

Summary for Policy Makers

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1 Introduction

2
3 This report responds to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's invitation to the IPCC in
4 December 2015 "... to prepare a Special Report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C
5 above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways". The IPCC
6 accepted this invitation in April 2016, deciding to prepare this report in the context of strengthening
7 the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate
8 poverty.

9
10 This Special Report assesses literature¹ relevant to all three IPCC Working Groups and uses the IPCC
11 methodologies and calibrated language for communicating certainty in key findings².

12
13 The Summary for Policy Makers is structured into four sections: Section A, Understanding global
14 warming of 1.5°C; Section B, Projected climatic changes, their potential impacts and associated risks
15 at 1.5°C global warming; Section C, Emission pathways and system transitions consistent with 1.5°C
16 global warming; and Section D, Strengthening the global response in the context of sustainable
17 development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

18
19 Its narrative is supported by headline statements that taken together, provide an overview of the key
20 findings. The underlying scientific basis for each paragraph can be traced to the chapter sections of the
21 report as indicated by references provided.

22 23 24 **Box SPM 1: Definitions central to SR1.5**

25
26 **Global mean surface temperature (GMST):** Area-weighted global average of land surface air
27 temperature and sea surface temperatures, unless otherwise specified, normally expressed relative to a
28 specified reference period.

29
30 **Global warming:** An increase in GMST averaged over a 30-year period, relative to 1850-1900 unless
31 otherwise specified. For periods shorter than 30 years, global warming refers to the estimated average
32 temperature over the 30 years centred on that shorter period, accounting for the impact of any
33 temperature fluctuations or trend within those 30 years.

34
35 **Pre-industrial:** The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity. The
36 reference period 1850-1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial GMST in this report.

37
38 **1.5°C or 2°C warmer worlds:** Projected worlds in which global warming has reached and, unless
39 otherwise indicated, been limited to 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

40
41 **Net-zero CO₂ emissions:** Conditions in which any remaining anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO₂)
42 emissions are balanced globally by anthropogenic CO₂ removals. Net-zero CO₂ emissions are also
43 referred to as carbon neutrality.

44
¹ FOOTNOTE: The assessment covers literature accepted for publication by May 15, 2018.

² FOOTNOTE: Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. In many cases, a synthesis of evidence and agreement supports an assignment of confidence. The summary terms for evidence are: limited, medium or robust. For agreement, they are low, medium or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., *medium confidence*. The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely likely 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, more unlikely than likely 0–<50%, extremely unlikely 0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., *very likely*. See for more details: Mastrandrea, M.D., C.B. Field, T.F. Stocker, O. Edenhofer, K.L. Ebi, D.J. Frame, H. Held, E. Kriegler, K.J. Mach, P.R. Matschoss, G.-K. Plattner, G.W. Yohe and F.W. Zwiers, 2010: Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Geneva, Switzerland, 4 pp

1 **Remaining carbon budget:** Cumulative global CO₂ emissions from the start of 2018 to the time that
2 CO₂ emissions reach net-zero that would result in a given level of global warming.
3

4 **Overshoot:** The temporary exceedance of a specified level of global warming, such as 1.5°C.
5 Overshoot implies a peak followed by a decline in global warming, achieved through anthropogenic
6 removal of CO₂ exceeding remaining CO₂ emissions globally.
7

8 **1.5°C-consistent pathway:** A pathway of emissions of greenhouse gases and other climate forcings
9 that provides an approximately one-in-two to two-in-three chance, given current knowledge of the
10 climate response, of global warming either remaining below 1.5°C or returning to 1.5°C by around
11 2100 following an overshoot.
12

13 **Impacts:** Effects of climate change, such as warming, sea level rise or changes in the frequency and
14 intensity of heat waves, on human and natural systems. Impacts can have positive or negative
15 outcomes for lives, livelihoods, health and wellbeing, ecosystems and species, economic, social and
16 cultural assets, services, and infrastructure.
17

18 **Risk:** The potential for adverse consequences from a climate-related hazard for human and natural
19 systems, resulting from the interactions between the hazard and the vulnerability and exposure of the
20 affected system. Risk can also include the uncertain adverse outcomes of adaptation or mitigation
21 responses.
22

23 **Enabling conditions:** Factors, including governance, policy, finance, behaviour, innovation and
24 capacity, that can facilitate the global response to climate change and that underpin the feasibility of
25 mitigation and adaptation options, acknowledging synergies and trade-offs among different options.
26
27
28

1 **A. Understanding global warming of 1.5°C**

2
3 **A1. Human-induced global warming reached approximately $1\pm 0.2^{\circ}\text{C}$ (*likely range*) above pre-**
4 **industrial levels in 2017 and is currently increasing at $0.2\pm 0.1^{\circ}\text{C}$ per decade (*high confidence*).**
5 **{1.2, Figure SPM1}**

