). Over time,
31 demand for food, feed, and other industrial uses is projected conditional on population and income
32 growth while bioenergy demand is typically informed in PE models by linking with IAMs/energy
33 systems models, and is usually endogenous in CGE/IAMs. Depending on the model, demand
34 projections are sensitive to price changes. International trade is often represented in LUMs using either
35 Armington or spatial equilibrium approaches.

36

37 **I.7.3 Treatment of land-based mitigation options**

38 Two broad categories of land-based mitigation options are represented in LUMs: i) reduction of GHG
39 (CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O) emissions from land use, ii) carbon sink enhancement options including biomass
40 supply for bioenergy. Each of these categories is underpinned by a portfolio of mitigation options with
41 varying degree of complexity and parameterisation across LUMs. The representation of mitigation
42 measures is influenced, on the one hand, by the availability of data for its techno-economic
43 characteristics and future prospects as well as the computational challenge, e.g. in terms of spatial and
44 process detail, to represent the measure, and on the other hand, by structural differences and general
45 focus of the different LUMs, and prioritisation of different mitigation options by the modelling teams.
46 While GHG emission reduction and CO₂ sequestration options such as afforestation, are typically

1 covered directly in LUMs, carbon sequestration from biomass supplied for bioenergy coupled with
2 carbon sequestration (BECCs) is usually not accounted for in LUMs but in the energy sector and hence
3 is taken care of directly in the IAMs. Yet, LUMs provide estimates of available biomass for energy
4 production and the impacts of its production.

6 *1.7.3.1 Treatment of GHG emissions reduction*

7 Agricultural non-CO₂ emissions covered in LUMs include CH₄ from enteric fermentation, manure
8 management and cultivation of rice paddies, and N₂O emissions from soils (fertiliser and manure
9 application, crop residues) and manure management and are based on IPCC accounting guidelines
10 (IPCC 2019a). For each of those sources, LUMs typically represent a (sub)set of technical, structural
11 and demand side mitigation options. Technical options refer to technologies such as anaerobic digesters,
12 feed supplements or nitrogen inhibitors that are either explicitly represented (Frank et al. 2018) or
13 implicitly via the use of MACCs (Beach et al. 2015; Harmsen et al. 2019; Lucas et al. 2007). Emission
14 savings from structural changes refer to more fundamental changes in the agricultural sector for
15 example through international trade, production system changes or reallocation and substitution effects
16 (Havlík et al. 2014). Demand side options include dietary changes and reduction of food waste (Mbow
17 et al. 2019; Rosenzweig et al. 2020; Springmann et al. 2016; Ivanova et al. 2020; Ritchie et al. 2018;
18 Creutzig et al. 2018; Clark et al. 2020; Popp et al. 2010; Frank et al. 2019). For the forest sector,
19 emission reduction options are mainly targeting CO₂ from deforestation (Rochedo et al. 2018; Eriksson
20 2020; Overmars et al. 2014; Bos et al. 2020; Hasegawa et al. 2017). Mitigation/restoration options for
21 wetlands to reduce emissions from drained organic soils are typically not represented in LUMs
22 (Humpenöder et al. 2020).

23 There are significant differences between UNFCCC nationally reported GHG inventories and analytical
24 global land use models. According to Grassi et al. (2017), this discrepancy results in a 3GtCO₂e
25 difference in estimates between country reports and global models. The difference relies on different
26 methods to classify and assess managed forests and its forest management fluxes (Houghton et al. 2012;
27 Pongratz et al. 2014; Tubiello et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2014; Grassi et al. 2017). While global models
28 account for GHG emissions from indirect human induced effects and natural effects in unmanaged land,
29 country only consider fluxes of land use and land use change in managed land. In order to produce
30 policy relevant land use model exercises, reconciling these differences is needed by harmonising
31 definitions and approaches of anthropogenic land and the treatment of indirect environmental change
32 (Grassi et al. 2017).

34 *1.7.3.2 Treatment of terrestrial carbon dioxide removal options including biomass supply for* 35 *bioenergy*

36 Terrestrial Carbon Dioxide Removal (tCDR) options are only partially included in LUMs and mostly
37 rely on afforestation and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) (Smith et al. 2019; Fuss et al. 2014, 2018; Minx
38 et al. 2018; Butnar et al. 2020). Especially some nature-based solutions (Griscom et al. 2017) such as
39 soil carbon management (Paustian et al. 2016) which have the potential to alter the contribution of land-
40 based mitigation in terms of timing, potential and sustainability consequences are only recently
41 becoming implemented in LUMs (Frank et al. 2017; Humpenöder et al. 2020). The representation of
42 bioenergy feedstocks varies across models but typically LUMs have comprehensive representation of a
43 series of crops (starch, sugar, oil, wood/lignocellulosic feedstocks) or residues/byproducts that can be
44 used for liquid and solid bioenergy production (Hanssen et al. 2019).

1 **I.7.4 Treatment of climate change impacts and CO₂ fertilisation**

2 Although LUMs have, in general, the capacity to consider the average impact of climate change on
3 crops, livestock-, forest productivities, and potential benefits of increasing CO₂ concentration in the
4 atmosphere on vegetal growth, typically climate change impacts are not considered in climate
5 mitigation scenarios to allow for a cleaner interpretation of the results and impact assessment of climate
6 change mitigation efforts.

8 **I.7.5 Treatment of environmental and socio-economic impacts of land use**

9 Aside reporting the implications on AFOLU GHG emissions, LUMs can provide a set of environmental
10 and socioeconomic impact indicators to assess the quantified climate stabilisation pathways in a broader
11 sustainable development agenda. These indicators typically span from land use area developments
12 (Popp et al. 2017a), fertiliser use, irrigation water use and environmental flows (Bonsch et al. 2015;
13 Pastor et al. 2019), and on biodiversity (Leclère et al. 2020), to market impacts on commodity prices
14 and food consumption, or impact on undernourishment (Fujimori et al. 2019a; Hasegawa et al. 2018).

16 **I.8 Reduced complexity climate modelling**

17 Climate model emulators (often referred to as reduced complexity or simple climate models) are used
18 to integrate the WG I knowledge of physical climate science in WG III assessment. Hence, emulators
19 are used to assess the climate implications of the GHG and other emissions trajectories that IAMs
20 produce (Rogelj et al. 2018a; Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj Joeri and Hare 2011; Schaeffer et al. 2015).
21 The IAM literature typically uses one of two approaches: comprehensive emulators such as MAGICC
22 (Meinshausen et al. 2011) or Hector (Hartin et al. 2015) or minimal complexity representations such as
23 the representation used in DICE (Nordhaus 2018), PAGE (Yumashev Dmitry and Hope 2019) and Fund
24 (Waldhoff et al. 2014). In physical science research, a wider range of different emulators are used
25 (Nicholls et al. 2020b,c).

26 A key application of emulators within IPCC WG III is the classification of emission scenarios with
27 respect to their global mean temperature outcomes (Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj et al. 2018a). WG III
28 relies on emulators to assess the full range of carbon-cycle, and climate response uncertainty of
29 thousands of scenarios, as assessed by AR6 WG I. An exercise of such amplitude is currently infeasible
30 with more computationally demanding state-of-the-art Earth system models. Cross-chapter Box 7.1 of
31 WG I documents how emulators used in AR6 WG3 are consistent with the physical science assessment
32 of WG I.

33 Previous IPCC Assessment Reports relied either on the climate output from each individual IAM (IPCC
34 2000) or a more streamlined approach, where one consistent emulator setup was used to assess all
35 scenarios. For instance, in AR5 and SR1.5, MAGICC was used for scenario classification (Clarke et al.
36 2014; Rogelj et al. 2018a). In recent years, numerous other emulators have been developed and
37 increased confidence and understanding can thus be gained by combining insights from more than one
38 emulator. For example, although SR1.5 continued to use MAGICC for its classification of scenarios,
39 additional insights from the FAIR model (Smith et al. 2018) were used to assess the robustness of this
40 approach. The SR1.5 experience with multiple emulators highlighted that the veracity of emulators “is
41 a substantial knowledge gap in the overall assessment of pathways and their temperature thresholds”
42 (Rogelj et al. 2018a). Since SR1.5, international research efforts have demonstrated tractable ways to
43 compare emulator performance (Nicholls et al. 2020b) as well as their ability to accurately represent a
44 set of uncertainty ranges in physical parameters (Nicholls et al. 2020c), such as those reported by the
45 AR6 WG I assessment.

1 Finally, dedicated efforts over the past year have reduced a key barrier for non-expert users to
2 incorporate multiple emulators in their assessment of the climate outcome of emissions scenarios. The
3 OpenSCM-Runner package (Nicholls et al. 2020a) provides users with the ability to run multiple
4 emulators from a single interface. OpenSCM-Runner has been built in collaboration with the WG III
5 research community and forms part of the WG III climate assessment (see Section II.2.4.1. Assessment
6 of WG III scenarios building on WG I physical climate knowledge).

8 **I.9 Integrated assessment modelling**

9 Integrated assessment models (IAMs) describe the coupled energy-land-economy-climate system
10 (Weyant 2009, 2017; Krey 2014). They typically capture all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions induced
11 by human activities and, in many cases, other emissions of climate forcers like sulphate aerosols.
12 Process-based IAMs represent most GHG and climate pollutant emissions by modelling the underlying
13 processes in energy and land use. Those models are able to endogenously describe the change in
14 emissions due to changes in energy and land use activities, particularly in response to climate action.
15 But IAMs differ in the extent to which all emissions and the corresponding sources, processes and
16 activities are represented endogenously and, thus, can be subjected to policy analysis.⁴ IAMs also differ
17 regarding the scope of representing carbon removal options and their interlinkage with other vital
18 systems such as the energy and the land-use sector.

19 Typically, IAMs are global models that span the time horizon until 2100 using time-steps of five to ten
20 years. To obtain global coverage, countries are aggregated into a limited number of world regions,
21 typically 10 to 60. IAMs consider multi-level systems of global, regional, national and local constraints
22 and balance equations for different categories such as emissions, material and energy flows, financial
23 flows, land availability that are solved simultaneously. Intertemporal IAMs can fully incorporate not
24 only flow constraints that are satisfied in each period, but also stock constraints that are aggregated over
25 time and require to balance activities over time. Changes of activities, e.g. induced by policies to reduce
26 emissions are connected to a variety of balance equations and constraints and therefore such policies
27 lead to system wide changes that can be analysed with IAMs. Many IAMs also contain gridded
28 components to capture, e.g., land use and climate change processes where the spatial distribution
29 matters greatly for the dynamics of the system. Processes that operate on smaller spatial and temporal
30 scales than resolved by IAMs, such as temporal variability of renewables, are included by
31 parameterisations and statistical modelling approaches that capture the impact of these subscale
32 processes on the system dynamics at the macro level (Pietzcker et al. 2017).

33 Global IAMs are used to analyse global emissions scenarios extrapolating current trends under a variety
34 of assumptions and climate change action pathways under a variety of global goals. In recent years, a
35 class of national / regional IAMs have emerged that describe the coupled energy-land-economy system
36 in a given geography. They typically have higher sectorial, policy and technology resolution than global
37 models and make assumptions about boundary conditions set by global markets and international policy
38 regimes. These IAMs are used to study trends and transformation pathways for a given region (Shukla
39 and Chaturvedi 2011; Capros et al. 2014; Lucena et al. 2016).

41 **I.9.1. Types of Integrated Assessment Models**

42 IAMs include a variety of model types that can be distinguished into two broad classes (Weyant 2017).
43 The first class comprises *cost-benefit IAMs* that fully integrate a stylized socioeconomic model with a

FOOTNOTE: ⁴ See the common IAM documentation at www.iamcdocumentation.eu.

1 reduced form climate model to simultaneously account for the costs of mitigation and the damages of
2 global warming using highly aggregate cost functions derived from more detailed models. In the model
3 context these functions do not explicitly represent the underlying processes, but map mitigation efforts
4 and temperature to costs. This closed-loop approach between climate and socioeconomic systems
5 enables cost-benefit analysis by balancing the cost of mitigation and the benefits of avoided climate
6 damages. This can be done in a globally cooperative setting to derive the globally optimal climate policy
7 where no region can further improve its welfare without reducing the welfare of another region (Pareto
8 optimum). Alternatively, it can be assumed that nations do not engage in emission mitigation at all or
9 mitigate in a non-cooperative way only considering the marginal benefit of their own action (Nash
10 equilibrium). Also, differing degrees of partial cooperation are possible.

11 The second class of IAMs, called *detailed process IAMs*, focuses on the analysis of transformation
12 processes depending on a broad set of activities that induce emissions as side effects. They describe the
13 interlinkages between economic activity, energy use, land use, and emissions with emission reductions
14 and removals as well as broader sustainable development targets. GHGs and other climate pollutants
15 are caused by a broad range of activities that are driven by socioeconomic developments (Riahi et al.
16 2017) and also induce broader environmental consequences such as land-use change (Popp et al. 2017a)
17 and air pollution (Rao et al. 2017b). The process-based modelling approach replicates the IPCC method
18 of GHG emission measuring by relating emission coefficients to activities and processes, which in turn
19 are influenced by policies. With few exceptions, these models typically do not close the loop with
20 climate change and damages that affect the economy, but focus on emission scenarios and climate
21 change mitigation pathways. Due to the process based representations of emission sources and
22 alternatives it is not only possible to investigate the implications of policies on GHG emissions, but also
23 the trade-offs and synergies with social and environmental sustainability criteria (von Stechow et al.
24 2015) (Section I.8.3). The analysis of different cross-sectorial synergies and trade-offs is frequently
25 termed a nexus analysis, such as the energy-water-land nexus. The analysis can also address
26 socioeconomic sustainability criteria such as energy access and human health. Process-based IAMs are
27 also used to explore the synergies and trade-offs of ‘common, but differentiated responsibilities’ by
28 analysing issues of burden sharing, equity, international cooperation, policy differentiation and transfer
29 measures (Tavoni et al. 2014; Leimbach and Giannousakis 2019; Bauer et al. 2020b; Fujimori et al.
30 2016).

31 There exists a broad range of detailed process IAMs that differ regarding the economic modelling
32 approaches (see Section I.2 Economic modelling) as well as the methodology and detail of sector
33 representation (Sections I.3 Energy system modelling-I.7 Land use modelling) and how they are
34 interlinked with each other. This leads to differences in model results regarding global aggregates as
35 well as sectorial and regional outputs. Several approaches have been used to evaluate the performance
36 of IAMs and understand differences in IAM behaviour (Wilson et al. 2017; Schwanitz 2013), including
37 sensitivity analysis (McJeon et al. 2011a; Luderer et al. 2013; Rogelj et al. 2013; Bosetti et al. 2015;
38 Marangoni et al. 2017), model comparisons (Clarke et al. 2009; Kriegler et al. 2014a; Tavoni et al.
39 2014; Kriegler et al. 2015a; Riahi et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. 2016; Riahi et al. 2017; Luderer et al. 2018;
40 McCollum et al. 2018a), model diagnostics (Kriegler et al. 2015a; Wilkerson et al. 2015), and
41 comparison with historical patterns (Wilson et al. 2013; van Sluisveld et al. 2015).

42

43 **I.9.2. Components of integrated assessment models**

44 ***I.9.2.1. Energy-economy component***

45 Typically, IAMs comprise a model of energy flows, emissions and the associated costs. The demand
46 for exploring the Paris Agreement climate goals led to model developments to make the challenges and
47 opportunities of the associated transformation pathways more transparent. Since AR5 much progress

1 has been achieved to improve the representation of mitigation options in the energy supply sector (e.g.
2 renewable energy integration (Pietzcker et al. 2017), energy trade (Bauer et al. 2017, 2016; Jewell et al.
3 2018; McCollum et al. 2016), capacity inertia, carbon removals, decarbonisation bottlenecks (Luderer
4 et al. 2018)) and technological and behavioural change measures in energy demand sectors such as
5 transport (Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; van Sluisveld et al. 2016; McCollum et al. 2017). An energy sector
6 model can be run as a partial equilibrium model using exogenous demand drivers for final energy and
7 energy services. These models derive mitigation policy costs in terms of additional energy sector costs
8 and area under the MAC curve.

9 Energy models can be also embedded into a broader, long-term macroeconomic context in a general
10 equilibrium model (Messner and Schrattenholzer 2000; Bauer et al. 2008). The demands for final energy
11 and energy services are endogenously driven by an economic growth model that also endogenises the
12 economic allocation problem of macroeconomic resources for the energy sector that crowd out with
13 alternatives. This allows impact analysis of climate policies on economic growth and structural change,
14 investment financing and crowding-out as well as income distribution and tax revenue recycling
15 (Guivarch et al. 2011). Moreover, general equilibrium models also derive mitigation costs in terms of
16 GDP losses and Consumption losses, which comprise the full macroeconomic impacts rather than only
17 the narrow energy related costs (Paltsev and Capros 2013).

19 *1.9.2.2. Land system component*

20 In recent years substantial efforts have been devoted to improve and integrate land-use sector models
21 in IAMs (Popp et al. 2017a, 2014; Weindl et al. 2017). This acknowledges the importance of land-use
22 GHG emissions of the agricultural and forestry sectors as well as the role of bioenergy, afforestation
23 and other land-based mitigation measures. The integration is particularly important in light of the long-
24 term climate goals of the Paris Agreement for four reasons (IPCC 2019b). First, the GHG emissions
25 from the land use sector accounts for LUC emissions account for more than 10% of global GHG
26 emissions (Kuramochi et al. 2020) and some sources of CH₄ and N₂O constitute serious mitigation
27 bottlenecks. Second, bioenergy is identified as crucial primary energy source for low-emission energy
28 supply and carbon removal (Bauer et al. 2020a). Third, land use-based mitigation measures such as
29 afforestation and reduced deforestation have substantial mitigation potentials. Finally, land-cover
30 changes alter the earth surface albedo, which has implications for regional and global climate. Pursuing
31 the Paris Agreement climate goals requires the inclusion of a broad set of options regarding GHG
32 emissions and removals, which will intensify the interaction between the energy, the economy and the
33 land use sector. Consequently, intersectoral policy coordination becomes more important and the land-
34 related synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development targets will intensify (Calvin et al. 2014b;
35 Humpenöder et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2017; Kreidenweis et al. 2016; van Vuuren et al. 2017; Bauer et
36 al. 2020c). IAMs used by the IPCC in the AR6 have continuously improved the integration of land-use
37 models with energy models to explore climate mitigation scenarios under varying policy and technology
38 conditions (Rogelj et al. 2018a; Smith et al. 2019). However, feedbacks from changes in climate
39 variables are not or only to a limited degree included in the land use sector models.

41 *1.9.2.3. Climate system component*

42 Reduced complexity climate models (often called simple climate models or emulators) are used for
43 communicating WG I physical climate science knowledge to the research communities associated with
44 other IPCC working groups (Section I.8). They are used by IAMs to model the climate outcome of the
45 multi-gas emissions trajectories that IAMs produce (van Vuuren et al. 2011a). A main application of
46 such models is related to scenario classifications in WG III of the IPCC (Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj et
47 al. 2018a). Since WG III assesses a large number of scenarios, it must rely on the use of these simple

1 climate models; more computationally demanding models (as used by WG I) will not be feasible to
2 apply. Analysing various features of the broad scenario database, like the timing of peak warming and
3 carbon neutrality, or 2030 emission levels in line with a certain global temperature goal, requires a large
4 amount of multi-gas scenarios to be analysed. For consistency across the AR6 reports, it is important
5 that these reduced-complexity models are up to date with the latest assessments from IPCC Working
6 Group I. This relies on calibrating these models so that they match, as closely as possible, the
7 assessments made by WG I (see Section **II.2.4. Scenario approaches to connect WG III with**
8 **the WG I and WG II assessments**). The calibrated models can then be used by WG III in various
9 parts of its assessment.

10

11 **I.9.3. Representation of nexus issues and sustainable development impacts in IAMs**

12 An energy-water-land nexus approach integrates the analysis of linked resources and infrastructure
13 systems to provide a consistent platform for multi-sector decision-making (Howells et al. 2013). Many
14 of the IAMs that contributed to the assessment incorporate a nexus approach that considers
15 simultaneous constraints on land, water and energy, as well as important mutual dependencies (Calvin
16 et al. 2019; Fricko et al. 2017; Dietrich et al. 2019; Fujimori et al. 2017; Van Vuuren et al. 2019).
17 Recently IAMs have also been integrated with life cycle assessment tools in assessing climate
18 mitigation policies to better understand the relevance of life cycle GHG emissions in cost-optimal
19 mitigation scenarios (Tokimatsu et al. 2020; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2016; Pehl et al. 2017; Arvesen et
20 al. 2018). This holistic perspective ensures mitigation pathways do not exacerbate challenges for other
21 sectors or environmental indicators. At the same time, pathways are leveraging potential synergies
22 along the way towards achieving multiple goals.

23 IAMs rely on biophysical models with a relatively high-degree of spatial and temporal resolution to
24 inform coarser scale economic models of the potentials and costs for land, water and energy systems
25 (Johnson et al. 2019). IAMs leverage population, GDP and urbanisation projections to generate
26 consistent water, energy and crop demand projections across multiple sectors (e.g., agriculture,
27 livestock, domestic, manufacturing and electricity generation) (Mouratiadou et al., 2016). The highly-
28 distributed nature of decisions and impacts across sectors, particularly for land and water, has been
29 addressed using multi-scale frameworks that embed regional and sub-regional models within global
30 IAMs (Mosnier et al. 2014; Hejazi et al. 2015; Bijl et al. 2018; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2018). These
31 analyses have demonstrated how local constraints and policies interact with national and international
32 strategies aimed at reducing emissions.

33 Sustainable development impacts extending beyond climate outcomes have been assessed by the IAMs
34 that contributed to the assessment, particularly in the context of the targets and indicators consistent
35 with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The representation of individual SDGs is diverse
36 (Figure I.3), and recent model development has focused mainly on improving capabilities to assess
37 climate change mitigation policy combined with indicators for economic growth, resource access, air
38 pollution and land use (van Soest et al. 2019). Synergies and trade-offs across sustainable development
39 objectives can be quantified by analysing multi-sector impacts across ensembles of IAM scenarios
40 generated from single or multiple models (McCollum et al. 2013; Mouratiadou et al. 2016). Modules
41 have also been developed for IAMs with the specific purpose of incorporating policies that address non-
42 climatic sustainability outcomes (Fujimori et al. 2018; Parkinson et al. 2019; Cameron et al. 2016).
43 Similar features have been utilised to incorporate explicit adaptation measures and targeted policies that
44 balance mitigation goals with other sustainability criteria (Bertram et al. 2018; McCollum et al. 2018a).

45




Figure I.3. The representation of SDGs by IAMs. a) Individual target coverage from a multi-model survey; and b) SDG interactions and coverage by IAM models according to a combination of expert and model surveys. The strength dimension of SDG interactions is indicated by grey shading: darker shades represent strong interactions while white represents no interactions. Orange cells indicate where there is the highest agreement between the importance of interactions and model representation, while blue coloured cells show the most important interactions without model representation. Source: van Soest et al. (2019).

I.9.4 Policy analysis with IAMs

A key purpose of IAMs is to provide orientation knowledge for the deliberation of future climate action strategies by policy makers, civil society and the private sector. This is done by presenting different courses of actions (climate change and climate action pathways) towards a variety of long-term climate outcomes under a broad range of assumptions about future socio-economic, institutional and technological developments. The resulting climate change and climate action pathways can be analysed in terms of their outcomes towards a set of societal goals (such as the SDGs) and the resulting trade-offs between different pathways. Key trade-offs that have been investigated in the IAM literature are between (1) no, moderate, and ambitious mitigation pathways (Riahi et al. 2017), (2) early vs. delayed mitigation action (Riahi et al. 2015; Luderer et al. 2018), (3) global action with a focus on economic efficiency equalising marginal abatement costs across countries and sectors vs. regionally and sectorially fragmented action (Kriegler et al. 2015b; Bertram et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. 2018b), (4) pathways with different emphasis on supply side vs. demand side mitigation measures (van Vuuren et

1 al. 2018a; Grubler et al. 2018) or more broadly different sustainable development strategies (van Vuuren
2 et al. 2015), and (5) pathways with different preferences about technology deployment, in particular
3 with regard to CCS and carbon dioxide removals (Kriegler et al. 2014a; van Vliet et al. 2014; Strefler
4 et al. 2018). Key uncertainties that were explored in the IAM literature are between (1) different socio-
5 economic futures as, e.g., represented by the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al. 2017;
6 Bauer et al. 2017; Popp et al. 2017a), (2) different technological developments (Bosetti et al. 2015) and
7 (3) different resource potentials (Kriegler et al. 2016).

8 Policy analysis with IAMs follows the approach that a baseline scenario is augmented by some kind of
9 policy intervention. To address the uncertainties in baseline projections, the scientific community has
10 developed the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) that provide a set of vastly different future
11 developments as reference cases (see Section II.1.2.2. Scenario framework for climate change research
12 and SSP-based mitigation scenarios). Most scenarios used in AR6 are based on the middle-of-the-road
13 reference system (SSP2). Depending on the research interest the baseline can be defined as a no-policy
14 baseline or it can include policies that either address GHG emissions like the NDCs or other pre-existing
15 policies such as energy subsidies and taxes. There is no standard definition for baseline scenarios
16 regarding the inclusion of policies. The baseline scenario is augmented by additional policies like a
17 carbon tax aiming towards a long-term climate goal. Hence, the IAM based policy analysis assumes a
18 reference system like SSP2 within which policy scenarios are compared with a baseline scenario.

19 Most policy analysis with process-based IAMs apply a mix of short-term policy evaluation and long-
20 term policy optimisation. Policy evaluation applies an exogenous set of policies such as the stated NDCs
21 and evaluates the emission outcomes. Policy optimisation is mostly implemented as a cost-effectiveness
22 analysis: a long-term climate stabilisation target is set to derive the optimal mitigation strategy that
23 equalises marginal abatement cost across sectors, GHGs and countries. This optimal mitigation strategy
24 can be implemented by a broad set of well-coordinated sector specific policies or by comprehensive
25 carbon pricing policies.

26 Most commonly the baseline scenario is either a no-policy baseline or based on the NDCs applying an
27 extrapolation beyond 2030. The climate policy regimes most commonly applied include a long-term
28 target to be reached. The optimal climate strategy can be phased in gradually or applied immediately
29 after 2020. It can focus on a global carbon price equalising marginal abatement costs across countries
30 or policy intensities can vary across countries and sectors in the near- to medium-term. The climate
31 policy regime can or cannot include effort sharing mechanisms and transfers between regions. Also, it
32 can be extended to include additional sector policies such as improved forest protection or fossil fuel
33 subsidy removal. If certain technologies or activities are related to spill-overs such as technology
34 learning carbon-pricing might be complemented by technology support (Schultes et al. 2018). If carbon
35 pricing policies are fragmented or delayed additional and early sector policies can help reduce
36 distortions and carbon leakage effects (Bauer et al. 2020b). All these variations to the policy regime can
37 lead to very different transformation pathways and policy costs, which is a core result of the IAM
38 analysis.

39 By applying sensitivity analysis IAMs can be used to assess the importance to strategically develop new
40 technologies and options for mitigation and identify sticking points in climate policy frameworks. The
41 sensitivity analysis evaluates differences in outcomes subject to changes in assumptions. For instance,
42 the assumption about the timing and costs of CCS and CDR availability can be varied (Bauer et al.
43 2020a). The differences in mitigation costs and the transformation pathway support the assessment of
44 policy prioritisation by identifying and quantifying crucial levers for achieving long-term climate
45 mitigation targets such as R&D efforts and timing of policies.

46

1 **I.9.5 Limitations of IAMs**

2 The application of IAMs and the use of IAM results for providing orientation knowledge on climate
3 change response strategies has been criticised for mainly four reasons. First, there are concerns that
4 IAMs are missing important dynamics, e.g. with regard to climate damages and economic co-benefits
5 of mitigation (Stern 2016), demand side responses (Wilson et al. 2012), bioenergy, land degradation
6 and management (Creutzig et al. 2014; IPCC 2019b), carbon dioxide removal (Smith et al. 2016), rapid
7 technological progress in the renewable energy sector (Creutzig et al. 2017), actor heterogeneity, and
8 distributional impacts of climate change and climate policy. This has given rise to criticism that IAMs
9 lack credibility in set of crucial assumptions, among which stands out the critique on the availability of
10 carbon dioxide removal technologies (Bednar et al. 2019; Anderson and Peters 2016).

11 These concerns spur continuous model development and improvements in scenario design, particularly
12 with regard to improved representations of energy demand, renewable energy, carbon dioxide removal
13 technologies, and land management. IAMs are aiming to keep pace with the development of sector-
14 specific models, including latest advances in estimating climate damages (Piontek et al. 2018). In
15 places, where dynamic modelling approaches are lacking, scenarios are being used to explore relevant
16 futures (Grubler et al. 2018). Although most models are still relying on the concept of a single
17 representative household representing entire regions, efforts are under way to better represent agent
18 heterogeneity and distributional impacts of climate change and climate mitigation policies (Rao et al.
19 2017a).

20 Second, concerns have been raised that IAMs are non-transparent and thus make it difficult to grasp
21 context and meaning of their results. These concerns are partly addressed by a substantially increase in
22 model documentation (see the common IAM documentation at www.iamcdocumentation.eu as entry
23 point) and open-source models, but more communication tools and co-production of knowledge formats
24 will be needed to contextualise IAM results for users. When projecting over a century, uncertainties are
25 large and cannot be ignored. Efforts have been undertaken (Marangoni et al. 2017; Gillingham et al.
26 2018) to better gauge what are robust findings from these models and how much they depend on key
27 assumptions (as for example long term growth of the economy, the monetary implication of climate
28 damages or the diffusion and cost of key mitigation technologies).

29 Third, there are concerns that IAMs are describing transformative change on the level of energy and
30 land use, but are largely silent about the underlying socio-technical transitions that could imply
31 restructuring of society and institutions. Weyant (2017) notes the inability of IAMs to mimic extreme
32 and discontinuous outcomes as one of their major limitations. This is relevant when modelling extreme
33 climate damages as well as when modelling disruptive changes. Dialogues and collaborative work
34 between IAM researchers and social scientists have explored ways to bridge insights from the various
35 communities to provide a more complete picture of high impact climate change scenarios and, on the
36 other end, deep transformation pathways (Turnheim et al. 2015; Geels et al. 2016). The extension of
37 IAM research to sustainable development pathways is giving rise to further inter-disciplinary research
38 on underlying transformations towards the Paris climate goals and other sustainable development goals
39 (Kriegler et al. 2018c; Sachs et al. 2019).

40 Finally, there are concerns that IAM analysis could focus on only a subset of relevant futures and thus
41 push society in certain direction without sufficient scrutiny (Beck and Mahony 2017). These concerns
42 can be effectively addressed by adopting an iterative approach between researchers and societal actors
43 in shaping research questions and IAM applications (Edenhofer and Kowarsch 2015). IAM research is
44 constantly taking up concerns about research gaps and fills it with new pathway research, as e.g.
45 occurred for low energy demand and limited bioenergy with CCS scenarios (Grubler et al. 2018; van
46 Vuuren et al. 2018a).

47

1 **I.10 Comparative table of key characteristics of models that contributed**
2 **scenarios to the assessment**

3 [Table to be included in FGD]

4

5 **I.11. Comparative table of mitigation measures represented by models that**
6 **contributed scenarios to the assessment**

7 [Table to be included in FGD]

8

1 **Part II Scenarios**

2 **II.1. Overview on climate change scenarios**

3 Scenarios are coherent and internally consistent descriptions of alternative futures. They are used to
4 explore possible developments in a situation of deep uncertainty about the future. Such deep uncertainty
5 usually precludes predictions of the probability of future events. While scenarios are not predictions or
6 forecasts, they can still be used to explore possible outcomes under a variety of assumptions.

7 Future climate change is a prime example for the application of scenarios. It is driven by human
8 activities across the world and thus can be altered by human agency. It affects all regions over many
9 centuries to come. Humankind's response to climate change touches not only on the way we use energy
10 and land, but also on socio-economic and institutional layers of societal development. Climate change
11 scenarios provide a central approach to analyse this wicked problem.

13 **II.1.1. Purposes of climate change scenarios**

14 Climate change scenarios are developed for a number of purposes (O'Neill et al. 2020). First they are
15 constructed to explore possible climate change futures covering the causal chain from (i) socio-
16 economic developments to (ii) energy and land use to (iii) greenhouse gas emissions to (iv) changes in
17 the atmospheric composition of greenhouse gases and associated radiative forcing to (v) changes in
18 temperature and precipitation patterns to (vi) bio-physical impacts of climate change and finally to (vii)
19 impacts on socio-economic developments, thus closing the loop. Quantitative scenarios exploring
20 possible climate change futures are often called climate change (impact) projections.

21 Second, climate change scenarios are developed to explore pathways towards long-term climate goals.
22 Goal-oriented scenarios often carry the word pathway in their name, such as climate change mitigation
23 pathway, climate change adaptation pathway, or more generally climate change transition /
24 transformation pathway. They are sometimes called backcasting scenarios, or short backcasts, in the
25 literature, particularly when contrasted with forecasts (Robinson 1982). Goal-oriented / backcasting
26 scenarios are inherently normative and intricately linked to human intervention. They can be used to
27 compare and contrast different course of actions. For example, they are often applied in the framework
28 of policy impact analysis by comparing a reference (baseline) scenario without or with only moderate
29 climate policy intervention with a mitigation and/or adaptation pathway (Grant et al. 2020). A set of
30 transformation pathways to climate goals of varied ambition can be used to learn about the multi-
31 dimensional trade-offs between raising or lowering ambition (Clarke et al. 2014). Likewise, different
32 transformation pathways to the same goal are often used to analyse trade-offs between different routes
33 towards this goal (Rogelj et al. 2018a). Since these scenarios have very limited predictive power, they
34 need to be looked at as a set to understand attainable outcomes and the trade-offs between them. With
35 scenarios, context matters!

36 Third, climate change scenarios are used to integrate knowledge and analysis between the three different
37 climate change research communities working on the climate system and its response to human
38 interference (linked to WG I of the IPCC), climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (linked
39 to WG II) and climate change mitigation (linked to WG III) (IPCC 2000; van Vuuren et al. 2011b;
40 O'Neill et al. 2016). This involves the adoption of common scenario frameworks that allow the
41 consistent use of, e.g., shared emissions scenarios, socio-economic development scenarios and climate
42 change projections (Moss et al. 2010; Kriegler et al. 2012; van Vuuren et al. 2012, 2014; O'Neill et al.
43 2014). The integrative power of climate change scenarios extends beyond the climate change research
44 community into neighbouring fields such as the social sciences and ecology (Rosa et al. 2020). To foster

1 such integration, underlying scenario narratives have proven extremely useful as they allow to develop
2 and link quantitative scenario expressions in very different domains of knowledge (O'Neill et al. 2020).

3 Fourth, climate change scenarios and their assessment aim to inform society (Weber et al. 2018; Auer
4 et al. 2020). Scenarios can help to coordinate perception about possible and desirable futures. It will
5 therefore be important to relate climate change scenarios to societal developments and goals (Kriegler
6 et al. 2018c). To this end, scenarios can be seen as tools for societal discourse and decision making
7 which are used in an iterative process between scenario researchers and societal actors (Edenhofer and
8 Kowarsch 2015; Beck and Mahony 2017).

9

10 **II.1.2. Types of climate change mitigation scenarios**

11 There are a number of different types of climate change scenarios, given the different purposes and
12 knowledge domains covered by them. The different types are linked to different models used to
13 construct them (see Part I Modelling methods). Global reference and mitigation scenarios and their
14 associated emissions projections (often called emission scenarios), and national, sector and service
15 transformation / transition scenarios are key types of scenarios that are assessed in the 6th Assessment
16 Report of Working Group III of the IPCC (see Section **II.2.4. Scenario approaches to connect
17 WG III with the WG I and WG II assessments** for a discussion how the WG I and WG II
18 assessments relate to the WG III scenario assessment). Since mitigation and transformation scenarios
19 are goal-oriented, the terms mitigation / transformation scenario and mitigation / transformation
20 pathway can be used interchangeably.

21

22 ***II.1.2.1. Global mitigation scenarios***

23 Since the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), many new global mitigation pathways and associated
24 emissions projections have been developed and published. These include scenarios extrapolating
25 currently implemented policies and the NDCs until the end of the century, moderate near-term action
26 scenarios that run through the mitigation ambition of current NDCs until 2030 and then aim towards
27 the Paris climate targets (Luderer et al. 2018; Roelfsema et al. 2020; Riahi et al. 2021), accelerated
28 action scenarios that gradually phase in regulatory policies and carbon pricing to strengthen ambition
29 beyond current NDCs before 2030 (Kriegler et al. 2018b; van Soest et al. 2020), demand-side driven
30 deep mitigation pathways towards 1.5°C with sustainable development co-benefits (van Vuuren et al.
31 2018a; Grubler et al. 2018; Bertram et al. 2018), and deep mitigation pathways without the use of net
32 negative CO₂ emissions (Riahi et al. 2021). There is also a push to extend mitigation pathways to cover
33 a broader range of sustainable development goals, with the ultimate goal to develop more and more
34 holistic Sustainable Development Pathways (SDPs) (van Vuuren et al. 2018b; Fujimori et al. 2020a;
35 Soergel et al. 2021). The scenarios described above are primarily assessed in Chapter 3 of the Report
36 from a climate mitigation perspective, however sectoral chapters have also used the scenarios, including
37 their climate mitigation categorisations to ensure consistent cross-chapter treatment. In addition to these
38 policy-oriented scenarios, a variety of mitigation scenarios were explored to diagnose system (Bauer et
39 al. 2020a; Smith et al. 2020) and model behaviour (Harmsen et al. 2020a). Purely diagnostic scenarios
40 were typically not collected in the AR6 scenario database.

41


42 ***II.1.2.2. Scenario framework for climate change research and SSP-based mitigation scenarios***

43 The current scenario framework for climate change research (van Vuuren et al. 2014; O'Neill et al.
44 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014b) is based on the concept of Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs)
45 (Kriegler et al. 2012; O'Neill et al. 2014). Unlike their predecessor scenarios in the IPCC Special Report

1 on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC 2000), their underlying narratives are motivated by the purpose
2 of using the framework for mitigation and adaptation policy analysis. Hence the narratives are
3 structured to cover the space socio-economic challenges to adaptation and socio-economic challenges
4 to mitigation. They tell five stories of sustainability (SSP1), middle of the road development (SSP2),
5 regional rivalry (SSP3), inequality (SSP4) and fossil-fuelled development (SSP5) (O'Neill et al. 2017).
6 Those have been translated into population and education (Kc and Lutz 2017), economic growth
7 (Dellink et al. 2017; Crespo Cuaresma 2017; Leimbach et al. 2017a), and urbanisation projections
8 (Jiang and O'Neill 2017) for each of the SSPs. The SSP narratives and associated projections of socio-
9 economic drivers provide the core components for building SSP-based scenario families. They have
10 been extended in various ways, including the addition of quantitative projections on further key socio-
11 economic dimensions like inequality (Rao et al. 2019) and governance (Andrijevic et al. 2019), or
12 spatially downscaled projections of, e.g., population (Jones and O'Neill 2016). By now, the SSPs have
13 been widely used in climate change research ranging from projections of future climate change to
14 mitigation, impact, adaptation and vulnerability analysis (O'Neill et al. 2020).

15 The integrated assessment modelling community has used the SSPs to provide a set of global integrated
16 energy-land use-emissions scenarios (Riahi et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2018b) in line with the matrix
17 architecture of the scenario framework (van Vuuren et al. 2014). It is structured along two dimensions:
18 socio-economic assumptions varied along the SSPs, and climate (forcing) outcomes varied along the
19 Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (van Vuuren et al. 2011b). The resulting scenarios are
20 typically named SSP x - y with $x = 1, \dots, 5$ the SSP label and $y = \{1.9, \mathbf{2.6}, 3.4, \mathbf{4.5}, \mathbf{6.0}, 7.0, \mathbf{8.5}\}$ W/m²
21 the forcing level obtained by the end of the century. The four forcing levels that were already covered
22 by the original RCPs are bolded. The original RCPs were used as an input to the Climate Model
23 Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) (Taylor et al. 2011) and the new SSP-based emissions and
24 concentrations pathway are providing the input (Gidden et al. 2019a) for CMIP6 (Eyring et al. 2015;
25 O'Neill et al. 2016) assessed in AR6 of WG I.

26 SSP-based emissions scenarios (Riahi et al. 2017; Bauer et al. 2017; Popp et al. 2017b) could not
27 identify scenarios for all combinations of SSPs and RCPs (Figure II.1). The highest forcing level,
28 RCP8.5, is only obtained in a no policy baseline in SSP5 (SSP5-8.5). Since there are already moderate
29 climate policies implemented in many countries around the world, it is highly unlikely that a forcing
30 level as high as RCP8.5 will actually be obtained. Baselines for SSP1 and SSP4 reach only up to 6.0
31 W/m², with baselines for SSP2 and SSP3 coming in above this level. On the lower end, no 1.5°C
32 (RCP1.9) and likely 2°C scenarios (RCP2.6) could be identified for SSP3 due to the lack of cooperative
33 action in this world of regional rivalry. 1.5°C scenarios (RCP1.9) could only be reached by all models
34 under SSP1 assumptions with SSP4 struggling to stay below 1.5°C due to limited ability to sustainably
35 manage land and SSP5 struggling due to its high dependence on ample fossil fuel resources in the
36 baseline (Rogelj et al. 2018b).



1

2 **Figure II.1: SSP/RCP matrix.** The SSP/RCP matrix shows the SSPs on the horizontal axis and the forcing
 3 **levels on the vertical axis. Not all SSP/RCP combinations are possible (red triangles), not all combinations**
 4 **were tried (grey triangles), and not all combinations are applicable (white boxes). The colours in each box**
 5 **are successful model runs, with the colours indicating the carbon price (log scale), with the higher prices**
 6 **indicating feasibility constraints are approached. Source: Rogelj et al. (2018b).**

7

8 **II.1.2.3. National transition scenarios**

9 A large number of transition scenarios is developed on a national/regional level by national integrated
 10 assessment, energy-economy or computable general equilibrium models, among others. These aim to
 11 analyse the implications of current climate plans of countries and regions, as well as long-term strategies
 12 until 2050 investigating different degrees of low carbon development. National/regional transition
 13 scenarios are assessed in Chapter 4 of the Report.

14 Recent research has focused on several different types of national transition scenarios that focus on
 15 accelerated climate mitigation pathways in the near-term to 2050. These include scenarios considered
 16 by the authors as tied to meeting specific global climate targets⁵ and scenarios tied to specific policy
 17 targets (e.g., carbon neutrality or 80-95% reduction from a certain baseline year). A majority of the
 18 accelerated national transition modelling studies up to 2050 evaluate pathways that the authors consider
 19 compatible with a 2°C global warming limit, with fewer scenarios defined as compatible with 1.5°C
 20 global pathways. Regionally, national transition scenarios have centred on countries in Asia

FOOTNOTE: ⁵ National emission pathways in the near- or mid-term cannot be linked to long-term mitigation goals without making additional assumptions about emissions by other countries up to the mid-term, and assumptions by all countries up to 2100 (see Chapter 4, Box 4.1).

1 (particularly in China, India, Japan), in the European Union, and in North America, with fewer and
2 more narrowly focused scenario studies in Latin America and Africa (Lepault and Lecocq 2020).

4 ***II.1.2.4. Sector transition scenarios***

5 There are also a range of sector transition scenarios, both on the global and the country level. These
6 include scenarios for the transition of the electricity, buildings, industry, transport and AFOLU sectors
7 until 2050. Due to the accelerated electrification in mitigation pathways, sector coupling plays an
8 increasingly important role to overcome decarbonisation bottlenecks, complicating a separate sector-
9 by-sector scenario assessment. Likewise, the energy-water-land nexus limits the scope a separate
10 assessment of the energy and agricultural sectors. Nevertheless, sector transition scenarios play an
11 important role for this assessment as they can usually offer much more technology, policy and behaviour
12 detail than integrated assessment models. They are primarily assessed in the sector chapters of the
13 report. Their projections of emissions reductions in the sectors in the near- to medium-term is used to
14 check the sector dynamics of global models in Chapter 3 of the Report.

15 Recent transition scenarios considered overarching accelerated climate mitigation strategies across
16 multiple sectors, including demand reduction, energy efficiency improvement, electrification and
17 switching to low carbon fuels. The sectoral strategies considered are often specific to national resource
18 availability, political, economic, climate, and technological conditions. Many sectoral transition
19 strategies have focused on the energy supply sectors, particularly the power sector, and the role for
20 renewable and bio-based fuels in decarbonising energy supply and carbon capture and sequestration
21 (CCS). Some studies present comprehensive scenarios for both supply-side and demand-side sectors,
22 including sector-specific technologies, strategies, and policies. Nearly all demand sector scenarios have
23 emphasised the need for energy efficiency, conservation and reduction through technological changes,
24 with a limited number of models also exploring possible behavioural changes enabled by new
25 technological and societal innovations.

27 ***II.1.2.5. Service transition scenarios***

28 A central feature of service transition pathways is a focus on the provision of adequate energy services
29 to provide decent standards of living for all as the main scenario objective. Energy services are proxies
30 for well-being, with common examples being provision of shelter (expressed as m²/capita), mobility
31 (expressed as passenger-kilometres), nutrition (expressed as kCal/capita), and thermal comfort
32 (expressed as degree-days) (Creutzig et al. 2018). Service transition pathways seek to meet adequate
33 levels of such energy services with minimal carbon emissions, using combinations demand- and supply-
34 side options. Ideally this is done by improving the efficiency of service provision systems to minimise
35 overall final energy and resource demand, thereby reducing pressure on supply-side and carbon dioxide
36 removal technologies (Grubler et al. 2018). Service transition pathways provide a compelling scenario
37 narrative focused on wellbeing, resulting in technology and policy pathways that give explicit priority
38 to decent living standards. Furthermore, more efficient service provision often involves combinations
39 of behavioural and technological change, expanding the options available to policymakers for achieving
40 mitigation goals (van Sluisveld et al. 2016, 2018). Service transition scenarios are primarily assessed in
41 Chapter 5 of the Report.

43 **II.1.3. Key design choices and assumptions in mitigation scenarios**

44 The development of a scenario involves design choices, in addition to the selection of the model. This
45 section will focus on key choices related to design of the scenario, and the respective socioeconomic,

1 technical, and policy assumptions. Model selection cannot be separated from these choices, but the
2 various advantages and disadvantages of models are described in Part I Modelling methods (Modelling
3 Methods).

4 **Target setting:** Goal-oriented scenarios in the climate scenario literature initially focussed on
5 concentration stabilisation but have now shifted more towards radiative forcing and temperature limits.
6 In early model intercomparisons, climate targets were often specified as a CO₂ equivalent concentration
7 level that could not be crossed, for example, 450ppm CO₂-eq or 550ppm CO₂-eq (Clarke et al. 2009).
8 These targets were either applied as not-to-exceed or overshoot targets. In the latter case, concentration
9 levels could be returned to the target level by 2100. Overshoot targets were particularly applied for low
10 concentration and temperature targets as many models could not find a solution otherwise (Clarke et al.
11 2009; Kriegler et al. 2014a; Blanford et al. 2014; Rogelj et al. 2018b). Bioenergy with Carbon Capture
12 and Storage (BECCS) was an important technology that facilitated aggressive targets to be met in 2100,
13 by allowing overshoot of the target leading to a distinctive peak-and-decline behaviour in concentration,
14 radiative forcing, and temperature (Clarke et al. 2014; Fuss et al. 2014). The mitigation scenarios based
15 on the SSP-RCP framework also applied radiative forcing levels in 2100 (Riahi et al. 2017).
16 Temperature targets were often implemented by imposing end-of-century carbon budgets, i.e.
17 cumulative emissions up until 2100. In the case of 2°C pathways, those budgets were usually chosen
18 such that the 2°C limit was not overshoot with some pre-defined probability (Luderer et al. 2018).
19 Nevertheless, due to the availability of net negative CO₂ emissions and assumptions of exponentially
20 increasing policy stringency (with carbon pricing used as proxy), peak and decline emissions and
21 temperature profiles could still occur below the target (Strefler et al. 2020). Arguably, the availability
22 of net negative CO₂ emissions has led to high levels of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the second
23 half of the century, although CDR deployment is often already substantial to compensate residual
24 emissions (Rogelj et al. 2018a). Recent literature has begun to explore the implications of using
25 alternative approaches such as peak warming or peak CO₂ budget constraints to implement targets
26 (Rogelj et al. 2019b; Johansson et al. 2020; Riahi et al. 2021).

27 **Efficiency considerations:** Process-based IAMs typically calculate cost-effective mitigation pathways
28 towards a given target as benchmark case (Clarke et al. 2014). In these pathways, global mitigation
29 costs are minimised by exploiting the abatement options with the least marginal costs across all sectors
30 and regions at any time, implicitly assuming a globally integrated and harmonised mitigation regime.
31 This idealised benchmark is typically compared across different climate targets or with reference
32 scenarios extrapolating current emissions trends (UNEP 2019).

33 The notion of cost-effectiveness is sensitive to economic assumptions in the underlying models,
34 particularly concerning the assumptions on pre-existing market distortions (Clarke et al. 2014; Krey et
35 al. 2014) and the discount rate on future values. Those assumptions are often not clearly expressed.
36 Most models have a discount rate of 3-5%, though the range of alternatives is larger. Cost-benefit IAMs
37 have had a tradition of exploring the importance of discount rates, but process-based IAMs have
38 generally not. A lower discount rate brings mitigation forward in time and uses less carbon dioxide
39 removal, but also increases modelled mitigation costs (Emmerling et al. 2019; Realmonte et al. 2019).
40 While most models report discount rates in documentation, there is arguably too little sensitivity
41 analysis of how the discount rate effects modelled outcomes.

42 Cost-effective pathways typically do not account for climate impacts below the target. They also do not
43 include equity considerations as long as compensation schemes to equalise the mitigation burden
44 between countries are not explicitly considered (Tavoni et al. 2014; Leimbach and Giannousakis 2019;
45 van den Berg et al. 2020).

46 **Policy assumptions:** Cost-effective mitigation scenarios assume that climate policies are globally
47 uniform. There is a substantial literature contrasting these benchmark cases with pathways derived
48 under the assumption of regionally fragmented and heterogeneous mitigation policy regimes (Blanford

1 et al. 2014; Kriegler et al. 2015b, 2018b; Roelfsema et al. 2020; van Soest et al. 2020; Bauer et al.
2 2020b). For example, the Shared Policy Assumptions (Kriegler et al. 2014b) used in the SSP-RCP
3 framework allows for some fragmentation of policy implementation, and many scenarios follow current
4 policies or emission pledges to a certain time period (2030) before implementing stringent policies
5 (Vrontisi et al. 2018; Roelfsema et al. 2020; Riahi et al. 2015). Other studies assume a gradual
6 strengthening of emissions pledges and regulatory measures converging to a globally harmonised
7 mitigation regime slowly over time (Kriegler et al. 2018b; van Soest et al. 2020). Scenarios limiting
8 warming to below 2°C phase in climate policies in all regions and sectors. Almost all converge to a
9 harmonised global mitigation regime before the end of century (with the exception of Bauer et al.
10 (2020b)). In practice, policies are often a mix of regulations, standards, or subsidies. Implementing
11 these real-world policies can give different outcomes to optimal uniform carbon pricing. Modelled
12 carbon prices will generally be lower when other policies are implemented (Calvin et al. 2014a; Bertram
13 et al. 2015). As countries become to implement more policies, the need to further develop the policy
14 assumptions in models is becoming apparent (O'Neill et al. 2020).

15 **Socio-economic drivers:** Key socio-economic drivers of emission scenarios are assumptions on
16 population and economic activity. There are other socio-economic assumptions, often included in
17 underlying narratives (O'Neill et al. 2017), that strongly affect energy demand per capita / unit of GDP
18 and dietary choices (Popp et al. 2017b; Bauer et al. 2017; Grubler et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018a).
19 The SSPs are often used to help harmonise socio-economic assumptions, and further explore the
20 scenario space. Many studies focus on the middle-of-the-road SSP2 as their default assumption, and
21 many use SSP variations to explore the sensitivity of their results to socio-economic drivers (Riahi et
22 al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2017; Marangoni et al. 2017). While the SSPs help harmonisation, they are not
23 unique and do not fully explore the scenario space (O'Neill et al. 2020). The population in the five SSPs
24 does not span the full UN range (Kc and Lutz 2017), and arguably is biased low relative to the UN
25 estimates (Figure II.2). A wider range of narratives describing alternative worlds is also conceivable.
26 The sustainability world (SSP1), for example, is a world with strong economic growth, but
27 sustainability worlds with low growth or even elements of degrowth in developed countries could also
28 be explored. Thus, standardisation of scenario narratives and drivers has advantages, but can also risk
29 narrowing the scenario space that is explored by the literature. Consequently, many studies in the
30 literature have adopted other socio-economic assumptions, for example with regard to population and
31 GDP (Kriegler et al. 2016; Gillingham et al. 2018) and sustainable development trends (Soergel et al.
32 2021).


33 **Technology availability and costs:** Technology assumptions are a key component of IAMs, with some
34 models representing hundreds or thousands of technologies. Despite the importance of technology costs
35 (Creutzig et al. 2017), there has been limited comparison of technology assumptions across models
36 (Krey et al. 2019; Kriegler et al. 2015a). There is, however, a substantial literature on the sensitivity of
37 mitigation scenarios to technology assumptions, including model comparisons (Kriegler et al. 2014a;
38 Riahi et al. 2015), single model sensitivity studies (McJeon et al. 2011b; Krey and Riahi 2013;
39 Giannousakis et al. 2021) and multi-model sensitivity studies (Bosetti et al. 2015). Not only are the
40 initial technology costs important, but also how these costs evolve over time either exogenously or
41 endogenously. Since IAMs have so many interacting technologies, assumptions on one technology can
42 affect the deployment of another. For example, limits on solar energy expansion rates, or integration,
43 may lead to higher levels of deployment for alternative technologies. Because of these interactions, it
44 can be difficult to determine what factors affect deployment across a range of models.

45 Within these key scenario design choices, model choice cannot be ignored. Not all models can
46 implement aspects of a scenario or implement in the same way. Alternative target implementations are
47 difficult for some model frameworks, and implementation issues also arise around technological change
48 and policy implementation. Certain scenario designs may lock out certain modelling frameworks. These

1 issues indicate the need for a diversity of scenario designs (Johansson et al. 2020) to ensure that model
2 diversity can be fully exploited.

3 It is possible for many assumptions to be harmonised, depending on the research question. The SSPs
4 were one project aimed at increasing harmonisation and comparability. It is also possible to harmonise
5 emission data, technology assumptions, and policies (Giarola et al. 2020). While harmonisation
6 facilitates greater comparability between studies, it also limits scenario and model diversity. The
7 advantages and disadvantages of harmonisation need to be discussed for each model study.

8



9

10 **Figure II.2: Population projections from the SSPs compared to the UN estimates. Source: Riahi et al.**
11 **(2017), Rogelj et al. (2018a) and SSP Database (version 2).**

12

13 II.2. Use of scenarios in the assessment

14 II.2.1. Use of scenario literature and database

15 The WGIII assessment draws on the full literature on mitigation scenarios. To support the assessment,
16 as many as possible mitigation scenarios in the literature were collected in a scenario database with
17 harmonised output reporting (see Section II.3. WG III AR6 scenario database). The collection of
18 mitigation pathways in a common database is motivated by a number of reasons: First, to establish
19 comparability of quantitative scenario information in the literature which is often only sporadically
20 available from tables and figures in peer-reviewed publications, reports and electronic supplementary
21 information. Moreover, this information is often reported using different output variables and
22 definitions requiring harmonisation. Second, to increase latitude of the assessment by establishing direct
23 access to quantitative information underlying the scenario literature. Third, to improve transparency
24 and reproducibility of the assessment by making the quantitative information underlying the scenario
25 figures and tables shown in the report available to the readers of AR6. The use of such scenario
26 databases in AR5 of WG III (Krey et al. 2014) and SR1.5 (Huppmann et al. 2018) proved its value for
27 the assessment as well as for broad use of the scenario information by researchers and stakeholders.
28 This is now being continued for AR6.

29

1 **II.2.2. Illustrative pathways**

2 In the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C Warming, illustrative pathways (IPs) were used in addition to
3 scenario ranges to assess and communicate the results from the scenario literature. While ranges express
4 the spread in scenario outcomes highlighting uncertain vs. robust outcomes, IPs can be used to contrast
5 different stories of mitigating climate change (Rogelj et al. 2018a). IPs have also been selected for the
6 assessment in WG3, AR6.

7 The IPs were selected by representatives from each chapter in AR6. They focus on changes in scenario
8 characteristics as a function of 1) the level of ambitious of climate policy, 2) the different mitigation
9 strategies, 3) timing of mitigation actions and 4) the combination of climate policy with sustainable
10 development policies. The IPs consists of a narrative – as well as possible quantifications. The selection
11 of the IPs is preliminary and for use in the SOD and may thus change in the future. The IPs are
12 illustrative and denote implications of different societal choices for the development of future emissions
13 and associated transformations of main GHG emitting sectors. For Chapter 3, for each of the IPs a
14 quantitative scenario was selected from the AR6 scenario database to have particular characteristics and
15 from diverse modelling frameworks.

16 One IP follows current policies as formulated around 2018 (Current Policies, CurPol) through to 2030
17 and follows a similar mitigation effort to 2100. This IP leads to about 3-4 degree C warming at the end
18 of the century, A second follows emission pledges to 2030 (NDCs) and then continues with moderate
19 climate action over time (Moderate Action, ModAct). The remaining IPs are deep mitigation pathways
20 consistent with a 66% chance of limiting warming to 2°C (<2) or a 50% chance of limiting warming to
21 1.5°C by 2100 (1.5). These scenarios respectively focus on supply side measures (<2-SUP, 1.5-SUP),
22 no net negative CO₂ emissions (Never Below Zero, <2-NBZ, 1.5NBZ), renewable electricity (<2-Ren,
23 1.5-Ren), low energy demand (1.5-LD), and gradual strengthening beyond NDC ambition levels until
24 2030 (<2C-GS). All these scenarios follow the SSP2 socioeconomic assumptions. There is one
25 additional scenario, following SSP1 socio-economic assumptions and strengthened sustainable
26 development trends, called Shifting Pathways (1.5-SP). The IPs are discussed further in Chapter 1.3,
27 Chapter 3.2 and the respective sector chapters.

28

Table II.1: The storylines for the eleven Illustrative Pathways (IPs) considered in IPCC WG3.

		General characteristics	Policy	Innovation	Energy	Land use, food biodiversity	Lifestyle
	CurPol	Continuation of current policies and trends;	- Implementation of current climate policies and neglect of stated goals and objectives; - Grey Covid recovery (focus on economic stimulus to incumbent industries).	Business-as-usual; slow progress in low-carbon technologies	Fossil fuels remain important; lock-in	Further expansion of western diets; further slow expansion of agriculture area	Demand will continue to grow; no significant changes in current habits
	ModAct	NDCs in 2030; fragmented policy landscape; post-2030 action consistent with modest action until 2030	- Strengthening of policies to implement NDCs and some further strengthening after 2030; - Mixed grey-green recovery.	Modest change compared to CurPol	Mostly moving away from coal; growth of renewables; some lock-in in fossil investments	Afforestation/reforestation policies as in NDCs	Modest change compared to CurPol
1.5/<2	Sup	Mitigation in all sectors, includes also heavy reliance on net negative emissions (supply-side)	Successful international climate policy regime with focus on long-term climate target	Further development of CDR options;	CDR forms part of energy mix.	Afforestation/reforestation, BECCS, increased competition for land	Not critical – some induced via price increases
	NBZ	Still some CDR– but no net negative emissions at the global scale (never below zero)	Successful international climate policy regime – globally not allowing net negative emissions to offset earlier emissions		CDR still forms part of the energy mix – but only to offset residual emissions.	Still some CDR	Not critical – some induced via price increases

	Ren	Rapid deployment and technology development of renewables; electrification;	Successful international climate policy regime; policies and financial incentives favouring renewable energy	Rapid further development of innovative electricity technologies and policy regimes	Renewable energy, electrification – also in transport; sector coupling; storage or power-to-X technologies; better interconnections		Service provisioning and demand changes to better adapt to high RE supply
	LD	Reduced demand leads to early emission reductions		Social innovation; efficiency; across all sectors	Demand reduction; modal shifts in transport; rapid diffusion of BAT in buildings and industry	Lower food and agricultural waste; less meat-intensive lifestyles	Service provisioning and demand changes; behavioural changes
	GS	Mitigation action is gradually strengthened until 2030 compared to NDCs, but a gap remains to immediate action	Until 2030, mostly current NDCs are implemented – but move towards strong, universal regime > 2030		Similar as Sup, but with some delay.	Similar as Sup, but with some delay.	
	SP	<i>Shifting pathways.</i> Major transformations shift development towards sustainability, including deep GHG emissions reduction	SDG policies in addition to Paris consistent climate action (international transfers; poverty reduction; healthy diets, environmental protection)		Demand reduction; renewable energy	Lower food and agricultural waste; less meat-intensive lifestyles; afforestation.	Service provisioning and demand changes

II.2.3. Treatment of scenario uncertainty

The calls for scenarios issued in preparation of this assessment report allowed to collect a large ensemble of scenarios, coming from many modelling teams using various modelling frameworks in many different studies. Although large ensembles of scenarios were gathered, it should be acknowledged that only a portion of the full uncertainty space is investigated, and that scenarios ensembles distribution of results are an “artefact” of the context of the studies the scenarios were developed in. This introduces “biases” in the ensemble: (i) the topics of the scenario studies collected in the database determine coverage of the scenario space, with large model-comparison studies putting large weight on selected topics over lesser explored topics explored by individual models, (ii) low-emissions scenarios are over-represented in scenarios databases, compared to overlooked intermediate emissions levels (van Ruijven 2016), (iii) some models are more represented than others, (iv) only “optimistic” models (i.e. models finding lower mitigation costs) reach the lowest mitigation targets (Tavoni and Tol 2010), (v) more scenarios explore uncertainty associated with energy-supply technologies than with demand and behaviours. This list would have to be adapted to the ensembles collected. Where appropriate, sampling bias was recognised in the assessment, but formal methods to reduce bias were not employed due to conceptual limitations.

Furthermore, although it has been attempted to elicit scenario likelihoods from expert knowledge (Christensen et al. 2018), scenarios are difficult to associate with probabilities as they typically describe a situation of deep uncertainty (Grübler and Nakicenovic 2001). This and the non-statistical nature of the scenario ensemble collected in the database does not allow a probabilistic interpretation of the distribution of output variables in the scenario database. Throughout the report, descriptive statistics are used to describe the spread of scenario outcomes across the scenarios ensemble. The ranges of results and the position of scenarios outcomes relative to some thresholds of interest are analysed. In some figures, the median of the distribution of results is plotted together with the interquartile range and possibly other percentiles (5th-10th-90th-95th) to facilitate the assessment of results. This needs to be done with caution to avoid a statistical interpretation of these ranges.

II.2.4. Scenario approaches to connect WG III with the WG I and WG II assessments

II.2.4.1. Assessment of WG III scenarios building on WG I physical climate knowledge

A transparent emission scenario climate assessment pipeline has been set up across WG I and WG II to ensure integration of assessment results across the two working groups. This pipeline consists of a step where emissions scenarios are harmonised with the historical record, a step in which missing species are transparently filled in, and a step in which the emission evolutions are assessed with a suit of climate model emulators (see Section I.8 Reduced complexity climate modelling) calibrated to the WG1 assessment. These three steps ensure a consistent and comparable assessment of the climate response to emission scenarios in the literature.

Harmonisation: Given that IAMs may use slightly different historical datasets, emission scenarios submitted to the AR6 WG3 scenario database (see Section II.3. WG III AR6 scenario database) are harmonised against a common source of historical emissions with the aneris scientific software package (Gidden et al. 2018). The harmonisation is performed so that different climate futures resulting from two different scenarios are a result of different future emission evolutions within the scenarios, not due to slightly different historical definitions and starting points. Emissions are harmonised to 2015 values based on (Hoesly et al. 2018; van Marle et al. 2017; Velders et al. 2015; Quéré et al. 2016; Gütschow et al. 2016) and inverse emissions from (Meinshausen et al. 2020), using aneris’ default settings. CO₂ from energy and industrial processes and CO₂ from agriculture, forestry, and land use change were harmonised separately. All other emissions species are harmonised based on the total reported emissions

per species. In the case that emissions input is not reported in 2015, the emissions offset between historical and modelled emissions in 2010 is used to determine the harmonisation method.

Infilling missing species: Infilling ensures that scenarios include all relevant anthropogenic emissions for an accurate climate assessment given that not all IAMs report all emission species. Infilling is performed using the silicone software package (Lamboll et al. 2020). Missing species that are not reported for a specific scenario, are infilled based on the relationships between species as found in the harmonised set of all scenarios reported to the WG III scenario database. As a minimum, submitted scenarios required either total CO₂ emissions or CO₂ from energy and industrial processes (E&IP). By applying silicone's default Quantile Rolling Window method described in (Lamboll et al. 2020), up to 21 species can be infilled, including aerosol precursor emissions, greenhouse gases and volatile organic compounds, plus CO₂ emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land use. Total CO₂ is applied as the lead gas, and E&IP CO₂ is used if the former is not available.

WG I-calibrated emulators: The WG I emulators' probabilistic parameter ensembles are derived such that they match a range of key climate metrics assessed by WG1 and the extent to which agreement is achieved is evaluated (WG I cross-chapter Box 7.1). Of particular importance to this evaluation is the verification against the WG I temperature assessment of the five scenarios assessed in Chapter 4 of WG1 (SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5). The inclusion of the temperature assessment as a benchmark for the emulators provides the strongest verification that WG3's scenario classification reflects the WG I assessment.

The evaluation of the emulators against the WG I assessment ensures that emulator differences are clearly explained. The comprehensive nature of the evaluation is a clear improvement on previous reports and ensures that multiple components of the emulators, from their climate response to effective radiative forcing through to their carbon cycles, have been examined before they are deemed fit for use by WG3.

Using expert judgement, emulators that reproduce the best estimates and uncertainties of the majority of WG I assessed metrics are recommended for scenario classification use by WG3. MAGICC7 and FaIR1.6 are currently recommended (see WG1 cross-chapter Box 7.1). Due to technical limitations, the SOD deadlines and the requirement for emulators to be in line with the latest available WG I assessment, only MAGICC7 is presently used for scenario classification in the SOD. When FaIR1.6 and Cicero-SCM results will become available they will be used alongside MAGICC7 to improve the understanding of the uncertainties involved in the scenario classification process, particularly those due to climate model uncertainty.

Scenario climate assessment: For the WG III scenario climate assessment, emulators are run hundreds of times per scenario, sampling from an emulator-specific probabilistic parameter set, which incorporates carbon cycle and climate system uncertainty in line with the WG I assessment. The emulator output is reported as percentiles from the full set of ensemble member runs in the AR6 scenario database. Percentiles for different output variables provide information about the spread in individual variables for a given scenario, but as a set do not form a consistent climate change projection. These are represented by individual ensemble member runs which however are not separately reported in the AR6 scenario database. The emulators provide an assessment of GSAT, peak warming, year of peak warming, ocean heat uptake, atmospheric CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O concentrations and effective radiative forcings from a range of species including CO₂, CH₄, N₂O and aerosols for each emissions scenario. The climate emulator's GSAT projections are in line with the WG1 climate assessment and normalised to match the WG1 Ch.2 assessed total warming between 1850-1900 and 1995-2014 of 0.84°C. These projections are used for classifying the WG III scenarios based on their temperature implications (see Section II.3.2. Global pathways).

An estimate of CO₂ and non-CO₂ induced warming is also provided. The estimate is calculated by performing two extra experiments for each scenario for each of the climate emulator ensemble members, one in which only anthropogenic climate forcings are considered and one in which only CO₂ forcing is considered. The CO₂ forcing experiment quantifies the CO₂-induced warming and the difference between the anthropogenic experiment and the CO₂ experiment quantifies the anthropogenic non-CO₂ induced warming. Due to feedbacks and non-linearities within the climate system, the sum of the diagnosed CO₂ and non-CO₂ induced warming does not exactly add up to the total warming in each scenario. For completeness, we also report the residual (which approximately quantifies the impact of these non-linearities and feedbacks as well as the impact of natural climate forcings). The residual is on the order of 0.05°C.

II.2.4.2. Relating the WG II and WG III assessments by use of warming levels

WG II is adopting common climate dimensions to facilitate consistent communication of impacts and synthesis, as well as to integrate with WG I and WG III (AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box 1.1). The common climate dimensions will be used to analyse, present and communicate observed and projected climate change impacts across WGII. They include (1) adoption of a common range of global warming levels (GWLs) from WGI, (2) assessment of how impacts at given GWLs depend on level of exposure/vulnerability, level of adaptation, and time period, (3) adoption of common ranges for other climate variables as needed (e.g., sea-level rise), (4) adoption of common regional climates as needed, and (5) a climate information translation resource for WG II use that maps climate variable levels to climate projections (e.g., RCPs, SSPx-y, SRES) and vice versa. Common socioeconomic dimensions are not being adopted in WG II due to a desire to draw on the full literature, inform the broad ranges of relevant possibilities (climate, development, adaptation, mitigation), and be flexible. The impacts literature is wide-ranging and diverse, with a fraction based on global socioeconomic scenarios. WGII's approach allows chapters and cross-chapter boxes to assess how impacts and ranges depend on socioeconomic factors affecting exposure, vulnerability, and adaptation independently as appropriate for their literature. For example, WG II Chapter 16 assesses how Representative Key Risks vary under low vs. high exposure/vulnerability conditions by drawing on SSP-based impact literature.

WG II's common GWL range is based on AR6 WGI's "Tier 1" dimensions of integration range – 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0°C (relative to the 1850 to 1900 period) – and will be used as a key WGII dimension of integration for impacts studies. However, GWL bands are needed in WG II to map to the diverse temperature levels and projections found across WG II's literature. Within WG II, use of GWLs facilitates comparison of climate states across climate change projections, assessment of the full impacts literature, and cross-chapter comparison. Across AR6, use of GWLs facilitates integration across WGs of climate change projections, climate change risks, adaptation opportunities, and mitigation.

For facilitating integration with WG III, GWLs need to be related to WG III's classification of mitigation efforts by temperature outcome. WG III's Chapter 3 groups full century emissions projections resulting from a large set of assessed mitigation scenarios into temperature classes (see Sections II.2.4.1. Assessment of WG III scenarios building on WG I physical climate knowledge, II.3.2.1. Temperature classification of global pathways, Chapter 3.3). Scenarios are classified by median peak global average temperature increase in the bands <2°C, 2-2.5°C, 2.5-3°C, and >3°C, with the range below 2°C broken out in greater detail. Estimates of the temperature response to emissions projections are attached with uncertainty. WG3 uses estimates of the median (50th percentile) and 67th percentile warming to classify mitigation scenarios, but actual warming outcomes can be lower or higher within the range of the estimated uncertainty. WG II's GWL bands and WG III's peak warming bands thus differ in terms of definition (transient GWL vs. median peak warming through 2100). The WG III scenario assessment is using additional classifications relating to, inter alia, near term policy developments, technology availability, energy demand, population and economic growth (see Section

II. 3.2.2. Additional classifications of global pathways, Chapter 3.3), and a set of illustrative pathways with varying socio-techno-economic assumptions (see Section II.2.2. Illustrative pathways, Chapter 3.2). Synthesising WG II assessments of climate change impacts and WG III assessments of climate change mitigation efforts for similar GWLs / peak warming levels will have to address how socio-techno-economic conditions affect impacts, adaptation, and mitigation outcomes. Furthermore, a synthesis of mitigation efforts and mitigation benefits in terms of avoided climate change impacts would require the use of similar reference scenarios and socioeconomic development assumptions, for consistency (O’Neill et al. 2020) (Cross WG-box “Economic benefits from avoided climate impacts along long-term mitigation pathways”).

II.3. WG III AR6 scenario database

As for previous IPCC reports of Working Group III, including the Special Report on 1.5 degrees (SR1.5) (Huppmann et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018a) and the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Clarke et al. 2014; Krey et al. 2014), quantitative information on mitigation pathways is collected in a dedicated AR6 scenario database^f to underpin the assessment.

By the time of the SOD (December 2020) the AR6 scenario database comprises 140 modelling frameworks – 61 globally comprehensive, 60 national/regional s, and 19 sectoral models – with in total 2,266 scenarios, summarised in Table II.3 and Table II.4 (global mitigation pathways), Table II.5 (national and regional mitigation pathways) and Table II.6 (sector transition pathways) below. The studies submitting these scenarios are summarised in factsheets in the Supplementary Material to this Annex.

[The AR6 scenario database will be open for submission of new scenarios until January 2021. Section II.3 will be updated in FGD to reflect the final status of the database.]

II.3.1. Process of scenario collection and vetting

To facilitate the AR6 assessment, modelling teams were invited to submit their available emissions scenarios to a web-based database hosted by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)^g. The co-chairs of Working Group III as well as a range of scientific institutions, including the Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium (IAMC), University of Cape Town (UCT) and the Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement (CIRED), support the open call for scenarios which is subdivided into four dedicated calls,

1. a call for global long-term scenarios to underpin the assessment in chapter 3 as well as facilitating integration with sectoral chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11,
2. a call for short- to medium-term scenarios at the national and regional scale underpinning the assessment in chapter 4, and
3. a call for building-focused scenarios to inform the assessment in chapter 9, and
4. a call for transport-focused scenarios to inform the assessment in chapter 10.

A common data reporting template with a defined variable structure was used and all teams were required to register and submit detailed model and scenario metadata. Scenarios were required to come from a formal quantitative model and the scenarios must be published in accordance with IPCC literature requirements. The calls for scenarios were open for a period of 16 months (Sept 2019-Jan 2021), with updates possible until July 2021 in line with the literature acceptance deadline. The data

FOOTNOTE: ^f <https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/ar6-scenario-submission/>

FOOTNOTE: ^g <https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/ar6-scenario-submission/#/about>

submission process included various quality control procedures to increase accuracy and consistency in reporting. Additional categorisation and processing of metadata over the full database provided a wide range of indicators and categories that were made centrally available to Lead Authors of the Report to enhance consistency of the assessment, such as: climate, policy and technology categories; characteristics about emissions, energy, socioeconomics and carbon sequestration; metadata such as literature references, model documentation and related projects.

For all scenarios reporting global data, a vetting process is undertaken to ensure that key indicators are within reasonable ranges for the baseline period – primarily for indicators relating to emissions and the energy sector (Table II.2). As part of the submission process, model teams were contacted individually with information on the vetting outcome with regard to their submitted scenarios giving them the opportunity to verify the reporting of their data. Checks on technology-specific variables for nuclear, solar & wind and CCS screen not only for accuracy with respect to recent developments, but also indicate reporting errors relating to different Primary Energy accounting methods. Whilst the criteria ranges appear to be large, the focus of these scenarios is the medium-long term and there is also uncertainty in the historical values. For vetting of illustrative pathways, the same criteria were used, albeit with narrower ranges (Table II.2). Future values were also assessed and reported to Lead Authors, but not used as exclusion criteria. Where possible we used latest values available, generally 2018, and if necessary extrapolated to 2020 as most models report only at 5-10 year intervals. 2020 as reported in the scenarios does not include the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Around two thirds of submitted scenarios passed the vetting. The remaining third comprised a fraction of scenarios that were rolled over from the SR1.5 database, and were no longer up-to-date with recent developments (excluding the COVID shock). This included scenarios that started stringent mitigation action already in 2015. Other scenarios were expected to deviate from historical trends due to their diagnostic design.

Table II.2. Summary of the vetting criteria and ranges applied to the global scenarios for the climate assessment and preliminary screening for Illustrative Pathways. N.B. rows do not sum to the same total of scenarios as not all scenarios reported all variables. [Final # of models and scenarios will be updated for the FGD].

	Reference value	Range (IP range)	Pass	Fail
<i>Historical Emissions (sources: EDGAR vIPCC and CEDS, 2018 value)</i>				
CO ₂ total (EIP + AFOLU)	43792-43897 MtCO ₂ /yr	±40% (±20%)	1439	29
CO ₂ EIP	37037-37525 MtCO ₂ /yr	±20% (±10%)	1456	22
CH ₄ emissions	350.0-399.1 MtCH ₄ /yr	±40% (±20%)	1396	8
CO ₂ EIP 2010-2020 % change	-	+0 to +50%	1398	59
CCS from Energy 2020	-	0-250 Mt CO ₂ /yr	1242	87
<i>Historical Energy production (sources: IEA 2019; IRENA; BP; EMBERS; trends extrapolated to 2020)</i>				
Primary Energy (2020, IEA)	578 EJ	±20% (±10%)	1394	0
Electricity Nuclear (2020, IEA)	9.77 EJ	±30% (±15%)	1299	230
Electricity Solar & Wind (2020, IEA, IRENA, BP, EMBERS).	8.51 EJ	±50% (±25%)	1171	358
Overall			1065	450
<i>Future criteria (not used for exclusion in climate assessment but flagged to authors as potentially problematic)</i>				
No net negative CO ₂ emissions before 2030	CO ₂ total in 2030 >0		1474	4
CCS from Energy in 2030	< 2000 Mt CO ₂ /yr		1186	143
Electricity from Nuclear in 2030	< 20 EJ/yr		1235	205

II.3.2. Global pathways

Almost 1600 global scenarios were submitted to the scenario database, 1065 passed the vetting criteria. Scenarios were submitted by both individual studies and model inter-comparisons (see factsheets in the Supplementary Material to this Annex). The main model inter-comparisons submitting scenarios are shown in Table II.3. Model inter-comparisons have a shared experimental design and assess research questions across different modelling platforms to enable more structured and systematic assessments. The model comparison projects thus help to understand the robustness of the insights.

The number of submitted scenarios varies considerably by study, e.g. from 90 to over 300 scenarios for the model inter-comparison studies (Table II.3). The numbers of scenarios also varies substantially by model (Table II.4), reinforcing the discussion of sampling bias in Section II.2.3. Treatment of scenario uncertainty

Table II.3. Model inter-comparisons providing emission scenarios that are assessed in Chapter 3.*[Scenario numbers to be confirmed in FGD]*

Project/model comparison	Description	Duration	Key references	Website	Number of scenarios in the database
SSPs	The SSPs are part of a new framework that the climate change research community has adopted to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation.	2013-2016	(Riahi et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2018b; Gidden et al. 2019a)	https://tntcat.iias.a.ac.at/SspDb	121
ADVANCE	ADVANCE developed a new generation of advanced IAMs and applied the improved models to explore different climate mitigation policy options in the post-Paris framework.	2013-2016	(Luderer et al. 2018; Vrontisi et al. 2018)	http://www.fp7-advance.eu/	93
CD-LINKS	Exploring the complex interplay between climate action and development, while simultaneously taking both global and national perspectives and thereby informing the design of complementary climate-development policies.	2015-2019	(McCollum et al. 2018b; Roelfsema et al. 2020)	https://www.cd-links.org/	127
COMMIT	Exploring new climate policy scenarios in different parts of the world based on team modelling groups worldwide	2017-2020	(van Soest et al. 2020)	https://themasites.pbl.nl/commit/	116
ENGAGE	Exploring new climate policy scenarios in different parts of the world	ongoing	(Riahi et al. 2021)	http://www.engage-climate.org/	323
EMF30	Energy Modelling Forum study into the role of non-CO ₂ climate forcers	2015-2019	(Smith et al. 2020; Harmsen et al. 2020b)	https://emf.stanford.edu/projects/emf-30-short-lived-climate-forcers-air-quality	149
EMF33	Energy Modelling Forum study into the role of bioenergy	2015-2019	(Rose et al. 2020; Bauer et al. 2020a)	https://emf.stanford.edu/projects/emf-33-bio-energy-and-land-use	181

II.3.2.1. Temperature classification of global pathways

The global long-term pathways underpinning the assessment in Chapter 3, to the degree possible, have been classified by the temperature goal that they correspond to, i.e. “1.5°C with no or low OS”, “1.5°C with high OS”, “likely 2°C”, “median 2°C”, “below 2.5°C”, “below 3.0°C”, and “above 3.0°C”. The first four of these categories correspond to the ones used in the IPCC SR1.5 (Rogelj et al. 2018a) while the latter three have been added as part of the AR6 to capture a broader set of temperature goals. Finally, a number of pathways could not be evaluated in terms of their temperature outcomes, either because of missing information or due to an insufficient time horizon. Table II.4 shows the climate outcomes of the full scenario set (without vetting). For numbers relating to vetted scenarios refer to the main text of Chapter 3, Section 3.2.

Table II.4. Global mitigation pathways by modelling framework and climate category. *[Final # of models and scenarios will be updated for the FGD].*

Model group	C1: 1.5°C with no or low OS	C2: 1.5°C with high OS	C3: likely 2°C	C4: median 2°C	C5: below 2.5°C	C6: below 3.0°C	C7: above 3.0°C	No climate assessment	Grand Total
AIM/CGE	20	7	52	15	28	11	47	12	192
BET		3	4	4	2	2	1		16
C3IAM						2	7		9
COFFEE			1						1
COPPE- COFFEE	1	5	19	13	26	6	6		76
C-ROADS- 5.005	3	2					1		6
DNE21+	6		8	6	4	3	9	13	49
EDGE- Buildings								16	16
En-ROADS-96	2						1		3
ENV-Linkages								15	15
EPPA			3	4		1	2		10
FARM							13		13
GAINS-dw4								2	2
GCAM	6	2	15	4	16	8	23		74
GEM-E3	7	4	4				2	11	28
GENeSYS- MOD								2	2
GMM-17								4	4

GRAPE-15			1		7	9	1		18
HEB								2	2
IEA ETP								1	1
IEA WEM			1					1	2
IMACLIM			3	1	6	1		48	59
IMAGE	9	2	28	12	17	12	31	7	118
LUT-ESTM								1	1
MAGPIE								3	3
McKinsey								3	3
MERGE-ETL			1		1		1		3
MESSAGE		1	4	3			1	1	10
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM	2	4	15	7	10	2	18		58
MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM	1	9	19	14	29	11	12	2	97
MESSAGE-Transport								3	3
MIGRATION	2					4	4	25	35
POLES	18	15	32	11	20	8	19		123
PROMETHEUS								9	9
REmap								2	2
REMIND	9	16	35	2	3	9	34	15	123
REMIND-Buildings								4	4
REMIND-EDGET			8		1	1			10
REMIND-MAGPIE	18	23	57	10	20	11	22		161
REMIND-Transport			20			2	6		28
Shell								1	1
TIAM-ECN	6	2	18	2	5	4	3	13	53
TIAM-Grantham			10				1		11
TIAM-UCL			2				1		3
TIAM-WORLD			1		4	4	2		11
WITCH	5	1	24	10	14	5	5		64

WITCH- GLOBIOM	4	2	9	4	8	7	25	3	62
Grand Total	119	98	394	122	221	123	298	219	1594

II. 3.2.2. Additional classifications of global pathways

[Discussion to be extended in FGD]

In addition to their temperature outcome, global pathways have a large number of other characteristics that are important for the WG3 assessment. Therefore, metadata on a number of key characteristics has been added to the database and has been used for analysis. These characteristics include:

- Socio-economic characteristics. Scenarios were classified as high, medium and low for population and economic growth based on a comparison with the assumed growth rates in the SSPs.
- Energy system characteristics. Scenarios have also been classified regarding a number of key energy system characteristics including energy demand (very low, low, medium, high and very high), the contribution of renewables, bio-energy, nuclear power, and CCS.
- Climate policy characteristics. A critical characteristic is the use of net negative emissions. Therefore scenarios were also classified on the basis of low, medium and high cumulative net negative emissions.
- The scenarios were also classified on the basis of assumptions regarding climate policy. Some scenarios are mostly meant for diagnostic purposes and classified as such. A second set of scenarios represents the situation in absence of climate policy. These scenarios (which are mostly used as counterfactual) have been classified as baseline scenarios. A third set of scenarios represent current policies. These are classified in various subclasses representing current policies, stated objectives (pledges) as well as scenarios that are particularly designed to explore specific assumed policies. For each of these categories, additional assumption for post- 2030 can be made. Finally, the largest set of scenarios represents immediate action (= as of 2020) scenarios that explore various climate targets. Many of these scenarios describe cost-effective pathways to achieve the targets.