6
7 **A1.1.** Observed global average surface temperature for the decade 2006-2015 was 0.87°C ($\pm 0.12^{\circ}\text{C}$)³
8 warmer than 1850-1900 (*very high confidence*). Since 2000, the estimated level of human-induced
9 warming has been equal to the level of observed warming with a *likely* range of $\pm 20\%$ (*high*
10 *confidence*). {1.2.1, Table 1.1}

11
12 **A1.2.** Energy continues to accumulate in the climate system due to past and present greenhouse gas
13 emissions and other anthropogenic climate forcers (*very high confidence*), causing continued warming
14 at a rate of $0.2^{\circ}\text{C}/\text{decade}$ with a *likely* range of $\pm 0.1^{\circ}\text{C}$ (*high confidence*). {1.2.1, 1.2.4}

15
16 **A1.3.** Warming greater than the global average is being experienced in many regions and seasons,
17 with average warming greater over land than over the ocean (*high confidence*). {1.2.1, 1.2.2, Figure
18 1.1, Figure 1.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2}

19
20 **A2. Past emissions alone are *unlikely* to raise GMST to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, but do**
21 **commit to further changes such as sea-level rise and associated impacts (*high confidence*). If**
22 **emissions continue at their present rate, human-induced warming will exceed 1.5°C by around**
23 **2040 (*high confidence*). {1.2, 3.3, Figure SPM 1}**

24
25 **A2.1.** If all anthropogenic emissions (including greenhouse gases, aerosols and their precursors) were
26 reduced to zero immediately, it is *likely* that any further warming would be less than 0.5°C over the
27 next two to three decades (*high confidence*), and *likely* less than 0.5°C on a century time scale
28 (*medium confidence*), due to the compensating effects of different climate processes and climate
29 forcers. {1.2.4, Figure 1.6}

30
31 **A2.2.** If emissions continue at their present rate over the coming decades, the present rate of human-
32 induced warming of $0.2\pm 0.1^{\circ}\text{C}$ per decade will continue (*very high confidence*). {1.2.1, 1.2.4}

33
34 **A2.3.** Stabilising GMST requires net-zero CO_2 emissions and declining total radiative forcing⁴ from
35 other anthropogenic forcers (*high confidence*). The maximum level of warming is then determined by
36 cumulative CO_2 emissions up to the time of net-zero (*high confidence*) and the level of non-
37 CO_2 radiative forcing in the decades immediately prior to that time (*medium confidence*) (Figure SPM
38 2). {Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2}

39
40 **A3. Risks for natural and human systems are lower for global warming of 1.5°C than at 2°C**
41 **depending on geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, and on the choices of**
42 **adaptation and mitigation options (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM2). {1.3, 3.3, 3.4, 5.6}**

43
44 **A3.1.** Risks for natural and human systems are lower if global warming gradually stabilises at 1.5°C ,
45 compared to overshooting 1.5°C and returning later to this level later in the century {medium
46 confidence}. {3.4, Box 3.4, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}

47
³ FOOTNOTE: This range spans several available peer-reviewed estimates of the observed global temperature change and also represents a *likely* range in warming to the decade 2006-2015, accounting for additional uncertainty due to possible short-term natural variability. {1.2.1, Table 1.1}

⁴ FOOTNOTE: The change in the top-of-atmosphere balance between incoming and outgoing energy resulting from a human or natural perturbation to the climate system, allowing the atmosphere and land-surface to adjust but retaining sea-surface temperatures and sea-ice at their unperturbed state (called "Effective Radiative Forcing" in previous reports).

1 **A4. Sustainable development, poverty eradication and implications for ethics and equity will be**
2 **will be key considerations in mitigation efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C and by efforts to**
3 **adapt to 1.5°C global warming {high confidence}. {1.1, 1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1,**
4 **5.2. 5.3}**
5

6 **A4.1.** The poor and vulnerable are disproportionately affected by many impacts of global warming as
7 well as the challenges of remaining below global warming of 1.5°C; with associated mitigation
8 options implying a combination of significant benefits and adverse effects, depending on the various
9 mitigation options (*high confidence*). {1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.4.3, 2.5.3, Cross-Chapter Boxes 4 in Chapter 1, 7
10 and 8 in Chapter 3 and 13 in Chapter 5}
11

12 **A4.2.** Effective adaptation requires the integration of scientific, technological and social conditions
13 and capacities. Sustainable development, poverty eradication and reduction of inequalities are enabled
14 by enhancing local capabilities (*high confidence*). {4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.3, 5.3.1}
15