II. 3.3. National and regional pathways

National and regional pathways have been collected in the AR6 scenario database to support the Chapter 4 assessment. To date, more than 500 pathways for 27 countries/regions have been submitted to the AR6 scenario database by integrated assessment, energy-economic and computable general equilibrium modelling research teams. This represents a limited sample of the overall literature on mitigation pathways at the national level. The majority of these pathways originate from a set of larger model intercomparison projects, JMIP/EMF35 (Sugiyama et al. 2020) focusing on Japan, CD-LINKS (Schaeffer et al. 2020; Roelfsema et al. 2020), COMMIT (van Soest et al. 2020), ENGAGE (Fujimori et al. 2020b), each covering several countries/regions from the following set of countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU-28, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Russia, Thailand, USA, Vietnam. The remaining pathways stem from individual modelling studies that were submitted/collected (Table II.5).

Table II.5. National and regional mitigation pathways by modelling framework, region and scenario type.

[Note to Reviewers: The final set of models and scenarios contributing to the assessment may still change as not all underlying studies have been accepted for publication. Also, scenarios that were submitted close to submission deadline for the SOD for technical reasons may not have been included in the SOD.]

Region	Model	Current Policies	NDCs	Other	Total
ARG	IMACLIM-ARG		2	2	4
AUS	TIMES-Australia	1		7	8
BRA	BLUES-Brazil	2	2	16	20
BRA	COPPE_MSB-Brazil			8	8
BRA	IMACLIM-BRA			5	5
CAN	GCAM-Canada	1	1	4	6
CHE	STEM-Switzerland	1		10	11
CHN	AIM/Hub-China	2	2	14	18
CHN	GENeSYS-MOD-CHN			3	3
CHN	IPAC-AIM/technology-China	1	1	11	13
CHN	PECE-China			1	1
CHN	TIMES-China	1	1	4	6
ECU	ELENA-Ecuador			2	2
ETH	TIAM-ECN ETH	1		1	2
EU	JRC-EU-TIMES			8	8
EU	PRIMES	2	1	8	11
EU	REMIND_EU			12	12
FRA	TIMES-France			8	8
GBR	7see			11	11
IDN	AIM/Hub-Indonesia			1	1
IDN	DDPP Energy			4	4
IND	AIM/Enduse India	1	1	5	7
IND	AIM/Hub-India	1	1	7	9
IND	MARKAL-INDIA	2	3	13	18
JPN	AIM/CGE-Enduse-Japan			6	6
JPN	AIM/Enduse-Japan	3	3	55	61
JPN	AIM/Hub-Japan	2	3	50	55
JPN	DNE21-Japan		1	30	31
JPN	DNE21+ V.14 (national)	1	1	4	6
JPN	IEEJ-Japan		1	34	35
KEN	TIAM-ECN KEN	1	1	2	4
KOR	AIM/CGE-Korea	1	1	6	8
KOR	AIM/Hub-Korea	2	2	14	18
MDG	TIAM-ECN MDG		2	1	3
MEX	GENeSYS-MOD-MEX			4	4
PRT	TIMES-Portugal			8	8
RUS	RU-TIMES	2	2	9	13
SAU	KLEM-SAU			2	2
SWE	TIMES-Sweden			4	4
THA	AIM/Hub-Thailand	1	2	18	21
USA	GCAM-USA	2	1	10	13
USA	RIO-USA			12	12
VNM	AIM/Hub-Vietnam	1	2	20	23
ZAF	TIAM-ECN AFR			4	4
	Total	32	35	456	523

II. 3.4. Sector transition pathways

[Discussion to be extended in FGD]

Sectoral transition pathways based on the AR6 Scenario database are addressed in a number of Chapters, primarily Chapter 6 (energy systems), 7 (AFOLU), 9 (buildings) and 10 (transport). These analyses cover both contributions from global IAMs and from sector-specific models with regional or global coverage. The assessments cover a variety of perspectives, including long-term global and macro-region trends for the sectors, sectoral analysis of the Illustrative Pathways, and comparison of the scenarios between full-economy IAMs and sector-specific models on shorter time horizons. These perspectives have a bi-directional utility – to understand how well IAMs are representing sectoral trends from more granular models, and position sectoral models in the context of full economy transitions to verify consistency with different climate targets.

Table II.6. Overview of how models and scenarios were used in sectoral chapters. *[Final # of models and scenarios will be updated for the FGD]*

Sector	# models	# scenarios	Key sections	Key perspectives
Energy systems (Ch6)	58	393	6.6, 6.7	Energy and electricity system at net-zero; carbon intensity of electricity; investments; Final energy electrification; hydrogen
AFOLU (Ch7)	59	523	7.4, 7.5	Regional and global GHG emissions and land use dynamics; economic mitigation potential for different GHGs; integrated mitigation pathways
Buildings (Ch9)	51	53	9.3, 9.6	Regional and global GHG emissions with a breakdown per end use and energy carrier
Transport (Ch10)	5	18	10.7	Global transport system, modes, vehicles, fuels.

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Annex C: Scenarios and modelling methods

Supplementary Material

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Supplementary Material to the Annex C

Part I: Scenario Study Factsheets

[The fact sheets collected for the SOD are preliminary and still contain placeholders. Those will be filled and the collection of factsheets updated in FGD to cover all studies that submitted scenarios to the AR6 scenario database]

The Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of Working Group 3 assesses global and national climate change mitigation pathways in the literature. Global mitigation pathways are primarily assessed in Chapter 3 and national climate change mitigation pathways are primarily assessed in Chapter 4 of the report. The supplementary material presented here documents the scenarios that were submitted to the AR6 scenario database (see Chapter 3.2 and Annex C Part II.3) for the assessment. The submitting entities were scenario studies published in the literature. The presentation of scenarios in this supplement is organized study by study in terms of *Scenario study factsheets*.

The scenario studies are steered by a set of specific scientific questions and produce insights, accordingly. The factsheets provided in this document summarize the essential information about the individual studies. Hereby, great emphasis is applied that readers can transparently connect scenario and model information to publications summarizing the most important facts for alleviated access. A factsheet briefly summarizes by publication

- the associated publication(s),
- the guiding scientific questions,
- the results,
- the scenarios,
- the models.

The guiding scientific questions give an understanding which aspects were investigated in the study. The results summarize the central insights developed by the study. The list of scenarios used in the study helps to get an orientation in naming and specification of decisive parameters for individual scenarios. Finally, the list of participating models allows to understand which models contributed to the insights of the study.

The factsheets are structured as described below:

- 1) Global scenario studies with participation of multiple models;
- 2) Hybrid multi-model scenario studies with participation of global and national models;
- 3) Global scenario studies from a single model;
- 4) Sectoral scenario studies, including global and national scale;
- 5) National scenario studies;
- 6) Other studies that cannot be assigned to the categories above.

The benefit of this approach is as follows:

- The essential information of a scenario study outcome becomes easier digestible for users. Further, describing each study in the same format supports orientation and comprehension in this diverse spectrum of multiple studies.
- The essential research questions and outcomes can be quickly grasped. They are summed up in a very high-level, abstract manner, no details like technical approaches or similar are allowed; only the questions to be answered and the results through the eyes of an external person, i.e. a stakeholder.

- The factsheets are stand-alone and can be used in a modular way also allowing to utilize them in different contexts outside this document.

1. Global scenario studies with participation of multiple models

Those studies are usually model comparison studies with harmonized scenario assumptions across models and aim to explore robust features of mitigation pathways. They typically produce a larger set of scenarios than single model studies.

1.1 Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP)

1.1.1 Publications

- Van Vuuren, D. P., Riahi, K., Calvin, K., Dellink, R., Emmerling, J., Fujimori, S., Kc, S., Kriegler, E. & O'Neill, B. 2017. The Shared Socio-economic Pathways: Trajectories for human development and global environmental change. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 148-152.
- Riahi, K., Van Vuuren, D. P., Kriegler, E., Edmonds, J., O'Neill, B. C., Fujimori, S., Bauer, N., Calvin, K., Dellink, R., Fricko, O., Lutz, W., Popp, A., Cuaresma, J. C., Kc, S., Leimbach, M., Jiang, L., Kram, T., Rao, S., Emmerling, J., Ebi, K., Hasegawa, T., Havlik, P., Humpenöder, F., Da Silva, L. A., Smith, S., Stehfest, E., Bosetti, V., Eom, J., Gernaat, D., Masui, T., Rogelj, J., Strefler, J., Drouet, L., Krey, V., Luderer, G., Harmsen, M., Takahashi, K., Baumstark, L., Doelman, J. C., Kainuma, M., Klimont, Z., Marangoni, G., Lotze-Campen, H., Obersteiner, M., Tabeau, A. & Tavoni, M. 2017. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 153-168.
- Rogelj, J., Popp, A., Calvin, K. V., Luderer, G., Emmerling, J., Gernaat, D., Fujimori, S., Strefler, J., Hasegawa, T., Marangoni, G., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Van Vuuren, D. P., Doelman, J., Drouet, L., Edmonds, J., Fricko, O., Harmsen, M., Havlík, P., Humpenöder, F., Stehfest, E. & Tavoni, M. 2018. Scenarios towards limiting global mean temperature increase below 1.5 °C. *Nature Climate Change*, 8, 325-332.
- O'Neill, B. C., Kriegler, E., Ebi, K. L., Kemp-Benedict, E., Riahi, K., Rothman, D. S., Van Ruijven, B. J., Van Vuuren, D. P., Birkmann, J., Kok, K., Levy, M. & Solecki, W. 2017. The roads ahead: Narratives for shared socioeconomic pathways describing world futures in the 21st century. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 169-180.
- Kc, S. & Lutz, W. 2017. The human core of the shared socioeconomic pathways: Population scenarios by age, sex and level of education for all countries to 2100. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 181-192.
- Dellink, R., Chateau, J., Lanzi, E. & Magné, B. 2017. Long-term economic growth projections in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 200-214.
- Leimbach, M., Kriegler, E., Roming, N. & Schwanitz, J. 2017. Future growth patterns of world regions – A GDP scenario approach. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 215-225.
- Crespo Cuaresma, J. 2017. Income projections for climate change research: A framework based on human capital dynamics. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 226-236.
- Jiang, L. & O'Neill, B. C. 2017. Global urbanization projections for the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 193-199.
- Bauer, N., Calvin, K., Emmerling, J., Fricko, O., Fujimori, S., Hilaire, J., Eom, J., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Mouratiadou, I., Sytze De Boer, H., Van Den Berg, M., Carrara, S., Daioglou, V., Drouet, L., Edmonds, J. E., Gernaat, D., Havlik, P., Johnson, N., Klein, D., Kyle, P., Marangoni, G., Masui, T., Pietzcker, R. C., Strubegger, M., Wise, M., Riahi, K. & Van Vuuren, D. P. 2017. Shared Socio-Economic Pathways of the Energy Sector – Quantifying the Narratives. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 316-330.

- 1 • Popp, A., Calvin, K., Fujimori, S., Havlik, P., Humpenöder, F., Stehfest, E., Bodirsky, B. L.,
2 Dietrich, J. P., Doelmann, J. C., Gusti, M., Hasegawa, T., Kyle, P., Obersteiner, M., Tabeau,
3 A., Takahashi, K., Valin, H., Waldhoff, S., Weindl, I., Wise, M., Kriegler, E., Lotze-Campen,
4 H., Fricko, O., Riahi, K. & Vuuren, D. P. V. 2017. Land-use futures in the shared socio-
5 economic pathways. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 331-345.
- 6 • Rao, S., Klimont, Z., Smith, S. J., Van Dingenen, R., Dentener, F., Bouwman, L., Riahi, K.,
7 Amann, M., Bodirsky, B. L., Van Vuuren, D. P., Aleluia Reis, L., Calvin, K., Drouet, L., Fricko,
8 O., Fujimori, S., Gernaat, D., Havlik, P., Harmsen, M., Hasegawa, T., Heyes, C., Hilaire, J.,
9 Luderer, G., Masui, T., Stehfest, E., Strefler, J., Van Der Sluis, S. & Tavoni, M. 2017. Future
10 air pollution in the Shared Socio-economic Pathways. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 346-
11 358.
- 12 • Van Vuuren, D. P., Stehfest, E., Gernaat, D. E. H. J., Doelman, J. C., Van Den Berg, M.,
13 Harmsen, M., De Boer, H. S., Bouwman, L. F., Daioglou, V., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Girod, B.,
14 Kram, T., Lassaletta, L., Lucas, P. L., Van Meijl, H., Müller, C., Van Ruijven, B. J., Van Der
15 Sluis, S. & Tabeau, A. 2017. Energy, land-use and greenhouse gas emissions trajectories under
16 a green growth paradigm. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 237-250.
- 17 • Fricko, O., Havlik, P., Rogelj, J., Klimont, Z., Gusti, M., Johnson, N., Kolp, P., Strubegger, M.,
18 Valin, H., Amann, M., Ermolieva, T., Forsell, N., Herrero, M., Heyes, C., Kindermann, G.,
19 Krey, V., Mccollum, D. L., Obersteiner, M., Pachauri, S., Rao, S., Schmid, E., Schoepp, W. &
20 Riahi, K. 2017. The marker quantification of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2: A middle-
21 of-the-road scenario for the 21st century. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 251-267.
- 22 • Fujimori, S., Hasegawa, T., Masui, T., Takahashi, K., Herran, D. S., Dai, H., Hijioka, Y. &
23 Kainuma, M. 2017. SSP3: AIM implementation of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Global*
24 *Environmental Change*, 42, 268-283.
- 25 • Calvin, K., Bond-Lamberty, B., Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Eom, J., Hartin, C., Kim, S., Kyle, P.,
26 Link, R., Moss, R., Mcjeon, H., Patel, P., Smith, S., Waldhoff, S. & Wise, M. 2017. The SSP4:
27 A world of deepening inequality. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 284-296.
- 28 • Kriegler, E., Bauer, N., Popp, A., Humpenöder, F., Leimbach, M., Strefler, J., Baumstark, L.,
29 Bodirsky, B. L., Hilaire, J., Klein, D., Mouratiadou, I., Weindl, I., Bertram, C., Dietrich, J. P.,
30 Luderer, G., Pehl, M., Pietzcker, R., Piontek, F., Lotze-Campen, H., Biewald, A., Bonsch, M.,
31 Giannousakis, A., Kreidenweis, U., Müller, C., Rolinski, S., Schultes, A., Schwanitz, J.,
32 Stevanovic, M., Calvin, K., Emmerling, J., Fujimori, S. & Edenhofer, O. 2017. Fossil-fueled
33 development (SSP5): An energy and resource intensive scenario for the 21st century. *Global*
34 *Environmental Change*, 42, 297-315.

35

36 1.1.2 Guiding questions

37 The SSPs are part of a scenario framework, established by the climate change research community in
38 order to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and
39 mitigation. The framework is built around a matrix that combines climate forcing on one axis (as
40 represented by the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)) and socio-economic conditions on
41 the other. Together, these two axes describe situations in which mitigation, adaptation and residual
42 climate damage can be evaluated.

- 43 1. In the absence of climate policy, how do scenarios based on the five different SSP narratives
44 unfold in the future?
- 45 2. Across the different narratives, how does the challenge to climate mitigation compare when
46 trying to limit global forcing levels consistent with those of the RCPs, going as low as
47 2.6W/m²?

1

2 **1.1.3 Results**

3 The SSPs are based on five narratives describing alternative socio-economic developments, including
4 sustainable development, regional rivalry, inequality, fossil-fuelled development, and middle-of-the-
5 road development. The long-term demographic and economic projections of the SSPs depict a wide
6 uncertainty range consistent with the scenario literature. A multi-model approach was used for the
7 elaboration.

- 8 1. The baseline scenarios lead to global energy consumption of 400–1200 EJ in 2100. The
9 associated annual CO₂ emissions of the baseline scenarios range from about 25 GtCO₂ to more
10 than 120 GtCO₂ per year by 2100.
- 11 2. With respect to mitigation, the scenarios show that associated costs strongly depend on three
12 factors: (1) the policy assumptions, (2) the socio-economic narrative, and (3) the stringency of
13 the target. The carbon price for reaching the target of 2.6 W/m² that is consistent with a
14 temperature change limit of 2 °C, differs in the analysis thus by about a factor of three across
15 the SSP marker scenarios. Consistent with the narratives, mitigation costs and thus the
16 challenge for mitigation is found lower in SSP1 & SSP4 relative to SSP3 & SSP5. Perhaps
17 most importantly, we find that not all targets are necessarily attainable from all SSPs.

18

19 **1.1.4 Scenarios**

- 20 • SSP1-19
- 21 • SSP1-26
- 22 • SSP1-34
- 23 • SSP1-45
- 24 • SSP1-Baseline
- 25 • SSP2-19
- 26 • SSP2-26
- 27 • SSP2-34
- 28 • SSP2-45
- 29 • SSP2-60
- 30 • SSP2-Baseline
- 31 • SSP3-34
- 32 • SSP3-45
- 33 • SSP3-60
- 34 • SSP3-Baseline
- 35 • SSP4-26
- 36 • SSP4-34
- 37 • SSP4-45
- 38 • SSP4-Baseline
- 39 • SSP5-26
- 40 • SSP5-34
- 41 • SSP5-45
- 42 • SSP5-60
- 43 • SSP5-Baseline

44

1 1.1.5 Models

- 2 • AIM/CGE 2.0
- 3 • GCAM 4.2
- 4 • IMAGE 3.0.1
- 5 • IMAGE 3.2
- 6 • MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0
- 7 • REMIND-MAgPIE 1.5
- 8 • WITCH-GLOBIOM 3.1

9

1 **1.2 ADVANCE**

2 **1.2.1 Publications**

- 3 • Luderer, G. et al. Residual fossil CO₂ emissions in 1.5–2 °C pathways. 2018. Nature Climate Change 8, 626–633.
- 4 • Vrontisi, Z. et al. Enhancing global climate policy ambition towards a 1.5 °C stabilization: a short-term multi-model assessment. 2018. Environ. Res. Lett. 13, 044039.

7

8 **1.2.2 Guiding questions**

9 The study aims to contribute the first multi-model assessment of Paris Agreement scenarios, exploring
10 both the emission impacts of NDC until 2030 and strengthening scenarios that achieve the long-term
11 targets of 2 or 1.5°C, with strengthening either after 2020 or 2030.

- 12 1. What energy system transformations are implied by nationally determined contributions
13 (NDCs) for 2030, and how do they differ from transformations in cost-optimal pathways
14 reaching the Paris Agreements (PA) long-term targets of well-below 2°C and 1.5°C?
- 15 2. How much residual emissions occur in different sectors in 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios, and what
16 are the determinants for those?
- 17 3. What implications does failure to strengthen ambition before 2030 have for individual energy
18 sectors and for achievability of the long-term targets?

19

20 **1.2.3 Results**

21 Aggregate NDC ambition level is not in line with long-term Paris Agreement targets. These targets
22 require full decarbonization of energy system, for which electrification, decarbonization of power
23 supply and increase in low-carbon fuels are required.

- 24 1. Aggregate NDC ambition level is not in line with long-term Paris Agreement (PA) targets,
25 emissions gap to cost-optimal 2°C and 1.5°C pathways in 2030 already between 9-29 Gt CO₂eq;
- 26 2. Higher ambition would only lead to modest increases of mitigation cost (not accounting for
27 avoided damages and co-benefits);
- 28 3. If countries fail to strengthen ambition before 2030, they lock-in more residual fossil emissions,
29 which leads to a higher overshoot of the net emissions budgets implied by the long-term targets,
30 so that more carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is then needed to still meet the targets. On the other
31 hand, failure to strengthen before 2030 also compromises the ability to scale-up negative
32 emission options at tolerable costs.

33

34 **1.2.4 Scenarios**

- 35 • ADVANCE_2020_1.5C-2100
- 36 • ADVANCE_2020_Med2C
- 37 • ADVANCE_2020_WB2C
- 38 • ADVANCE_2030_Med2C
- 39 • ADVANCE_2030_Price1.5C
- 40 • ADVANCE_2030_WB2C
- 41 • ADVANCE_INDC
- 42 • ADVANCE_NoPolicy

- 1 • ADVANCE_Reference
- 2 • ADVANCE_WP2_IND-450-FullTech
- 3 • ADVANCE_WP2_IND-Base-FullTech
- 4 • ADVANCE_WP2_TRA-450-FullTech
- 5 • ADVANCE_WP2_TRA-Base-FullTech
- 6 • ADVANCE_WP2_TRA-Ctax-FullTech
- 7 • ADVANCE_2030_1.5C-2100
- 8 • ADVANCE_2020_1.5C-2100_WP6
- 9 • ADVANCE_2020_Med2C_WP6
- 10 • ADVANCE_2020_WB2C_WP6
- 11 • ADVANCE_2030_Med2C_WP6
- 12 • ADVANCE_2030_Price1.5C_WP6
- 13 • ADVANCE_2030_WB2C_WP6
- 14 • ADVANCE_INDC_WP6
- 15 • ADVANCE_NoPolicy_WP6
- 16 • ADVANCE_Reference_WP6

17

18 **1.2.5 Models**

- 19 • AIM/CGE 2.0
- 20 • AIM/CGE 2.2
- 21 • DNE21+ V.ADVANCE
- 22 • GCAM 4.2
- 23 • IMACLIM 1.1
- 24 • IMAGE 3.0
- 25 • IMAGE 3.0.1
- 26 • MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0
- 27 • MESSAGE-Transport V.5
- 28 • POLES ADVANCE
- 29 • REMIND 1.7
- 30 • WITCH-GLOBIOM 4.2

31

1.3 Energy Modelling Forum 30 (EMF30)

1.3.1 Publications

- Smith, S. J., Klimont, Z., Drouet, L., Harmsen, M., Luderer, G., Riahi, K., ... Weyant, J. P. 2020. The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF)-30 study on short-lived climate forcers: introduction and overview. *Climatic Change*, Vol. 163, pp. 1399–1408. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02938-5>
- Harmsen, M., van Vuuren, D. P., Bodirsky, B. L., Chateau, J., Durand-Lasserve, O., Drouet, L., ... Wada, K. 2019. The role of methane in future climate strategies: mitigation potentials and climate impacts. *Climatic Change*, 163(3), 1409–1425. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02437-2>

1.3.2 Guiding questions

The EMF30 project is designed to assess the impact of policies aiming at reducing short-lived climate forcers, namely CH₄ and BC/OC.

1. What is the impact of policies aiming at reducing short-lived climate forcers on emission reductions?

1.3.3 Results

We find that the health benefits of reduced air pollution of a coal exit by far exceed mitigation costs on a global level. Taking the same coal exit path and additionally introducing a 2°C consistent GHG budget shows that aggregated co-benefits almost compensate the additional cost.

1. Air pollution benefits and mitigation cost are regionally very heterogeneous with India and China yielding most of the resulting synergies.
2. Synergies are robust under different air pollution legislation scenarios, hence climate policy is a no-regret option for especially Asian countries.

1.3.4 Scenarios

- EMF30_BCOC-EndU
- EMF30_Baseline
- EMF30_CH4-Only
- EMF30_ClimPolicy
- EMF30_ClimPolicy+SLCF
- EMF30_D_BCOC-Red
- EMF30_D_CH4-ClimPolicy
- EMF30_D_CO2-Only
- EMF30_D_Frozen-CH4
- EMF30_D_Frozen-EF
- EMF30_D_Frozen-EF-EndU
- EMF30_D_Frozen-EF-SLCF
- EMF30_SLCF
- EMF30_Slower-Action

- 1 • EMF30_Slower-Action+SLCF
- 2 • EMF30_Slower-to-faster
- 3 • EMF30_Slower-to-faster+SLCF
- 4 • EMF30_Slower-to-faster+SLCF+HFC

5

6 **1.3.5 Models**

- 7 • AIM/CGE 2.0
- 8 • DNE21+ V.14E1
- 9 • ENV-Linkages 3.0
- 10 • GCAM 4.2
- 11 • IMAGE 3.0.1
- 12 • MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0
- 13 • POLES EMF30
- 14 • REMIND 1.6
- 15 • WITCH-GLOBIOM 4.2

16

1.4 Energy Modelling Forum 33 (EMF33)

1.4.1 Publications

- Rose, S. K., Bauer, N., Popp, A., Weyant, J., Fujimori, S., Havlik, P., ... van Vuuren, D. P. 2020. An overview of the Energy Modeling Forum 33rd study: assessing large-scale global bioenergy deployment for managing climate change. *Climatic Change*, Vol. 163, pp. 1539–1551. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02945-6>
- Bauer, N., Rose, S. K., Fujimori, S., Van Vuuren, D. P., Weyant, J., Wise, M., ... & Kitous, A. 2018. Global energy sector emission reductions and bioenergy use: overview of the bioenergy demand phase of the EMF-33 model comparison. *Climatic Change*, 1-16.

1.4.2 Guiding questions

Objective: Assessing large-scale global bioenergy deployment for managing climate change.

1. How is bioenergy used across different IAMs under harmonized variations of climate policies, availability of bioenergy technologies and constraints on biomass supply?

1.4.3 Results

1. Imposing a range of increasingly stringent carbon budgets mostly increases bioenergy use. Sector and regional bioenergy allocation varies dramatically mainly due to bioenergy technology options, final energy patterns and availability of alternative options of energy sector de-carbonization;
2. Although much bioenergy is used in combination with CCS (BECCS), it is not necessarily the driver of bioenergy use;
3. The flexibility to use biomass feedstocks in the energy sector makes large-scale bioenergy deployment a robust strategy in mitigation scenarios that is surprisingly insensitive with respect to reduced technology availability;
4. However, the impact on achievability of stringent carbon budgets and associated carbon prices is sensitive, if the availability of e.g. BECCS is reduced.

1.4.4 Scenarios

- EMF33_Baseline
- EMF33_Med2C_cost100
- EMF33_Med2C_full
- EMF33_Med2C_nobeccs
- EMF33_Med2C_nofuel
- EMF33_Med2C_none
- EMF33_WB2C_cost100
- EMF33_WB2C_full
- EMF33_tax_hi_full
- EMF33_tax_hi_none
- EMF33_tax_lo_full
- EMF33_tax_lo_none
- EMF33_1.5C_cost100

- 1 • EMF33_1.5C_full
- 2 • EMF33_1.5C_nofuel
- 3 • EMF33_Med2C_limbio
- 4 • EMF33_WB2C_limbio
- 5 • EMF33_WB2C_nofuel
- 6 • EMF33_1.5C_limbio
- 7 • EMF33_WB2C_nobeccs
- 8 • EMF33_WB2C_none

9

10 **1.4.5 Models**

- 11 • AIM/CGE 2.1
- 12 • BET EMF33
- 13 • DNE21+ V.14E2
- 14 • FARM 3.2
- 15 • GCAM 4.2
- 16 • GRAPE-15 1.0
- 17 • IMACLIM-NLU 1.0
- 18 • IMAGE 3.0.2
- 19 • MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0
- 20 • POLES EMF33

21

1.5 Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS)

1.5.1 Publications

- NGFS. 2019. A call for action: Climate change as a source of financial risk. First Comprehensive Report, Network for Greening the Financial System, Paris, France 42 pp. https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_first_comprehensive_report_-_17042019_0.pdf
- NGFS. 2019. Macroeconomic and financial stability: Implications of climate change. Technical supplement to the First NGFS Comprehensive Report, Network for Greening the Financial System, Paris, France, 51 pp. https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs-report-technical-supplement_final_v2.pdf
- NGFS. 2020. Guide for Supervisors – Integrating climate-related and environmental risks in prudential supervision. Network for Greening the Financial System, Paris, France, 62 pp. https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_guide_for_supervisors.pdf
- NGFS. 2020. Guide for Supervisors Guide to climate scenario analysis for central banks and supervisors. Network for Greening the Financial System, Paris, France, 38 pp. https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_guide_scenario_analysis_final.pdf

1.5.2 Guiding questions

1. What scenarios can inform transition risk assessment for the financial sector?
2. What macroeconomic implications arise for the financial sector for the aspects of delayed vs. immediate action?
3. What macroeconomic implications arise for insufficient climate policies leading to a hot house world, i.e. following the NPIs or NDCs?
4. What effect does reduced CDR availability have to the risk structure?

1.5.3 Results

Scenarios are used by actors in the finance sector to assess climate-related transition risk.

1.5.4 Scenarios | Models

In the NGFS report, IAM scenarios from other studies are re-named according to categories and pursued policies. Below we link the NGFS names to the original scenario names and their respective models.

- NGFS Category: Hothouse world – Current policies
 - NGFS_Current policies (Hot house world Rep)|GCAM 5.2
 - ENGAGE_NPi | MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM
 - PEP_NPi | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0
- NGFS Category: Hothouse world – Nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
 - CD-LINKS_INDCi | MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM
 - PEP_NDC | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0
- NGFS Category: Orderly – Immediate 2C scenario with CDR
 - NGFS_Immediate 2C with CDR (Orderly Rep)|GCAM 5.2
 - CD-LINKS_NPi2020_1000 | MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM
 - PEP_2C_full_eff | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0

- 1 • NGFS Category: Orderly – Immediate 2C scenario with limited CDR
- 2 ○ Zero2060_4_0 | MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM
- 3 ○ PEP_2C_red_eff | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0
- 4 • NGFS Category: Orderly – Immediate 1.5C scenario with CDR
- 5 ○ CD-LINKS_NPi2020_400 | MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM
- 6 ○ PEP_1p5_full_eff | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0
- 7 • NGFS Category: Disorderly – Delayed 2C scenario with limited CDR
- 8 ○ PEP_2C_red_NDC | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0
- 9 • NGFS Category: Disorderly – Delayed 2C scenario with CDR
- 10 ○ CD-LINKS_INDCi2030_1000 | MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM
- 11 ○ PEP_2C_full_NDC | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0
- 12 • NGFS Category: Disorderly – Immediate 1.5C scenario with limited CDR
- 13 ○ Zero2050_4_2 | MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM
- 14 ○ PEP_1p5C_red_eff | REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0

2. Hybrid scenario studies with participation of global and national models

2.1 Latin American Modelling Project (LAMP)

2.1.1 Publications

- van der Zwaan, B. C. C., Calvin, K. V., & Clarke, L. E. 2016. Climate Mitigation in Latin America: Implications for Energy and Land Use: Preface to the Special Section on the findings of the CLIMACAP-LAMP project. *Energy Economics*, Vol. 56, pp. 495–498. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.05.005>
- Lucena, A. F., Clarke, L., Schaeffer, R., Szklo, A., Rochedo, P. R., Nogueira, L. P., ... & Kober, T. 2016. Climate policy scenarios in Brazil: A multi-model comparison for energy. *Energy Economics*, 56, 564-574.

2.1.2 Guiding questions

This study is a multi-model assessment of climate change mitigation in Latin America.

1. How does the energy system evolve in Latin America under both baseline and mitigation scenarios?
2. What is the policy and low-carbon development context for individual Latin American countries?
3. How does climate change mitigation affect agriculture and land use and macro-economic activity in Latin America?

2.1.3 Results

Baseline and mitigation scenarios for Latin America differ across country and model.

1. The economic potential for mitigation of fossil fuel emissions in Latin America is lower than the world as a whole.
2. Mitigation potential and the cost of mitigation varies across individual Latin American countries.
3. There is significant uncertainty in future GHG emissions from AFOLU across models due to differences in underlying assumptions across models.

2.1.4 Scenarios

- 20% abatement (FF&I)
- 20% abatement (GHG)
- 450 concentration
- 50% abatement (FF&I)
- 50% abatement (GHG)
- 550 concentration
- 650 concentration
- Core baseline
- High CO2 price

- 1 • Low CO2 price
- 2 • Policy baseline

3

4 **2.1.5 Models**

- 5 • COPPE_MSB-Brazil 2.0
- 6 • TIAM-WORLD 1.0
- 7 • GCAM 4.0

8

1 **2.2 CD-LINKS**

2 **2.2.1 Publications**

- 3 • McCollum DL, Zhou W, Bertram C, de Boer H-S, Bosetti V, Busch S, Després J, Drouet L,
4 Emmerling J, Fay M, Fricko O, Fujimori S, Gidden M, Harmsen M, Huppmann D, Iyer G, Krey
5 V, Kriegler E, Nicolas C, Pachauri S, Parkinson S, Pobleto-Cazenave M, Rafaj P, Rao N,
6 Rozenberg J, Schmitz A, Schoepp W, van Vuuren D, Riahi K. 2018. Energy investment needs
7 for fulfilling the Paris Agreement and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. *Nature*
8 *Energy* 3:589-599.
- 9 • Schaeffer R et al. 2020. Comparing transformation pathways across major economies, *Climatic*
10 *Change* 162, 1787-1803. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02837-10>
- 11 • Vrontisi Z, Fragkiadakis K, Kannavou M, Capros P. 2019. Energy system transition and
12 macroeconomic impacts of a European decarbonization action towards a below 2°C climate
13 stabilization. *Climatic Change*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02440-7>
- 14 • Roelfsema, M., van Soest, H. L., Harmsen, M., van Vuuren, D. P., Bertram, C., den Elzen, M.,
15 ... Vishwanathan, S. S. 2020. Taking stock of national climate policies to evaluate
16 implementation of the Paris Agreement. *Nature Communications*, 11(1), 2096.
17 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15414-6>

18

19 **2.2.2 Guiding questions**

20 The CD-LINKS project is exploring the complex interplay between climate action and development,
21 while simultaneously taking both global and national perspectives and thereby informing the design of
22 complementary climate-development policies.

- 23 1. How do national decarbonisation pathways that are collectively consistent with global well-
24 below-2°C pathways look like?
- 25 2. How do these low-carbon development pathways for the seven largest greenhouse gas emitters
26 (China, the USA, the EU, India, Russia, Japan and Brazil) compare to each other and which
27 sectoral mitigation measures are deployed?
- 28 3. How much achieve currently implemented national policies and submitted NDCs on the way
29 to limit temperature change to 1.5 and 2°C and how large is the emissions gap to cost-effective
30 emissions pathways?
- 31 4. What are implications of climate policy to achieve the 1.5 and 2°C targets for Sustainable
32 Development Goals (SDGs)?
- 33 5. How can adverse effects of climate policies on non-climate SDGs, e.g. on food security, be
34 avoided?
- 35 6. What are investment needs to limit temperature rise to 1.5 and 2°C and how do these compare
36 to investment needs to achieve a subset of SDGs?

37

38 **2.2.3 Results**

39 The CD-LINKS scenarios are analysed from a set of different angles, including consistency of national
40 action with global climate targets, investment needs and sustainable development implications of
41 climate policy consistent with the Paris Agreement. These analyses have been (and are being) published
42 in a series of journal articles, part of which are listed below in relation to the high-level insights. In
43 addition, a full Special Issue with national level analysis in selected G20 countries is currently in
44 preparation.

- 1 1. Roelfsema et al.: Seven G20 countries were assessed. Some seem on track to meet NDC targets
2 with current policies, others display an ambition gap. Their NDCs are not on track with cost-
3 efficient emission pathways which limit warming to well below 2°C. Current policies bring a
4 reduction of 2 to 5.5 GtCO₂eq. Additional policies and measures are required to fully
5 implement the NDCs, which would reduce emissions by 7 to 17 GtCO₂eq. The emissions gap
6 in 2030 between planned national policies and a well below 2°C trajectory are 9 to 37 Gt. For
7 a 1.5°C trajectory there is a gap of 17 to 43 Gt.
- 8 2. Kriegler et al.: Although countries differ considerably in the sectoral composition of emission
9 reductions, a robust pattern emerges, with an almost complete decarbonisation of the electricity
10 sector by 2050 that is accompanied by accelerated electrification and a limited reduction of
11 carbon intensity of fuel consumption in the industry, buildings and transport sectors.
- 12 3. Krey et al.: Climate policies to achieve 1.5 and 2C potentially create both synergies and trade-
13 offs with other SDGs, highlighting that integrated policy approaches are needed to ensure
14 multiple SDGs are achieved simultaneously. In particular, dealing with undesirable
15 distributional consequences of climate policies is key to avoid negative impacts on the poor,
16 like ensuring food security and access to modern energy services.
- 17 4. McCollum et al.: The Nationally Determined Contributions lack the pronounced reallocation
18 of the investment portfolio needed for transforming the energy system. Charting a course
19 toward ‘well below 2 °C’ instead requires that low-carbon investments overtake fossil
20 investments globally before 2025 and then continue to grow from there. Pursuing the 1.5 °C
21 target demands a marked up-scaling in low-carbon capital beyond that demanded by 2 °C. The
22 investment needs for making progress on certain other SDG targets are small relative to those
23 for energy.

24

25 2.2.4 Scenarios

- 26 • CD-LINKS_INDC2030i_1600
- 27 • CD-LINKS_INDCi
- 28 • CD-LINKS_NDC2030i_1000
- 29 • CD-LINKS_NPi
- 30 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_1000
- 31 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_1600
- 32 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_400
- 33 • CD-LINKS_NoPolicy
- 34 • CD-LINKS_INDC2030_high
- 35 • CD-LINKS_INDC2030_low
- 36 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_high
- 37 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_low
- 38 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_verylow
- 39 • CD-LINKS_INDC2030_high_V3
- 40 • CD-LINKS_INDC2030_low_V3
- 41 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_high_V3
- 42 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_low_V3
- 43 • CD-LINKS_NPi_V3
- 44 • CD-LINKS_NoPOL_V3
- 45 • CD-LINKS_NoPOL
- 46 • CD-LINKS_INDCi_recGenTaxation
- 47 • CD-LINKS_INDCi_recSocialSecurity

- 1 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_1000_recGenTaxation
- 2 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_1000_recSocialSecurity
- 3 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_400_recGenTaxation
- 4 • CD-LINKS_NPi2020_400_recSocialSecurity
- 5 • CD-LINKS_INDC2030i_400
- 6 • CD-LINKS_INDC2030i_1000

7

8 **2.2.5 Models**

- 9 • AIM/CGE 2.1
- 10 • AIM/Enduse India 3.1
- 11 • BLUES-Brazil 1.0
- 12 • COPPE-COFFEE 1.0
- 13 • DNE21+ V.14 (national)
- 14 • DNE21+ V.14C
- 15 • GCAM-USA_CDLINKS
- 16 • GEM-E3 V1
- 17 • IMAGE 3.0.1
- 18 • IPAC-AIM/technology V1.0
- 19 • India MARKAL
- 20 • MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.0
- 21 • POLES CD-LINKS
- 22 • PRIMES_V1
- 23 • REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0
- 24 • RU-TIMES 3.2
- 25 • WITCH-GLOBIOM 4.4

26

27 **2.2.6 Part of CD-LINKS special issue**

28 **Publications**

- 29 • Oshiro, K., Gi, K., Fujimori, S., van Soest, H. L., Bertram, C., Després, J., ... Vrontisi, Z. 2020.
- 30 Mid-century emission pathways in Japan associated with the global 2 °C goal: national and
- 31 global models' assessments based on carbon budgets. *Climatic Change*, 162(4), 1913–1927.
- 32 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02490-x>

33

34 **Guiding questions**

35 Exploring national development pathways which are consistent with the global climate goals implied
36 by the carbon budgets based on global model's analyses.

- 37 1. What are the level of carbon budgets and low-emission pathways in Japan given the Paris
- 38 Agreement climate goals?
- 39 2. Energy system transformations required for meeting the national low emission pathways;
- 40 3. Is the national mid-century strategy consistent with the global climate goal stated in the Paris
- 41 Agreement?

42 **Results**

- 1 1. CO₂ emissions in Japan in 2050 were estimated -66% and -75% below the 2010 level in the
2 global 1600Gt and 1000Gt budget scenarios, respectively.
- 3 2. Large scale deployment of low-carbon energy (nuclear, renewable, and carbon capture and
4 storage) is essential in both the 1600 and 1000Gt budget scenarios.
- 5 3. The 1000Gt budget scenarios, which require a 75% reduction of CO₂ emissions by 2050 for
6 Japan, is nearly the same as Japan's governmental 2050 goal of reducing greenhouse gas
7 emissions by 80%.

8 **Scenarios**

- 9 • CDLINKS-NDC
- 10 • CDLINKS-NDC1000
- 11 • CDLINKS-NDC1600
- 12 • CDLINKS-NPi
- 13 • CDLINKS-NPi1000
- 14 • CDLINKS-NPi1600

15

16 **Models**

- 17 • AIM/Enduse-Japan 2.1

18

2.3 COMMIT

2.3.1 Publications

- van Soest HL et al. 2020. A global roll-out of nationally relevant policies to bridge the emissions gap. *In Review*.

2.3.2 Guiding questions

Closing the remaining emissions gap between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the global emissions levels needed to achieve the Paris Agreement's climate goals will likely require a comprehensive package of policy measures. National and sectoral policies can help fill the gap, but success stories in one country cannot be automatically replicated in other countries, but need to be adapted to the local context. In COMMIT, we developed a new bridging scenario based on nationally relevant measures informed by interaction with country experts.

1. To what extent can the emissions gap between NDCs and well-below 2C pathways be closed by the Bridge scenario?
2. What do the transformations in energy and land-use systems look like, and which sectors contribute most to the emissions reductions in the Bridge scenario?
3. What are the costs of 'building the bridge'?

2.3.3 Results

The Bridge scenario was implemented with an ensemble of global and national Integrated Assessment Models. A global roll-out of the good practice policies until 2030 and transitioning to a cost-optimal 2C pathway thereafter closes the emissions gap by two-thirds by 2030 and more than fully by 2050. In the absence of immediate, all-encompassing and ambitious climate policy measures, therefore, a global roll-out and successful implementation of good practice policies can put the world on track to a 2 °C - compatible pathway without posing large additional challenges.