16 **A4.3.** Climate resilient development pathways (CRDPs) are a framework to simultaneously achieve
17 the goals of emission reduction, climate adaptation and climate resilience in the context of sustainable
18 development, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities. {1.4.3, Cross Chapter Box 1, 5.1, 5.5.3}
19

20 **A5. There is no simple answer to the question of whether it is feasible to limit warming to 1.5°C**
21 **and to adapt to the consequences because feasibility has multiple dimensions that need to be**
22 **considered simultaneously and systematically. {1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1, 4.3, 4.4}**
23


24 **A5.1.** In the context of sustainable development, feasibility depends on enabling conditions. These
25 include institutional capacity, policy and finance, multi-level governance, technological innovation
26 and transfer, and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles. Feasibility also reflects links, positive
27 (synergies) and negative (trade-offs), between sustainable development, mitigation, and adaptation on
28 multiple scales. {1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1, 4.4, 5.6}
29
30
31

Cumulative emissions of CO₂ and future non-CO₂ radiative forcing determine the chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C


Observed global average temperatures, estimated human-induced warming to date, and one estimate of the range of temperature responses to an idealised 1.5°C-consistent emissions pathway in which CO₂ emissions decline in a straight line from 2020 to 2055, while non-CO₂ radiative forcing increases to 2030 and then declines.

Panels (a) to (e) explain how different aspects of future emissions affect the probability of temperatures exceeding 1.5°C.


Global warming relative to 1850-1900




a) Idealised CO₂ emissions pathways




b) Total cumulative CO₂ emissions




c) Warming response to lower future cumulative CO₂ emissions



d) Scenarios for non-CO₂ radiative forcing



e) Warming response to higher future non-CO₂ radiative forcing



1 **Figure SPM 1:** Top panel: Observed monthly global average surface temperature (grey line) and estimated
 2 human-induced warming to date (orange line and shading) reproduced from Chapter 1,
 3 Figure 1.2. Grey plume shows distribution of warming responses to an idealized 1.5°C-
 4 consistent pathway in which CO₂ emissions (grey line in sub-panels b and c) decline in a
 5 straight line from 2020 to 2055 while non-CO₂ radiative forcing increases to 2030 and then
 6 declines following an indicative 1.5°C-consistent pathway as assessed in Chapter 2 (grey
 7 line in panel d). Light grey shading in top panel shows an estimate of the *likely* range, while
 8 dark grey shows central third of the distribution. Sub-panels a) to e) explain how varying
 9 future cumulative CO₂ emissions (a-c) and non-CO₂ radiative forcing (d-e) affects the
 10 probability of warming exceeding 1.5°C. {1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 2.3}

13 **B. Projected climatic changes, their potential impacts and associated risks at 1.5°C global** 14 **warming**

16 **B1. There are substantial increases in extremes between the present-day and a global warming**
 17 **of 1.5°C, and between 1.5°C and 2°C, including hot extremes in all inhabited regions⁵ (*high***
 18 ***confidence*), heavy precipitation events in most regions (*high confidence*), and extreme droughts**
 19 **in some regions (*medium confidence*). {3.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}**

21 **B1.1.** Changes in temperature extremes and heavy precipitation indices are detectable in observations
 22 for the 1991-2010 period compared with 1960-1979, a time-span over which global warming of
 23 approximately 0.5°C occurred. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}

25 **B1.2.** Temperature extremes on land are projected to warm more than the global average: extreme hot
 26 days in mid-latitudes by a factor of up to 2, i.e. ~3°C at 1.5°C global warming, and extreme cold
 27 nights in high-latitudes by a factor of up to 3, i.e. ~4.5°C at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*).
 28 The number of highly unusual hot days is projected to increase the most in the tropics (*high*
 29 *confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}

31 **B1.3.** Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C reduces the likelihood of increases in heavy
 32 precipitation events in several northern hemisphere high latitude and high elevation regions (*medium*
 33 *confidence*). Less land would be affected by flood hazards (*medium confidence*) and the probability of
 34 extreme droughts would be less in some regions, including the Mediterranean and southern Africa
 35 (*medium confidence*). {3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5}

37 **B2. On land, risks of climate-induced impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species**
 38 **loss and extinction, are substantially less at 1.5°C global warming than at 2°C. Limiting global**
 39 **warming to 1.5°C has large benefits for terrestrial and wetland ecosystems and for the**
 40 **preservation of their services (*high confidence*). Temperature overshoot, if much higher than**
 41 **1.5°C (e.g. close to 2°C), could have irreversible impacts on some species, ecosystems and their**
 42 **ecological functions and services to humans, even if global warming eventually stabilizes at 1.5°C**
 43 **by 2100 (*high confidence*). (SPM Figure 2) {3.4, 3.5, Box 3.4, Box 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in**
 44 **Chapter 3}**