1. The Bridge scenario closes the global emissions gap between NDCs and a cost-optimal 2C pathway by 71% (median, range 26%–275%) by 2030, and compensates the slower start by a slightly deeper emission reduction in 2050, 106% (85%–112%). The 2030 emissions gap is closed by 17% in the USA, 49% in India, 56% in the EU and 75% in China.
2. The Bridge scenario leads to a scale-up of renewable energy (reaching 50%-85% of global electricity supply by 2050), electrification of end-uses, efficiency improvements in energy demand sectors, and enhanced afforestation and reforestation. The energy sector (through higher renewable energy share, electrification, energy efficiency improvement) is the largest contributor to emissions reductions between the NDCplus and Bridge scenarios, both in 2030 and in 2050. In most models, also mitigation of non-CO₂ emissions, the transport sector (zero-carbon vehicles and efficiency improvements), and AFOLU (notably in 2030) play an important role.
3. Although the Bridge scenario raises policy costs (as expressed by GDP cost per tonne CO_{2e} abated relative to the Current Policy scenario) in 2050 by more than 20% (1%–38%) compared to an immediate implementation of a cost-optimal 2 °C scenario with globally uniform carbon prices (2Deg2020), it has lower policy costs and carbon prices in the near term (2030). The Bridge scenario also outperforms a delayed 2 °C scenario (2Deg2030) with costs being more than 10% (-6%–33%) lower in 2050. As such, our analysis suggests that early but non cost optimal action is preferred over climate policy delay.

1

2 **2.3.4 Scenarios**

- 3 • CO_2Deg2020
- 4 • CO_2Deg2030
- 5 • CO_BAU
- 6 • CO_Bridge
- 7 • CO_Bridge_notax
- 8 • CO_CurPol
- 9 • CO_GPP
- 10 • CO_GPP_notax
- 11 • CO_NDC_2050convergence
- 12 • CO_NDCMCS
- 13 • CO_NDCplus

14

15 **2.3.5 Models**

- 16 • RU-TIMES 3.2
- 17 • GCAM-USA 4.2
- 18 • IMAGE 3.0
- 19 • COFFEE 1.1
- 20 • GCAM-Canada 4.2
- 21 • IPAC-AIM/technology-China 1.0
- 22 • MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM_1.0
- 23 • AIM/CGE 2.1
- 24 • MARKAL-India 1.0
- 25 • WITCH 5.0
- 26 • AIM/CGE-Korea 2.1
- 27 • COFFEE 1.0
- 28 • PROMETHEUS 1.0
- 29 • TIMES-Australia 20.73
- 30 • AIM/Enduse-Japan 2.1
- 31 • DDPP Energy 1.0
- 32 • PRIMES 1.0
- 33 • POLES GECCO2019
- 34 • BLUES-Brazil 1.0

35

1 2.4 ENGAGE

2 2.4.1 Publications

- 3 • Riahi, K., Bertram, C., Huppmann, D., Rogelj, J., Bosetti, V., Cabardos, A.-M., ... Zakeri, B.
4 2021. Long-term economic benefits of stabilizing warming without overshoot – the ENGAGE
5 model intercomparison. *In Review*.
- 6 • Bertram, C., Riahi, K., Hilaire, J., Bossetti, V., & Drouet, L. (n.d.). Energy system
7 developments and investments in the decisive decade for Paris Agreement targets. *In Review*,
8 1–30.
- 9 • Hasegawa, T. (n.d.). Agriculture and land use implications of early climate change mitigation
10 efforts without reliance on net-negative emissions. *In Review*, 1–18.
- 11 • Drouet, L., Bosetti, V., Padoan, S., Aleluia Reis, L., Bertram, C., Dalla Longa, F., ... Tavoni,
12 M. 2020. Net zero emission pathways reduce the physical and economic risks of climate
13 change. *Nature Climate Change*, Submitted.
- 14 • Fujimori S, Krey V, van Vuuren D, Oshiro K, Sugiyama M, Chunark P, Limmeechokchai B,
15 Mittal S, Nishiura O, Park C, Rajbhandari S, Herran Silva D, Tu T T, Zhao S, Ochi1 Y, Shukla
16 P R, Masui T, Nguyen, Phuong V.H. Cabardos A-M and Riahi K. 2020. A new national scenario
17 framework: National Long-term Pathways (NLPs) *Nature Climate Change*. *In Review*.

18

19 2.4.2 Guiding questions

- 20 1. How do future generations benefit of rapid transformations avoiding net negative CO₂
21 emissions (NNCE), regarding long term economic benefits or losses?
- 22 2. How does a stabilization of warming without overshoot impact long-term economic benefits?
- 23 3. What insights can be taken from alternative configurations of net-zero CO₂ emissions systems?

24

25 2.4.3 Results

26 Scenarios that avoid temperature overshoot and NNCE are thus not only economically more attractive
27 over the long term, they also involve lower climate risks.

- 28 1. Scenarios without a reliance on net negative CO₂ emissions avoid a systematic bias in favour
29 of temperature overshoot, but at the same time require a much more pronounced near-term
30 transition;
- 31 2. The long-term savings in mitigation costs are by far larger than the upfront near-term
32 investments to avoid reliance on NNCE. Especially peak carbon prices over the course of the
33 century are significantly lower in most scenarios without reliance on NNCE;
- 34 3. The study shows the importance of the underlying discount rate: rates of less than 2% would
35 make the corresponding IAM scenarios without NNCE cheaper and thus cost-optimal overall;
- 36 4. Front-runner sectors (AFOLU, energy sector) and regions (e.g. Latin America or Reforming
37 Economies including Russia) may provide an entry point for rapid and deep cuts towards zero
38 CO₂ emissions. OECD economies could set their timing earlier to reach net zero if
39 acknowledging a leadership position or historic responsibility;
- 40 5. The study shows a broad range in the portfolio of CDR measures and allows policy flexibility
41 with respect to technology choices and sustainability aspects, like water availability, food
42 security and biodiversity.

43

1 2.4.4 Scenarios

- 2 • EN_INDCi2030_1000
- 3 • EN_INDCi2030_1000f
- 4 • EN_INDCi2030_1200
- 5 • EN_INDCi2030_1200f
- 6 • EN_INDCi2030_1400
- 7 • EN_INDCi2030_1400f
- 8 • EN_INDCi2030_1600
- 9 • EN_INDCi2030_1600f
- 10 • EN_INDCi2030_1800
- 11 • EN_INDCi2030_1800f
- 12 • EN_INDCi2030_2000
- 13 • EN_INDCi2030_2000f
- 14 • EN_INDCi2030_2500
- 15 • EN_INDCi2030_2500f
- 16 • EN_INDCi2030_3000
- 17 • EN_INDCi2030_3000f
- 18 • EN_INDCi2030_300f
- 19 • EN_INDCi2030_400f
- 20 • EN_INDCi2030_500f
- 21 • EN_INDCi2030_600f
- 22 • EN_INDCi2030_700
- 23 • EN_INDCi2030_700f
- 24 • EN_INDCi2030_800f
- 25 • EN_INDCi2030_900
- 26 • EN_INDCi2030_900f
- 27 • EN_INDCi2030_900r
- 28 • EN_INDCi2100
- 29 • EN_NoPolicy
- 30 • EN_NPi2020_1000
- 31 • EN_NPi2020_1000f
- 32 • EN_NPi2020_1200
- 33 • EN_NPi2020_1200f
- 34 • EN_NPi2020_1400
- 35 • EN_NPi2020_1400f
- 36 • EN_NPi2020_1600
- 37 • EN_NPi2020_1600f
- 38 • EN_NPi2020_1800
- 39 • EN_NPi2020_1800f
- 40 • EN_NPi2020_2000
- 41 • EN_NPi2020_2000f
- 42 • EN_NPi2020_200f
- 43 • EN_NPi2020_2500
- 44 • EN_NPi2020_2500f
- 45 • EN_NPi2020_300
- 46 • EN_NPi2020_3000
- 47 • EN_NPi2020_3000f

- 1 • EN_NPi2020_300f
- 2 • EN_NPi2020_400
- 3 • EN_NPi2020_400f
- 4 • EN_NPi2020_500
- 5 • EN_NPi2020_500f
- 6 • EN_NPi2020_500r
- 7 • EN_NPi2020_600
- 8 • EN_NPi2020_600f
- 9 • EN_NPi2020_700
- 10 • EN_NPi2020_700f
- 11 • EN_NPi2020_700r
- 12 • EN_NPi2020_800
- 13 • EN_NPi2020_800f
- 14 • EN_NPi2020_900
- 15 • EN_NPi2020_900f
- 16 • EN_NPi2020_900r
- 17 • EN_NPi2100
- 18 • NDCCon2030_-100pc2050
- 19 • NDCCon2030_-30pc2050
- 20 • NDCCon2030_-40pc2050
- 21 • NDCCon2030_-50pc2050
- 22 • NDCCon2030_-60pc2050
- 23 • NDCCon2030_-70pc2050
- 24 • NDCCon2030_-80pc2050
- 25 • NDCCon2030_-90pc2050
- 26 • NDCUnc2030_-100pc2050
- 27 • NDCUnc2030_-30pc2050
- 28 • NDCUnc2030_-40pc2050
- 29 • NDCUnc2030_-50pc2050
- 30 • NDCUnc2030_-60pc2050
- 31 • NDCUnc2030_-70pc2050
- 32 • NDCUnc2030_-80pc2050
- 33 • NDCUnc2030_-90pc2050

34

35 **2.4.5 Models**

- 36 • AIM/CGE 2.2
- 37 • COFFEE 1.1
- 38 • GEM-E3_092019
- 39 • IMAGE 3.0
- 40 • MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM_1.0
- 41 • POLES ENGAGE
- 42 • REMIND-MAgPIE 2.0-4.1
- 43 • TIAM-ECN 1.1
- 44 • WITCH 5.0

45

3. Global scenario studies based on a single model

3.1 CEMICS study on the role of CDR for delayed action

3.1.1 Publications

- Strefler et al. 2018. Between Scylla and Charybdis: Delayed mitigation narrows the passage between large-scale CDR and high costs. *Environmental Research Letters* 13, 4.

3.1.2 Guiding questions

CEMICS is driven by the hypothesis that society will not take decisions on climate engineering (CE) in isolation, but in consideration of the whole portfolio of existing climate policy options. The work within that project puts CE in the context of mitigation by exploring synergies, trade-offs, and side-effects of different CDR methods.

Please note: The project itself investigated the options of CE in a broader context also towards potential synergies or ethical aspects. This research however is not based on scenarios and thus not treated here.

1. How much CDR is at least necessary to achieve the Paris climate targets?
2. How does this minimum CDR requirement depend on short-term climate policy and medium-term emission reductions?

3.1.3 Results

There are major concerns about the sustainability of large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. It is therefore an urgent question to what extent CDR will be needed to implement the long-term ambition of the Paris Agreement, and how this depends on short-term climate policy. In this paper we show that ambitious near-term mitigation significantly decreases CDR requirements to keep the Paris climate targets within reach.

1. Following the NDCs until 2030 requires then both fast CO₂ emission reductions until 2050 and high amounts of CDR to achieve the 2°C-target. Reducing 2030 emissions by 20% below NDC levels already alleviates the trade-off between high transitional challenges and high CDR deployment.
2. In order to achieve 2°C entirely without CDR, emissions have to be roughly halved until 2030 and again every decade until 2050.
3. Transitional challenges can only be kept in check if at least 5 Gt CO₂/yr CDR are available in any year. At least 8 Gt CO₂/yr CDR are necessary in the long term to achieve 1.5°C and more than 15 Gt CO₂/yr to keep transitional challenges in bounds.

3.1.4 Scenarios

- CEMICS-1.5-CDR12
- CEMICS-1.5-CDR20
- CEMICS-1.5-CDR8
- CEMICS-2.0-CDR12
- CEMICS-2.0-CDR20
- CEMICS-2.0-CDR8

- 1 • CEMICS-Ref
- 2
- 3 **3.1.5 Models**
- 4 • REMIND 1.7
- 5

3.2 Pathways and Entry Points to Limit Global Warming to 1.5°C (Pep1p5)

3.2.1 Publications

- Kriegler, E. et al. 2018. Short term policies to keep the door open for Paris climate goals. Environ. Res. Lett. 13, 074022.

3.2.2 Guiding questions

The Pep1p5 project aims to answer crucial questions about the feasibility of 1.5°C scenarios, related to the feasibility of policies - contrasting immediate pricing only and scenarios with gradual ratcheting up of ambition. Further it assesses the implications of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) availability.

1. To what extent can plausible bottom-up policy packages (sectoral policies like renewable support or efficiency targets as already observed in a number of countries) that are more ambitious than the NDCs close the emissions gap towards least-cost pathways?
2. Which implementability challenges (grouped into scale, speed, disruption, price impacts and efficiency) are major hurdles for different policy scenarios?
3. How do they differ between scenarios based on a range of regionally differentiated bottom-up policies and scenarios with a comprehensive and harmonized carbon price only (so called "first-best" or "cost-effective" scenarios)?
4. What implications follow from the assumption of more strongly limited availability of carbon dioxide removal (CDR)?

3.2.3 Results

The comparison across 3 different dimensions offer a rich exploration of implementability challenges.

1. A global roll-out of strengthened bottom-up policies could reduce global CO₂ emissions by an additional 10 GtCO₂eq in 2030 compared to NDCs.

It would lead to emissions pathways close to the levels of cost-effective well below 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios until 2030, thereby reducing implementation challenges post 2030.

2. Comparing a gradual phase-in of a portfolio of regulatory policies with immediate cost-effective carbon pricing shows that the bottom-up policies might be less disruptive. However, they would perform worse in other dimensions. In particular, they lead to higher economic costs. Hence, such policy packages should not be viewed as alternatives to carbon pricing, but rather as complements that provide entry points to achieve the Paris climate goals.
3. Assuming lower availability of CDR implies faster and more disruptive near-term decarbonization.

3.2.4 Scenarios

- PEP_1p5C_full_NDC
- PEP_1p5C_full_eff
- PEP_1p5C_full_goodpractice
- PEP_1p5C_full_netzero
- PEP_1p5C_red_eff
- PEP_2C_full_NDC

- 1 • PEP_2C_full_eff
- 2 • PEP_2C_full_goodpractice
- 3 • PEP_2C_full_netzero
- 4 • PEP_2C_red_NDC
- 5 • PEP_2C_red_eff
- 6 • PEP_2C_red_goodpractice
- 7 • PEP_2C_red_netzero
- 8 • PEP_NDC
- 9 • PEP_NPi
- 10 • PEP_NoPolicy
- 11 • PEP_goodpractice
- 12 • PEP_netzero

13

14 **3.2.5 Models**

- 15 • REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0

16

1 **3.3 UBA SMP**

2 **3.3.1 Publications**

- 3 • Bertram, C. et al. 2018. Targeted policies can compensate most of the increased sustainability
4 risks in 1.5 °C mitigation scenarios. Environ. Res. Lett. 13, 064038.

5

6 **3.3.2 Guiding questions**

7 The study aims to contribute to the understanding of key sustainability impacts of mitigation pathways,
8 and how they can be managed by policy choice in order to maximize benefits and minimize risks.

- 9 1. What sustainability effects (benefits and risks) does mitigation targets of 2 and 1.5°C imply?
- 10 2. How does the choice of mitigation policy paradigm impact the sustainability effects (benefits
11 and risks) of mitigation?
- 12 3. How do different measures interact?

13

14 **3.3.3 Results**

15 The study analyses a range of crucial sustainability indicators for 2 different temperature targets
16 achieved by 5 different policy approaches respectively.

- 17 1. Mitigation leads to a number of sustainability benefits (air pollution, cooling water
18 requirements), but under default policies also leads to severe risks (uranium use, food and
19 energy price increases, land requirements for bioenergy, etc.). Both benefits and risks increase
20 if ambition is raised from 2 to 1.5°C.
- 21 2. A combination of additional policies (direct sector-level regulation, early mitigation action, and
22 lifestyle changes) can alleviate air pollution, water extraction, uranium extraction, food and
23 energy price hikes, and dependence on negative emissions technologies, thus resulting in
24 substantially reduced sustainability risks associated with mitigating climate change.
- 25 3. Importantly, we find that these targeted policies more than compensate for most increased
26 sustainability risks of increasing climate ambition from 2°C to 1.5°C.

27

28 **3.3.4 Scenarios**

- 29 • SMP_1p5C_Def
- 30 • SMP_1p5C_Sust
- 31 • SMP_1p5C_early
- 32 • SMP_1p5C_lifesty
- 33 • SMP_1p5C_regul
- 34 • SMP_2C_Def
- 35 • SMP_2C_Sust
- 36 • SMP_2C_early
- 37 • SMP_2C_lifesty
- 38 • SMP_2C_regul
- 39 • SMP_REF_Def
- 40 • SMP_REF_Sust

41

1 **3.3.5 Models**

- 2 • REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0

3

1 **3.4 REMIND2.1**

2 **3.4.1 Publications**

- 3 • Baumstark, L., Bauer, N., Benke, F., Bertram, C., Bi, S., Gong, C. C., ... Luderer, G. 2020.
4 REMIND2.1: Transformation and innovation dynamics of the energy-economic system within
5 climate and sustainability limits.

6

7 **3.4.2 Guiding questions**

8 The scenarios are the update of the SSP1, SSP2 and SSP5 scenarios (baseline, NDC, NPi, peak Budget
9 1300/1100/900) for our new version REMIND2.1.

- 10 1. What are the transformation pathways in the energy-economy sytem for a SSP1, SSP2 and
11 SSP5 world?
- 12 2. What is REMIND?
- 13 3. How are different sectors represented in REMIND and what are possible models REMIND can
14 belinket to?

15

16 **3.4.3 Results**

17 REMIND is a multi-regional model of the energy-economic system, it can fully capture the interactions
18 between the energy transformation in response to climate policies and economic development.

- 19 1. Different socio-economic developments feature different strategies to achieve the 1.5°C target
20 and the timing of emission reduction can vary strongly across regions.
- 21 2. The evolution of the global energy system fundamentally depends on socio-economic
22 assumptions, and policy scenario. Fossil fuels dominance would continue for SSP5 socio-
23 economic assumptions, but would be gradually reduced in SSP2 futures, and would be replaced
24 by a rather diverse energy system with similar contributions from wind, solar, bioenergy and
25 fossils in 2100 in SSP1.
- 26 3. The modular structure of REMIND enables detailed analysis of specific parts of the model
27 tailored to the research question without increasing the numerical burden of the default model.
28 The feasibility to link REMIND with other models (e.g. EDGE, MAgPIE, MAGICC)
29 guarantees consistent detailed results with small increase of model complexity.

30

31 **3.4.4 Scenarios**

- 32 • R2p1_SSP1-Base
- 33 • R2p1_SSP1-NDC
- 34 • R2p1_SSP1-NPi
- 35 • R2p1_SSP1-PkBudg1100
- 36 • R2p1_SSP1-PkBudg1300
- 37 • R2p1_SSP1-PkBudg900
- 38 • R2p1_SSP2-Base
- 39 • R2p1_SSP2-NDC
- 40 • R2p1_SSP2-NPi
- 41 • R2p1_SSP2-PkBudg1100
- 42 • R2p1_SSP2-PkBudg1300

- 1 • R2p1_SSP2-PkBudg900
- 2 • R2p1_SSP5-Base
- 3 • R2p1_SSP5-NDC
- 4 • R2p1_SSP5-NPi
- 5 • R2p1_SSP5-PkBudg1100
- 6 • R2p1_SSP5-PkBudg1300
- 7 • R2p1_SSP5-PkBudg900
- 8 • SSP1-Base
- 9 • SSP1-NDC
- 10 • SSP1-NPi
- 11 • SSP1-PkBudg1100
- 12 • SSP1-PkBudg1300
- 13 • SSP1-PkBudg900
- 14 • SSP2-Base
- 15 • SSP2-NDC
- 16 • SSP2-NPi
- 17 • SSP2-PkBudg1100
- 18 • SSP2-PkBudg1300
- 19 • SSP2-PkBudg900
- 20 • SSP5-Base
- 21 • SSP5-NDC
- 22 • SSP5-NPi
- 23 • SSP5-PkBudg1100
- 24 • SSP5-PkBudg1300
- 25 • SSP5-PkBudg900

26

27 **3.4.5 Models**

- 28 • REMIND 2.1

29

1 **3.5 Uncertainty in technology costs and CDR availability**

2 **3.5.1 Publications**

- 3 • Giannousakis, A., Hilaire, J., Nemet, G. F., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Rodrigues, R., ...
4 Kriegler, E. 2020. How uncertainty in technology costs and carbon dioxide removal availability
5 affect climate mitigation pathways. Energy, 119253.
6 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.119253>

7

8 **3.5.2 Guiding questions**

9 We measure the sensitivities of mitigation indicators to the costs and potential of energy technologies
10 (the costs of wind, solar, biomass, gas, coal, oil, nuclear, and electric/hydrogen vehicles, as well as the
11 injection rate of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)) across economic sectors.

- 12 1. How are CDR demands and individual sectors affected?
- 13 2. What is the relative importance of the costs of technologies when compared with each other?
- 14 3. How is the year of carbon neutrality affected by the uncertainty in technology costs?

15 **3.5.3 Results**

16 This sensitivity analysis of technology costs shows that the uncertainty in biomass&CCS followed by
17 the transport-related options (ELH2 and oil) have the largest effects on both physical and economic
18 mitigation indicators.

- 19 1. The use of CDR is a more sensitive economy-wide physical mitigation indicator, mainly
20 affected by the CCS injection limit and the dipole oil/ELH2. The sector affected the most by
21 energy technology cost variations is the transport sector;
- 22 2. The high overall influence of biomass&CCS (with uncertain potential) and transport-related
23 technologies (difficult to decarbonize) on the indicators, highlights the need for robust and
24 broad policy support for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement;
- 25 3. The year of carbon neutrality remains largely unaffected by the variation in costs. This indicates
26 the importance of early climate action, as even in “favorable” price scenarios, optimal
27 emissions need to reach zero by 2065.

28

29 **3.5.4 Scenarios**

- 30 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-bioH
- 31 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-ccsH
- 32 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-coalH
- 33 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-elh2H
- 34 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-gasH
- 35 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-nucH
- 36 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-oilH
- 37 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-spvH
- 38 • TechCost-SSP2-B1100-windH

39

- 1 **3.5.5 Models**
- 2 • REMIND 2.1
- 3

1 **3.6 Accelerated electrification based on cheap renewables**

2 **3.6.1 Publications**

- 3 • Luderer, G., Madeddu, S., Ueckerdt, F., Pehl, M., Pietzcker, R., Rottoli, M., ... Kriegler, E.
4 (n.d.). Accelerated electrification based on cheap renewables facilitates reaching Paris Climate
5 targets. *Nature Energy*. Submitted.

7 **3.6.2 Guiding questions**

8 Technological progress in photovoltaics, wind power and battery storage make reliable renewable
9 electricity increasingly cheap. At the same time, any international effort to increase ambition towards
10 keeping the targets of the Paris Agreement will make carbon-based fuels scarce and expensive. Our
11 study shows that a continuation of rapid innovation in solar and wind power along with carbon pricing
12 to reach the Paris Climate targets will make electricity cheaper than carbonaceous fuels, resulting in a
13 fundamental transformation of energy systems towards a dominance of electricity-based end uses.

- 14 1. What are the role and potential of electrification for global and long-term deep decarbonization
15 strategies?
- 16 2. What are the dynamics, requirements and full-systems implications of deep electrification?
- 17 3. Do IAMs over-emphasize bioenergy, CCS and CDR, and underappreciate the pace of
18 technological progress in solar energy and energy end-use technologies?

19

20 **3.6.3 Results**

21 A profound and rapid energy transformation is required to put the world on a pathway for limiting
22 warming in line with the climate targets of the Paris Agreement. Formidable technological progress in
23 solar PV, wind power and battery technologies have been among the most encouraging developments
24 towards this transformation. Renewable electricity supply is already cost-competitive in many parts of
25 the world, and electric vehicle technology is making rapid strides towards increasing competitiveness.
26 At the same time, the sustainability and regulatory challenges of large-scale bioenergy use are becoming
27 increasingly evident, and so are difficulties to upscale carbon capture and storage. A climate change
28 mitigation strategy centred around renewables-based electrification becomes increasingly plausible.

- 29 1. Our analysis shows that climate policy strongly shifts the economics in favor of electricity as
30 an energy carrier. The key enabling assumptions for very high electrification shares in our
31 scenario are (1) limited biomass, (2) limited CCS, and (3) limited other options CDR.
32 Electrification shares could become even higher in the long-term with further technological
33 breakthroughs, e.g. in battery technology, in aviation, primary steel production or other
34 industrial processes;
- 35 2. The detailed analysis of individual end uses reveals greater demand-side electrification
36 potential than suggested in the previous integrated assessment modeling literature. Fuel
37 demands for aviation, shipping, some industrial processes as well as feedstocks for the chemical
38 industry are the most significant sources of residual demands for carbonaceous energy carriers;
- 39 3. The transition to a renewables-based electrification of energy systems is only possible in a
40 favorable policy environment. First and foremost, comprehensive carbon pricing is crucial for
41 internalizing the climate benefits of renewable electricity vis-a-vis fossil-based fuels. Secondly,
42 the increasing share of VRE in power supply requires adjustments of the electricity market
43 design to incentivize deployment of storage and flexibilization of demand. Thirdly, a deep
44 electrification of energy systems requires political coordination in the build-up of new

1 infrastructure, such as grid interconnectors to pool VRE generation over larger geographical
2 areas, or charging stations for electric vehicles.

3

4 **3.6.4 Scenarios**

- 5 • DeepElec_SSP2_HighRE_Budg1100
- 6 • DeepElec_SSP2_HighRE_Budg1300
- 7 • DeepElec_SSP2_HighRE_Budg900
- 8 • DeepElec_SSP2_Base
- 9 • DeepElec_SSP2_def_Budg1100
- 10 • DeepElec_SSP2_def_Budg1300
- 11 • DeepElec_SSP2_def_Budg900
- 12 • DeepElec_SSP2_NDC
- 13 • DeepElec_SSP2_NPi

14

15 **3.6.5 Models**

- 16 • REMIND 2.1

17

1 **3.7 Trade-off between cost-efficiency and sovereignty**

2 **3.7.1 Publications**

- 3 • Bauer N, Bertram C, Schultes A, Luderer G, Kriegler E, Popp A, Edenhofer O. 2020.
4 Quantifying the trade-off between cost-efficiency and sovereignty in international climate
5 mitigation cooperation. Nature, 588, 261-266.

6

7 **3.7.2 Guiding questions**

- 8 1. How can sovereignty, efficiency and fairness be balanced?
- 9 2. Can fair burden sharing (defined as equal percentage income reduction across regions) achieved
10 without transfers by differentiated carbon prices.
- 11 3. What is the shape of the sovereignty-efficiency trade-off?
- 12 4. What are implications of differentiated carbon prices?
- 13 5. What role could additional sector-specific policies play?

14

15 **3.7.3 Results**

16 A strategy of international financial transfers guided by moderate deviations from uniform carbon
17 pricing could achieve the goal without straining either the economies or sovereignty of nations.

- 18 1. Yes, but very high differentiation is required, especially for high policy ambition. The
19 efficiency losses this entails (measured in cumulative discounted income losses) are smaller
20 than the net-present value of required transfers to achieve fairness with equal carbon prices.
- 21 2. The trade-off is highly non-linear, so that already allowing for small transfers achieves much
22 of the efficiency gains.
- 23 3. Relatively large market distortions are induced at relatively moderate carbon price
24 differentiation. Resulting leakage between regions and asynchronicity of mitigation timing
25 across regions, such as reaching carbon neutrality, are most sensitive at moderate carbon price
26 differentiation. As price differentiation is increased the additional effect on market distortion
27 and asynchronous mitigation timing become smaller. Hence, small deviations from uniform
28 carbon pricing have the largest effect on reducing transfers, but also the largest impact on
29 leakage and putting a wedge in regional timing of mitigation measures.
- 30 4. Complementing moderately differentiated carbon prices with additional sector-specific policies
31 could further reduce or eliminate distortions and environmental trade-offs. The effects of
32 specific policies become context dependent.

33

34 **3.7.4 Scenarios**

- 35 • Diff_1300Gt_hybrid_def
- 36 • Diff_1300Gt_no-transfer_def
- 37 • Diff_1300Gt_uniform-pricing_def
- 38 • Diff_No-policy_baseline

39

40 **3.7.5 Models**

- 41 • REMIND-MAgPIE 2.0-4.1

3.8 Deeper near-term emissions cuts induced by economic damages from on-going climate change

3.8.1 Publications

- Schultes, Anselm; Piontek, Franziska; Soergel, Bjoern; Rogelj, Joeri; Baumstark, Lavinia; Kriegler, Elmar; Edenhofer, Ottmar; Luderer, G. 2020. Economic damages from on-going climate change imply deeper near-term emission cuts. *Environmental Research Letters*, submitted.

3.8.2 Guiding questions

The study explores emissions and carbon prices in scenarios combining a climate target in line with the Paris agreement with climate damages with different degrees of persistency. Multiple dimensions of uncertainty are assessed.

1. How does a least-total cost framework, combining a climate target and climate damages, affect optimal emissions and carbon prices?
2. What role does the very uncertain persistence of damages play?
3. How do the different dimensions of uncertainty (impacts, climate, socioeconomic) contribute to overall uncertainty?

3.8.3 Results

Accounting for damages increases near-term ambition of transformation pathways, increasing the emissions gap. This is mainly driven by the long-term persistence of damages.

1. In a cost-benefit setting, 2030 social costs of carbon increase strongly with the assumed persistence of the damages. Even for low degrees of persistence (5 years) the SCC is significantly higher than the value put forward by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Costs of Greenhouse Gases.
2. When accounting for damages, mean 2030 carbon prices almost double compared to the standard cost-effectiveness analysis for a 2° target, increasing the emissions gap to the currently pledged nationally determined contributions by two thirds.
3. In the long run, accounting for damages requires lower carbon prices to reach the 2° target than in the cost-effective pathway.

3.8.4 Scenarios

- LeastTotalCost_Base_brkLR15_SSP1_P50
- LeastTotalCost_Base_brkLR15_SSP2_P50
- LeastTotalCost_Base_brkLR15_SSP5_P50
- LeastTotalCost_Base_brkSR15_SSP1_P50
- LeastTotalCost_Base_brkSR15_SSP2_P50
- LeastTotalCost_Base_brkSR15_SSP5_P50
- LeastTotalCost_CBA_brkLR15_SSP2_P50
- LeastTotalCost_CBA_brkSR15_SSP2_P50
- LeastTotalCost_CEA_brkLR15_SSP2_P50

- 1 • LeastTotalCost_CEA_brkSR15_SSP2_P50
- 2 • LeastTotalCost_LTC_brkLR15_SSP1_P50
- 3 • LeastTotalCost_LTC_brkLR15_SSP2_P50
- 4 • LeastTotalCost_LTC_brkLR15_SSP5_P50
- 5 • LeastTotalCost_LTC_brkSR15_SSP1_P50
- 6 • LeastTotalCost_LTC_brkSR15_SSP2_P50
- 7 • LeastTotalCost_LTC_brkSR15_SSP5_P50
- 8 • LeastTotalCost_NDC_brkLR15_SSP2_P50
- 9 • LeastTotalCost_NDC_brkSR15_SSP2_P50
- 10 • LeastTotalCost_NPi_brkLR15_SSP1_P50
- 11 • LeastTotalCost_NPi_brkLR15_SSP2_P50
- 12 • LeastTotalCost_NPi_brkLR15_SSP5_P50
- 13 • LeastTotalCost_NPi_brkSR15_SSP1_P50
- 14 • LeastTotalCost_NPi_brkSR15_SSP2_P50
- 15 • LeastTotalCost_NPi_brkSR15_SSP5_P50

16

17 **3.8.5 Models**

- 18 • REMIND 2.1

19

1 **3.9 Sustainable Development Pathway**

2 **3.9.1 Publications**

- 3 • Soergel, B., Kriegler, E., Weindl, I., Rauner, S., Dirnaichner, A., Ruhe, C., ... Popp, A. 2020.
4 *Climate action within the 2030 Agenda: A holistic sustainable development pathway*. 28.

5

6 **3.9.2 Guiding questions**

7 This study investigates how to reach the UN Sustainable Development Goals alongside the 1.5°C
8 climate target. It identifies the key policy interventions required for this purpose, and quantifies their
9 individual and combined effects on SDG outcomes.

- 10 1. Are faster economic development, better education, technological progress, resource
11 efficiency, less resource-intensive lifestyles, and ambitious climate policies sufficient to
12 achieve the SDGs?
13 2. If no, what are the other key policy interventions required for substantial progress towards the
14 SDGs?
15 3. If all these interventions are combined, can the SDGs be achieved by 2030 (and 2050)?

16

17 **3.9.3 Results**

18 The policy interventions included in existing transformation pathways are insufficient to meet the
19 SDGs. However, additional targeted sustainable development interventions can substantially boost
20 progress towards the SDGs.

- 21 1. A continuation of current trends and policies will fail to meet the SDGs. Even faster economic
22 development, better education, technological progress, higher resource efficiency, less
23 resource-intensive lifestyles, and ambitious climate policies will not be sufficient.
24 2. The following key interventions enable a more holistic sustainable development pathway: (i)
25 An ambitious international “climate & development” finance scheme, (ii) a progressive
26 redistribution of carbon pricing revenues to alleviate inequality and poverty, (iii) sufficient and
27 healthy nutrition, improved access to modern energy in low-income countries, and an ambitious
28 reduction of energy demands in high-income countries.
29 3. The above interventions drive substantial progress towards the SDGs, but due to the narrow
30 time horizon substantial gaps will remain by 2030. However, many of these gaps can be closed
31 by 2050, reconciling the provisioning for human well-being with respecting the climate targets
32 and other planetary boundaries.

33

34 **3.9.4 Scenarios**

- 35 • SusDev_SDP-PkBudg1000
36 • SusDev_SSP1-NDC
37 • SusDev_SSP1-PkBudg900
38 • SusDev_SSP2-NDC
39 • SusDev_SSP2-PkBudg900
40 • SusDev_SDP-NPi
41 • SusDev_SSP1-NPi
42 • SusDev_SSP2-NPi

1

2 **3.9.5 Models**

- 3 • REMIND 2.1-4.2

4

3.10 Emissions Reduction Under the World Energy Council Scenario Framework

3.10.1 Publications

- Kober T., Panos E., Volkart K. 2018. Energy System Challenges of Deep Global CO₂ Emissions Reduction Under the World Energy Council's Scenario Framework. In: Giannakidis G., Karlsson K., Labriet M., Gallachóir B. (eds) Limiting Global Warming to Well Below 2°C.
- Kober, T., Schiffer, H.-W., Densing, M., Panos, E. 2020. Global energy perspectives to 2060 - WEC's world energy scenarios 2019. Energy Strategy Reviews, 31, pp. 100523. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2020.100523>

3.10.2 Guiding questions

The report from World Energy Council, “Exploring Innovation Pathways to 2040”, presents three global storylines to 2040, with supporting systems thinking maps, comparative analysis and regional summaries. It includes a discussion of new insights, reflecting deeper shifts in the energy system innovation landscape, and provides a broader view on “how to use” the scenarios.

1. Modern_Jazz Scenario: How the energy system transition to decarbonisation can be facilitated by a market-led digitally disrupted world with faster-paced and more even economic growth?
2. Unfinished_Symphony & Symphony_1.5C Scenarios: What is the effect of a strong, coordinated policy-led world, with long-term planning and unified global action to address connected challenges, including inequitable access and affordable decarbonisation, on the energy system transition towards Paris Agreements 2015?
3. Hard_Rock Scenario: Can a fragmented world with inward looking policies, lower growth and less global cooperation, move towards a low-carbon energy system?

3.10.3 Results

Signals of each scenario have been detected in all regions of the world through the use of a variety of leadership surveys and systematic horizon-scanning methods. There has been a marked shift in perception about the scenario Hard Rock, which is no longer seen as an extreme scenario. Perspectives are also more divided about the outlook for effective global cooperation, which is assumed in the scenario Unfinished Symphony. The entrepreneurial scenario Modern Jazz has generated a lot of questions about new societal dynamics relating to increasing inequality, active consumers and effective market design.

1. Achieving Paris Agreements targets remains elusive, with none of the 2019 scenarios meeting the temperature increase targets.
2. Infrastructure innovation and investment, and proactive policies are necessary to secure affordable decarbonisation and socially just energy transition. New net-zero carbon technology pathways (including hydrogen) and carbon abatement mechanisms emerge and start to scale by 2040. Energy efficiency gains are critical to manage energy demand from industrial, residential, commercial sectors to avoid reducing climate change momentum. Consumer-centricity of the energy system increases in all scenarios to provide energy-plus service. Electrification and a mobility revolution has the potential to disrupt the entire system landscape in the longer term.
3. Energy business leaders should identify new customer-centric growth opportunities in electrification, storage, PtX and hydrogen economy. Policy makers need to identify new integrated policy innovation opportunities and implement sector-coupling policies to enable

1 faster, socially affordable and deeper decarbonisation of the whole economy. Policy makers
2 also need to establish new economics of whole energy system transition that looks beyond zero
3 marginal cost pricing and enable demand side participation and better connectivity of the actors
4 of the energy system. The international community needs to renew efforts to facilitate
5 technology transfer, recognise and enhance adaptability and resilience of interdependent
6 energy-food-water systems, and reduce the risk of fragmentation by encouraging cross-border,
7 cross-sector and cross-vector strategic partnerships to accelerate progress along net-zero
8 pathways.

9

10 **3.10.4 Scenarios**

- 11 • Hard_Rock
- 12 • Modern_Jazz
- 13 • Unfinished_Symphony

14

15 **3.10.5 Models**

- 16 • GMM-17

17

18

1 **3.11 Sustainable development implications of climate change mitigation**

2 **3.11.1 Publications**

- 3 • Shinichiro F, Tomoko H, Kiyoshi T, Hancheng D, Jing-Yu L, Haruka O, et al. 2020. Measuring
4 the sustainable development implications of climate change mitigation. Environmental
5 Research Letters.

6

7 **3.11.2 Guiding questions**

8 SDG implications of climate policy:

- 9 1. What are the trade off and synergies in SDGs and climate policy?

10

11 **3.11.3 Results**

12 Land-related SDGs can be negatively affected by climate policy.

- 13 1. Need for consideration of land-related emissions reduction.

14

15 **3.11.4 Scenarios**

- 16 • 1.5C
- 17 • 2.5C
- 18 • 2C
- 19 • WB2C

20

21 **3.11.5 Models**

- 22 • AIM/Hub-Global 2.0

23

3.12 Implications of the Paris Agreement in the Context of Long-Term Climate Mitigation Goals

3.12.1 Publications

- Shinishiro Fujimori, Xuanming Su, Jing-Yu Liu, Tomoko Hasegawa, Kiyoshi Takahashi, Toshihiko Masui, Maho Takimi. 2017. Implications of the Paris Agreement in the Context of Long-Term Climate Mitigation Goals. SpringerPlus 5:1620.

3.12.2 Guiding questions

NDCs are released and assessed the first NDC implications.

1. How much are the long term goals are affected by the NDCs?
2. Energy and land use implications on NDCs.

3.12.3 Results

NDC delays the reductions compared with cost optimal pathways.

1. 2 degree goal is still feasible under NDC but cost becomes large.
2. More negative emissions technologies and deep decarbonization is needed in the latter half of century.

3.12.4 Scenarios

- 450ppmCancunP
- 450ppmeINDC
- 450ppmRCP
- Baseline
- INDCSamePrice
- Baseline

3.12.5 Models

- AIM/Hub-Global 2.0

3.13 The Transition in Energy Demand Sectors to Limit Global Warming to 1.5 °C

3.13.1 Publications

- Méjean, Aurélie, Céline Guivarch, Julien Lefèvre, and Meriem Hamdi-Cherif. 2019. The Transition in Energy Demand Sectors to Limit Global Warming to 1.5 °C. *Energy Efficiency* 12 (2): 441–62. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-018-9682-0>

3.13.2 Guiding questions

1. What does the 1.5°C target imply for the transition in energy demand sectors?
2. How does the date of the peak of emissions affect the emission pathway of different sectors?
3. When should the peak of emissions occur in order to remain on track with the 1.5°C target?

3.13.3 Results

Stringent policies in energy demand sectors, especially transport and industry, are needed in the short run to trigger an immediate peak of emissions and increase the probability to meet the 1.5°C objective.

1. Bringing forward the peak of global emissions does not lead to a homothetic adjustment of all sectoral emission pathways: an early peak of global emissions implies the faster decarbonization of the electricity sector and early emission reductions in energy-demand sectors – mainly industry and transportation.
2. The results suggest that it is impossible to delay the peak of global emissions until 2030 while remaining on a path compatible with the 1.5 °C objective.

3.13.4 Scenarios

- base_DemandHigh_FossilHigh_TechHigh
- base_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechHigh
- base_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechLow
- base_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechHigh
- base_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechLow
- base_DemandLow_FossilLow_TechHigh
- base_DemandLow_FossilLow_TechLow
- peak2016_DemandHigh_FossilHigh_TechHigh
- peak2016_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechHigh
- peak2016_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechLow
- peak2016_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechHigh
- peak2016_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechLow
- peak2016_DemandLow_FossilLow_TechHigh
- peak2016_DemandLow_FossilLow_TechLow
- peak2020_DemandHigh_FossilHigh_TechHigh
- peak2020_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechHigh
- peak2020_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechLow
- peak2020_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechHigh

- 1 • peak2020_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechLow
- 2 • peak2020_DemandLow_FossilLow_TechHigh
- 3 • peak2020_DemandLow_FossilLow_TechLow
- 4 • peak2025_DemandHigh_FossilHigh_TechHigh
- 5 • peak2025_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechHigh
- 6 • peak2025_DemandHigh_FossilLow_TechLow
- 7 • peak2025_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechHigh
- 8 • peak2025_DemandLow_FossilHigh_TechLow
- 9 • peak2025_DemandLow_FossilLow_TechHigh

10

11 **3.13.5 Models**

- 12 • IMACLIM 1.1

13

3.14 Socioeconomic factors and future challenges of the goal of limiting the increase in global average temperature to 1.5 °C

3.14.1 Publications

- <Literature placeholder>

3.14.2 Guiding questions

Explore the impacts of socioeconomic factors to SDG indicators.

1. Under various assumptions what factors can be the major to change SDGs?

3.14.3 Results

There are multiple channels that change SDGs implications.