46 **B2.1.** The number of species projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic
 47 range at 2°C is reduced by a factor of two or more at 1.5°C, i.e. by 50% (plants, vertebrates) or 66%
 48 (insects) (*high confidence*). Impacts associated with other biodiversity-related risks such as forest
 49 fires, and the spread of invasive species, are also reduced substantially at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of
 50 global warming (*high confidence*). {3.4.3.2, 3.5.2}

⁵ FOOTNOTE: Region definition based on IPCC regions (AR5, SREX; see Fig. 3.2)

1 **B2.2.** The terrestrial area affected by ecosystem transformation (13%) at 2°C is approximately halved
2 at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*). {3.3.4, 3.4.3.5, 3.4.6.1, 3.5.10, Box 4.2}

3
4 **B2.3.** High-latitude tundra and boreal forests are particularly at risk, with woody shrubs encroaching
5 into the tundra (*high confidence*). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C could prevent the thawing of an
6 estimated permafrost area of 2 million km² of permafrost area over centuries (*high confidence*) {3.3.2,
7 3.4.3, 3.5.5}

8
9 **B3. Due to projected differences in ocean temperature, acidification and oxygen levels, limiting**
10 **warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C would substantially reduce risks to marine biodiversity,**
11 **ecosystems and their ecological functions and services to humans in ocean and coastal areas,**
12 **especially Arctic sea-ice ecosystems and warm water coral reefs. {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, Boxes 3.4, 3.5}**

13
14 **B3.1.** With 2°C of global warming, it is *very likely* that there will be at least one sea ice-free Arctic
15 summer per decade. This is reduced to one per century with 1.5°C global warming. Effects of an
16 overshoot are reversible for Arctic sea-ice cover (*high confidence*). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}

17
18 **B3.2.** Ocean ecosystems are experiencing large-scale changes with critical thresholds being exceeded
19 at 1.5°C and above (*high confidence*). Crossing these thresholds may have irreversible effects. The
20 majority of warm water coral reefs, for example, are already experiencing the large scale loss of coral
21 abundance (cover) today and would lose a further 70-90% of cover at 1.5°C global warming (*very high*
22 *confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

23
24 **B3.3.** The level of ocean acidification in a 1.5°C warmer world is expected to amplify the adverse
25 effects of warming, impacting the survival, calcification, growth, development, and abundance of a
26 broad range of taxonomic groups (i.e. from algae to fish) (*high confidence*). {3.3.10, 3.4.4}

27
28 **B3.4.** The risk of declining ocean productivity, distributional shifts (to higher latitudes), damage to
29 ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs, wetlands), loss of fisheries productivity (at low latitudes), and changing
30 ocean chemistry (e.g., acidification, hypoxia) are projected to be substantially lower at 1.5°C of global
31 warming, as compared to 2°C (*high confidence*) {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

32
33 **B4. By 2100, sea level rise would be around 0.1m lower with 1.5°C global warming compared to**
34 **2°C (*medium confidence*). Increased saltwater intrusions, flooding, and damage to infrastructure**
35 **associated with increased sea level are especially harmful for vulnerable environments such as**
36 **small islands, low-lying coasts, and deltas (*high confidence*) {3.3, 3.4, 3.6}**

37
38 **B4.1.** Sea level rise will continue beyond 2100 (*high confidence*). Greenland and/or Antarctic ice sheet
39 instabilities that could result in multi-metre rise in sea level on centennial to millennial time scales,
40 maybe triggered even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C by 2100 (*medium confidence*). {3.3.9,
41 3.4.5, 3.5.2, 3.6.3, Box 3.3}

42
43 **B4.2.** A reduction to global sea level rise of 0.1m at global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C implies
44 that approximately 10 million fewer people are expected to be exposed to related risks, based on a
45 2010 population estimate. The slower rate of rise for global warming of 1.5°C is expected to provide
46 substantially greater opportunities for adaptation. {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 4.3.2}

47
48 **B5. Impacts on health, livelihoods, food and water supply, human security, infrastructure, and**
49 **the underlying potential for economic growth will increase with 1.5°C of warming compared to**
50 **today, and even more with 2°C warming compared to 1.5°C. (SPM Figure 2) {3.4, 3.5, Box 3.2,**
51 **Box 3.3, Box 3.5, Box 3.6, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4,**
52 **Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 5.2}**