1. Technological improvement in energy supply is the most important.

3.14.4 Scenarios

- SFCM_SSP2_Bio_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_Bio_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_Bio_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_EEEI_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_EEEI_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_EEEI_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_LifeStyle_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_LifeStyle_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_LifeStyle_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_Ref_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_Ref_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_Ref_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_CCS_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_CCS_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_CCS_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_bio_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_bio_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_bio_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_nuclear_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_nuclear_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_nuclear_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_solar_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_solar_2Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_solar_Baseline
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_wind_1p5Degree
- SFCM_SSP2_ST_wind_2Degree

- 1 • SFCM_SSP2_ST_wind_Baseline
- 2 • SFCM_SSP2_SupTech_1p5Degree
- 3 • SFCM_SSP2_SupTech_2Degree
- 4 • SFCM_SSP2_SupTech_Baseline
- 5 • SFCM_SSP2_combined_1p5Degree
- 6 • SFCM_SSP2_combined_2Degree
- 7 • SFCM_SSP2_combined_Baseline

8

9 **3.14.5 Models**

- 10 • AIM/CGE 2.0

11

1

2 3.15 C3IAM**3 3.15.1 Publications**

- 4 • <Literature placeholder>

5

6 3.15.2 Guiding questions

7 <placeholder>

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9 3.15.3 Results

10 <placeholder>

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12 3.15.4 Scenarios

- 13 • SSP1_5.0
- 14 • SSP1_BAU
- 15 • SSP1_NDC
- 16 • SSP2_5.0
- 17 • SSP2_BAU
- 18 • SSP2_NDC
- 19 • SSP3_5.5
- 20 • SSP3_BAU
- 21 • SSP3_NDC

22

23 3.15.5 Models

- 24 • C3IAM 1.0

25

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2 **3.16 EPPA Study**

3 **3.16.1 Publications**

- 4 • <Literature placeholder>

5

6 **3.16.2 Guiding questions**

7 <placeholder>

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9 **3.16.3 Results**

10 <placeholder>

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12 **3.16.4 Scenarios**

- 13 • 1.5CNow_Gradual
- 14 • 1.5CNow_OptTax
- 15 • 2CNow_Gradual
- 16 • 2CNow_OptTax
- 17 • Paris1.5C_OptTax
- 18 • Paris2C_Gradual
- 19 • Paris2C_OptTax
- 20 • ParisFlat
- 21 • ParisForever
- 22 • Ref

23

24 **3.16.5 Models**

- 25 • EPPA 6

26

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2 **3.17 GCAM Study**

3 **3.17.1 Publications**

- 4 • <Literature placeholder>

5

6 **3.17.2 Guiding questions**

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9 **3.17.3 Results**

10 <placeholder>

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12 **3.17.4 Scenarios**

- 13 • 20% abatement (FF&I)
- 14 • 20% abatement (GHG)
- 15 • 450 concentration
- 16 • 50% abatement (FF&I)
- 17 • 50% abatement (GHG)
- 18 • 550 concentration
- 19 • 650 concentration
- 20 • Core baseline
- 21 • High CO2 price
- 22 • Low CO2 price
- 23 • Policy baseline

24

25 **3.17.5 Models**

- 26 • GCAM 4.0

27

1 **3.18 HEB Study**

2 **3.18.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.18.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

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8 **3.18.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

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11 **3.18.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • Deep
13 • Moderate

14

15 **3.18.5 Models**

- 16 • HEB 2.0

17

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2 **3.19 IMA15**

3 **3.19.1 Publications**

- 4 • Van Vuuren, D. P., Stehfest, E., Gernaat, D. E. H. J., Van Den Berg, M., Bijl, D. L., De Boer,
5 H. S., Daioglou, V., Doelman, J. C., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Harmsen, M., Hof, A. F. & Van
6 Sluisveld, M. A. E. 2018. Alternative pathways to the 1.5 °c target reduce the need for negative
7 emission technologies. *Nature Climate Change*, 8, 391-397.

8

9 **3.19.2 Guiding questions**

10 CDR strategies face several difficulties such as reliance on underground CO₂ storage and competition
11 for land with food production and biodiversity protection. The question arises whether alternative deep
12 mitigation pathways exist?

- 13 1. How essential are bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, and other negative-emission
14 technologies for the 1.5 degree target?

15

16 **3.19.3 Results**

17 The study illustrates how a combination of alternative 1.5°C pathways can significantly reduce the need
18 for CDR. They are based on the inclusion of options which are not normally considered in integrated
19 assessment analyses, such as lifestyle change, significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions other
20 than CO₂, swift electrification of energy demand and low population growth. While each of these
21 alternatives will still require rapid societal changes and faces its own specific barriers, several also show
22 important synergies with other sustainability goals.

- 23 1. While this study shows that alternative options can greatly reduce the volume of CDR to
24 achieve the 1.5 °C goal, nearly all scenarios still rely on BECCS and/or reforestation (even the
25 hypothetical combination of all alternative options still captured 400 GtCO₂ by reforestation).
26 Therefore, investment in the development of CDR options remains an important strategy if the
27 international community intends to implement the Paris target.

28

29 **3.19.4 Scenarios**

- 30 • IMA15-AGInt
- 31 • IMA15-Def
- 32 • IMA15-Eff
- 33 • IMA15-LiStCh
- 34 • IMA15-LoNCO₂
- 35 • IMA15-Pop
- 36 • IMA15-RenElec
- 37 • IMA15-TOT

38

- 1 **3.19.5 Models**
- 2 • IMAGE 3.0.1
- 3

1 **3.20 MERGE ETL Study**

2 **3.20.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.20.2 Guiding questions**

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8 **3.20.3 Results**

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11 **3.20.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • BAU
13 • DAC15_50
14 • DAC2_66

15

16 **3.20.5 Models**

- 17 • MERGE-ETL 6.0

18

1 **3.21 Global energy assessment**

2 **3.21.1 Publications**

- 3 • GEA 2012. Global Energy Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge University
4 Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied
5 Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
- 6 • Riahi, K., Dentener, F., Gielen, D., Grubler, A., Jewell, J., Klimont, Z., Krey, V., Mccollum,
7 D., Pachauri, S., Rao, S., Van Ruijven, B., Van Vuuren, D. P. & Wilson, C. 2012. Chapter 17
8 - Energy Pathways for Sustainable Development. Global Energy Assessment - Toward a
9 Sustainable Future. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA
10 and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
- 11 • Mccollum, D. L., Krey, V., Riahi, K., Kolp, P., Grubler, A., Makowski, M. & Nakicenovic, N.
12 2013. Climate policies can help resolve energy security and air pollution challenges. Climatic
13 Change, 119, 479-494.
- 14 • Rogelj, J., Mccollum, D. L. & Riahi, K. 2013. The UN's 'Sustainable Energy for All' initiative
15 is compatible with a warming limit of 2C. Nature Climate Change, 3, 545-551.
- 16 • Rao, S., Pachauri, S., Dentener, F., Kinney, P., Klimont, Z., Riahi, K. & Schoepp, W. 2013.
17 Better air for better health: Forging synergies in policies for energy access, climate change and
18 air pollution. Global Environmental Change, 23, 1122-1130.

19

20 **3.21.2 Guiding questions**

21 The main purpose of the GEA has been to establish a state-of-the-art assessment of the science of energy
22 in light of the inevitable transformation that is required to address major challenges and avoiding
23 potentially catastrophic future consequences for human kind and planetary systems. The transformation
24 pathways developed within the framework of the GEA are designed to explore technical measures,
25 policies, and related costs and benefits for meeting the following energy objectives:

- 26 • Improving energy access: Universal access to electricity and clean cooking by 2030;
 - 27 • Reduce air pollution and improve human health: Achieve global compliance with World Health
28 Organization (WHO) air quality standards (PM_{2.5} concentration < 35 µg/m³) by 2030;
 - 29 • Avoid dangerous climate change: Limit global average temperature change to 2°C above
30 preindustrial levels with a likelihood >50%;
 - 31 • Enhance energy security: Reduce energy import dependence; increase diversity and resilience
32 of energy supply (both by 2050).
- 33 1. Which are the fundamental key-messages common to the scenario ensemble?
 - 34 2. Is universal access to modern energy carriers and cleaner cooking achievable by 2030 while
35 limiting long term global warming to 2°C?

36

37 **3.21.3 Results**

38 The pathways show that it is technically possible to achieve improved energy access, air quality, and
39 energy security simultaneously while avoiding dangerous climate change. In fact, a number of
40 alternative combinations of resources, technologies, and policies are found capable of attaining these
41 objectives. From a large ensemble of possible transformations, three distinct groups of pathways (GEA-
42 Supply, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Efficiency) have been identified and analysed.

- 1 1. Limiting climate change to to 2°C will require a technological transformation of the global
2 energy system over the next several decades, as well as the rapid introduction of policies and
3 fundamental political changes toward concerted and coordinated efforts to integrate global
4 concerns into local and national policy priorities. The GES analysis demonstrates that a
5 sustainable future requires a transforamtion from today's energy systems to those with: (i)
6 radical improvements in enegyuy systems, especially in the end-use, and (ii) greater shares of
7 renewable energies and advanced energy systems with carbon capture and storage (CCS) for both
8 fossil fuels and biomass.
- 9 2. Achieving universal access to clean cooking fuels and electricity requires that between US\$36
10 billion and US\$41 billion be spent annually over the next two decades. In addition to furthering
11 human development and poverty alleviation goals, universal access is necessary for attaining
12 World Health Organization guidelines for air quality in all countries by 2030. At the same time,
13 in order to ensure a high likelihood of limiting global warming to 2°C, global CO2 emissions
14 need to peak by about 2020 and then be reduced 30–70% by 2050 relative to 2000. Under the
15 GEA pathways, energy security improves in the world as a whole and in the majority of regions:
16 imports decline and supply diversity increases.

18 3.21.4 Scenarios

- 19 • GEA_Eff_1p5C
- 20 • GEA_Eff_1p5C_Delay2020
- 21 • GEA_Eff_2C_Delay2020
- 22 • GEA_Eff_AdvNCO2_1p5C
- 23 • GEA_Eff_base
- 24 • GEA_Mix_1p5C_AdvNCO2_PartialDelay2020
- 25 • GEA_Mix_1p5C_AdvTrans_PartialDelay2020
- 26 • GEA_Mix_2C_AdvNCO2_PartialDelay2020
- 27 • GEA_Mix_2C_AdvTrans_PartialDelay2020
- 28 • GEA_Mix_base

30 3.21.5 Models

- 31 • MESSAGE V.3

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3.22 Low energy demand

3.22.1 Publications

- Grubler A, Wilson C, Bento N, Boza-Kiss B, Krey V, McCollum DL, Rao ND, Riahi K, Rogelj J, De Stercke S, Cullen J, Frank S, Fricko O, Guo F, Gidden M, Havlík P, Huppmann D, Kiesewetter G, Rafaj P, Schoepp W, Valin H. 2018. A low energy demand scenario for meeting the 1.5 °C target and sustainable development goals without negative emission technologies. *Nature Energy* 3:515-527.

3.22.2 Guiding questions

Scenarios that limit global warming to 1.5 °C describe major transformations in energy supply and ever-rising energy demand. Here, we provide a contrasting perspective by developing a narrative of future change based on observable trends that results in low energy demand.

1. How does a narrative of future change based on observable trends which results in low energy demand look like?
2. Which quantitative changes in activity levels and energy intensity are required in the Global North and South for all major energy services consistent with the low energy demand narrative?
3. Is it possible to limit global warming to 1.5 °C without relying on controversial negative emissions technologies such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)?
4. What are sustainable development co-benefits of a low energy demand transformation?

3.22.3 Results

1. We find that global final energy demand by 2050 can be reduced to 245 EJ, around 40% lower than today's levels despite rising population, income and activity and show how changes in the quantity and type of energy services drive structural change in intermediate and upstream supply sectors (energy and land use).
2. Down-sizing the global energy system dramatically improves the feasibility of low-carbon supply-side transformation by renewables and electrification. Our scenario meets 1.5°C climate and other sustainable development goals, without relying on controversial negative emission technologies.

3.22.4 Scenarios

- LowEnergyDemand
- LowEnergyDemand_1.3_IPCC

3.22.5 Models

- MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.0

3.23 Advanced demand-sector technologies and energy demand reduction in achieving ambitious carbon budget

3.23.1 Publications

- Napp, T. A., Few, S., Sood, A., Bernie, D., Hawkes, A., & Gambhir, A. 2019. The role of advanced demand-sector technologies and energy demand reduction in achieving ambitious carbon budgets. *Applied Energy*, 238, 351–367. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.01.033>

3.23.2 Guiding questions

Addressing residual emissions in ‘challenging-to-decarbonise’ sectors such as the industrial and aviation sectors relies on the development and commercialization of innovative advanced technologies, currently still in their infancy.

1. What is the role of advanced technologies in achieving deep decarbonisation of the energy system?
2. What are the technology-specific details (i.e. technologies used, contribution) of how rapid and deep carbon intensity reductions can be achieved in the energy demand sectors?
3. To what extent do demand side measures reduce the need for negative emissions?

3.23.3 Results

Key advanced technologies in the industrial sector include hydrogen-based steel, electrification (e.g. of glass and ceramics kilns, electrification of pulp and electric boilers in chemicals) and Carbon Capture and Storage from cement production. In the transport sector, electric trucks, hydrogen ships and planes and the hyperloop present a way to achieve deep decarbonisation of this sector. In the absence of advanced low-carbon technologies, residual or unabated emissions in 2100 remain at 4 Gt CO₂/yr for the transport sector and 4 Gt CO₂/yr for the industrial sector. With the inclusion of advanced low-carbon technologies, these are reduced to 0 Gt CO₂/yr and 2 Gt CO₂/yr for the transport and industrial sectors, respectively (in the highest carbon price scenario).

1. Reducing residual emissions from demand-sectors is crucial for achieving <2 °C.
2. Advanced technologies and energy demand reduction reduces reliance on BECCS by ~18%.
3. Targeted innovation in the demand sectors is required to realize this potential.

3.23.4 Scenarios

- AdvTech, Cen Dem, PE off (V3) CO₂ budget 1.5
- AdvTech, Cen Dem, PE off (V3) CO₂ price \$100 (5% p.a.)
- AdvTech, Cen Dem, PE off (V3) CO₂ price \$150 (5% p.a.)
- AdvTech, Cen Dem, PE off (V3) CO₂ price \$200 (5% p.a.)
- AdvTech, Cen Dem, PE off (V3) CO₂ price \$250 (5% p.a.)
- AdvTech, Low Dem, PE off (V4) CO₂ budget 1.5
- AdvTech, Low Dem, PE off (V4) CO₂ price \$100 (5% p.a.)
- AdvTech, Low Dem, PE off (V4) CO₂ price \$150 (5% p.a.)
- AdvTech, Low Dem, PE off (V4) CO₂ price \$200 (5% p.a.)

- 1 • AdvTech, Low Dem, PE off (V4) CO2 price \$250 (5% p.a.)

2

3 **3.23.5 Models**

- 4 • TIAM-Grantham 1.0

5

1 **3.24 MESSAGE Study**

2 **3.24.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.24.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

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8 **3.24.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **3.24.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • SSP2_int_lc_15
- 13 • SSP2_int_lc_50
- 14 • SSP2_int_mc_15
- 15 • SSP2_int_mc_50
- 16 • SSP2_noint_lc_15
- 17 • SSP2_noint_lc_50
- 18 • SSP2_noint_mc_15
- 19 • SSP2_noint_mc_50
- 20 • SSP2_openres_lc_15
- 21 • SSP2_openres_lc_50
- 22 • SSP2_openres_mc_15
- 23 • SSP2_openres_mc_50

24

25 **3.24.5 Models**

- 26 • MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM_GEI 1.0

27

1 **3.25 CEMICS CDR portfolio study**

2 **3.25.1 Publications**

- 3 • Strefler, S., Bauer, N., Humpenöder, F., Klein, D., Popp, A., Kriegler, E. 2020. Carbon dioxide
4 removal are not born equal. Submitted

5

6 **3.25.2 Guiding questions**

7 The study analyses how portfolios of carbon dioxide removal options can limit environmental side-
8 effects.

- 9 1. To what extent does a portfolio of carbon dioxide removal options limit environmental side-
10 effects?
- 11 2. Can these side-effects be further reduced at acceptable economic costs if CDR is limited?

12

13 **3.25.3 Results**

14 A mix of CDR options should be deployed as environmental side-effects increase with deployment, but
15 do not accumulate across different options.

- 16 1. Controlled CDR is sufficient to keep 2C and 1.5C in reach.
- 17 2. A portfolio of CDR options can substantially reduce environmental side-effects.
- 18 3. The strategic value of CDR is already large at small CDR amounts

19

20 **3.25.4 Scenarios**

- 21 • CEMICS_SSP1-1p5C-fullCDR
- 22 • CEMICS_SSP1-1p5C-limCDR
- 23 • CEMICS_SSP1-1p5C-noCDR
- 24 • CEMICS_SSP1-2C-fullCDR
- 25 • CEMICS_SSP1-2C-limCDR
- 26 • CEMICS_SSP1-2C-noCDR
- 27 • CEMICS_SSP1-NPI
- 28 • CEMICS_SSP2-1p5C-fullCDR
- 29 • CEMICS_SSP2-1p5C-limCDR
- 30 • CEMICS_SSP2-1p5C-noCDR
- 31 • CEMICS_SSP2-2C-fullCDR
- 32 • CEMICS_SSP2-2C-limCDR
- 33 • CEMICS_SSP2-2C-noCDR
- 34 • CEMICS_SSP2-NPI

35

36 **3.25.5 Models**

- 37 • REMIND-MAgPIE 2.1-4.2

38

1 **3.26 TIAM Study**

2 **3.26.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.26.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **3.26.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **3.26.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • AdvTech_CenDem_PEff (V3) CO2 budget 1.5
- 13 • AdvTech_CenDem_PEff (V3) CO2 price \$100 (5% p.a.)
- 14 • AdvTech_CenDem_PEff (V3) CO2 price \$150 (5% p.a.)
- 15 • AdvTech_CenDem_PEff (V3) CO2 price \$200 (5% p.a.)
- 16 • AdvTech_CenDem_PEff (V3) CO2 price \$250 (5% p.a.)
- 17 • AdvTech_LowDem_PEff (V4) CO2 budget 1.5
- 18 • AdvTech_LowDem_PEff (V4) CO2 price \$100 (5% p.a.)
- 19 • AdvTech_LowDem_PEff (V4) CO2 price \$150 (5% p.a.)
- 20 • AdvTech_LowDem_PEff (V4) CO2 price \$200 (5% p.a.)
- 21 • AdvTech_LowDem_PEff (V4) CO2 price \$250 (5% p.a.)
- 22 • Baseline

23

24 **3.26.5 Models**

- 25 • TIAM-Grantham 1.0

26

1 **3.27 TIAM UCL Study**

2 **3.27.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.27.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **3.27.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **3.27.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • SSP2_1_75D-66

- 13 • SSP2_2D-66

- 14 • SSP2_BASE

15

16 **3.27.5 Models**

- 17 • TIAM-UCL 4.1.1

18

1 **3.28 TIAM World Study**

2 **3.28.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.28.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **3.28.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **3.28.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • 20% abatement (FF&I)
- 13 • 20% abatement (GHG)
- 14 • 450 concentration
- 15 • 50% abatement (FF&I)
- 16 • 50% abatement (GHG)
- 17 • 550 concentration
- 18 • 650 concentration
- 19 • Core baseline
- 20 • High CO2 price
- 21 • Low CO2 price
- 22 • Policy baseline

23

24 **3.28.5 Models**

- 25 • TIAM-WORLD 1.0

26

1 **3.29 C-ROADS Study**

2 **3.29.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.29.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **3.29.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **3.29.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • Ratchet-1.5-allCDR
13 • Ratchet-1.5-limCDR
14 • Ratchet-1.5-limCDR-noOS
15 • Ratchet-1.5-noCDR
16 • Ratchet-1.5-noCDR-noOS
17 • Reference

18

19 **3.29.5 Models**

- 20 • C-ROADS-5.005

21

1 **3.30 EN-ROADS Study**

2 **3.30.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.30.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **3.30.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **3.30.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • Ratchet-1.5-allCDR
13 • Ratchet-1.5-limCDR
14 • Reference

15

16 **3.30.5 Models**

- 17 • En-ROADS-96

18

1 **3.31 McKinsey Study**

2 **3.31.1 Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **3.31.2 Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **3.31.3 Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **3.31.4 Scenarios**

- 12 • 1.5C A
13 • 1.5C B
14 • 1.5C C

15

16 **3.31.5 Models**

- 17 • McKinsey 1.0

18

1 **3.32 E3ME Study**

2 **3.32.1 Publications**

3 Mercure, J. F., Pollitt, H., Viñuales, J. E., Edwards, N. R., Holden, P. B., Chewpreecha, U., ...
4 Knobloch, F. 2018. Macroeconomic impact of stranded fossil fuel assets. *Nature Climate Change*, 8(7),
5 588–593. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0182-1>

6 Holden, B., Edwards, N. R., Ridgwell, A., Wilkinson, R. D., Fraedrich, K., Lunkeit, F., ... Viñuales, E.
7 (n.d.). *Climate-carbon cycle uncertainties and the Paris Agreement*.

8

9 **3.32.2 Guiding questions**

10 <placeholder>

11

12 **3.32.3 Results**

13 <placeholder>

14

15 **3.32.4 Scenarios**

- 16 • 1.5C
- 17 • 2C
- 18 • 1.5C OPEC sell-out
- 19 • 2C OPEC sell-out
- 20 • Baseline

21

22 **3.32.5 Models**

- 23 • E3ME 6.1

24

4. Sectoral scenario studies (national and global)

4.1 Energy supply (only global)

4.1.1 IRENA Global Renewables Outlook

Publications

- IRENA. 2020. Global Renewables Outlook: Energy transformation 2050. International Renewable Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi. ISBN 978-92-9260-238-3

Guiding questions

The “Planned Energy Scenario (PES)” is the primary reference case for IRENA's Global Renewables Outlook, providing a perspective on energy system developments based on governments' current energy plans and other planned targets and policies (as of 2019), including Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement unless the country has more recent climate and energy targets or plans.

1. What type of energy pathway do current and planned policies of governments result in?
2. What is the impact of energy-related CO₂ emissions under current plans and policies?
3. Do current plans and policies result in meeting Paris-Agreement targets?

Results

Current and planned policies of government do not align with long-term Paris Agreement targets.

1. Under current plans and policies, energy demand increases by about 20% by 2050, however this is lower than the rate observed in historical trends.
2. Under current plans and policies, energy-related CO₂ emissions remain more or less flat to 2050, despite increasing energy demand - a result of a combination of greater use of renewables and fuel-switching.
3. Under current plans and policies, global temperature rise could exceed 2.5°C by 2050, and continue to rise thereafter

Scenarios

- Planned Energy Scenario (PES)
- Transforming Energy Scenario (TES)

Models

- REmap GRO2020

1 **4.1.2 IEA**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • IEA, 2017. Energy Technology Perspectives 2017: Catalyzing Energy Technology
4 Transformations. International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, France, 443 pp.
5 • IEA, 2017. World Energy Outlook 2017. International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, France,
6 782 pp.

7

8 **Guiding questions**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **Results**

12 <placeholder>

13

14 **Models | Scenarios**

- 15 • IEA Energy Technology Perspective Model 2017 | B2DS
16 • IEA World Energy Model 2017 | Faster Transition Scenario
17 • WEM 2019 | SDS

18

1 **4.1.3 Shell**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Shell International B.V. 2018. Shell Scenarios: Sky – Meeting the Goals of the Paris
4 Agreement. Shell International B.V. 36 pp.

5

6 **Guiding questions**

7 <placeholder>

8

9 **Results**

10 <placeholder>

11

12 **Models | Scenarios**

- 13 • Shell World Energy Model 2018 | Sky

14

1

2 **4.2 Transport**

3 **4.2.1 Advance WP2**

4 **Publications**

- 5 • Edelenbosch et al. 2017. Decomposing passenger transport futures: Comparing results of global
6 integrated assessment models. *Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment* 55,
7 281-293.
- 8 • Edelenbosch, O. Y., et al. 2017. Comparing projections of industrial energy demand and
9 greenhouse gas emissions in long-term energy models. *Energy* 122, 701-710.

10

11 **Guiding questions**

12 This study aims to contribute for better understanding of the role of demand sector changes to achieve
13 long-term climate mitigation targets, such as 2°C or 1.5°C.

- 14 1. To what extent can the following factors contribute to reduce emissions in the transport sector:
15 activity reduction, energy efficiency, and fuel switching?
- 16 2. Which factors and technologies contribute to reduce emissions in the industry sector?
- 17 3. What are the opportunities or pitfalls in the specific sub-sectors in the industry, such as cement,
18 iron, steel, or paper?
- 19 4. What challenges are specific to those sectors?

20

21 **Results**

22 The demand for energy services is projected to increase significantly in all three sectors as a result of
23 population and economic growth. For instance, assuming no new climate policies, energy demand in
24 the transport and industry sectors is projected to more than double.

25 If stringent climate policy consistent with the 2° C target is implemented, all demand sectors show
26 strong potential for energy demand reductions. Drastic technology innovation to increase energy
27 efficiency or boost use of low-carbon fuels are important to fully exploit this potential.

- 28 1. While all factors, activity reduction, energy efficiency, and fuel switching, can contribute to
29 emission reduction in transport, in the long-term aggressive technology change for improved
30 energy efficiency and fuel switching are required to meet internationally set climate targets.
- 31 2. In the industry sector alternative fuel use, both in the form of electricity and low carbon fuels,
32 increases significantly in response to climate policy, especially during the second half of the
33 century.

34 The ability to switch to alternative fuels to mitigate GHG emissions differs across models with
35 technologically detailed models being less flexible in switching from fossil fuels to electricity.

- 36 3. Using industry sub-sector details like material, technology and energy to support the projected
37 mitigation potential can provide improved insight in the feasibility of how emission reductions
38 can be achieved.

1 Specifically, opportunities for material efficiency and technological change are subsector specific and
2 at the same time affect the mitigation potential of the industry as a whole. In the cement sector for
3 example reduction of use clinkers will depend on substitution material availability.

4

5 **Scenarios**

- 6 • ADVANCE_WP2_IND-450-FullTech
- 7 • ADVANCE_WP2_IND-Base-FullTech
- 8 • ADVANCE_WP2_TRA-450-FullTech
- 9 • ADVANCE_WP2_TRA-Base-FullTech
- 10 • ADVANCE_WP2_TRA-Ctax-FullTech

11

12 **Models**

- 13 • AIM/CGE 2.2
- 14 • DNE21+ V.ADVANCE
- 15 • IMAGE 3.0
- 16 • MESSAGE-Transport V.5
- 17 • WITCH-GLOBIOM 4.2

18

1 **4.2.2 Transportation Infrastructures in a Low Carbon World**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Fisch-Romito, Vivien, and Céline Guivarch. 2019. Transportation Infrastructures in a Low
4 Carbon World: An Evaluation of Investment Needs and Their Determinants. Transportation
5 Research Part D: Transport and Environment 72 (July): 203–19.
6 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2019.04.014>.

7

8 **Guiding questions**

9 What are the main determinants of transportation infrastructure needs in a low carbon world?

- 10 1. How does investment needs are related to the overall demand for transport in climate policy
11 scenarios?
- 12 2. What is the main determinant of transport infrastructure investments?

13

14 **Results**

15 The expenditure needed for transportation infrastructure is lower in low-carbon pathways than in
16 baseline scenarios, both at the global and regional scales

- 17 1. The overall decrease of investment in transport infrastructure is brought about in particular by a
18 reduction in transport activity. Modal shift from road to rail can be a lever to reduce investment
19 needs only if combined with action on rail infrastructure occupancy.
- 20 2. Rail utilization rates and road construction costs are determining factors for investment in all
21 regions.

22

23 **Scenarios**

- 24 • SSP1_NoPolicy_TranspBase
- 25 • SSP1_NoPolicy_TranspOpt
- 26 • SSP1_RCP34_TranspBase
- 27 • SSP1_RCP34_TranspOpt
- 28 • SSP1_RCP45_TranspBase
- 29 • SSP1_RCP45_TranspOpt
- 30 • SSP3_NoPolicy_TranspBase
- 31 • SSP3_NoPolicy_TranspOpt
- 32 • SSP3_RCP34_TranspBase
- 33 • SSP3_RCP34_TranspOpt
- 34 • SSP3_RCP45_TranspBase
- 35 • SSP3_RCP45_TranspOpt

36

37 **Models**

- 38 • IMACLIM 1.1

39

1 **4.2.3 Key factors to reduce transport-related air pollutants & CO₂ emissions in Asian**
2 **region**

3 **Publications**

- 4 • Bao S, Nishiura O, Fujimori S, Oshiro K, Zhang R. 2020. Identification of key factors to reduce
5 transport-related air pollutants and CO₂ emissions in Asian region, Sustainability.

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 Explore the Asian transport-oriented air pollutants emissions and its interaction with climate policy

- 9 1. How much the climate policy and transport behaviour changes can reduce air pollutants in Asia

10

11 **Results**

12 Carbon pricing has the largest impacts on air pollutant emissions.

- 13 1. Transport policy and behavior has large impacts on air pollutants.

14

15 **Scenarios**

- 16 • Advanced_tech_high
17 • APS_strong
18 • Baseline
19 • Carbon_pricing
20 • Ene_Efficiency_High
21 • Occupancy_high
22 • SpeedHigh
23 • Sustainable development (SD)

24

25 **Models**

- 26 • AIM/Transport-National 1.0

27

1 **4.2.4 AIM Transport**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Runsen Zhang et al 2018 Environ. Res. Lett. 13 054008

4

5 **Guiding questions**

6 This paper aims to investigate the interaction between transport policies, mitigation potential and the
7 cost of meeting the goal of limiting warming to below 2 °C and 1.5°C.

8 1. Which transport policy has the most significant reduction potential?

9 2. Can transport policies reduce mitigation potential generated by climate mitigation policies to limit
10 global warming to 2 °C and 1.5°C?

11 3. Is the contribution of transport policies more effective for stringent climate change targets in the
12 1.5°C scenario?

13

14 **Results**

15 This paper is intended to detect the potential for different transport policy interventions to reduce
16 emissions and mitigation cost for the 2°C and 1.5°C targets.

17 1. Technological transformations such as vehicle technological innovations and energy efficiency
18 improvements provide the most significant reduction potential.

19 2. Low-carbon transport policies can reduce the carbon price, gross domestic product loss rate, and
20 welfare loss rate generated by climate mitigation policies

21 3. The degree of contribution of transport policies is more effective for stringent climate change
22 targets.

23

24 **Scenarios**

- 25 • TERL_15D_LowCarbonTransportPolicy
- 26 • TERL_15D_NoTransportPolicy
- 27 • TERL_2D_LowCarbonTransportPolicy
- 28 • TERL_2D_NoTransportPolicy
- 29 • TERL_Baseline_LowCarbonTransportPolicy
- 30 • TERL_Baseline_NoTransportPolicy

31

32 **Models**

- 33 • AIM/CGE 2.1

34

1 4.2.5 REMIND Transport Study

2 Publications

- 3 • Rottoli, M., Dirnaichner, A., Pietzcker, R., & Luderer, G. (n.d.). Alternative electrification
4 pathways for light duty vehicles in the energy transition.

5

6 Guiding questions

7 We apply a newly developed highly detailed transport sector model to spell out transport sector
8 scenarios with different sectoral policies and overall mitigation ambition. In the transport sector, we
9 look both at different technological focal points as well as transformative lifestyles.

- 10 1. Which interventions and policies are required in the transport sector to overcome burdens for
11 technological transformation towards battery electric vehicles, fuel-cell vehicles or synfuel driven
12 cars?
- 13 2. What are the consequences for the energy system for each of the technological options?
- 14 3. What can be the role of demand reduction to meet the mitigation targets compared to technological
15 innovation?

16

17 Results

18 Deep CO2 emission reductions in the transport sector can be achieved with all alternative technological
19 options until 2050. However, the upfront costs and energy requirements as well as the required demand-
20 side policies vary strongly depending on the favoured technology.

- 21 1. For battery electric vehicle, increasing consumer acceptance is key for higher market shares.
22 Besides infrastructure build-up and technological innovation for batteries, active anti-combustion
23 engine policies have to be considered. For fuel-cell vehicles, premiums or other subsidies are
24 required to reach competitive vehicle prices, as well as pessimistic assumptions on the
25 development of battery electric vehicles. For synthetic fuels, the challenges are fully shifted to the
26 supply side.
- 27 2. Direct electrification via battery electric vehicles poses the smallest burden on the electricity
28 supply. Sufficient hydrogen supply for fuel-cell vehicles is possible without major mark-ups to
29 the electricity production, however, we did not analyse the role of competing demands from other
30 sectors. Although the model is able to provide enough electricity to produce synfuels to power at
31 least 50% of the transport sector by 2050, the required investments are high and biomass-based
32 and nuclear power plants might have to play a role. The burden on the power sector and the grid
33 is significant due to the major increase in renewables required, with challenges in terms of stability
34 of the grid and security of supply.
- 35 3. Significant reductions in energy and material demands are possible by shifting to public transport
36 and non-motorized modes in cities. To avoid larger environmental impacts inflicted by the scale-
37 up of alternative technologies, sustainable policies should also aim at reducing overall demand.

38

39 Scenarios

- 40 • Transport_Budg1100_BE
- 41 • Transport_Budg1100_BE-LS

- 1 • Transport_Budg1100_Conv
- 2 • Transport_Budg1100_Conv-LowD
- 3 • Transport_Budg1100_ConvCase
- 4 • Transport_Budg1100_ConvCaseWise
- 5 • Transport_Budg1100_ConvSyn
- 6 • Transport_Budg1100_ElecEra
- 7 • Transport_Budg1100_ElecEraWise
- 8 • Transport_Budg1100_ElecPush
- 9 • Transport_Budg1100_ElecPush-LowD
- 10 • Transport_Budg1100_FC
- 11 • Transport_Budg1100_H2Push
- 12 • Transport_Budg1100_HydrHype
- 13 • Transport_Budg1100_HydrHypeWise
- 14 • Transport_Budg1100_IC
- 15 • Transport_Budg1100_IC-LS
- 16 • Transport_Budg1100_ICsyn
- 17 • Transport_Budg1100_SynSurge
- 18 • Transport_Budg1100_SynSurgeWise
- 19 • Transport_NDC
- 20 • Transport_NDC_Conv
- 21 • Transport_NDC_ConvCase
- 22 • Transport_NDC_ConvCaseWise
- 23 • Transport_NDC_IC
- 24 • Transport_NPi
- 25 • Transport_NPi_Conv
- 26 • Transport_NPi_IC

27

28 **Models**

- 29 • REMIND-Transport 2.1

30

1

2 **4.3 Buildings**

3 **4.3.1 Energy consumption of buildings in 2100**

4 **Publications**

- 5 • Levesque A, Pietzcker R.C, Baumstark L, De Stercke S, Grübler A, Luderer G. 2018. How
6 much energy will buildings consume in 2100? A global perspective within a scenario
7 framework. Energy 148 514-527

8

9 **Guiding questions**

10 The scenarios investigate the range of possible pathways for buildings energy demand in response to
11 socio-economic drivers

- 12 1. How large are the differences in buildings energy demand across SSP scenarios in the absence of
13 climate change mitigation?
- 14 2. What are the main patterns of the future buildings' energy demand landscape?
- 15 3. Are there significant differences between developing and developed countries?

16

17 **Results**

18 The extent to which energy demand will grow in the future strongly depends upon socio-economic
19 assumptions. Nevertheless, we can observe similar patterns across scenarios

- 20 1. Our results show growth in buildings' energy demand across all SSPs. This growth is especially
21 strong when considering useful energy projections. In terms of final energy, the extent of the
22 demand increase differs widely across scenarios: from 116 EJ/yr in 2010 to a range of 120-378
23 EJ/yr by 2100, underlining the importance of socio-economic, climatic and lifestyles development
24 on long-term projections.
- 25 2. Despite the differences in aggregate energy demand, common patterns arise between scenarios.
26 The final energy distribution across end-uses changes radically between 2010 and 2100. While in
27 2010, cooking and space heating constituted the main end-uses in developing and developed
28 countries respectively, in 2100, appliances and lighting will be the dominant end-use, representing
29 30-60% of total demand.
- 30 3. In developing countries, space cooling will be as important as appliances and lighting, while in
31 developed countries space heating is the next largest end use, accounting for roughly a fourth of
32 demand. Our results indicate that developing countries will experience a deep electrification.
33 Electrification will also concern developed countries due to the saturation of thermal needs and
34 the growing demand for appliances and lighting.

35

36 **Scenarios**

- 37 • SSP1
- 38 • SSP2
- 39 • SSP3
- 40 • SSP4

1 • SSP5

2

3 **Models**

4 • EDGE-Buildings 1.0

5

1 **4.3.2 Halving energy demand from buildings & low consumption practices**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Levesque A, Pietzcker R.C, Luderer G. 2019. Halving energy demand from buildings: The
4 impact of low consumption practices, Tech For & Socl Chg 146 253-266

5

6 **Guiding questions**

7 Reductions of energy demand have an important role to play in a sustainable energy transition. Here we
8 explore the extent to which the emergence of low energy consuming practices, encompassing new
9 behaviours and the adoption of more efficient technologies, could contribute to lowering energy demand

- 10 1. To which extent can buildings energy demand be decreased by the adoption of low-consumption
11 practices?
- 12 2. Which low-consumption practices have a significant impact on buildings energy demand?

13

14 **Results**

15 The adoption of low consumption practices can save more than half of the energy consumed in buildings

- 16 1. Half the buildings energy demand could be saved by 2050 and 61% by 2100
- 17 2. The decrease in energy demand is driven by new practices for hot water usage, insulation and by
18 the increased use of efficient air conditioners and heat pumps.

19

20 **Scenarios**

- 21 • Practices-low
- 22 • Practices-reference
- 23 • Practices-verylow

24

25 **Models**

- 26 • EDGE-Buildings 2.0

27

1 **4.3.3 Deep decarbonisation of building's energy services in demand & supply**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Levesque A, Pietzcker R.C, Baumstark L, Luderer G. 2020. Deep decarbonisation of buildings
4 energy services through demand and supply transformations. Submitted.

5

6 **Guiding questions**

7 Decarbonising buildings energy demand will pass through two types of strategies: first through an
8 overall reduction of energy demand, that could to some extent be reaped at negative costs; and second
9 through a reduction of the carbon content of energy via fuel switching and supply side decarbonisation.
10 This study assesses the contributions of each of these strategies for the decarbonisation of the buildings
11 sector in line with a 1.5°C global warming.

- 12 1. What is the respective importance of energy demand reductions and carbon-content reductions for
13 the decarbonisation of buildings in a 1.5°C scenario?
- 14 2. What is the impact of reducing the energy efficiency gap on energy demand and emissions?

15

16 **Results**

17 This study makes clear how important the reduction of the carbon content of energy is for the
18 decarbonisation of buildings energy demand.

- 19 1. The reduction of the carbon content of energy accounts for 81% of the emission reductions in the
20 sector compared to a baseline scenario without policy intervention. Energy demand reductions
21 contribute the remaining 19% despite energy demand reductions of 31%.
- 22 2. The impact of closing the energy efficiency gap is of similar magnitude on buildings energy
23 demand than carbon pricing in a 1.5°C scenario by 2050. Without supply side decarbonisation,
24 efficiency improvements almost entirely suppress the doubling of emissions that would otherwise
25 be expected, but fail to induce an absolute decline in emissions.

26

27 **Scenarios**

- 28 • Base
- 29 • Budg600
- 30 • Budg600-EG
- 31 • EG

32

33 **Models**

- 34 • REMIND-Buildings 2.0

35

4.3.4 Long term, cross-country effects of buildings insulation policies

Publications

- O.Y. Edelenbosch, D. Rovelli, A. Levesque, G. Marangoni and M. Tavoni. 2020. Long term, cross-country effects of buildings insulation policies. Technological Forecasting and Social Change (under review).

Guiding questions

What is the global potential for improved insulation of buildings as a climate policy measure, when taking in to account regional building stock dynamics and climate effects?

- Can we identify the important regional drivers of building stock development, and how do these impact the projected building stock globally and in the long-term?
- How does the regional development of building stock impact the projected insulation investments?
- What is the impact of delayed policy implementation?

Results

The model shows that the majority of buildings standing in 2050 will be built after 2015. Especially in regions outside of the OECD the increasing shares of new buildings is striking. While space cooling demand is expected to grow due to economic development, the level of insulation of new buildings remains low in these regions. New construction polices could thereby have a significant impact.

- We identify the current stock, economic growth, population, population age, and building lifetimes as key drivers that explain historically seen differences in buildings stock development. The model shows as a result large regional variation in building vintages across the world in 2050.
- The model projections show that while globally the majority of buildings in 2050 are built after 2015, in Europe, the opposite is true. This has major consequences for policy impact of building codes. In Europe and other OECD countries, renovating the existing building stock results in significantly higher savings than implementing new construction policies, due to the slower stock turnover and the relatively high current isulation levels of new build buildings. Subsequently, Europe and other OECD countries are more vulnerable to lock in effects, therefore in these regions acting fast and implementing ambitious (nZEB level) standards is fundamental to reduce building sector emissions. In China and Africa, on the other hand, focusing on new construction policies can be extremely effective, saving on itself up to respectively 43% and 64% of space heating and cooling final energy demand in 2050
- Assuming an electricity emission factor of 96 g/MJ (average of SSP2 baseline results for 2050 of the 6 marker models) and standard emission factors of other fuels globally implementation of the EPDB standards would save approximately 3 Gt worldwide. Delaying policy implementation with 10 years would reduce savings with about 1 Gt. In this case the largest relative losses due to delayed implementation occur in Europe, Russia and NCD countries.

Scenarios

- SSP1
- SSP2
- SSP2_2020_0.3_All

- 1 • SSP2_2020_0.3_NC
- 2 • SSP2_2020_1.0_All
- 3 • SSP2_2020_1.0_NC
- 4 • SSP3

5

6 **Models**

- 7 • EDGE-Buildings 3.0

8

1 **4.3.5 Energy Systems: Demand perspective**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Michael Hartner, Sebastian Forthuber, Lukas Kranzl, Sara Fritz, Eric Aichinger, Andreas
4 Müller. 2019. H2020 SET-Nav, D.5.8: WP5 Summary report - Energy Systems: Demand
5 perspective
6 ([http://www.set-nav.eu/sites/default/files/common_files/deliverables/D5.8%20SET-](http://www.set-nav.eu/sites/default/files/common_files/deliverables/D5.8%20SET-Nav_WP5_Summary_report_final.pdf)
7 [Nav_WP5_Summary_report_final.pdf](http://www.set-nav.eu/sites/default/files/common_files/deliverables/D5.8%20SET-Nav_WP5_Summary_report_final.pdf))

8

9 **Guiding questions**

10 In order to assess pathways towards a low carbon emission energy system, four pathway scenario
11 narratives aiming at an overall CO₂ emission reduction target for the energy system as a whole of
12 roughly -85% in the year 2050 compared to the year 2015 were developed in the SET-Nav project and
13 transformed into projections for the building sector.

- 14 1. Which factors trigger renovation rate and depth and how might building related energy policies
15 and other framework conditions affect energy demand in buildings?
- 16 2. Which factors trigger heating system choice (including district heating) and the uptake of on-site
17 RES and how might energy policies and other framework conditions affect the energy supply mix
18 of buildings and related generation of on-site RES?
- 19 3. How will these developments interact with the overall energy system?

20

21 **Results**

22 The total final energy demand decreases significantly in all pathways compared to the year 2015,
23 varying from -36% to -32%. Reductions are mainly achieved for space heating, whereas space cooling
24 demand increases significantly. Assuming a strong decarbonisation of the electricity and district heating
25 supply systems of around -95%, the pathway calculations for the demand side in the SET-Nav project
26 show that deep carbonization until 2050 is possible, although strong policy interventions in some form
27 are needed as early as possible to set the path for all actors in each sector.

- 28 1. The pathway analysis show that the final energy consumption for space heating and hot water can
29 be significantly reduced until 2050 through thermal refurbishments of the existing building stock,
30 leading to a conservation of renewable resources and facilitation the integration of heat pumps.
31 Ambitious CO₂ emission targets of more than 90% until the year 2050 can be reached. Our
32 modelling results show that policies regarding the efficiency in the building can significantly
33 influence the investment decision of building occupants and owners. However strong early
34 measures to increase the thermal efficiency of the European building stock are needed to reach
35 climate targets in line with the Paris agreement.
- 36 2. Very ambitious decarbonisation scenarios also go hand in hand with an early phase out of natural
37 gas in the long term, triggering large investments in alternative technologies for heating.
38 Electricity demand increases significantly due to a stronger diffusion of heat pumps. District
39 heating can be a substitute for natural gas in urban areas and allows to integrate central low carbon
40 heat sources. Heat pumps and solar systems are key technologies to reach low emissions in the
41 building stock. The use of biomass is crucial; however, biomass potentials are limited.
- 42 3. The decarbonisation of the buildings stock is strongly linked to the electricity system. Only if the
43 electricity system is decarbonized in parallel overall CO₂ emission reduction targets can be

1 reached. While final energy demand for heating is expected to still dominate the overall final
2 energy demand in buildings, electricity demand peaks can be significantly influenced by space
3 cooling.

4

5 **Scenarios**

- 6 • directed_vision_181015
- 7 • diversification_180904
- 8 • localization_181015
- 9 • national_champions_181011
- 10 • reference_181031

11

12 **Models**

- 13 • Invert/EE-Lab 1.9

1 **4.3.6 Reducing building CO₂ emissions 80% by 2050**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Langevin J, Harris CB, Reyna JL. 2019. Assessing the potential to reduce building CO₂
4 emissions 80% by 2050. Joule 3(10): 2403-2424. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2019.07.013>

5

6 **Guiding questions**

7 The study assesses the feasibility of reducing U.S. building energy CO₂ emissions 80% by 2050 -
8 consistent with the U.S. Mid-Century Strategy - using a reproducible and granular model of U.S.
9 building energy use

- 10 1. Can building energy-related CO₂ emissions be reduced 80% by 2050 relative to 2005 levels under
11 plausible scenarios of efficient technology deployment, electrification, and renewable electricity
12 penetration?
- 13 2. Which energy end uses and building types most influence reductions in overall building CO₂
14 emissions?
- 15 3. Which specific building technologies achieve the largest cost-effective CO₂ emissions reductions?
16

16

17 **Results**

18 A combination of aggressive efficiency measures, electrification, and high renewable energy
19 penetration can reduce building energy CO₂ emissions by 72%–78% relative to 2005 levels, just short
20 of the 2050 target.

- 21 1. By 2050, aggressive building efficiency, incentivized electrification, and high renewable
22 penetration can reduce building energy CO₂ emissions up to 78% relative to 2005
- 23 2. CO₂ emissions reductions are driven by the heating, water heating, and envelope end uses in
24 existing residential buildings
- 25 3. Prospective envelope, controls, and fuel switching heating and water heating technologies achieve
26 the largest cost-effective CO₂ emissions reductions
27

27

28 **Scenarios**

- 29 • 1: RB 1T
- 30 • 2: RB 1T-2T
- 31 • 3: RB 1T-2T-3T
- 32 • 4: RB 1T-2T-3T (FS0)
- 33 • 5: RB 1T-2T-3T (FS20)
- 34 • 6: HR 1T-2T-3T
- 35 • 7: HR 1T-2T-3T FS0
- 36 • 8: HR 1T-2T-3T FS20
- 37 • 9: HR 3T (FS0)
- 38 • 10: HR 3T (FS20)

39

40 **Models**

- 1 • Scout-0.4.3
- 2

1 **4.3.7 Annual Energy Outlook 2018**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook. 2018. DOE/EIA-0383. \$25
4 carbon dioxide allowance fee Side Case (Washington, DC, February 2018).
5 <https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo18/>

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7 **Guiding questions**

8 The study assesses the feasibility of reducing U.S. building energy CO₂ emissions 80% by 2050 -
9 consistent with the U.S. Mid-Century Strategy - using a reproducible and granular model of U.S.
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- 11 1. Can building energy-related CO₂ emissions be reduced 80% by 2050 relative to 2005 levels under
12 plausible scenarios of efficient technology deployment, electrification, and renewable electricity
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- 14 2. Which energy end uses and building types most influence reductions in overall building CO₂
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- 16 3. Which specific building technologies achieve the largest cost-effective CO₂ emissions reductions?
17

18 **Results**

19 A combination of aggressive efficiency measures, electrification, and high renewable energy
20 penetration can reduce building energy CO₂ emissions by 72%–78% relative to 2005 levels, just short
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- 22 1. By 2050, aggressive building efficiency, incentivized electrification, and high renewable
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- 24 2. CO₂ emissions reductions are driven by the heating, water heating, and envelope end uses in
25 existing residential buildings
- 26 3. Prospective envelope, controls, and fuel switching heating and water heating technologies achieve
27 the largest cost-effective CO₂ emissions reductions

28

29 **Scenarios**

- 30 • Baseline-AEO2018-HR

31

32 **Models**

- 33 • Scout-0.4.3

34

4.3.8 Zero emission technologies in a national building stock

Publications

- Sandberg N H, Naess J S, Brattebø H, Andresen I, Gustavsen A. 2020. What aggregated energy and GHG emission savings can be obtained by large-scale implementation of zero emission technologies in a national building stock? Submitted to Energy Policy.

Guiding questions

This study uses the dynamic building stock energy model RE-BUILDS 2.0 to estimate the potential energy and GHG emission savings from large-scale deployment of Zero Emission Building technologies in the Norwegian building stock

1. What development is to be expected in energy use and related GHG emissions in the Norwegian building stock towards 2050, in a Baseline scenario following recent trends?
2. What is the potential for additional savings from large-scale implementation of zero emission building technologies in new and renovated buildings towards 2050?
3. In the Norwegian context with domestic hydropower electricity production connected to the European electricity market with higher shares of non-renewable electricity production - what emission intensity factor should be applied for electricity and how does it affect the results?

Results

There is a large potential for energy and GHG emission savings from the Norwegian building stock, and large-scale deployment of zero emission building technologies will be important to reach the potential.

1. The Baseline scenario results in a 10% (7TWh) reduction in delivered energy, even though the simulated stock growth is 21% due to expected population growth. This is because a large share of the old and inefficient buildings is either demolished and replaced by new energy efficient construction or renovated and energy upgraded.
2. The most optimistic scenario results in additional energy savings of 30 TWh, or in total a 56% decrease in delivered energy from 2020 to 2050. Hence, stricter future regulations and practise will have important aggregated effects.
3. The applied emission intensity for electricity is critical for the estimated emissions. The results reveal a large relative GHG emission saving potential from all the five alternative emission factors for electricity that are applied. The absolute value, however, is 25 times higher when assuming the marginal emission factor than when assuming the average Norwegian consumption mix. In this context, we consider the marginal approach to better reflect the real saving potential, as a large reduction in electricity consumption in the Norwegian building stock affects the electricity production at the margin or makes available hydropower electricity to use in transport or other sectors.

Scenarios

- NOR_Baseline_a
- NOR_Baseline_b
- NOR_Baseline_c

- 1 • NOR_Baseline_d
- 2 • NOR_Baseline_e
- 3 • NOR_ZEB1_a
- 4 • NOR_ZEB1_b
- 5 • NOR_ZEB1_c
- 6 • NOR_ZEB1_d
- 7 • NOR_ZEB1_e
- 8 • NOR_ZEB2_a
- 9 • NOR_ZEB2_b
- 10 • NOR_ZEB2_c
- 11 • NOR_ZEB2_d
- 12 • NOR_ZEB2_e

13

14 **Models**

- 15 • RE-BUILDS 2.0

16

1 **4.3.9 Daily enthalpy gradients and the effects of climate change on the thermal energy**
2 **demand of buildings in the United States**

3 **Publications**

- 4 • Fonseca, J., & Schlueter, A. 2020. Daily enthalpy gradients and the effects of climate change
5 on the thermal energy demand of buildings in the United States. Applied Energy, 262, 114458.
6 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114458>

7
8 **Description**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **Results**

12 <placeholder>

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14 **Scenarios**

- 15 • High Impact - 50th percentile
16 • High Impact - 97.5th percentile
17 • High Impact - 2.5th percentile
18 • Low Impact - 2.5th percentile
19 • Low Impact - 50th percentile
20 • Low Impact - 97.5th percentile
21 • Medium Impact - 2.5th percentile
22 • Medium Impact - 50th percentile
23 • Medium Impact - 97.5th percentile

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25 **Models**

- 26 • DEG-USA 1.0
27 • HBLM-USA 1.0

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4.4 Land use

4.4.1 The central role of peatland protection and restoration in climate change mitigation

Publications

- Humpenöder, F., Karstens, K., Lotze-Campen, H., Leifeld, J., Menichetti, L., Barthelmes, A., & Popp, A. 2020. Peatland protection and restoration are key for climate change mitigation. *Environmental Research Letters*, 15(10), 104093. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abae2a>

Guiding questions

The study presents the first quantitative model-based projections of future peatland dynamics and associated GHG emissions in the context of a 2°C mitigation pathway.

1. How do projections of AFOLU GHG emissions change if emissions from degraded peatlands are accounted for?
2. How do land-demanding mitigation options like bioenergy production affect intact peatlands in the future?
3. What is the potential of peatland protection and restoration to reduced peatland-related emissions?

Results

Peatland protection and restoration are key for climate change mitigation

1. Without dedicated peatland policy and even in the case of peatland protection, our results indicate that the land system would remain a net source of CO₂ throughout the 21st century.
2. This result is in contrast to the outcome of current mitigation pathways, in which the land system turns into a net carbon sink by 2100.
3. According to our results, the land system would turn into a global net carbon sink by 2100, as projected by current mitigation pathways, if about 60% of present-day degraded peatlands would be rewetted in the coming decades, next to the protection of intact peatlands.

Scenarios

- SSP2_RCP2.6
- SSP2_RCP2.6+PeatProt
- SSP2_RCP2.6+PeatRestor

Models

- MAgPIE 4.2

5. National scenario studies

5.1 Africa

5.1.1 Pathways for low-carbon development in Africa

Publications

- van der Zwaan, B., Kober, T., Longa, F. D., van der Laan, A., & Jan Kramer, G. 2018. An integrated assessment of pathways for low-carbon development in Africa. *Energy Policy*, 117, 387–395. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.03.017>

Guiding questions

In this paper we investigate the prospects for the large-scale use of low-emission energy technologies in Africa. We use the TIAM-ECN model for our study, which renewables are detailed for energy systems research through a technology-rich cost-minimisation procedure.

- How can modern forms of energy be supplied to the continent while controlling global climate change through low-emission development strategies (LEDS)?
- Is Africa capable of “leap-frogging” the use of fossil fuels, that is, launching energy systems that from the outset mostly rely on renewable forms of energy, rather than following the pathways of developed countries?
- What is the cost-optimal configuration of renewable energy expansion in Africa?

Results

The results from our analysis fully support an Africa-led effort to substantially enhance the use of the continent's renewable energy potential.

- Results suggest that the current aim of achieving 300GW of additional renewable electricity generation capacity by 2030 is perhaps unrealistic, even given high GDP and population growth: we find figures that are close to half this level.
- We find evidence for leap-frogging opportunities, by which renewable energy options rather than fossil fuels could constitute the cost-optimal solution to fulfil most of Africa's growing energy requirements
- The use of renewable energy resources such as hydro, solar and wind power receives a major impetus under stringent climate change control. Biomass experiences a turn-around, as its use in traditional carbon-intensive (non-sustainable) ways for e.g. cooking and heating (mostly in solid form, essentially fuel wood and charcoal) is replaced by modern low-carbon (sustainable) usage in many sectors, notably cooking and its combustion in solid (waste) form in thermal power plants.

Scenarios

- 2DC
- CAP
- REF
- TAX

1 **Models**

- 2 • TIAM-ECN AFR 1.1

3

5.1.2 Kenya – are large-scale renewable energy deployment and dedicated low-carbon energy policy necessary?

Publications

- Dalla Longa, F., & van der Zwaan, B. 2017. Do Kenya's climate change mitigation ambitions necessitate large-scale renewable energy deployment and dedicated low-carbon energy policy? *Renewable Energy*, 113, 1559–1568. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2017.06.026>

Guiding questions

Kenya's climate change mitigation ambitions are analysed from an energy system perspective, with a focus on the role of renewable and other low-carbon energy technologies on achieving Kenya's NDCs. We use the TIAM-ECN model to characterize plausible development pathways for the Kenyan energy mix until 2050 under different climate change mitigation scenarios.

- Are the emission mitigation objectives of Kenya's NDC achievable and what do they entail for the energy mix?
- What are the possible additional costs of the Kenyan energy system under stringent mitigation scenarios?
- Are dedicated low-carbon energy policy measures necessary in all sectors to achieve Kenya's NDC ambitions?

Results

We conclude that the power sector can expand with mostly renewable energy options even in the absence of stringent greenhouse gas abatement targets. On the contrary, on the demand side a substantial deployment of low-carbon technologies is triggered only when ambitious emission reduction objectives are in place.

- We find that Kenya's NDC target is achievable with a timely deployment of renewable energy.
- Additional costs in 2050 range between 0.5% and 2% of Kenya's GDP in our mitigation scenarios.
- Stringent climate change policies are needed mostly in the residential and transport sectors, while the power sector can expand with low-carbon technologies even without GHG abatement targets.

Scenarios

- CAP
- NDC
- REF
- TAX

Models

- TIAM-ECN KEN 1.1

1 **5.1.3 Prospects for hydropower in Ethiopia: energy-water nexus analysis**

- 2 • van der Zwaan, B., Boccalon, A., & Dalla Longa, F. 2018. Prospects for hydropower in
3 Ethiopia: An energy-water nexus analysis. *Energy Strategy Reviews*, 19, 19–30.
4 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2017.11.001>

5

6 **Guiding questions**

7 We investigate the prospects for large-scale hydropower deployment in Ethiopia by the middle of the
8 century under climate change mitigation scenarios, using two distinct modelling approaches.

- 9 1. What are the expected levels of hydropower production in Ethiopia by the middle of the century,
10 under stringent climate change control policy?
- 11 2. Can energy-system cost-minimization and hydrological models be combined to provide useful
12 insights on hydropower development as a climate change mitigation option?
- 13 3. What is the key policy recommendation for the future development of hydropower in Ethiopia?

14

15 **Results**

16 With two distinct modelling approaches we find high projections for future hydropower generation,
17 despite domestic water use and irrigated agriculture water demand expansions, and irrespective of
18 hydrological effects from climate change in terms of a drop in average precipitation nationwide.

- 19 1. Our projections indicate hydropower production levels between 71 and 87 TWh/yr by 2050 in a
20 stringent climate change control scenario in which Ethiopia contributes substantially to global
21 efforts to reach the 2°C target of the Paris Agreement.
- 22 2. Our combined energy cost-minimisation and hydrological balance analysis shows that our models
23 can be jointly used for the assessment of hydropower as climate change mitigation option, and can
24 assist in the design of policies that integrate the energy and water sectors.
- 25 3. Our case study did not yield direct reasons for the Ethiopian government to swiftly stop pursuing
26 its current ambitious national hydropower development plan, but we encourage it to adequately
27 internalise an extensive range of factors - including environmental, geopolitical and social - that
28 may induce it to take a different course.

29

30 **Scenarios**

- 31 • Baseline
- 32 • RCP2.6

33

34 **Models**

- 35 • TIAM-ECN ETH 1.1

36

1 **5.1.4 Alternatives for climate mitigation in Madagascar**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Nogueira, L. P., Longa, F. D., & van der Zwaan, B. 2020. A cross-sectoral integrated
4 assessment of alternatives for climate mitigation in Madagascar. *Climate Policy*, 1–17.
5 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1791030>

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 Using the integrated assessment model TIAM-ECN, we analyse how Madagascar’s nationally
9 determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement can be implemented in both the energy and non-
10 energy sectors.

- 11 1. What is the role of mitigation in AFOLU and in the Malagasy energy system to achieve the NDC
12 target of 2030 and beyond?
- 13 2. Given the links between AFOLU and energy sectors in Madagascar, which co-benefits (related to
14 Sustainable Development Goals) can be maximized under the different mitigation scenarios?
- 15 3. Which energy technologies are key for the transition towards a low-carbon economy in
16 Madagascar?

17

18 **Results**

19 We find that land use is the main sector in which large greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions must
20 be achieved, but there are opportunities to also exploit the country’s abundant domestic low-carbon
21 energy resources.

- 22 1. Biomass may well remain the most important energy resource in Madagascar until 2050, mainly
23 driven by residential cooking demand. Solid biomass stoves with efficient combustion should be
24 promoted hand-in-hand with alternative fuels, e.g. electricity and bioethanol.
- 25 2. Promoting GHG mitigation in both AFOLU and energy sectors maximizes co-benefits, which
26 enables achieving a higher number of sustainable development goals (SDGs).
- 27 3. Providing electricity for household services is an important part of climate change mitigation.
28 Investments in power distribution infrastructure and decentralized electricity generation are
29 needed to achieve electrification of rural households.

30

31 **Scenarios**

- 32 • NDC
- 33 • NDC+
- 34 • REF

35

36 **Models**

- 37 • TIAM-ECN MDG 1.1

38

1

2 **5.2 Americas**

3 **5.2.1 Are conventional energy megaprojects competitive?**

4 **Publications**

- 5 • Köberle, A. C., Garaffa, R., Cunha, B. S. L., Rochedo, P., Lucena, A. F. P., Szklo, A., &
6 Schaeffer, R. 2018. Are conventional energy megaprojects competitive? Suboptimal decisions
7 related to cost overruns in Brazil. *Energy Policy*, 122, 689–700.
8 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.08.021>
- 9 • Fragkos, P., Laura van Soest, H., Schaeffer, R., Reedman, L., Köberle, A. C., Macaluso, N., ...
10 Iyer, G. 2021. Energy system transitions and low-carbon pathways in Australia, Brazil, Canada,
11 China, EU-28, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States.
12 *Energy*, 216, 119385. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.119385>
- 13 • R Rochedo, P. R., Soares-Filho, B., Schaeffer, R., Viola, E., Szklo, A., Lucena, F. P., ...
14 Rathmann, R. 2018. The threat of political bargaining to climate mitigation in Brazil. *Nature*
15 *Climate Change*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.119385>
- 16 • Schaeffer, R., Köberle, A., van Soest, H. L., Bertram, C., Luderer, G., Riahi, K., ...
17 Potashnikov, V. 2020. Comparing transformation pathways across major economies. *Climatic*
18 *Change*, 162(4), 1787–1803. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02837-9>
- 19 • Köberle, A. C., Rochedo, P. R. R., Lucena, A. F. P., Szklo, A., & Schaeffer, R. 2020. Brazil's
20 emission trajectories in a well-below 2 °C world: the role of disruptive technologies versus
21 land-based mitigation in an already low-emission energy system. *Climatic Change*, 162(4),
22 1823–1842. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02856-6>

23

24 **Guiding questions**

25 This study analyses the competitiveness of energy megaprojects when accounting for construction cost
26 overruns (CCO).

- 27 1. Do optimistic assumptions on techno-economic performance of megaprojects favour their
28 inclusion in the solution of integrated assessment models (IAMs), preventing higher shares of non-
29 hydro renewables, energy efficiency and other low-carbon options?
- 30 2. Do the inclusion of regional cost overruns and delays for energy megaprojects can affect the
31 solution of a cost-optimization model for the expansion of energy infrastructure in Brazil?

32

33 **Results**

34 CCO inclusion in IAMs reflects a more realistic baseline scenario, indicating renewable energy sources
35 as the least-cost options for the energy supply system expansion, and reducing GHG emissions.

- 36 1. CCO inclusion in IAMs may raise the cost of the baseline scenario, thereby reducing the perceived
37 cost of climate change mitigation by showing that the business-as-usual scenarios assumed as
38 costless actually have a hefty cost associated with them.
- 39 2. At least in Brazil, the focus should be on small(er)-scale solutions for power generation. Such
40 projects may have a higher investment cost per unit of capacity but run a much lesser risk of facing
41 significant delays and cost overruns.

- 1 3. The real appraisalment of CCO of megaprojects can indicate non-hydro renewables, energy
2 efficiency and other low-carbon options as the least-cost technologies for the energy supply
3 system expansion, even in the absence of carbon mitigation policies, reducing GHG emissions.

4

5 **Scenarios**

- 6 • BL
7 • OR

8

9 **Models**

- 10 • COPPE_MSB-Brazil 2.0

11

1

2 **5.2.2 Integration of Renewable Energy Sources in the Mexican Energy System**

3 **Publications**

- 4 • Sarmiento, L., Burandt, T., Löffler, K., & Oei, P.-Y. 2019. Analyzing Scenarios for the
5 Integration of Renewable Energy Sources in the Mexican Energy System—An Application of
6 the Global Energy System Model (GENeSYS-MOD). *Energies*, 12(17), 3270.
7 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12173270>

8

9 **Guiding questions**

10 This paper uses numerical techno-economic modelling to analyse the effect of current national
11 renewable targets and climate goals on the cost and structural composition of the Mexican energy
12 system.

- 13 1. How do costs and power mixes change in response to variations in energy and climate policies?
14 Specifically, what are the effects of current renewable targets and climate goals vis-a-vis a
15 scenario without the implementation of climate policies and another attaining full decarbonization.
- 16 2. Second, what is the 2050 cost-optimal share of renewables in the Mexican energy mix for the
17 power, heating and transportation sectors?
- 18 3. Are the climate goals and renewable targets aligned and how much do these deviates from the full
19 decarbonization and policy free scenarios?

20

21 **Results**

22 Results from the study show that Mexican renewable targets are insufficient and sub-optimal: the model
23 shows that the optimal share of renewables for the generation of electricity is 80%, that is, 30% higher
24 than current commitments in the national strategy for the promotion of clean fuels and technologies.
25 Even more, the share of renewables in the power mix between BAU and National Targets is very
26 similar. This indicates that current renewable targets do not even deviate from a scenario without
27 climate policies, meaning that there is a misalignment between climate goals and renewable targets.

- 28 1. A significant dependence of the energy system on photovoltaics and natural gas can be observed.
- 29 2. The 2050 cost-optimal share of renewables for the production of electricity, transportation and
30 industrial heating is respectively 75%, 90% and 5%.
- 31 3. As national renewable targets for the power sector are lower than the cost-optimal share of
32 renewables, equivalent to the shares in a scenario without climate policies and completely
33 disconnected from national climate goals, these should be modified.

34

35 **Scenarios**

- 36 • 100% Renewable 1.0
- 37 • BAU 1.0
- 38 • Climate Goals 1.0
- 39 • National Targets 1.0

40

1 **Models**

- 2 • GENeSYS-MOD-MEX 2.1

3

1 **5.2.3 Long-term Deep Decarbonisation Pathways for Ecuador**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Villamar, D, Soria, R, Rochedo, P, Szklo, A, Imperio, M, Carvajal, P, Schaeffer, R. Long-term
4 Deep Decarbonisation Pathways for Ecuador: Insights from an Integrated Assessment Model.
5 Energy Strategy Reviews (under review)

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 What would be the future energy and emissions pathway for Ecuador, framed in a decarbonization
9 trajectory aligned with the 1.5C target of the Paris Agreement?

- 10 1. How would Ecuador face the post petroleum era and its energy transition in the next decades? Is
11 it an opportunity for a sustainable energy development?
- 12 2. Is there a decarbonisation pathway for Ecuador that does not oppose the country's long-term
13 economic development?
- 14 3. Which are the technologies required for decarbonizing Ecuador's energy and land sectors?

15

16 **Results**

17 Ecuador's NDC are not aligned with the "well below" 2°C target, but achieving deep decarbonisation is
18 possible through bioenergy, electrification and reforestation.

- 19 1. In the reference scenario, oil still remains as the main energy source, fossil fuels increase its share
20 in the power generation matrix and a rampant deforestation is observed to make room for pastures
21 and grasslands
- 22 2. However, to achieve negative emissions, biomass is a key energy fuel, including disruptive
23 technologies as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).
- 24 3. Also, renewable energies dominate the power generation, allowing a massive electrification of
25 transportation, buildings and industry, suitable to decarbonize the country.

26

27 **Scenarios**

- 28 • DDP_High
- 29 • MinC

30

31 **Models**

- 32 • ELENA-Ecuador 1.0

33

1 **5.2.4 Economic and social implications of low-emission development pathways in Brazil**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • La Rovere, E. L., Wills, W., Grottera, C., Dubeux, C. B. S., & Gesteira, C. 2018. Economic
4 and social implications of low-emission development pathways in Brazil. Carbon Management,
5 9(5), 563–574. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17583004.2018.1507413>

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 <placeholder>

9

10 **Results**

11 <placeholder>

12

13 **Scenarios**

- 14 • 1.5C
- 15 • GPS
- 16 • MA1T
- 17 • MA2T
- 18 • Reference

19

20 **Models**

- 21 • IMACLIM-BR 1.0

22

1 **5.2.5 Publication**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • < placeholder >

4

5 **Guiding questions**

6 < placeholder >

7

8 **Results**

9 < placeholder >

10

11 **Scenarios**

- 12 • 100% RE
- 13 • 100% renewable primary energy
- 14 • central
- 15 • central low fuel price
- 16 • central low RE cost
- 17 • central, low fossil fuel price
- 18 • central, low renewables cost
- 19 • delayed electrification
- 20 • low demand
- 21 • low land
- 22 • net negative

23

24 **Models**

- 25 • RIO-USA 1.0

26

1 **5.2.6 Publication**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • < placeholder >

4

5 **Guiding questions**

6 < placeholder >

7

8 **Results**

9 < placeholder >

10

11 **Scenarios**

- 12 • 100% RE
- 13 • 100% renewable primary energy
- 14 • central
- 15 • central low fuel price
- 16 • central low RE cost
- 17 • central, low fossil fuel price
- 18 • central, low renewables cost
- 19 • delayed electrification
- 20 • low demand
- 21 • low land
- 22 • net negative

23

24 **Models**

- 25 • RIO-USA 1.0
- 26 • EnergyPATHWAYS-USA 1.0

27

1 **5.2.7 Study**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **Scenarios**

- 12 • CCS_XNDC
13 • DD1
14 • DD2
15 • HdNC_XNDC

16

17 **Models**

- 18 • IMACLIM-ARG 1.0

19

20

21

1

2 **5.3 Asia**

3 **5.3.1 Asian INDC Assessments: The Case of Thailand.**

4 **Publications**

- 5 • Limmeechokchai, B., Chunark, P., Fujimori, S., & Masui, T. 2017. Asian INDC Assessments:
6 The Case of Thailand. In Post-2020 Climate Action (pp. 157–178). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3869-3_10)
7 981-10-3869-3_10

8

9 **Guiding questions**

10 Explore the NDC implications in Asian countries (Thailand, Vietnam and India)

- 11 1. NDC impacts on energy and economy

12

13 **Results**

14 NDC has not much impacts on economy

- 15 1. NDC has not much impacts on economy

16

17 **Scenarios**

- 18 • BaU
- 19 • RED1
- 20 • RED2
- 21 • RED3
- 22 • RED4

23

24 **Models**

- 25 • AIM/Hub-Thailand 2.0

26

1 **5.3.2 The Role of Renewable Energies in Vietnam with respect to the INDCs**

- 2 • Tran, T. T., Fujimori, S., & Masui, T. 2017. Realizing the Intended Nationally Determined
3 Contribution: The Role of Renewable Energies in Vietnam. In Post-2020 Climate Action (pp.
4 179–200). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3869-3_11

5

6 **Guiding questions**

7 Explore the NDC implications in Asian countries (Thailand Vietnam and India).

- 8 1. NDC impacts on energy and economy.

9

10 **Results**

11 NDC has not much impacts on economy.

- 12 1. NDC has not much impacts on economy.

13

14 **Scenarios**

- 15 • AddRE-HighINDC
16 • BaU
17 • HighRE-HighINDC
18 • HighRE-LowINDC
19 • LowRE-HighINDC
20 • LowRE-LowINDC

21

22 **Models**

- 23 • AIM/Hub-Vietnam 2.0

24

1 **5.3.3 Implications of Japan’s 2030 target for long-term low emission pathways**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Oshiro, K., Kainuma, M., & Masui, T. (2017). Implications of Japan’s 2030 target for long-
4 term low emission pathways. Energy Policy, 110, 581–587.
5 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.003>

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 Exploring the impact of Japan’s NDC target for the long-term goal by 2050 as well as the feasibility of
9 the 2030 target itself.

- 10 1. Is the ambition level of the NDC target sufficient given the 2050 goal to reduce GHG emission by
11 80%?
- 12 2. What are the key mitigation options for meeting both 2030 and 2050 goals?
- 13 3. What is the implication of different 2030 target level for the longer-term transformation pathways?

14

15 **Results**

16 NDC implementation is effective for energy system changes, while additional mitigation actions are
17 required to meet the longer-term goals.

- 18 1. Implementation of the NDC could consolidate a transition from the baseline trajectory for
19 decarbonization, but more actions are needed after 2030.
- 20 2. Energy efficiency and decarbonization of energy supply are key options both for 2030 and 2050
21 goals, while strong electrification is needed mainly after 2030.
- 22 3. Without enhancing the 2030 target, rapid and huge transformation of energy system after 2030
23 would be required.

24

25 **Scenarios**

- 26 • MILES_baseline
- 27 • MILES_INDC80

28

29 **Models**

- 30 • AIM/Enduse-Japan 2.1

31

1 **5.3.4 Energy transformation cost for the Japanese mid-century strategy**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Fujimori, S., Oshiro, K., Shiraki, H., & Hasegawa, T. 2019. Energy transformation cost for the
4 Japanese mid-century strategy. *Nature Communications*, 10(1), 4737.
5 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-12730-4>

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 Exploring the policy costs reduction by using the economic model integrating an energy system model's
9 outputs, using Japan's mid-century climate mitigation target as an example.

- 10 1. Economic impacts of meeting Japan's 2050 goal to reduce GHG emissions by 80% by 2050.
- 11 2. The comparison of the level of economic impact between the integrated model and conventional
12 economic model alone.
- 13 3. Which sectors are main contributor to the differences between these two modelling approaches?

14

15 **Results**

16 The economic impact estimated with the integrated model were significantly lower than those in the
17 conventional economic model.

- 18 1. The GDP losses in 80% reduction goal by 2050 in Japan were estimated around 1% based on the
19 integrated model.
- 20 2. The GDP losses estimated with the integrated model were significantly lower than those in the
21 conventional economic model
- 22 3. Industry and service sector energy consumption are the main factors causing these differences.

23

24 **Scenarios**

- 25 • 80NPi
- 26 • BaU
- 27 • NoCCS_80NPi
- 28 • NoCCS_BaU
- 29 • NoNuc_80NPi
- 30 • NoNuc_BaU

31

32 **Models**

- 33 • AIM/CGE-Enduse-Japan 1.0

34

5.3.5 Japan's long term climate mitigation target and the relevance of uncertain nuclear policy

Publications

- Silva Herran, D., Fujimori, S., & Kainuma, M. 2019. Implications of Japan's long term climate mitigation target and the relevance of uncertain nuclear policy. *Climate Policy*, 19(9), 1117–1131. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1634507>

Guiding questions

Assessment of 80% emission reduction target by 2050 in Japan considering scenarios with limited nuclear power deployment, and limited mitigation capacity.

1. Is it possible to achieve Japan's 2050 mitigation goal with limited availability of key mitigation measures?
2. What is the role of limited availability of nuclear power in achieving the 2050 goal?
3. What are the macroeconomic and energy security implications?

Results

Target of 80% emissions reduction by 2050 was assessed with a CGE model in scenarios assuming limited availability of key mitigation measures.

1. 80% emissions reduction by 2050 is feasible for all scenarios irrespective of which mitigation measure is limited, but with varying levels of economic and energy systems impacts; considerable reductions in energy consumption are needed in addition to energy supply dominated by low carbon sources.
2. The long-term target is feasible even with early phase out of nuclear power, and its absence can be counterbalanced by natural gas and CCS deployment.
3. The macroeconomic impact (GDP loss) was the largest when CCS is unavailable, and relatively small when nuclear power is limited or phased out; energy security indicators improved compared to the baseline in mitigation scenarios; expanding the availability of renewable resources lowers the macroeconomic impacts but doesn't affect the relative relevance of limiting mitigation measures.

Scenarios

- AEEI_L_NDC80
- Default_NDC80
- NoCCS_NDC80
- Nuc_H_NDC80
- Nuc_L_NDC80
- Nuc_no_NDC80
- PrFossil_L_NDC80
- RE_CostRed_L_NDC80
- Reference
- vreH_Default_NDC80

- 1 • vreH_NoCCS_NDC80
- 2 • vreH_Nuc_L_NDC80
- 3 • vreH_Reference

4

5 **Models**

- 6 • AIM/Hub-Japan 2.1

7

5.3.6 Decarbonizing China's energy system: electricity, transportation, heat, industrial sectors

Publications

- Burandt, T., Xiong, B., Löffler, K., & Oei, P. Y. 2019. Decarbonizing China's energy system – Modeling the transformation of the electricity, transportation, heat, and industrial sectors. *Applied Energy*, 255, 113820. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113820>

Guiding questions

This paper describes three potential decarbonization pathways to analyse different effects for the electricity, transport, heating, and industrial sectors until 2050. Using an enhanced version of the multi-sectoral, open-source Global Energy System Model, enables us to assess the impact of different CO₂ budgets on the upcoming energy system transformation. A detailed provincial resolution allows for the implementation of regional characteristics and disparities within China. Conclusively, we complement the model-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of current barriers for the needed transformation.

1. What are suitable pathways for the decarbonization of the Chinese energy system?
2. What role does sector-coupling play in the fulfilment of climate goals?
3. What effects will such a low-carbon transition have on the Chinese coal consumption?

Results

Results indicate that overall energy system CO₂ emissions and in particular coal usage have to be reduced drastically to meet (inter-) national climate targets. Specifically, coal consumption has to decrease by around 60% in 2050 compared to 2015. The current Nationally Determined Contributions proposed by the Chinese government of peaking emissions in 2030 are, therefore, not sufficient to comply with a global CO₂ budget in line with the Paris Agreement. Renewable energies, in particular photovoltaics and onshore wind, profit from decreasing costs and can provide a more sustainable and cheaper energy source. Furthermore, increased stakeholder interactions and incentives are needed to mitigate the resistance of local actors against a low-carbon transformation.

1. China's Nationally Determined Contributions do not comply with the Paris Agreement.
2. Sector coupling increases the electricity demand by 100% (2 °C) to 400% (1.5 °C).
3. Incentives for local actors are needed for a sustainable low-carbon transformation.

Scenarios

- Ambitious 1.0
- Limited Effort 1.0
- Paris Agreement 1.0

Models

- GENeSYS-MOD-CHN 2.3

5.3.7 Macroeconomic pathways of the Saudi economy: global mitigation action versus the opportunity of national energy reforms

Publications

- Soummane, Salaheddine, Frédéric Gherzi, and Julien Lefèvre. 2019. Macroeconomic pathways of the Saudi economy: The challenge of global mitigation action versus the opportunity of national energy reforms. *Energy policy* 130 (2019): 263-282. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421519302356>

Guiding questions

We analyse the mid-term macroeconomic challenge to Saudi Arabia of a global low-carbon transition reducing oil revenues, versus the opportunity of national energy reforms.

1. What are the macroeconomic implications for Saudi Arabia of oil prices compatible with the Paris Agreement?
2. Can domestic energy price reforms and energy efficiency measures mitigate the impact of oil rent losses for Saudi Arabia?

Results

Low oil prices are associated with macroeconomic losses for Saudi Arabia. By 2030, shifting from the NPS to the SDS oil price of the IEA lowers economic growth, increases unemployment and public debt. Energy price reforms and efficiency measures can mitigate the economic impact of oil rent losses.

1. By 2030, the Saudi economy loses 1.4 GDP points, 1.6 employment points and USD 504 billion trade surplus accumulation from shifting from IEA's NPS to IEA's SDS oil prices. Its cumulated public deficit rises to 92.8% of GDP.
2. National reforms gradually aligning Saudi energy prices on international prices and inducing structural change of Saudi activity away from energy-intensive industries mitigate these costs if a share of the public income from energy-price deregulation is directed to investment.
3. However, they reduce the cumulated trade surplus and fail to control public deficit accumulation. Sensitivity analysis confirms the capacity of national energy reforms to mitigate the activity cost of global mitigation action, but aggravates the threat of an escalating public deficit.

Scenarios

- Baseline
- Low-Oil-Price
- Reformed

Models

- KLEM-SAU 1.0

1 **5.3.8 Publication**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

5 **Guiding questions**

6 The housing module of the Sustainable Alternative Futures for India (SAFARI) model contributes the
7 first annually, dynamically computed estimate of India's affordable housing shortage. We consider
8 improved benchmarks for quality of life and estimate shortage up to 2050.

- 9 1. How much of the annual and dynamic housing shortage will be met at current rates of affordable
10 housing construction (BAU)? At what increased construction rates will this shortage be met?
- 11 2. What are the energy and resource implications of meeting this shortage along with India's growing
12 consumption patterns?
- 13 3. With India's urbanization trends, what type of built form would result in the fewest land,
14 emissions, and energy trade-offs and most quality-of-life benefits when combined with urban
15 transport?

17 **Results**

18 While current government estimates of India's affordable housing shortage can be met in a business-
19 as-usual scenario, our dynamically computed estimate based on improved quality of life benchmarks
20 will need increased construction rates. However, the land, energy and emission trade-offs can be limited
21 through better urban planning.

- 22 1. Current construction rates are not sufficient to meet India's affordable housing shortage based on
23 our recalibrated benchmarks. A 50-60 % increase in annual construction will be required to meet
24 the shortage by 2030-2040.
- 25 2. The increase in energy demands and emissions is predominantly driven by India's growing
26 consumption patterns of higher-income housing rather than from bridging affordable housing
27 shortage.
- 28 3. Compact form with high urban green space per capita and public transport results in the least land
29 conversion, and emissions and energy trade-offs. Urban sprawl with higher shares of private
30 transport results in the greatest land conversion and emissions and energy trade-offs.