1 **B5.1.** Disadvantaged and vulnerable populations and nations will be disproportionately affected by the
2 impacts of global warming of 1.5°C and beyond (*high confidence*). This is particularly the case for
3 Indigenous peoples and systems in the Arctic, populations dependent on agriculture- and coastal
4 livelihoods, and small-island developing states, many of which face limits to adaptation already
5 (*medium confidence*). {3.4.10, 3.4.11, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box
6 11 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.6.3}

8 **B5.2.** While any future increase in global warming will affect human health (*high confidence*), risks
9 will be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (*very high confidence*).
10 Risks are with increasing warming are particularly high in urban areas due to the urban heat island
11 effect (*high confidence*). Risks are projected to increase for some vector-borne diseases, such as
12 malaria and dengue fever (*high confidence*). {3.4.7}

14 **B5.3.** Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C would result in a lower global reduction in
15 crop yields and nutritional quality (*high confidence*) and lower risks to crop production in Sub-
16 Saharan Africa (particularly West Africa, southern Africa), South-East Asia, and Central and South
17 America. Risks of food shortages in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe, and
18 the Amazon are significantly lower with 1.5°C of warming, compared to 2°C. {3.4.6, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, Box
19 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, 4.3.2, 4.3.5, 4.5.3, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in
20 Chapter 4}

22 **B5.4.** Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C would approximately halve the proportion
23 of the world population expected to suffer water scarcity, although there is considerable variability
24 between regions (*medium confidence*). Many small island developing states would experience
25 substantially less freshwater stress as a result of projected changes in aridity when global warming is
26 limited to 1.5°C, as compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.8, 3.5.5, Box 3.2, Box
27 3.5, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

29 **B5.5.** Impacts of 1.5°C global warming on global economic growth are larger than those of the
30 present-day, with the largest impacts expected in the tropics and the Southern Hemisphere subtropics
31 (*low confidence*). Economic growth is projected to be lower at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming
32 for many developed and developing countries (*medium confidence*). {3.5.2, 3.5.3}

34 **B5.6.** There are multiple lines of evidence that since AR5 that the levels of risk has increased for four
35 of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming levels of up to 2°C (*high confidence*), see
36 Figure SPM2. Constraining warming to 1.5°C reduces the risk of reaching a ‘very high’ level in RFC1
37 (Unique and threatened systems) (*high confidence*), and reduces the risk of reaching a ‘high’ level in
38 RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (*high confidence*) and RFC4 (Global Aggregate Impacts) (*medium*
39 *confidence*). It would also reduce risks associated with RFC2 (Extreme weather events) and RFC5
40 (Large scale singular events) (*high confidence*) (SPM Figure 2) {3.4.13; 3.5, 3.5.2}

42 **B6. Limits to adaptation and associated losses exist at every level of global warming (*medium*
43 *confidence*) with site-specific implications for vulnerable regions and populations. Further
44 adaptation is required within the assessed sectors of energy, land and ecosystems, urban,
45 industrial, and transport systems, and within cross-cutting sectors such as disaster risk
46 management, health and education; adaptation needs will be lower at global of 1.5°C, compared
47 to 2°C.**

49 **B6.1.** Adaptation opportunities will be reduced and the risks of unavoidable damages increased
50 (*medium confidence*) in vulnerable regions, including small islands, that are projected to experience
51 higher multiple inter-related climate risks at 1.5°C global warming compared to today, with risks

1 increasing further with warming of 2°C (*high confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.4.5, Box 3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.5,
2 5.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 5.3}

3
4 **B6.2.** Infrastructure investments and innovative mechanisms to target finance towards adaptation,
5 including transformational approaches, at various scales may alleviate the impacts of climate change at
6 1.5°C. {4.4.5, 4.5.3}


7
8 **B6.3.** In energy and industrial systems, options considered feasible for adaptation at global warming of
9 1.5°C are water management and cooling strategies and resilience of existing infrastructure (*medium*
10 *confidence*). Adaptation options for land and ecosystems at global warming of 1.5°C include
11 conservation agriculture, efficient irrigation, efficient livestock, agroforestry, community-based
12 adaptation, ecosystem restoration and avoided deforestation, biodiversity management and coastal
13 defence and hardening (*high confidence*). Urban adaptation options at global warming of 1.5°C
14 include green infrastructure, resilient water and urban ecosystem services, urban and peri-urban
15 agriculture, and adapting buildings and land use through regulation and planning (*high confidence*).
16 {4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.5.3}

17
18 **B6.4.** Several overarching adaptation options that are closely linked to sustainable development can be
19 implemented across rural landscapes, such as investing in health, social safety nets, and insurance for
20 risk management, or disaster risk management and education-based adaptation options. These are
21 being implemented today and can also be scaled up for 1.5°C of global warming {1.4.3, 4.3.5, 4.5.3}

How the level of global warming affects risk associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs) and specific natural, managed and human systems


Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) illustrate the implications of different levels of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies and ecosystems across sectors and regions. The figure is updated since AR5 and the focus is on levels of global warming between 0°C and 2°C. {3.5}

Risk associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs)



Risks for specific natural, managed and human systems

The key elements are presented here as a function of the risk level assessed between 1.5 and 2°C.