31

32 **Scenarios**

- 33 • SAFARI_BAU
- 34 • SAFARI_HFA_AMB
- 35 • SAFARI_HFA_CUR
- 36 • SAFARI_HFA_HighEff
- 37 • SAFARI_HFA_LeastEff
- 38 • SAFARI_HFA_SDG
- 39 • SAFARI_HFA_SDG_Compact
- 40 • SAFARI_HFA_SDG_Sprawl

41

1 **Models**

- 2 • SAFARI 1.0

3

1 **5.3.9 Asian INDC Assessments: The Case of Thailand**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Limmeechokchai, B., Chunark, P., Fujimori, S., & Masui, T. 2017. Asian INDC Assessments:
4 The Case of Thailand. In Post-2020 Climate Action (pp. 157–178). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3869-3_10
5

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 < placeholder >

9

10 **Results**

11 < placeholder >

12

13 **Scenarios**

- 14 • BaU

15

16 **Models**

- 17 • AIM/Hub-Thailand 2.0

18

1 **5.3.10 India INDC Assessment: Emission Gap Between Pledged Target and 2 °C Target**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Shukla, P. R., Mittal, S., Liu, J.-Y., Fujimori, S., Dai, H., & Zhang, R. (2017). India INDC
4 Assessment: Emission Gap Between Pledged Target and 2 °C Target. In Post-2020 Climate
5 Action (pp. 113–124). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3869-3_7

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 < placeholder >

9

10 **Results**

11 < placeholder >

12

13 **Scenarios**

- 14 • INDC
- 15 • Reference
- 16 • Two-Degree

17

18 **Models**

- 19 • AIM/Hub-India 2.0

20

1 **5.3.11 An Assessment of Indonesia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Fujimori, S., Siagian, U. W. R., Hasegawa, T., Yuwono, B. B., Boer, R., Immanuel, G., &
4 Masui, T. 2017. An Assessment of Indonesia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions.
5 In Post-2020 Climate Action (pp. 125–142). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3869-3_8

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 < placeholder >

9

10 **Results**

11 < placeholder >

12

13 **Scenarios**

- 14 • Baseline
15 • CM

16

17 **Models**

- 18 • AIM/Hub-Indonesia 2.0

19

1 **5.3.12 Low carbon development in China**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Chen W, Yin X, Zhang H. 2016. Towards low carbon development in China: a comparison of
4 national and global models. Climatic Change, 136(1): 95-108. DOI:10.1007/s10584-013-0937-
5 7
- 6 • Wang H, Chen W, Zhang H, et al. 2019. Modeling of power sector decarbonization in China:
7 comparisons of early and delayed mitigation towards 2-degree target. Climatic Change, 2019:
8 1-14. DOI:10.1007/s10584-019-02485-8

9

10 **Guiding questions**

11 < placeholder >

12

13 **Results**

14 < placeholder >

15

16 **Scenarios**

- 17 • INDC
- 18 • INDC_2030_290
- 19 • INDC_2030_400
- 20 • NPi
- 21 • NPi_2020_290
- 22 • NPi_2020_400

23

24 **Models**

- 25 • TIMES-China 2.0

26

1 **5.3.13 Deep decarbonization in India**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • P.R.Shukla, Dhar, S., Pathak, M., Mahadevia, D. and Garg, A. 2015. Pathways to deep
4 decarbonization in India, pp. 62. Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and
5 Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI)

6

7 **Guiding questions**

8 < placeholder >

9

10 **Results**

11 < placeholder >

12

13 **Scenarios**

- 14 • Conventional
15 • Sustainable

16

17 **Models**

- 18 • ANSWERMARKAL-INDIA 1.0

19

1 **5.3.14 Energy efficiency and CO₂ emissions reduction potential in the buildings sector in**
2 **China**

3 **Publications**

- 4 • Zhou Nan, Nina Khanna, Wei Feng, Jing Ke, Mark Levin. 2018. Scenarios of energy efficiency
5 and CO₂ emissions reduction potential in the buildings sector in China to year 2050. Nature
6 Energy 3(11), 978.

7

8 **Guiding questions**

9 < placeholder >

10

11 **Results**

12 < placeholder >

13

14 **Scenarios**

- 15 • Reference Scenario
16 • Techno-economic potential scenario

17

18 **Models**

- 19 • DREAM-China 1.1

20

1 **5.3.15 Study**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • <Literature placeholder>

4

5 **Guiding questions**

6 <placeholder>

7

8 **Results**

9 <placeholder>

10

11 **Scenarios**

- 12 • CET-1

- 13 • Ref-1

14

15 **Models**

- 16 • CGE-IMRT 1.0

17

18

19

1

2 **5.4 Europe**

3 **5.4.1 Potential for hydrogen and Power-to-Liquid in a low-carbon EU energy system**

4 **Publications**

- 5 • Blanco, H., Nijs, W., Ruf, J., & Faaij, A. 2018. Potential for hydrogen and Power-to-Liquid in
6 a low-carbon EU energy system using cost optimization. *Applied Energy*, 232, 617–639.
7 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.09.216>

8

9 **Guiding questions**

10 This study assesses the role of hydrogen and Power-to-Liquid by using the JRC-EU-TIMES model that
11 includes 31 countries. The scenarios achieve 95–100% CO₂ reduction by 2050 within the entire EU27+
12 energy system. The scenarios from the open model explore the impacts of CO₂ neutrality that is reached
13 through a net-zero sum of carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industrial processes and carbon
14 dioxide removals.

- 15 1. What is priority uses of hydrogen and Power-to-Liquid when aiming at net-zero carbon?
- 16 2. How relevant are hydrogen and Power-to-Liquid fuels and how are they produced?
- 17 3. What are the technology challenges when underground storage of CO₂ is restricted, given that also
18 biomass use is limited?

19

20 **Results**

21 Electrification occurs already in the baseline scenario and electricity meets 45% of final energy demand
22 in the other scenarios (including non-energy uses and bunkers). Electricity generation up to 2050
23 increases by a factor 3. Close to 50% of the future electricity demand is for electrolyzers. In 2050, the
24 consumption of electricity for hydrogen production can reach up to 3 600 TWh which is comparable to
25 the current size of the electricity sector.

- 26 1. Hydrogen represents an attractive option for steel (direction reduction) and heavy-duty trucks.
27 Power-to-Liquid can complement Biomass-to-Liquid increasing the liquid yield and satisfy the
28 demand for sectors that are more difficult to electrify like aviation or marine transport.
- 29 2. Hydrogen makes up around 15% and Power-to-Liquid fuels make up 10 to 20% of final energy
30 consumption (including non-energy uses and bunkers). Hydrogen based synfuels or synthetic
31 hydrocarbons are produced by combining hydrogen that originates almost entirely from electricity
32 and CO₂ that originates mostly as a by-product from the production of 2nd generation biofuel.
- 33 3. When underground storage of CO₂ is reduced from 0.8 to 0.3 GtCO₂/yr, around 8 EJ of fossil fuel
34 is replaced by solar electricity to provide sufficient hydrogen and e-fuels. The use of Direct Air
35 Capture reduces but remains important for carbon removal. When underground storage of CO₂ is
36 limited to zero, only 95% reduction of CO₂ is possible and Direct Air Capture does not play a role
37 any longer.

38

39 **Scenarios**

- 40 • Hydrogen_Economy_T95

- 1 • Open_Baseline
- 2 • Open_Zero_Carbon
- 3 • Open_Zero_Carbon_HighCCS

4

5 **Models**

- 6 • JRC-EU-TIMES 1.1.1

7

1 **5.4.2 Deployment scenarios for low carbon energy technologies**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Nijs, W., Ruiz Castello, P., Tarvydas, D., Tsiropoulos, I., & Zucker, A. 2019. Deployment
4 scenarios for low carbon energy technologies - Publications Office of the EU. Retrieved from
5 [https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1c25c504-1878-11e9-8d04-](https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1c25c504-1878-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en)
6 [01aa75ed71a1/language-en](https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1c25c504-1878-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en)

8 **Guiding questions**

9 The Low Carbon Energy Observatory (LCEO) aims to provide top-class data, analysis and intelligence
10 on developments in low carbon energy supply technologies. Up to now, 25 reports are available from
11 the Publications Office of the European Union. In-house scenarios have been developed with the JRC-
12 EU-TIMES model to explore energy prospects within the EU to reach 80-100% reduction of CO₂.

- 13 1. What are the implications of an 80% CO₂ reduction when using all technology options, including
14 massive use of permanent storage of CO₂?
- 15 2. What are the implications of an 80% CO₂ reduction when permanent underground storage of CO₂
16 is not an option?
- 17 3. What are the mitigation options that allow reaching 100% CO₂ reduction?

19 **Results**

20 It is not possible to reach net-zero carbon emissions in the EU in the absence of CO₂ sequestration. With
21 limited amounts of underground CO₂ storage (0.3 GtCO₂/yr), the results show large amounts of RES,
22 hydrogen and e-fuels.

- 23 1. In scenario 'LCEO Diversified', almost 60% of the total CO₂ is stored or used, mostly captured
24 from power production. Permanent storage of CO₂ occurs in the countries where underground
25 storage of CO₂ has not been restricted yet. Such transformations would require a rapid scale-up of
26 CCS technologies.
- 27 2. In scenario 'LCEO ProRES', energy is mainly produced with renewable resources. Power-to-
28 Liquid (e-fuel) complements biofuels in sectors with no easy electric alternative like aviation.
29 Biomass is in most cases equipped with CCS, whether it is for power, heat or biofuels.
- 30 3. In scenario 'LCEO Zero Carbon' the further reduction of fossil fuels is compensated by an
31 increase of electricity production from solar (+65%) and from wind (+20%). Underground
32 sequestration of CO₂ (0.3 GtCO₂/yr) is mainly done with CO₂ from Direct Air Capture. Part of the
33 CO₂ captured from biomass and Direct Air Capture is reused to produce e-fuels (0.2 GtCO₂/yr).
34 The energy use of buildings consists almost entirely of electricity and ambient and district heat.

36 **Scenarios**

- 37 • LCEO ProRES SET Plan
- 38 • LCEO Baseline
- 39 • LCEO Diversified
- 40 • LCEO Zero Carbon

41

1 **Models**

- 2 • JRC-EU-TIMES 1.1.1

3

1 **5.4.3 Low Carbon Futures of the pan-European Energy System**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Quantitative Scenarios for Low Carbon Futures of the pan-European Energy System. (n.d.).

5 **Guiding questions**

6 This report presents the pan-European storylines of the Horizon 2020 project "openENTRANCE",
7 which aim at developing suitable pathways towards a decarbonized European energy system.

- 8 1. How do the previously defined storylines fare in a quantitative optimization setting?
- 9 2. What role does sector-coupling play in the fulfilment of climate goals?
- 10 3. How do outside effects such as technological innovation and societal commitment change the
11 outcome of quantitative decarbonization pathways?

13 **Results**

14 The pan-European openENTRANCE scenario results show that a strong policy enforcement of climate
15 goals in the short-term does drastically affect the speed of the energy transition. However, this is
16 accompanied with the risk (from today's point-of-view), that the technology breakthrough and lifestyle
17 change of society actually takes place in time.

- 18 1. If we are going to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C, significant efforts need to start
19 now!
- 20 2. Already in 2030, the emissions in Europe must be around 1/3 of today's level only!
- 21 3. Removing the last 1/3 of the emissions from 2030 to 2050 expects increases of CO₂ prices several
22 times and remains at high levels in 2050!

24 **Scenarios**

- 25 • Directed Transition 1.0
- 26 • Gradual Development 1.0
- 27 • Societal Commitment 1.0
- 28 • Techno-Friendly 1.0

30 **Models**

- 31 • GENeSYS-MOD 2.9

32

1 **5.4.4 REMIND-EU Study**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • Rodrigues, R., Pietzcker, R., Luderer, G., Fragkos, P., Capros, P., Fotiou, T., ... McDowall, W.
4 2020. Alternative roads to achieve mid-century CO2 net neutrality in Europe. *Energy*.

5

6 **Guiding questions**

7 <placeholder>

8

9 **Results**

10 <placeholder>

11

12 **Scenarios**

- 13 • Eff_1p5
14 • Eff_Weak
15 • Eff_min80
16 • Efficient_1p5
17 • Efficient_Weak
18 • Efficient_min80
19 • Incumb_1p5
20 • Incumb_Weak
21 • Incumb_min80
22 • NewPI_1p5
23 • NewPI_Weak
24 • NewPI_min80

25

26 **Models**

- 27 • REMIND_EU 2.0

28

5.4.5 Socio-economic and energy data to generate business-as-usual scenarios

Publications

- Roberts, S. H., Axon, C. J., Goddard, N. H., Foran, B. D., & Warr, B. S. 2019. Modelling socio-economic and energy data to generate business-as-usual scenarios for carbon emissions. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 207, 980–997. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.10.029>

Guiding questions

Scenarios are widely used for informing policy development and for creating BAU scenarios to help understand possible effects of different policy interventions. However, the term BAU is frequently misused. We showed how econo-physical BAU scenarios can be developed by examining the historical behaviour of coefficients which manifest the relationship between components of an economy.

1. What level of economic growth should be used in BAU scenarios?
2. What level of emissions reduction follows the selected level of economic growth in BAU scenarios?
3. Can this approach be applied to other economies?

Results

We endogenised economic growth for the UK economy by mimicking national level policies that focus on a target level of unemployment. We manifest a GDP growth of 2% falling to 1% which contrasts with an exogenous growth of 2.3% of a comparator BAU scenario. We suggest that it may be possible to achieve a greater reduction in the BAU CO₂ emissions in the UK fifth carbon budget than currently projected.

1. Our methodology manifests a GDP growth of 2% falling to 1%, which is largely dependent on the evolution of jobs in the service industry. This contrasts with GDP growth in others' scenarios of 2.3% simply based on a historical rolling average.
2. We find that CO₂ emissions continue their historical fall reaching 390 MtCO₂/y in 2027 before rising to 400 MtCO₂/y in 2035.
3. Growth, and consequential emissions, is crucially dependant on the evolution of jobs in the service industry. We find simply behaviour for jobs in the service industry comparing economies of the UK, the USA, Australia, Taiwan (ROC) and Colombia.

Scenarios

- JPC to 0.8 of asymptote
- JPC to asymp. with high population projection
- JPC to asymp. with low population projection
- JPC to asymptote

Models

- 7see Mk5-20 GB

5.4.6 Consequences of selecting technology pathways on cumulative carbon dioxide emissions for the United Kingdom

Publications

- Roberts, S. H., Foran, B. D., Axon, C. J., Warr, B. S., & Goddard, N. H. 2018. Consequences of selecting technology pathways on cumulative carbon dioxide emissions for the United Kingdom. *Applied Energy*, 228, 409–425. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.06.078>

Guiding questions

The fifth carbon budget (5CB) of the UK Committee on Climate Change includes a significant level of carbon capture and storage (CCS), but is this feasible? Current energy systems modelling methods do not explore, or are unable to account for, physical (thermodynamic) limits to the rate of change of infrastructure. We applied our novel system dynamics model to substantiate the policy’s ability to meet emissions targets while maintaining financial productivity and socially expected employment levels. In our study we compared physically constrained scenarios that accentuate either CCS, fastest plausible nuclear new build, or fastest plausible build rate of offshore wind.

1. Can expansion of nuclear new build at the fastest plausible rate achieve greater emissions reduction compared with the 5CB and at what cost?
2. Can the fastest feasible rate of expansion of offshore wind replace CCS within in the 5CB?
3. Given gaps appearing between intended and actual policy implementation, what is the best overall strategy?

Results

The outcome of our study, within the constraints of the 5CB, is that it is possible to exceed the stated legislated goals of the Committee on Climate Change if implemented at the suggested rate and scope. We estimate a cumulative carbon dioxide saving from 2017 of approximately 400 Mt by 2032 compared with business as usual.

1. Expansion of nuclear new build at the fastest plausible rate does not achieve as large a cumulative reduction in emissions compared with the 5CB and there is a notable delay owing to the long lead-time of construction, but it does cost less than CCS.
2. We show that replacing CCS with offshore wind at double the expansion rate within the 5CB is a feasible investment strategy. This can be achieved at reduced whole-economy capital investment cost (GFCF).
3. If delays or cancellation occur to the deployment programmes of CCS technologies or nuclear new build, we suggest the electricity and decarbonisation targets can be met by a fast growth of offshore wind generation with no change to financial and employment levels.

Scenarios

- GB 5CB
- GB BAU1a
- GB FNNB
- GB FOfW

1

2 **Models**

3 • 7see Mk5-30 GB

4

1 **5.4.7 Carbon intensity of the service industry in the UK.**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • <placeholder>

5 **Guiding questions**

6 In accounting for carbon emissions, the conventional wisdom is that the service industry is ‘emissions
7 light’, but this is not supported when goods and other inputs to services production are included. The
8 service industry provides the majority of employment. Lack of attention to the way the service industry
9 is integrated within the whole economy can hamper emissions reduction policy development, and
10 societies will likely reject changes if rising unemployment results. Frequently, emissions reduction
11 targets are stated without the intermediate steps or details of implementation. Our study shows how
12 modelling the rate of introducing measures is as important as defining a target because of the
13 implications of cumulative emissions.

- 14 1. What is the full emissions footprint of the service industry beyond the direct use of fuel alone?
- 15 2. Which of the 6 key goods used by the service industry are continuing to grow in use, giving rise
16 to increasing emissions?
- 17 3. Why is it important to attend to the speed of emission reduction measures?
- 18 4. Can economic growth for employment and emissions reduction be achieved?

20 **Results**

21 Policy for emissions reductions for intersecting areas, such has buildings and use of goods, may not be
22 sufficiently coherent to have the effect required by a net-zero target. The service industry needs to be
23 treated as a coherent single entity to achieve emission reductions without reducing the volume of
24 employment it provides.

- 25 1. In production accounting terms (excluding imports), the service industry is responsible for 17-
26 24% of GHG emissions for the assessed countries since 1990, contrary to its perception as
27 ‘emissions light’. Countries assessed were Australia, Germany, Italy, the UK and USA.
- 28 2. Emissions from four key goods underpinning the UK service industry continue growing:
29 electronic, pharmaceutical, materials, and machinery.
- 30 3. Implementation of mitigation measures must be aggressive because although both our fast and
31 slow scenarios with additional measures reach the same end point in annual CO₂ emissions, in
32 cumulative terms the difference between them leads to 500 million tonnes CO₂ extra to 2050.
- 33 4. Over the next 30 years, energy and emissions policy must reconcile GDP and jobs with rates of
34 energy-provision transformation and dematerialisation.

36 **Scenarios**

- 37 • WAM-fast
- 38 • WAM-slow
- 39 • WEM

40

1 **Models**

- 2 • 7see Mk6-10 GB

5.4.8 Electric storage technologies vs alternative flexibility options for the Swiss energy system

Publications

- Panos, E., Kober, T., Wokaun, A. 2019. Long term evaluation of electric storage technologies vs alternative flexibility options for the Swiss energy system, Applied Energy, 252 , <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113470>

Guiding questions

We assess two long-term scenarios: a Baseline scenario, which assumes the continuation of major existing energy policy lines, and a Climate scenario, which assumes the achievement of the Swiss National Determined Contributions. The aim of the study is to identify the cost-effective transition pathway to achieve the Swiss NDC and to assess the flexibility options deployed to integrate a high share of renewable energy

1. How can the Swiss energy transition be realised regarding the technology choices in both energy supply and demand;
2. How much flexibility would need the future energy system to cope with the large penetration of renewable energy needed to meet the climate targets;
3. How the different flexibility options can be coordinated to ensure a cost-effective integration of renewables, as well as the reliable and secure operation of the energy system.

Results

The transition to a low-carbon system requires deployment of renewable energy, the integration of which needs coordinated actions across all sectors of the energy system

1. The achievement of the Swiss NDC climate targets requires a peak in emissions in 2010, while the deployment of energy savings contributes by 20% in the emissions reduction, the **spread of** use of electricity to heating and mobility accounts for more than two-thirds in the total abatement effort, and the integration of a large share of variable renewable energy in supply and demand is critical for decarbonisation
2. Key flexibility options are batteries (+1GW in 2050 from today levels), hydrostorage (8.8 TWh), participation of about 150 MW of virtual plant units in ancillary service markets for secondary reserve (ca total demand 600 MW), seasonal balancing via P2X pathways and the shift of 0.6 TWh of electricity via H2 and synthetic fuels, smart charging and discharging of EVs, and exercise of DSM practices that shift 13% of the electricity demand in heating and appliances at a daily basis
3. Coordination between the different flexibility options and between sectors is needed to secure a reliable operation of the energy system, as the various flexibility options have both synergistic and complementary effect. This coordination would require a shift from a supply-driven perspective towards a perspective that enables system integration.

Scenarios

- STEM_BAU
- STEM_CLI

1 **Models**

- 2 • STEM-Switzerland 2.0

3

5.4.9 Swiss Industry: Price Elasticities and Demand Developments for Electricity and Gas

Publications

- Kober, T., Kannan, R., Obrist, E., Panos, E., Heald, S., Clements, L., Goldman, M., Politt, H. 2019. Swiss Industry: Price Elasticities and Demand Developments for Electricity and Gas (SWIDEM), Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Bern <https://www.aramis.admin.ch/Dokument.aspx?DocumentID=65688>

Guiding questions

The Joint Activity Scenarios and Modelling (JASM) aims at providing a set of robust scenarios for the realization of the Swiss Energy Strategy 2050. The modelling groups of the 8 Swiss Competence Centres for Energy Research (SCCER) work together and bring in their respective experience in the field of electricity generation technologies, buildings, mobility, industry, grids, biomass, storage and economy

1. JASM_CLI, JASM_LC100: What energy system transformations are implied for Switzerland by its NDC for 2030, and what is the cost-optimal pathway reaching its indicated long-term targets for 2050 of net-zero emissions by then?
2. JASM_EPOL, SWIDEM_EPOL: Can the current Swiss energy strategy achieves the NDC targets for 2030, how much residual emissions occur in 2050 from achieving the net-zero ambition and what are their determinant factors?
3. JASM_LC80: What is the additional effort required moving from the currently declared target of -80% reduction of GHG emissions in 2050 compared to 1990 levels (JASM_LC80 scenario) to the ambition of achieving net-zero emissions in 2050 (JASM_CLI, JASM_LC100 scenarios) for Switzerland

Results

The current Swiss ambition level is not in line with long-term Paris Agreement targets. To achieve net-zero emissions in 2050 would require full decarbonization of the residential, commercial and transport sectors for which electrification, efficiency and adoption of new pathways based on P2X is required. At the same time Switzerland would need to develop negative emissions technologies by 2040.

1. The current electricity production mix in Switzerland is of an almost zero carbon intensity, as it is based on nuclear and hydro power. Due to the foreseen nuclear phase out, a significant deployment of solar PV would require as other renewable domestic resources are limited. Achieving the net-zero ambition would require a doubling of installed solar PV capacities every decade, reaching from 2 GW today to >25 GW in 2050
2. Achieving the net-zero ambition would require that the buildings sector undergo transformation towards electrified heat via heat pumps and implement aggressive renovation measures. The mobility sector needs to shift to electric vehicles and biofuels and synthetic e-fuels. Residual emissions remain in industry for processes required gaseous fuels.
3. About 4 Mt CO₂/yr. Negative emissions would require to offset emissions from the energy system. If agriculture is to be included, then the amount of the negative emissions required exceeds 8 Mt CO₂/yr. The total CO₂ captured needs range from 8 Mt to 12 Mt CO₂/yr in 2050. If storing the captured CO₂ in the Swiss territory is uncertain or impossible (technical or social acceptance

1 barriers), then access to international infrastructure to transport and store CO₂ abroad would be
2 needed.

3

4 **Scenarios**

- 5 • JASM_BAU
- 6 • JASM_CLI
- 7 • JASM_EPOL
- 8 • JASM_LC100
- 9 • JASM_LC80
- 10 • SWIDEM_EPOL

11

12 **Models**

- 13 • STEM-Switzerland 2.0

14

5.4.10 Future energy transition to net-zero emissions: differences between France and Sweden

Publications

- Millot, A., Krook-Riekkola, A., & Maïzi, N. 2020. Guiding the future energy transition to net-zero emissions: Lessons from exploring the differences between France and Sweden. *Energy Policy*, 139, 111358. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111358>

Guiding questions

The study identifies key factors that can drive energy transition toward a carbon neutrality goal, by comparing the past energy transition (qualitative) as well as comparing the future energy transition to carbon neutrality in Sweden by 2045 and in France by 2050 (quantitative/model-based).

1. What are the differences over time between the countries in term of final energy consumption (in general), in the carbon Neutrality scenario?
2. What are the differences over time between the countries in term of the power sector, in the carbon Neutrality scenario?
3. What are the differences over time between the countries in term of energy for Industries, in the carbon Neutrality scenario?
4. What are the differences over time between the countries in term of energy for Transportation, in the carbon Neutrality scenario?
5. What are the differences over time between the countries in term of energy for Buildings and agriculture, in the carbon Neutrality scenario?

Results

First, the energy transition to net zero emissions should be accompanied by diverse public policies like taxes, subsidies, regulation and information. Secondly, public policies should set realistic and achievable climate goals since they determine different energy system trajectories. Thirdly, these targets should be supported by a long-term vision for the energy system. Investments in critical technologies is needed. Lastly, public policies benefit from consistent, long-term support in order to make their targets credible and to foster investment in low-carbon technologies.

The cross-country comparisons were seen to be useful to highlight the similarities and differences that each country will have to take into account for their future energy systems pathways. Pair studies show what works in one country and could apply to others, while highlighting the challenges and barriers that each country faces (which might be reason for not necessary working in all countries just because it works in one country).

1. In France, an increase of natural gas is seen until 2035, thereafter natural gas is gradually replaced by biomethane and hydrogen, thus natural gas works as a transition commodity for climate mitigation in France. A similar trend could not be seen in Sweden, where natural gas today only has a minor share of the energy mix, this trend remains over the entire period. In both countries oil and coal are replaced with a combination of electrification and an increase us of bioenergy. Thus, natural gas will not per-default reduce the climate impact, not even in a short-term perspective.

- 1 2. The increase in electricity use is higher in France compared with Sweden, which could be
2 explained by the higher level of electrification in present Swedish energy system. In France, the
3 increase in electricity demand and phase out of old nuclear plants is met by an increase of
4 installation in wind, solar and new nuclear power. In Sweden, the increase in electricity demand
5 and phase out of old nuclear plants is met by an increase of installation in wind, solar and BECCS
6 (bioenergy CHP plants and tri-biofuel plants with CCS).
- 7 3. In France, the electricity consumption in the industry sector increases significantly during the last
8 periods mainly replacing natural gas, while it remains stable in Sweden. Similar, the consumption
9 of bioenergy is doubled in the France, while it increases by only 8% in Sweden. The final biomass
10 shares in 2050 remains much more significant in Sweden than in France: 45% vs 12%. The
11 stabilization in Sweden can partly be explained by biomass already having a significant share
12 today, and partly been seen more profitable to replace fossil fuels in the transportation sector and
13 in BECCS plans (producing electricity, biofuels and district heating).
- 14 4. Although in the past neither country has put in place specific policies regarding the transport
15 sector, we observe significant differences in their future evolution. In France, gas consumption
16 increases significantly between 2015 and 2040 and is used in buses and vehicles for goods
17 transport. By 2050, this gas is totally replaced by biomethane. In Sweden, biogas consumption
18 remains very low and the use of biofuels increase faster compared with in France. In both
19 countries, there is an increase in electrification of the transport sector from 2030.
- 20 5. In France, the energy demand for space heating decline over time is explained by investments in
21 energy efficiency measures (insulation), while the demand for space heating is increasing in
22 Sweden (when there were no energy efficiency measure options for space heating in the Swedish
23 model). In France, gas consumption decreases significantly while biomass and biomethane
24 consumption increases. In order to meet carbon neutrality in France, a massive shift toward heat
25 pumps and solar heating is seen in the last period (year 2050). In Sweden, geothermal and biomass
26 consumption increase, while electricity consumption remains stable. (In other, not yet published
27 scenarios for Sweden, heat-pumps is installed in the district heating grids, instead of in the
28 buildings).

29

30 Scenarios

- 31 • Sweden
- 32 • Sweden_B
- 33 • SwedenNeutrality
- 34 • SwedenNeutrality_B
- 35 • NeutralityV2_CCSLow
- 36 • Ref_DLow

37

38 Models

- 39 • TIMES-Sweden 1.0
- 40 • TIMES-France 2.0

41

1 **5.4.11 Carbon neutrality in France**

2 **Publications**

- 3 • < placeholder >

5 **Guiding questions**

6 The study contributes to reflecting on how to achieve carbon neutrality in France and how it differs
7 from the main goals of the LTECV.

- 8 1. What energy system transformations are implied by carbon neutrality for 2050, and how do they
9 differ from transformations in cost-optimal pathways reaching the goals of the LTECV?
- 10 2. How is the evolution sensitive to lower availability of CCS, to a higher demand and to a stringent
11 carbon neutrality constraint?
- 12 3. What is the marginal cost of CO₂ emissions?

14 **Results**

15 Carbon neutrality requires deep and structural changes in the energy system and differs from the
16 pathways to LTECV goals.

- 17 1. A pathway to carbon neutrality requires more power capacity and a more significant use of
18 biomass (biomethane) in the transport sector.
- 19 2. Meeting the constraint of carbon neutrality requires optimistic assumptions concerning the
20 availability of CCS, a moderate growth in energy service demand and the construction of new
21 nuclear power plants.
- 22 3. The marginal cost of CO₂ emissions reaches above 1000€/tCO₂ which underlines the difficulty of
23 reaching the carbon neutrality constraint.

25 **Scenarios**

- 26 • LTECV
- 27 • NeutralityV0_CCSHigh_Dhigh
- 28 • NeutralityV0_CCSLow_Flex
- 29 • NeutralityV2_CCSLow
- 30 • NeutralityV2_CCSLow_Dhigh
- 31 • NeutralityV2_NoCCS_Flex
- 32 • Ref_Dhigh
- 33 • Ref_Dlow

35 **Models**

- 36 • TIMES-France 2.0

37

1 **5.4.12 Contributions of building retrofitting in five member states to EU targets for**
2 **energy savings**

3 **Publications**

- 4 • Mata É, Sasic Kalagasidis A, Johnsson F. 2018. Contributions of building retrofitting in five
5 member states to EU targets for energy savings. Renewable and Sustainable Energy
6 Reviews 93: 759-774.

7

8 **Guiding questions**

9 < placeholder >

10

11 **Results**

12 < placeholder >

13

14 **Scenarios**

- 15 • BAU-T

16

17 **Models**

- 18 • ECCABS 2.0

19

1 5.4.13 Publication**2 Publications**

- 3 • < placeholder >

4

5 Guiding questions

6 < placeholder >

7

8 Results

9 < placeholder >

10

11 Scenarios

- 12 • Off_Track
- 13 • OoR
- 14 • Pack
- 15 • Pack_cap
- 16 • Yellow_Jersey
- 17 • Yellow_Jersey_cap
- 18 • YJ
- 19 • YJ_cap

20

21 Models

- 22 • TIMES-Portugal 9.2

23

24

6. Other

6.1 Migration

6.1.1 Publications

- H. Benveniste, J. Crespo Cuaresma, M. Gidden, R. Muttarak. Tracing International Migration in Projections of Income Levels and Inequality across the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways.

6.1.2 Guiding questions

The study contributes the first explicit quantification of the effect of international migration on country-level projections of income, inequality, energy consumption, and CO₂ emissions along the 5 SSP and associated RCP, by developing versions of those projections for zero international migration. The effect of migration on income plays through changes in population sizes and remittances, i.e. transfers of money between migrants and home communities. The effect of migration on energy consumption and CO₂ emissions is derived from the one on income assuming, for a given SSP narrative, that migration does not affect the energy consumption, respectively emissions path along GDP per capita levels. These new projections can then be compared to original quantifications which include, implicitly, international migration. The difference between the two sets of projections highlights the effect of migration.

1. How does migration affect GDP projections? Does its effect on income level vary with the SSP narrative considered? Which countries does migration make better off?
2. How do migration and related remittances affect inequality both between and within countries?
3. Does migration affect energy consumption and CO₂ emissions?

6.1.3 Results

Migration makes the world richer and more equal in all SSP narratives. The nature of migration and remittance corridors is shaped by the specific scenario of future development considered.

1. Depending on the particular SSP narrative and world region considered, the effects of migration on income can be substantial, ranging from -5% to +21% at the continental level.
2. Migration tends to decrease income inequality across countries, does not tend to affect within-country inequality in origin countries and tends to decrease it in most destination countries.
3. Migration tends to increase energy consumption globally for most SSP narratives, driven by an increase in consumption in destination countries. Migration tends to increase CO₂ emissions, but also negative emissions through affluence.

6.1.4 Scenarios

- GDP_SSP1_zeromig
- GDP_SSP2_zeromig
- GDP_SSP3_zeromig
- GDP_SSP4_zeromig
- GDP_SSP5_zeromig
- GINI_SSP1_zeromig
- GINI_SSP2_zeromig

- 1 • GINI_SSP3_zeromig
- 2 • GINI_SSP4_zeromig
- 3 • GINI_SSP5_zeromig
- 4 • GINIBTW_SSP1_zeromig
- 5 • GINIBTW_SSP2_zeromig
- 6 • GINIBTW_SSP3_zeromig
- 7 • GINIBTW_SSP4_zeromig
- 8 • GINIBTW_SSP5_zeromig
- 9 • SSP1-1.9_zeromig
- 10 • SSP1_zeromig
- 11 • SSP2-4.5_zeromig
- 12 • SSP2_zeromig
- 13 • SSP3-7.0_zeromig
- 14 • SSP3_zeromig
- 15 • SSP4-6.0_zeromig
- 16 • SSP4_zeromig
- 17 • SSP5-8.5_zeromig
- 18 • SSP5_zeromig

19

20 **6.1.5 Models**

- 21 • MIGRATION 1.0

22

1

2 **6.2 Behavioural change**

3 **6.2.1 Publications**

- 4 • Niamir, L., Kiesewetter, G., Wagner, F., Schöpp, W., Filatova, T., Voinov, A., & Bressers, H.
5 2020. Assessing the macroeconomic impacts of individual behavioral changes on carbon
6 emissions. *Climatic Change*, 158(2), 141–160. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02566-8>

7

8 **6.2.2 Guiding questions**

9 To shed light on individuals' energy decision-making and grassroots dynamics in transition to low-
10 carbon economy; to assess the macroeconomic impacts of individual energy behavioural changes on
11 carbon emission.

- 12 1. What are the macroeconomic impacts of individuals' energy behavioural and lifestyle changes on
13 energy demand and carbon emission?

14

15 **6.2.3 Results**

16 The findings demonstrate that the regional dimension is important in a low-carbon economy transition.
17 Heterogeneity in individual socio-demographics (e.g. education and age), structural characteristics (e.g.
18 type and size of dwellings), behavioural and social traits (e.g. awareness and personal norms), and social
19 interactions amplify these differences, causing nonlinearities in diffusion of green investments among
20 households and macro-economic dynamic.

- 21 1. The results indicate that accounting for demand side heterogeneity provides a better insight into
22 possible transitions to a low-carbon economy and climate change mitigation. The model with
23 household heterogeneity represented in socio-demographic, dwelling, and behavioural factors
24 shows rich dynamics and provides more-realistic image of socio-economics by simulating
25 economy through the social interactions of heterogeneous households. Two end-user scenarios are
26 presented, which vary from the baseline scenario by introducing agent heterogeneity, intensity of
27 social interactions among households (slow or fast).

- 28 2. Electricity consumption resulting from individual behavioural changes decreases between 56.2-
29 69.5% by 2050 in the Netherlands. There is spatial heterogeneity in how behavioural changes
30 diffuse and what regions (within a country) emerge as laggards or pioneers in bottom-up
31 investments in energy-efficiency.

32

33 **6.2.4 Scenarios**

- 34 • FD
- 35 • SD

36

37 **6.2.5 Models**

38 BENCH-NLD 1.0

1 **Part II: Model reference cards**

2 *[The model reference cards included in the SOD are preliminary and based on the reference cards*
3 *developed in the FOD. These are examples for a selected set of models. They will be updated and the*
4 *collection expanded to cover all global and national models that submitted scenarios to the AR6*
5 *scenario database in FGD]*

6

7 **Reference card – AIM-CGE**

8 **About**

9 **Name and version**

10 AIM-CGE V2

11 **Institution**

12 National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES), Japan.

13 **Model scope and methods**

14 **Objective**

15 AIM/CGE is developed to analyses the climate mitigation and impact. The energy system is
16 disaggregated to meet this objective in both of energy supply and demand sides. Agricultural sectors
17 have also been disaggregated for the appropriate land use treatment. The model is designed to be flexible
18 in its use for global analysis.

19 **Solution concept**

20 General equilibrium (closed economy)

21 **Solution horizon**

22 Recursive dynamic (myopic)

23 **Solution method**

24 Simulation

25 **Temporal dimension**

26 Base year: 2005, time steps: Annual, horizon: 2100

27 **Spatial dimension**

28 Number of regions: 17

29 1. Japan

30 2. China

- 1 3. India
- 2 4. Rest of Asia
- 3 5. Rest of Europe
- 4 6. Former Soviet Union
- 5 7. Turkey
- 6 8. Canada
- 7 9. United States
- 8 10. Brazil
- 9 11. Rest of South America
- 10 12. Middle East
- 11 13. North Africa
- 12 14. Rest of Africa
- 13 15. Rest of East and South East Asia
- 14 16. EU
- 15 17. New Zealand and Australia

16 Climate policies

- 17
 - Emission tax
- 18
 - Pricing
- 19
 - Cap and Trade

20 Energy policies

- 21
 - Fuel taxes
- 22
 - Fuel subsidies
- 23
 - Portfolio standard

24 Energy technology policies

- 25
 - Capacity targets
- 26
 - Emission standards
- 27
 - Energy efficiency standards

28 Agricultural policies

- 29
 - Agricultural producer subsidies
- 30
 - Agricultural consumer subsidies

31 Land-use policies

- 32
 - Land protection
- 33
 - Pricing carbon stocks

34 **Socio economic drivers**

35 **Population:** Yes (exogenous)

36 **GDP:** Yes (exogenous)

37 **Employment rate:** Yes (exogenous)

- 1 **Labor productivity:** Yes (exogenous)
- 2 **Total factor productivity:** Yes (endogenous)
- 3 **Autonomous energy efficiency improvements:** Yes (endogenous)

4 **Macro economy**

5 Economic sector

6 **Industry:** Yes (economic)

7 **Energy:** Yes (physical & economic)

8 **Residential and commercial:** Yes (economic)

9 **Agriculture:** Yes (physical & economic)

10 Trade

- 11 • Coal
- 12 • Oil
- 13 • Gas
- 14 • Electricity
- 15 • Food crops
- 16 • Emissions permits
- 17 • Non-energy goods
- 18 • Uranium

19 Cost measures

- 20 • GDP loss
- 21 • Welfare loss
- 22 • Consumption loss
- 23 • Equivalent Variation

24 Categorization by group

- 25 • Income
- 26 • Urban - rural

27 Resource Use

28 **Coal:** Yes (supply curve)

29 **Conventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

30 **Unconventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

31 **Conventional Gas:** Yes (supply curve)

1 **Bioenergy:** Yes (supply curve)

2 Technological change

3 **Energy End-use:** Exogenous technological change

4 **Material Use:** Exogenous technological change

5 **Agriculture:** Exogenous technological change

6 **Energy Conversion:** Exogenous Technological Change

7 **Energy**

8 Energy technology substitutability

- 9 • Mostly high substitutability in some sectors and mostly low substitutability in other sectors

10 Energy technology deployment

- 11 • Mostly high substitutability in some sectors and mostly low substitutability in other sectors

12 Electricity technologies

- 13 • Coal w/o CCS
- 14 • Coal w/ CCS
- 15 • Gas w/o CCS
- 16 • Gas w/ CCS
- 17 • Oil w/o CCS
- 18 • Bioenergy w/o CCS
- 19 • Bioenergy w/ CCS
- 20 • Geothermal power
- 21 • Nuclear power
- 22 • Solar power
- 23 • Wind power
- 24 • Wind power-onshore
- 25 • Wind power-offshore
- 26 • Hydroelectric power

27 Refined liquids

- 28 • Bioliquids w/o CCS
- 29 • Bioliquids w/ CCS

30 Grid and infrastructure

31 **Electricity:** Yes (aggregate)

32 **Gas:** Yes (aggregate)

33 **Heat:** Yes (aggregate)

1 **CO₂**: Yes (aggregate)

2 **Hydrogen**: Yes (aggregate)

3 Energy end-use technologies

4

5 **Residential and commercial**

- 6 • Cooking
- 7 • Space heating

8 **Land use**

9 Land cover

- 10 • Cropland
- 11 • Forest
- 12 • Pasture
- 13 • Shrubland
- 14 • Cropland energy crops
- 15 • Managed forest
- 16 • Natural forest

17 **Agriculture and forestry demands**

- 18 • Agriculture food
- 19 • Agriculture food crops
- 20 • Agriculture food livestock
- 21 • Agriculture feed
- 22 • Agriculture feed crops
- 23 • Agriculture feed livestock
- 24 • Agriculture non-food
- 25 • Agriculture non-food crops
- 26 • Agriculture non-food livestock
- 27 • Agriculture bioenergy

28 **Agricultural commodities**

- 29 • Wheat
- 30 • Rice
- 31 • Oilseeds
- 32 • Other coarse grains
- 33 • Sugar crops
- 34 • Ruminant meat
- 35 • Non-ruminant meat and eggs
- 36 • Dairy products

1 Emissions, climate and impacts

2 Greenhouse gases

- 3 • HFCs
- 4 • CFCs
- 5 • SF6
- 6 • CO2 fossil fuels
- 7 • CO2 cement
- 8 • CO2 land use
- 9 • CH4 energy
- 10 • CH4 land use
- 11 • CH4 other
- 12 • N2O energy
- 13 • N2O land use
- 14 • N2O other

15 Pollutants

- 16 • CO energy
- 17 • CO land use
- 18 • CO other
- 19 • NOx energy
- 20 • NOx land use
- 21 • NOx other
- 22 • VOC energy
- 23 • VOC land use
- 24 • VOC other
- 25 • SO2 energy
- 26 • SO2 land use
- 27 • SO2 other
- 28 • BC energy
- 29 • BC land use
- 30 • BC other
- 31 • OC energy
- 32 • OC land use
- 33 • OC other
- 34 • NH3 energy
- 35 • NH3 land use
- 36 • NH3 other

37 Climate indicators

- 38 • Temperature change
- 39 • Ocean acidification
- 40 • Concentration: CH4
- 41 • Concentration: N2O
- 42 • Concentration: Kyoto gases
- 43 • Radiative forcing: CO2
- 44 • Radiative forcing: CH4
- 45 • Radiative forcing: N2O
- 46 • Radiative forcing: F-gases
- 47 • Radiative forcing: Kyoto gases

- 1 • Radiative forcing: aerosols
- 2 • Radiative forcing: land albedo
- 3 • Radiative forcing: AN3A
- 4 • Radiative forcing: total
- 5 • Sea level rise

6 Carbon dioxide removal

- 7 • Bioenergy with CCS
- 8 • Reforestation
- 9 • Afforestation

10 Climate change impacts

- 11 • Agriculture

12 Co-Linkages

- 13 • Energy security: Fossil fuel imports & exports (region)
- 14 • Air pollution & health: Source-based aerosol emissions

15

1 Reference card – GEM-E3

2 **About**

3 Name and version

4 GEM-E3_092019

5 Institution

6 Institute of Communication And Computer Systems (ICCS), Greece.

7 **Model scope and methods**

8 Objective

9 The model puts emphasis on: i) The analysis of market instruments for energy-related
10 environmental policy, such as taxes, subsidies, regulations, emission permits etc., at a degree
11 of detail that is sufficient for national, sectoral and World-wide policy evaluation. ii) The
12 assessment of distributional consequences of programmes and policies, including social equity,
13 employment and cohesion for less developed regions.