1 **Figure SPM 2:** The dependence of risk on the extent of global warming for five Reasons for Concern
 2 (RFCs) together with a range of key elements of the Earth system, on the level of global
 3 warming. The colour shading indicates the additional risk due to climate change when a
 4 temperature level is reached and then sustained or exceeded. Comparison of the increase in
 5 risk across RFCs, or across elements, indicates the relative sensitivity to increases in global
 6 mean temperature above pre-industrial levels. The RFC component is updated from AR5
 7 with a focus on levels of global warming between 0°C and 2°C global warming.
 8 Assessment of risks at higher than 2°C is beyond the scope of the present assessment. The
 9 levels of risk illustrated here reflect the expert judgment of the report authors. The selection
 10 of risks to key elements of the Earth system in the lower panel is illustrative and is not
 11 intended to be fully comprehensive. {3.4.13; 3.5, 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3, 3.5.2.4, 3.5.2.5 }
 12
 13

14 C. Emission pathways and system transitions consistent with 1.5°C global warming

15
 16 **C1. All 1.5°C-consistent pathways imply rapid reductions in net global anthropogenic CO₂**
 17 **emissions to reach net-zero around mid-century, together with rapid reductions in other**
 18 **anthropogenic emissions, particularly methane. Greater emissions reductions by 2030 lead to a**
 19 **higher chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C without, or with only limited overshoot (zero**
 20 **to 0.2°C). (*high confidence*) (Figures SPM1 and SPM3) {1.3, 1.2, 2.2, 2.4, 2.3, 2.5}**
 21

22 **C1.1.** 1.5°C-consistent pathways differ in the portfolio of measures deployed to achieve emissions
 23 reductions. This results in different implications regarding synergies and trade-offs with sustainable
 24 development, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities. Solar radiation modification (SRM)
 25 measures are not included in any of the available assessed pathways. Though some may be
 26 theoretically effective in reducing an overshoot, SRM measures face large uncertainties and
 27 knowledge gaps as well as substantial institutional and social constraints to deployment related to
 28 governance, ethics, and impacts on sustainable development (*medium confidence*). (Figures SPM3 and
 29 SPM4) {2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 4.3, 4.3.8, 4.5, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4, 5.4.2, 5.5.2}
 30

31 **C1.2.** The remaining carbon budget for a one-in-two chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C is
 32 about 750 GtCO₂, and about 550 GtCO₂ for a two-in-three chance (*medium confidence*). These
 33 remaining budgets are larger than those estimated in AR5⁶. Estimates of remaining budgets for 1.5°C
 34 vary by more than 50% due to assessed uncertainties in the climate response to emissions, and by
 35 ±250 GtCO₂ due to assessed uncertainties in global warming until the decade 2006-2015. If calculated
 36 out to 2100, budgets could be reduced by up to 100 GtCO₂ by permafrost thawing and potential
 37 methane release from wetlands (*medium confidence*). {2.2.2, 2.6.1, Table 2.2, Technical Annex
 38 Chapter 2}
 39

40 **C1.3.** Different amounts of non-CO₂ mitigation result in variations in the remaining carbon budget
 41 consistent with 1.5°C of ±250 GtCO₂ (*medium confidence*). In the next two to three decades, removal
 42 of SO₂ would add to future warming, but reductions in methane emissions would partially compensate
 43 (*high confidence*). However, emissions of N₂O increase in some pathways with high bioenergy
 44 demand. (Figures SPM1 and SPM3) {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.3}
 45

46 **C1.4.** Pathways that aim for no or limited (zero to 0.2°C) overshoot of 1.5°C have substantial emission
 47 reductions by 2030, keeping global GHG emissions⁷ in 2030 to 25-30 GtCO₂eq/yr (interquartile
 48 range), a 40-50% reduction from 2010. Uncertainties in the climate response imply the possibility of
 49 lower or higher warming levels being reached by these pathways. (SPM Figure 1) {2.2.1, 2.3.3}

⁶ FOOTNOTE: New literature consistently shows larger remaining 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets compared to those reported in AR5. This literature does not challenge the AR5 relationship between cumulative emissions and global-mean temperature but expresses the remaining carbon budget relative to a recent period that reflects the observational record, rather than relative to the preindustrial period.