14 Solution concept

15 General equilibrium (closed economy)

16 Solution horizon

17 Recursive dynamic (myopic)

18 Solution method

19 Optimization

20 Temporal dimension

21 Base year: 2014, time steps: 5, horizon: 2100

22 Spatial dimension

23 Number of regions: 46

24 Climate policies

- 25 • Emission tax
- 26 • Pricing
- 27 • Cap and Trade

1 Energy policies

- 2 • Feed-in-Tariff
- 3 • Fuel taxes
- 4 • Fuel subsidies
- 5 • Portfolio standard

6 Energy technology policies

- 7 • Capacity targets

8 **Socio economic drivers**

9 **Population:** Yes (exogenous)

10 **GDP:** Yes (endogenous)

11 **Employment rate:** Yes (endogenous)

12 **Labor productivity:** Yes (exogenous)

13 **Total factor productivity:** Yes (exogenous)

14 **Autonomous energy efficiency improvements:** Yes (exogenous)

15 **Macro economy**

16 Economic sector

17

18 GEM-E3 represents 29 sectors:

19 Agriculture, Coal, Crude Oil, Oil, Gas, Electricity supply, Ferrous and non ferrous metals, Chemical
20 Products, Other energy intensive, Electric Goods, Transport equipment, Other Equipment Goods,
21 Consumer Goods Industries, Construction, Transport (Air),Transport (Land),Transport (Water), Market
22 Services, Non Market Services, Coal fired, Oil fired, Gas fired, Nuclear, Biomass, Hydro electric, Wind,
23 PV, CCS coal, CCS Gas

24 Trade

- 25 • Coal
- 26 • Oil
- 27 • Gas
- 28 • Emissions permits
- 29 • Bioenergy crops
- 30 • Food crops
- 31 • Capital
- 32 • All other major traded economic activities (40 economic sectors)
- 33 • Energy goods

34 The model links all countries and sectors through endogenous bilateral trade transactions.

35 Cost measures

- 36 • GDP loss
- 37 • Welfare loss

- 1 • Equivalent Variation
- 2 Categorization by group
- 3 • Technology adoption
- 4 Resource Use
- 5 **Coal:** Yes (fixed)
- 6 **Unconventional Oil:** Yes (fixed)
- 7 **Conventional Gas:** Yes (fixed)
- 8 **Bioenergy:** Yes (process model)
- 9 Technological change
- 10 **Material Use:** Exogenous technological change
- 11 Other technological change
- 12 • Other: Total factor productivity
- 13 • Labour productivity
- 14 • Capital productivity are all exogenous. Semi-endogenous TFP for clean technologies based
- 15 on learning by doing and learning by research
- 16 **Energy**
- 17 Energy technology substitution
- 18 • Mostly high substitutability
- 19 Energy technology deployment
- 20 • Expansion and decline constraints
- 21 Electricity technologies
- 22 • Coal w/ CCS
- 23 • Gas w/o CCS
- 24 • Gas w/ CCS
- 25 • Oil w/o CCS
- 26 • Bioenergy w/o CCS
- 27 • Geothermal power
- 28 • Nuclear power
- 29 • Solar power
- 30 • Solar power-central PV
- 31 • Wind power
- 32 • Wind power-onshore
- 33 • Wind power-offshore

- 1 • Hydroelectric power

2 **Grid and infrastructure**

- 3 • Not represented

4 **Energy end-use technologies**

5 **Passenger transportation**

- 6 • Buses
7 • Electric LDVs
8 • Hybrid LDVs
9 • Gasoline LDVs
10 • Passenger trains
11 • Passenger aircrafts

12 **Freight transportation**

- 13 • Freight trains
14 • Heavy duty vehicles
15 • Freight aircrafts
16 • Freight ships

17 **Industry**

- 18 • Steel production
19 • Aluminium production
20 • Cement production
21 • Petrochemical production
22 • Paper production
23 • Pulp production
24 • Other: Equipment goods
25 • Non-metallic minerals
26 • Consumer goods industries

27 **Residential and commercial**

- 28 • Cooking
29 • Space heating

30 **Land use**

31 **Agricultural commodities**

- 32 • Oilseeds

33 **Emissions, climate and impacts**

34 **Greenhouse gases**

- 35 • HFCs

- 1 • SF6
- 2 • CO2 fossil fuels
- 3 • CH4 energy
- 4 • CH4 other
- 5 • N2O energy
- 6 • N2O other

7 Climate indicators

- 8 GEM-E3 model does not include climate indicators.

9 Carbon dioxide removal

- 10 • Bioenergy with CCS
- 11 • Afforestation
- 12 • Direct air capture

13 Co-Linkages

- 14 • Energy access: Household energy consumption

15

1 Reference card – IMAGE

2 **About**

3 Name and version

4 IMAGE framework 3.0

5 Institution and users

6 Utrecht University (UU), Netherlands, <http://www.uu.nl>.

7 PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Netherlands, <http://www.pbl.nl>.

8 **Model scope and methods**

9 Objective

10 IMAGE is an ecological-environmental model framework that simulates the environmental
11 consequences of human activities worldwide. The objective of the IMAGE model is to explore the long-
12 term dynamics and impacts of global changes that result. More specifically, the model aims

- 13 1. to analyse interactions between human development and the natural environment to gain better
14 insight into the processes of global environmental change;
- 15 2. to identify response strategies to global environmental change based on assessment of options
16 and
- 17 3. to indicate key inter-linkages and associated levels of uncertainty in processes of global
18 environmental change.

19 Solution concept

20 Partial equilibrium (price elastic demand)

21 Solution horizon

22 Recursive dynamic (myopic)

23 Solution method

24 Simulation

25 Anticipation

26 Simulation modelling framework, without foresight. However, a simplified version of the
27 energy/climate part of the model (called FAIR) can be run prior to running the framework to obtain data
28 for climate policy simulations.

29 Temporal dimension

30 Base year: 1970, time steps: 1-5 year time step, horizon: 2100

1 Spatial dimension

2 Number of regions: 26

- 3 1. Canada
- 4 2. USA
- 5 3. Mexico
- 6 4. Rest of Central America
- 7 5. Brazil
- 8 6. Rest of South America
- 9 7. Northern Africa
- 10 8. Western Africa
- 11 9. Eastern Africa
- 12 10. South Africa
- 13 11. Western Europe
- 14 12. Central Europe
- 15 13. Turkey
- 16 14. Ukraine +
- 17 15. Asian-Stan
- 18 16. Russia +
- 19 17. Middle East
- 20 18. India +
- 21 19. Korea
- 22 20. China +
- 23 21. Southeastern Asia
- 24 22. Indonesia +
- 25 23. Japan
- 26 24. Oceania
- 27 25. Rest of South Asia
- 28 26. Rest of Southern Africa

29 Time discounting type

- 30 • Discount rate exogenous

31 Time discounting average

32 5 (% per year)

33 Climate policies

- 34 • Emission tax
- 35 • Pricing
- 36 • Cap and Trade

37 Energy policies

- 38 • Fuel taxes
- 39 • Portfolio standard

40 Energy technology policies

- 41 • Capacity targets

- 1 • Emission standards
- 2 • Energy efficiency standards

3 Land-use policies

- 4 • Land protection
- 5 • Pricing carbon stocks

6 **Socio economic drivers**

7 **Population:** Yes (exogenous)

8 **Urbanization rate:** Yes (exogenous)

9 **GDP:** Yes (exogenous)

10 **Income distribution:** Yes (exogenous)

11 **Autonomous energy efficiency improvements:** Yes (exogenous)

12 **Macro economy**

13 Economic sector

14 **Industry:** Yes (physical & economic)

15 **Energy:** Yes (physical & economic)

16 **Transportation:** Yes (physical & economic)

17 **Residential and commercial:** Yes (economic)

18 **Agriculture:** Yes (physical & economic)

19 **Forestry:** Yes (physical & economic)

20 Trade

- 21 • Coal
- 22 • Oil
- 23 • Gas
- 24 • Uranium
- 25 • Bioenergy crops
- 26 • Food crops
- 27 • Emissions permits
- 28 • Non-energy goods

29 Cost measures

- 30 • Area under MAC

1 Categorization by group

- 2 • Urban - rural
- 3 • Income
- 4 • Technology adoption

5 Institutional and political factors

- 6 • Early retirement of capital allowed
- 7 • Behavioural change differentiated by country/region
- 8 • Technology costs differentiated by country/region

9 Resource Use

10 **Coal:** Yes (supply curve)

11 **Conventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

12 **Unconventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

13 **Conventional Gas:** Yes (supply curve)

14 **Uranium:** Yes (fixed)

15 **Bioenergy:** Yes (process model)

16 **Water:** Yes (process model)

17 **Land:** Yes (supply curve)

18 Technological change

19 **Energy End-use:** Endogenous technological change

20 **Material Use:** Exogenous technological change

21 **Agriculture:** Exogenous technological change

22 **Energy conversion:** Endogenous technological change

23 Energy

24 Behaviour

25 In the energy model, substitution among technologies is described in the model using the multinomial
26 logit formulation. The multinomial logit model implies that the market share of a certain technology or
27 fuel type depends on costs relative to competing technologies. The option with the lowest costs gets the
28 largest market share, but in most cases not the full market. We interpret the latter as a representation of
29 heterogeneity in the form of specific market niches for every technology or fuel.

- 1 Energy technology choice
- 2 • Logit choice model
- 3 Energy technology substitutability
- 4 • Mostly high substitutability
- 5 Energy technology deployment
- 6 • Expansion and decline constraints
- 7 • System integration constraints
- 8 Electricity technologies
- 9 • Coal w/o CCS
- 10 • Coal w/ CCS
- 11 • Gas w/o CCS
- 12 • Gas w/ CCS
- 13 • Oil w/o CCS
- 14 • Oil w/ CCS
- 15 • Bioenergy w/o CCS
- 16 • Bioenergy w/ CCS
- 17 • Geothermal power
- 18 • Nuclear power
- 19 • Solar power
- 20 • Solar power-central PV
- 21 • Solar power-CSP
- 22 • Wind power
- 23 • Wind power-onshore
- 24 • Wind power-offshore
- 25 • Hydroelectric power
- 26 Hydrogen production
- 27 • Electrolysis
- 28 • Coal to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 29 • Coal to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 30 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 31 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 32 • Oil to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 33 • Oil to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 34 • Biomass to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 35 • Biomass to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 36 • Solar thermochemical hydrogen
- 37 Refined liquids
- 38 • Bioliquids w/o CCS
- 39 • Bioliquids w/ CCS
- 40 • Oil refining

1 Refined gases

- 2 • Biomass to gas w/o CCS
- 3 • Biomass to gas w/ CCS

4 Heat generation

- 5 • CHP (coupled heat and power)
- 6 • Coal heat
- 7 • Natural gas heat
- 8 • Oil heat
- 9 • Biomass heat
- 10 • Geothermal heat

11 CHP also has a CCS option

12 Grid and infrastructure

13 **Electricity:** Yes (aggregate)

14 **Gas:** Yes (aggregate)

15 **CO2:** Yes (aggregate)

16 **Hydrogen:** Yes (aggregate)

17 Energy end-use technologies

18 Passenger transportation

- 19 • Buses
- 20 • Light Duty Vehicles (LDVs)
- 21 • Electric LDVs
- 22 • Hydrogen LDVs
- 23 • Hybrid LDVs
- 24 • Gasoline LDVs
- 25 • Diesel LDVs
- 26 • Passenger trains
- 27 • Passenger aircrafts

28 Freight transportation

- 29 • Freight trains
- 30 • Heavy duty vehicles
- 31 • Freight aircrafts
- 32 • Freight ships

33 Industry

- 34 • Steel production
- 35 • Cement production
- 36 • Plastics production

1 Residential and commercial

- 2 • Cooking
- 3 • Refrigeration
- 4 • Washing
- 5 • Lighting
- 6 • Space heating
- 7 • Space cooling

8 Land use

9 Land cover

- 10 • Cropland
- 11 • Forest
- 12 • Pasture
- 13 • Shrubland
- 14 • Cropland irrigated
- 15 • Cropland food crops
- 16 • Cropland feed crops
- 17 • Cropland energy crops
- 18 • Managed forest
- 19 • Natural forest
- 20 • Built-up area

21 Agriculture and forestry demands

- 22 • Agriculture food
- 23 • Agriculture food crops
- 24 • Agriculture food livestock
- 25 • Agriculture feed crops
- 26 • Agriculture feed livestock
- 27 • Agriculture non-food
- 28 • Agriculture non-food crops
- 29 • Agriculture non-food livestock
- 30 • Agriculture bioenergy
- 31 • Agriculture residues
- 32 • Forest industrial roundwood
- 33 • Forest fuelwood
- 34 • Forest residues

35 Agricultural commodities

- 36 • Wheat
- 37 • Rice
- 38 • Oilseeds
- 39 • Other coarse grains
- 40 • Sugar crops
- 41 • Ruminant meat
- 42 • Non-ruminant meat and eggs
- 43 • Dairy products

1 Emissions, climate and impacts

2 Greenhouse gases

- 3 • HFCs
- 4 • CFCs
- 5 • SF6
- 6 • PFCs
- 7 • CO2 fossil fuels
- 8 • CO2 cement
- 9 • CO2 land use
- 10 • CH4 energy
- 11 • CH4 land use
- 12 • CH4 other
- 13 • N2O energy
- 14 • N2O land use
- 15 • N2O other

16 Pollutants

- 17 • CO energy
- 18 • CO land use
- 19 • CO other
- 20 • NOx energy
- 21 • NOx land use
- 22 • NOx other
- 23 • VOC energy
- 24 • VOC land use
- 25 • VOC other
- 26 • SO2 energy
- 27 • SO2 land use
- 28 • SO2 other
- 29 • BC energy
- 30 • BC land use
- 31 • BC other
- 32 • OC energy
- 33 • OC land use
- 34 • OC other
- 35 • NH3 energy
- 36 • NH3 land use
- 37 • NH3 other

38 Climate indicators

- 39 • Temperature change
- 40 • Concentration: CO2
- 41 • Concentration: CH4
- 42 • Concentration: N2O
- 43 • Concentration: Kyoto gases
- 44 • Radiative forcing: CO2
- 45 • Radiative forcing: CH4
- 46 • Radiative forcing: N2O
- 47 • Radiative forcing: F-gases

- 1 • Radiative forcing: Kyoto gases
- 2 • Radiative forcing: aerosols
- 3 • Radiative forcing: land albedo
- 4 • Radiative forcing: AN3A
- 5 • Radiative forcing: total
- 6 • Sea level rise

7 Carbon dioxide removal

- 8 • Bioenergy with CCS
- 9 • Reforestation
- 10 • Afforestation

11 Climate change impacts

- 12 • Agriculture
- 13 • Inequality
- 14 • Energy supply
- 15 • Energy demand

16 Co-Linkages

- 17 • Biodiversity
- 18 • Energy security: Fossil fuel imports & exports (region)
- 19 • Energy access: Household energy consumption
- 20 • Air pollution & health: Source-based aerosol emissions
- 21 • Air pollution & health: Health impacts of air Pollution

1 Reference card – MESSAGE-GLOBIOM

2 **About**

3 Name and version

4 MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0

5 Institution

6 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Austria,
7 <http://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/message-globiom/>.

8 **Model scope and methods**

9 Objective

10 MESSAGE-GLOBIOM is an integrated assessment framework designed to assess the transformation
11 of the energy and land systems vis-a-vis the challenges of climate change and other sustainability issues.
12 It consists of the energy model MESSAGE, the land use model GLOBIOM, the air pollution and GHG
13 model GAINS, the aggregated macro-economic model MACRO and the simple climate model
14 MAGICC

15 Solution concept

16 General equilibrium (closed economy)

17 Solution method

18 Optimization

19 Temporal dimension

20 Base year: 2030, time steps: 10, horizon: 2110

21 Spatial dimension

22 Number of regions: 11

- 23 1. AFR (Sub-Saharan Africa)
- 24 2. CPA (Centrally Planned Asia & China)
- 25 3. EEU (Eastern Europe)
- 26 4. FSU (Former Soviet Union)
- 27 5. LAM (Latin America and the Caribbean)
- 28 6. MEA (Middle East and North Africa)
- 29 7. NAM (North America)
- 30 8. PAO (Pacific OECD)
- 31 9. PAS (Other Pacific Asia)
- 32 10. SAS (South Asia)
- 33 11. WEU (Western Europe)

1 Time discounting average

2 1 (% per year)

3 Climate policies

- 4 • Emission tax
- 5 • Pricing
- 6 • Cap and Trade

7 Energy policies

- 8 • Portfolio standard

9 Energy technology policies

- 10 • Capacity targets
- 11 • Emission standards
- 12 • Energy efficiency standards

13 **Socio economic drivers**

14

15 **Population:** Yes (exogenous)

16 **GDP:** Yes (exogenous)

17 **Income Distribution:** Yes (exogenous)

18 **Labor Productivity:** Yes (exogenous)

19 **Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvements:** Yes (endogenous)

20 **Macro economy**

21 Economic sector

22 **Industry:** Yes (physical)

23 **Energy:** Yes (physical)

24 **Services:** Yes (physical)

25 Trade

- 26 • Coal
- 27 • Oil
- 28 • Gas
- 29 • Uranium
- 30 • Electricity
- 31 • Emissions permits

1 Cost measures

- 2 • GDP loss
- 3 • Consumption loss
- 4 • Area under MAC
- 5 • Energy system cost mark-up

6 Categorization by group

- 7 • Income
- 8 • Urban - rural

9 Resource Use

10 **Coal:** Yes (supply curve)

11 **Conventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

12 **Unconventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

13 **Conventional Gas:** Yes (supply curve)

14 **Uranium:** Yes (supply curve)

15 **Bioenergy:** Yes (supply curve)

16 Technological change

17 **Energy End-use:** Exogenous technological change

18 **Energy conversion:** Endogenous technological change

19 **Energy**

20 Energy technology choice

- 21 • Linear choice (lowest cost)

22 Energy technology substitutability

- 23 • Mostly high substitutability

24 Energy technology deployment

- 25 • Expansion and decline constraints
- 26 • System integration constraints

27 Electricity technologies

- 28 • Coal w/o CCS

- 1 • Coal w/ CCS
- 2 • Gas w/o CCS
- 3 • Gas w/ CCS
- 4 • Oil w/o CCS
- 5 • Bioenergy w/o CCS
- 6 • Bioenergy w/ CCS
- 7 • Geothermal power
- 8 • Nuclear power
- 9 • Solar power
- 10 • Solar power-central PV
- 11 • Solar power-CSP
- 12 • Wind power
- 13 • Wind power-onshore
- 14 • Wind power-offshore
- 15 • Hydroelectric power

16 Hydrogen production

- 17 • Electrolysis
- 18 • Coal to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 19 • Coal to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 20 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 21 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 22 • Biomass to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 23 • Biomass to hydrogen w/ CCS

24 Refined liquids

- 25 • Bioliquids w/o CCS
- 26 • Bioliquids w/ CCS
- 27 • Coal to liquids w/o CCS
- 28 • Coal to liquids w/ CCS
- 29 • Gas to liquids w/o CCS
- 30 • Gas to liquids w/ CCS
- 31 • Oil refining

32 Refined gases

- 33 • Coal to gas w/o CCS
- 34 • Coal to gas w/ CCS
- 35 • Biomass to gas w/o CCS
- 36 • Biomass to gas w/ CCS

37 Heat generation

- 38 • CHP (coupled heat and power)
- 39 • Coal heat
- 40 • Natural gas heat
- 41 • Oil heat
- 42 • Biomass heat
- 43 • Geothermal heat
- 44 • Solarthermal heat

1 Grid and infrastructure

2 **Electricity:** Yes (aggregate)

3 **Gas:** Yes (aggregate)

4 **Heat:** Yes (aggregate)

5 **CO2:** Yes (aggregate)

6 **Hydrogen:** Yes (aggregate)

7 Energy end-use technologies

8 Residential and commercial

- 9 • Cooking
10 • Space heating

11 **Land use**

12

13 **Emissions, climate and impacts**

14 Greenhouse gases

- 15 • CO2 fossil fuels
16 • CO2 cement
17 • CO2 land use
18 • CH4 energy
19 • CH4 land use
20 • CH4 other
21 • N2O energy
22 • N2O land use
23 • N2O other
24 • HFCs
25 • CFCs
26 • SF6

27 **Pollutants**

- 28 • CO energy
29 • CO land use
30 • CO other
31 • NOx energy
32 • NOx other
33 • VOC energy
34 • VOC land use
35 • VOC other
36 • SO2 energy
37 • SO2 land use
38 • SO2 other

- 1 • BC energy
- 2 • BC land use
- 3 • BC other
- 4 • OC energy
- 5 • OC land use
- 6 • OC other
- 7 • NH3 energy
- 8 • NH3 land use
- 9 • NH3 other

10 Climate indicators

- 11 • Temperature change
- 12 • Ocean acidification
- 13 • Concentration: CO2
- 14 • Concentration: CH4
- 15 • Concentration: N2O
- 16 • Concentration: Kyoto gases
- 17 • Radiative forcing: CO2
- 18 • Radiative forcing: CH4
- 19 • Radiative forcing: N2O
- 20 • Radiative forcing: F-gases
- 21 • Radiative forcing: Kyoto gases
- 22 • Radiative forcing: aerosols
- 23 • Radiative forcing: land albedo
- 24 • Radiative forcing: AN3A
- 25 • Radiative forcing: total
- 26 • Sea level rise

27 Carbon dioxide removal

- 28 • Bioenergy with CCS
- 29 • Reforestation
- 30 • Afforestation

31 Co-Linkages

- 32 • Energy security: Fossil fuel imports & exports (region)
- 33 • Energy access: Household energy consumption
- 34 • Air pollution & health: Source-based aerosol emissions
- 35 • Air pollution & health: Health impacts of air Pollution

36

1 Reference card – POLES

2 **About**

3 Name and version

4 POLES ENGAGE (other versions are in use in other applications)

5 Institution

6 JRC - Joint Research Centre - European Commission (EC-JRC), Belgium,
7 <http://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/poles>.

8 **Model scope and methods**

9 Objective

10 POLES was originally developed to assess energy markets, combining a detailed description of energy
11 demand, transformation and primary supply for all energy vectors. It provides full energy balances on
12 a yearly basis using frequent data updates to as to deliver robust forecasts for both short and long-term
13 horizons. It has quickly been used, in the late 90s, to assess energy-related CO2 mitigation policies.
14 Over time other GHG emissions have been included (energy and industry non-CO2 from the early
15 2000s), and linkages with agricultural and land use models have been progressively implemented.

16 Solution concept

17 Partial equilibrium (price elastic demand)

18 Solution horizon

19 Recursive dynamic (myopic)

20 Solution method

21 Simulation

22 Anticipation

23

24 Myopic

25 Temporal dimension

26 Base year: 2015, time steps: Yearly, horizon: 2015-2100

27 Spatial dimension

28 Number of regions:66 Complete energy balances: 57 countries / regions covering the World,
29 including detailed EU28, all OECD countries and main non-OECD countries

1 Fossil fuel supply: 80 countries / regions

2 **Climate policies**

- 3 • Emission tax
- 4 • Pricing
- 5 • Cap and Trade

6 **Energy policies**

- 7 • Feed-in-Tariff
- 8 • Fuel taxes
- 9 • Fuel subsidies

10 **Energy technology policies**

- 11 • Capacity targets
- 12 • Emission standards
- 13 • Energy efficiency standards

14 **Land-use policies**

- 15 • Pricing carbon stocks

16 **Socio economic drivers**

17 **Population:** Yes (exogenous)

18 **GDP:** Yes (exogenous)

19 **Autonomous energy efficiency improvements:** Yes (endogenous)

20 **Macro economy**

21 Economic sector

22 **Industry:** Yes (physical & economic)

23 **Energy:** Yes (physical & economic)

24 **Agriculture:** Yes (physical & economic)

25 Other economic sector

- 26 • Services (economic)

27 Trade

- 28 • Coal
- 29 • Oil

- 1 • Gas
- 2 • Bioenergy crops
- 3 • Emissions permits
- 4 • Electricity

- 5 **Cost measures**

- 6 • Area under MAC
- 7 • Investments: supply-side only
- 8 **Resource Use**

- 9 **Coal:** Yes (process model)

- 10 **Conventional Oil:** Yes (process model)

- 11 **Unconventional Oil:** Yes (process model)

- 12 **Conventional Gas:** Yes (process model)

- 13 **Uranium:** Yes (process model)

- 14 **Bioenergy:** Yes (supply curve)

- 15 **Land:** Yes (fixed)

- 16 **Technological change**

- 17 **Energy End-Use:** Exogenous technological change

- 18 **Energy conversion:** Endogenous technological change

- 19 **Energy**
- 20 **Behaviour**

- 21 Activity drivers depend on income per capita and energy prices via elasticities. Energy demand depends
- 22 on activity drivers, energy prices and technology costs. Primary energy supply depends on remaining
- 23 resources, production cost and price effects.

- 24 **Energy technology choice**

- 25 • Logit choice model

- 26 **Energy technology substitutability**

- 27 • Mostly high substitutability

- 28 **Energy technology deployment**

- 29 • Expansion and decline constraints

1 Electricity technologies

- 2 • Coal w/o CCS
- 3 • Coal w/ CCS
- 4 • Gas w/o CCS
- 5 • Gas w/ CCS
- 6 • Oil w/o CCS
- 7 • Bioenergy w/o CCS
- 8 • Bioenergy w/ CCS
- 9 • Geothermal power
- 10 • Nuclear power
- 11 • Solar power
- 12 • Solar power-central PV
- 13 • Solar power-CSP
- 14 • Wind power
- 15 • Wind power-onshore
- 16 • Wind power-offshore
- 17 • Hydroelectric power
- 18 • Ocean power
- 19 • Solar power-distributed PV

20 Hydrogen production

- 21 • Electrolysis
- 22 • Coal to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 23 • Coal to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 24 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 25 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 26 • Oil to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 27 • Biomass to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 28 • Biomass to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 29 • Nuclear thermochemical hydrogen
- 30 • Solar thermochemical hydrogen

31 Refined liquids

- 32 • Bioliquids w/o CCS
- 33 • Bioliquids w/ CCS
- 34 • Coal to liquids w/o CCS
- 35 • Coal to liquids w/ CCS
- 36 • Gas to liquids w/o CCS
- 37 • Gas to liquids w/ CCS
- 38 • Oil refining

39 Heat generation

- 40 • Biomass heat
- 41 • CHP (coupled heat and power)
- 42 • Coal heat
- 43 • Natural gas heat
- 44 • Oil heat
- 45 • Solarthermal heat

1 **Grid and infrastructure**

2 **Gas:** Yes (aggregate)

3 **CO2:** Yes (aggregate)

4 **Energy end-use technologies**

5 **Passenger transportation**

- 6 • Buses
- 7 • Light Duty Vehicles (LDVs)
- 8 • Electric LDVs
- 9 • Hydrogen LDVs
- 10 • Hybrid LDVs
- 11 • Gasoline LDVs
- 12 • Diesel LDVs
- 13 • Passenger trains
- 14 • Passenger aircrafts

15 **Freight transportation**

- 16 • Freight trains
- 17 • Heavy duty vehicles
- 18 • Freight ships

19 **Industry**

- 20 • Steel production
- 21 • Cement production
- 22 • Petrochemical production

23 **Residential and commercial**

- 24 • Cooking
- 25 • Space heating
- 26 • Space cooling

27 **Land use**

28 **Land cover**

- 29 • Cropland
- 30 • Forest
- 31 • Pasture
- 32 • Cropland irrigated
- 33 • Cropland food crops
- 34 • Cropland feed crops
- 35 • Managed forest
- 36 • Natural forest
- 37 • Built-up area

1 Agriculture and forestry demands

- 2 • Agriculture food
- 3 • Agriculture food crops
- 4 • Agriculture feed crops
- 5 • Agriculture bioenergy
- 6 • Forest industrial roundwood
- 7 • Forest fuelwood
- 8 • Forest residues

9 Emissions, climate and impacts

10 Greenhouse gases

- 11 • CO₂ cement
- 12 • CO₂ fossil fuels
- 13 • CO₂ land use
- 14 • CH₄ energy
- 15 • CH₄ other
- 16 • N₂O energy
- 17 • N₂O land use
- 18 • N₂O other
- 19 • HFCs
- 20 • CFCs
- 21 • PFCs
- 22 • SF₆

23 Pollutants

- 24 • CO energy
- 25 • CO land use
- 26 • CO other
- 27 • NO_x energy
- 28 • NO_x land use
- 29 • NO_x other
- 30 • VOC energy
- 31 • VOC land use
- 32 • VOC other
- 33 • SO₂ energy
- 34 • SO₂ land use
- 35 • SO₂ other
- 36 • BC energy
- 37 • BC land use
- 38 • BC other
- 39 • NH₃ energy
- 40 • NH₃ land use
- 41 • NH₃ other

42 Carbon dioxide removal

- 43 • Bioenergy with CCS
- 44 • Reforestation
- 45 • Afforestation

1 Climate change impacts

- 2 • Energy demand

3 Co-Linkages

- 4 • Energy security: Fossil fuel imports & exports (region)
5 • Energy access: Household energy consumption
6 • Air pollution & health: Source-based aerosol emissions

7

1 Reference card – REMIND-MagPIE

2 **About**

3 Name and version

4 REMIND-MAgPIE 2.0-4.1

5 Institution

6 Potsdam Institut für Klimafolgenforschung (PIK), Germany, [https://www.pik-](https://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/sustainable-solutions/models/remind)
7 [potsdam.de/research/sustainable-solutions/models/remind](https://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/sustainable-solutions/models/remind).

8 **Model scope and methods**

9 Objective

10 Construct self-consistent optimal benchmark scenarios for the transformation of the global energy-
11 economy-land system, for different assumptions on climate policies or targets. Comparison with no-
12 policy benchmark scenarios allows for the calculation of mitigation costs.

13 Solution concept

14 General equilibrium (closed economy)

15 Solution method

16 Optimization

17 Temporal dimension

18 Base year: 2005, time steps: 5, horizon: 2005-2100

19 Spatial dimension

20 Number of regions: 12

21 Time discounting average

22 (% per year)

23 Climate policies

- 24 • Emission tax
- 25 • Pricing
- 26 • Cap and Trade

1 Energy policies

- 2 • Fuel taxes
- 3 • Fuel subsidies
- 4 • Portfolio standard

5 Energy technology policies

- 6 • Capacity targets

7 Land-use policies

- 8 • Land protection
- 9 • Pricing carbon stocks

10 **Socio economic drivers**

11 **Population:** Yes (exogenous)

12 **GDP:** Yes (exogenous)

13 **Employment rate:** Yes (exogenous)

14 **Labor productivity:** Yes (exogenous)

15 **Total factor productivity:** Yes (exogenous)

16 **Autonomous energy efficiency improvements:** Yes (exogenous)

17 **Macro economy**

18 Economic sector

19 **Energy:** Yes (physical)

20 **Agriculture:** Yes (physical)

21 Other economic sector

22 The macro-economic part contains a single sector representation of the entire economy. A
23 generic final good is produced from capital, labor, and different final energy types.

24 Trade

- 25 • Coal
- 26 • Oil
- 27 • Gas
- 28 • Uranium
- 29 • Bioenergy crops
- 30 • Capital

- 1 • Emissions permits
- 2 • Non-energy goods
- 3 • Food crops
- 4 • Energy goods

- 5 **Cost measures**

- 6 • Consumption loss
- 7 • GDP loss
- 8 • Welfare loss

- 9 **Resource Use**

- 10 **Coal:** Yes (supply curve)

- 11 **Conventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

- 12 **Unconventional Oil:** Yes (supply curve)

- 13 **Conventional Gas:** Yes (supply curve)

- 14 **Uranium:** Yes (supply curve)

- 15 **Bioenergy:** Yes (supply curve)

- 16 **Water:** Yes (process model)

- 17 **Technological change**

- 18 **Energy End-use:** Endogenous technological change

- 19 **Energy**
- 20 Energy technology substitutability
- 21 • Mostly high substitutability

- 22 **Electricity technologies**

- 23 • Coal w/o CCS
- 24 • Coal w/ CCS
- 25 • Gas w/o CCS
- 26 • Gas w/ CCS
- 27 • Oil w/o CCS
- 28 • Bioenergy w/o CCS
- 29 • Bioenergy w/ CCS
- 30 • Geothermal power
- 31 • Nuclear power
- 32 • Solar power
- 33 • Solar power-central PV
- 34 • Solar power-CSP

- 1 • Wind power
- 2 • Hydroelectric power

3 Hydrogen production

- 4 • Electrolysis
- 5 • Coal to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 6 • Coal to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 7 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 8 • Natural gas to hydrogen w/ CCS
- 9 • Biomass to hydrogen w/o CCS
- 10 • Biomass to hydrogen w/ CCS

11 Refined liquids

- 12 • Bioliquids w/ CCS
- 13 • Bioliquids w/o CCS
- 14 • Coal to liquids w/ CCS
- 15 • Coal to liquids w/o CCS
- 16 • Oil refining

17 Refined gases

- 18 • Coal to gas w/o CCS
- 19 • Biomass to gas w/o CCS

20 Heat generation

- 21 • CHP (coupled heat and power)
- 22 • Coal heat
- 23 • Natural gas heat
- 24 • Oil heat
- 25 • Biomass heat
- 26 • Geothermal heat

27 Grid and infrastructure

28 Generalized transmission and distribution costs are included, but not modeled on an explicit
29 spatial level. Regionalized additional grid and storage costs for renewable integration are
30 included.

31 Energy end-use technologies

32 Passenger transportation

- 33 • Light Duty Vehicles (LDVs)
- 34 • Electric LDVs
- 35 • Hydrogen LDVs
- 36 • Gasoline LDVs
- 37 • Passenger trains

1 Freight transportation

- 2 • Heavy duty vehicles

3 Land use

4 Land cover

- 5 • Cropland
- 6 • Forest
- 7 • Pasture
- 8 • Cropland irrigated
- 9 • Cropland food crops
- 10 • Cropland feed crops
- 11 • Cropland energy crops
- 12 • Managed forest
- 13 • Natural forest
- 14 • Built-up area

15 Agriculture and forestry demands

- 16 • Agriculture food
- 17 • Agriculture food crops
- 18 • Agriculture food livestock
- 19 • Agriculture feed
- 20 • Agriculture feed crops
- 21 • Agriculture feed livestock
- 22 • Agriculture non-food
- 23 • Agriculture non-food crops
- 24 • Agriculture non-food livestock
- 25 • Agriculture bioenergy
- 26 • Agriculture residues

27 Agricultural commodities

- 28 • Wheat
- 29 • Rice
- 30 • Oilseeds
- 31 • Other coarse grains
- 32 • Sugar crops
- 33 • Ruminant meat
- 34 • Non-ruminant meat and eggs
- 35 • Dairy products

36 Emissions, climate and impacts

37 Greenhouse gases

- 38 • CO₂ fossil fuels
- 39 • CO₂ cement
- 40 • CO₂ land use
- 41 • CH₄ energy

- 1 • CH4 land use
- 2 • CH4 other
- 3 • N2O energy
- 4 • N2O land use
- 5 • N2O other
- 6 • HFCs
- 7 • CFCs
- 8 • SF6

9 Pollutants

- 10 • BC energy
- 11 • BC land use
- 12 • BC other
- 13 • CO energy
- 14 • CO land use
- 15 • CO other
- 16 • NH3 energy
- 17 • NH3 land use
- 18 • NOx energy
- 19 • NOx land use
- 20 • NOx other
- 21 • OC energy
- 22 • OC land use
- 23 • OC other
- 24 • SO2 energy
- 25 • SO2 land use
- 26 • SO2 other
- 27 • VOC energy
- 28 • VOC land use
- 29 • VOC other

30 Ozone is not modeled as emission, but is an endogenous result of atmospheric chemistry.

31 Climate indicators

- 32 • Temperature change
- 33 • Concentration: CO2
- 34 • Concentration: CH4
- 35 • Concentration: N2O
- 36 • Concentration: Kyoto gases
- 37 • Radiative forcing: CO2
- 38 • Radiative forcing: CH4
- 39 • Radiative forcing: N2O
- 40 • Radiative forcing: F-gases
- 41 • Radiative forcing: Kyoto gases
- 42 • Radiative forcing: aerosols
- 43 • Radiative forcing: AN3A
- 44 • Radiative forcing: total
- 45 • Radiative Forcing (Land Albedo) - Yes (exogenous)

46 Carbon dioxide removal

- 47 • Bioenergy with CCS

- 1 • Afforestation
- 2 • Direct air capture
- 3 • Enhanced weathering

4 Co-Linkages

- 5 • Energy security: Fossil fuel imports & exports (region)
- 6 • Water availability

7

8

1 Reference card – WITCH

2 **About**

3 Name and version

4 WITCH 5.0

5 Institution

6 Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Italy, <http://www.feem.it>.

7 Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC), Italy, <http://www.cmcc.it>.

8 **Model scope and methods**

9 Objective

10 WITCH evaluates the impacts of climate policies on global and regional economic systems
11 and provides information on the optimal responses of these economies to climate change. The
12 model considers the positive externalities from leaning-by-doing and learning-by-researching
13 in the technological change.

14 Solution concept

15 General equilibrium (closed economy)

16 Solution method

17 Optimization

18 Temporal dimension

19 Base year: 2005, time steps: 5, horizon: 2150

20 Spatial dimension

21 Number of regions: 17

22 Climate policies

- 23 • Emission tax
- 24 • Pricing
- 25 • Cap and Trade

26 Energy policies

- 27 • Fuel taxes
- 28 • Fuel subsidies

1 Energy technology policies

- 2 • Capacity targets
- 3 • Emission standards

4 **Socio economic drivers**

5 **Population:** Yes (exogenous)

6 **Urbanization rate:** Yes (exogenous)

7 **GDP:** Yes (endogenous)

8 **Total factor productivity:** Yes (exogenous)

9 **Autonomous energy efficiency improvements:** Yes (exogenous)

10 **Macro economy**

11 Economic sector

12 A single economy sector is represented. Production inputs are capital, labor and energy
13 services, accounting for the Energy sector split into 8 energy technologies sectors (coal, oil,
14 gas, wind & solar, nuclear, electricity and biofuels).

15 Trade

- 16 • Coal
- 17 • Oil
- 18 • Gas
- 19 • Emissions permits
- 20 • Uranium
- 21 • Electricity
- 22 • Bioenergy crops
- 23 • Capital
- 24 • Non-energy goods

25 Cost measures

- 26 • GDP loss
- 27 • Welfare loss
- 28 • Consumption loss
- 29 • Energy system cost mark-up

30 Resource Use

31 **Coal:** Yes (supply curve)

32 **Conventional Oil:** Yes (process model)

- 1 **Unconventional Oil:** Yes (process model)
- 2 **Conventional Gas:** Yes (fixed)
- 3 **Uranium:** Yes (fixed)
- 4 **Bioenergy:** Yes (supply curve)
- 5 Technological change
- 6 **Energy End-use:** Endogenous technological change
- 7 **Agriculture:** Exogenous technological change
- 8 **Energy**
- 9 Energy technology choice
- 10
 - No discrete technology choices
- 11 Energy technology substitutability
- 12
 - Mostly high substitutability
- 13 Energy technology deployment
- 14
 - Expansion and decline constraints
 - 15 • System integration constraints
- 16 Electricity technologies
- 17
 - Coal w/o CCS
 - 18 • Coal w/ CCS
 - 19 • Gas w/o CCS
 - 20 • Gas w/ CCS
 - 21 • Oil w/o CCS
 - 22 • Oil w/ CCS
 - 23 • Bioenergy w/o CCS
 - 24 • Bioenergy w/ CCS
 - 25 • Nuclear power
 - 26 • Solar power
 - 27 • Solar power-central PV
 - 28 • Solar power-CSP
 - 29 • Wind power
 - 30 • Wind power-onshore
 - 31 • Wind power-offshore
 - 32 • Hydroelectric power
 - 33 • Solar power-distributed PV

1 Grid and infrastructure

2 **Electricity:** Yes (aggregate)

3 Energy end-use technologies

4 Passenger transportation

- 5 • Light Duty Vehicles (LDVs)
- 6 • Electric LDVs
- 7 • Hybrid LDVs
- 8 • Diesel LDVs

9 **Land use**

10 Land cover

- 11 • Cropland
- 12 • Forest
- 13 • Pasture
- 14 • Cropland irrigated

15 **Emissions, climate and impacts**

16 Greenhouse gases

- 17 • CO₂ fossil fuels
- 18 • CO₂ land use
- 19 • CH₄ energy
- 20 • CH₄ land use
- 21 • CH₄ other
- 22 • N₂O energy
- 23 • N₂O land use
- 24 • N₂O other
- 25 • HFCs

26 Pollutants

- 27 • CO energy
- 28 • CO land use
- 29 • CO other
- 30 • NO_x energy
- 31 • NO_x land use
- 32 • NO_x other
- 33 • VOC energy
- 34 • VOC land use
- 35 • VOC other
- 36 • SO₂ energy
- 37 • SO₂ land use
- 38 • SO₂ other
- 39 • BC energy
- 40 • BC land use
- 41 • BC other

- 1 • OC energy
- 2 • OC land use
- 3 • OC other
- 4 • NH3 energy
- 5 • NH3 land use
- 6 • NH3 other

7 Climate indicators

- 8 • Temperature change
- 9 • Concentration: CO2
- 10 • Concentration: CH4
- 11 • Concentration: N2O
- 12 • Concentration: Kyoto gases
- 13 • Radiative forcing: CO2
- 14 • Radiative forcing: CH4
- 15 • Radiative forcing: N2O
- 16 • Radiative forcing: F-gases
- 17 • Radiative forcing: Kyoto gases
- 18 • Radiative forcing: aerosols
- 19 • Radiative forcing: land albedo
- 20 • Radiative forcing: AN3A
- 21 • Radiative forcing: total

22 Carbon dioxide removal

- 23 • Bioenergy with CCS
- 24 • Reforestation
- 25 • Afforestation
- 26 • Direct air capture

27 Climate change impacts

- 28 • Economic output

29 Co-Linkages

- 30 • Air pollution & health: Source-based aerosol emissions
- 31 • Air pollution & health: Health impacts of air Pollution

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