⁷ FOOTNOTE: For consistency with other IPCC assessments, greenhouse gas emissions have been aggregated to CO₂-equivalent emissions with 100-year GWP values of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.

1
2 **C2. 1.5°C-consistent pathways can have different levels of carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Some**
3 **limit global warming to 1.5°C without relying on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage**
4 **(BECCS). Behaviour change, demand-side measures and emission reductions in the short term**
5 **can limit the dependence on CDR (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.5, 4.3}**
6

7 **C2.1.** Different CDR methods exist, with widely differing maturity, potentials, costs and side-effects.
8 Examples include afforestation and reforestation, BECCS, direct air carbon capture and storage and
9 soil carbon sequestration. The feasibility of CDR measures relates to their impacts on sustainable
10 development, and depends on scale, implications for land, water and energy use (*high confidence*).
11 Feasibility of CDR could be enhanced by a portfolio of options deployed at smaller scales, rather than
12 a single option at a large scale (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM3) {2.3, 2.5.3, 2.6, 3.6.2, 4.3.7, 4.5.2,
13 5.4.1, 5.4.2; Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3, Table 4.11, Table 5.3, Figure 5.3}.
14

15 **C2.2.** The faster reduction in emissions associated with 1.5°C-consistent pathways compared to
16 holding warming below 2°C-consistent pathways is predominantly achieved by measures that result in
17 less CO₂ being emitted, and only to a smaller degree through additional CDR. Pathways that overshoot
18 1.5°C need to rely on CO₂ removal exceeding remaining CO₂ emissions to return global warming to
19 below 1.5°C by 2100 (*high confidence*). Geophysical understanding is limited about the effectiveness
20 of CDR to reduce temperatures after they peak. (Figure SPM3) {2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, Table 4.11}
21

22 **C2.3.** There is variation in the amount and types of CDR used in 1.5°C-consistent pathways,
23 suggesting flexibility in addressing implementation challenges (*medium confidence*). In 1.5°C-
24 consistent pathways, BECCS deployment ranges from 0–9 GtCO₂/yr in 2050, and 0–16 GtCO₂/yr in
25 2100, while agriculture, forestry and land-use (AFOLU) related CDR measures remove 0–11
26 GtCO₂/yr in 2050 and 1–5 GtCO₂/yr in 2100. Some pathways avoid BECCS deployment through low
27 energy demand and greater reliance on AFOLU-related CDR measures. Bioenergy can still be
28 substantial without BECCS due to its cross-sectoral potential for replacing fossil fuels (*high*
29 *confidence*) (Figure SPM3) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 3.6.2, 5.4.1, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3, 4.4.3,
30 4.3.7, Table 2.4}
31

32 **C2.4.** Some AFOLU measures have potential other benefits, for example, improved biodiversity and
33 soil quality, when combined with policies to conserve and restore land carbon stocks and protect
34 natural ecosystems (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM 4) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 3.6.2, 5.4.1, Cross-
35 Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, Table 2.4}
36

37 **C3. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid and far-reaching systems transitions**
38 **occurring during the coming one to two decades, in energy, land, urban, and industrial systems.**
39 **{2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 5.4}**
40

41 **C3.1.** Pathways that are consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C are qualitatively similar to
42 those for 2°C, but their system changes are more rapid and pronounced over the next decades (*high*
43 *confidence*). These rates of change were observed in the past within specific sectors, technologies and
44 spatial contexts, but there is no documented historic precedent for the scale found in 1.5°C-consistent
45 pathways. {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.5}
46

47 **C3.2.** In energy systems, 1.5°C-consistent pathways include a substantial reduction in energy demand,
48 a decline in the carbon intensity of electricity to zero by mid-century, and an increase in electrification
49 of energy use (*high confidence*). By 2030, the median level of primary renewable energy (including
50 bioenergy, hydro, wind and solar) in 1.5°C-consistent pathways increases by 60% compared to 2020,
51 while primary energy from coal decreases by two-thirds. By 2050, renewables are expected to supply
52 49–67% of primary energy, while coal would be expected to supply 1–7%. The political, economic,
53 social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity storage technologies

1 increased over the past few years (*high confidence*), signalling that such a system transition in
2 electricity generation may be underway. {2.4.2, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3}

3
4 **C3.3.** Transitions in global and regional land use are required to limit warming to 1.5°C. Such
5 transitions require integrative policies to sustainably manage competing demands on land for human
6 settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and ecosystem
7 services. This may include sustainable intensification of land use practices, enhanced agricultural
8 productivity and diet changes. Such options are often limited by institutional, environmental and
9 socio-cultural feasibility, though experiences show that these constraints can be overcome (*high*
10 *confidence*). {1.4.2, 2.3.4, 2.4.4, 4.3.2, 4.4.5, 4.4.3, 5.4.2, 5.4.1, Cross-Chapter Boxes 3 in Chapter 1
11 and 7 in Chapter 3}

12
13 **C3.4.** Emissions from industry in 1.5°C-consistent pathways are about 70-90% lower in 2050
14 compared to 2010. Energy-intensive industry can achieve these reductions through combinations of
15 novel technologies and practices, including low-emission electrification, hydrogen, bio-based
16 feedstocks, product substitution, and in several cases CCS (*high confidence*). Although technically
17 proven, the deployment at scale of these options is limited by economic feasibility and institutional
18 constraints. Energy efficiency can have a positive effect (synergy) on a large number of SDGs and is a
19 more economically feasible enabler of industrial system transitions, though by itself provides
20 insufficient emission reductions in industry (Figure SPM4) (*high confidence*). {4.2.1, 4.3.4, 4.5.2,
21 5.4.1}


22
23 **C3.5.** Transport and buildings, and their associated infrastructure, achieve deep emission reductions
24 by 2050 in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Technical measures (such as efficient appliances, insulation
25 and electrification) and lifestyle choices that lower energy demand or favour cycling and walking can
26 achieve such deep emissions reductions while enhancing multiple SDGs. While technological
27 performance can be improved for all these options, socio-cultural, market, and economic barriers may
28 inhibit rapid and far-reaching change (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM4). {2.3.4, 2.4.3, 4.3.3, 4.4.3,
29 4.5.2, 4.4.5, 5.4.1, Table 5.3}

Emissions in four 1.5°C-consistent pathways and their temperature implications

Limiting warming to 1.5°C during the 21st century is achieved by **reducing CO₂ emissions to net zero** in combination with **marked reductions in non-CO₂ emissions**. The overall level of **carbon dioxide removal (CDR)** varies across pathways depending on mitigation choices, as do the relative contributions of Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and removals in the Agriculture Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector. The shape of the emissions trajectory over time has implications for peak warming and temperature overshoot.



Global CO₂ emissions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways (four archetype pathways are highlighted)

Global total CO₂ emissions [GtCO₂ yr⁻¹]




Non-CO₂ emissions relative to 2010

Emissions of non-CO₂ forcers are also reduced in 1.5°C-consistent pathways but they do not reach zero levels



Breakdown of contributions to global CO₂ emissions in four archetype pathways [GtCO₂ yr⁻¹]



Pathway LED

A scenario in which social, business, and technological innovations lead to dramatic reductions in the energy needed to provide useful services, resulting in lower energy demand to 2050 while living standards rise, particularly in the global South. A down-sized energy system enables rapid decarbonisation of energy supply. Afforestation is the only CDR option considered; neither fossil CCS nor BECCS are used.

Pathway S1

A scenario with a broad focus on sustainability and a shift towards energy intensity improvements, human development, economic convergence and international cooperation, sustainable and healthy consumption patterns, low-carbon technology innovation, and well-managed land systems with limited societal acceptability for BECCS.

Pathway S2

A middle-of-the-road scenario in which societal as well as technological development follows historical patterns. Emissions reductions are mainly achieved by changing the way in which energy and products are produced, and to a lesser degree by demand reductions.

Pathway S5

A resource and energy-intensive scenario in which rapid economic growth and globalization lead to widespread adoption of greenhouse-gas intensive lifestyles, including high demand for transportation fuels and livestock products. Emissions reductions are mainly achieved through technological means, making strong use of CDR through the deployment of BECCS.

Temperature implications of emissions trajectories

1.5°C-consistent pathways that reduce CO₂ emissions markedly by 2030 have a higher chance of limiting peak warming to 1.5°C, and thus have comparatively lower overshoots of the 1.5°C limit. Smaller net negative CO₂ emissions in second half of the century imply a slower temperature decline after peak warming.




1 **Figure SPM 3:** Emissions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways and their temperature implications. Global CO₂
2 emissions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways and a breakdown of the contributions in terms of
3 emissions from fossil fuel and industry, agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU),
4 and Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) for four illustrative archetype
5 pathways⁸ that illustrate a range of potential mitigation approaches. Temperature
6 implications are illustrated at the bottom. Non-CO₂ emissions ranges in the inset show the
7 10-90% (light grey) and interquartile (dark grey) ranges. {2.2, 2.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.10,
8 Figure 2.11}
9

⁸ FOOTNOTE : Four archetypes of 1.5°C-consistent pathways are shown, which illustrate different approaches to reduce GHG emissions. The S5 pathway pursues GHG intensive lifestyles and focusses on technological means to reduce GHG emissions through CDR. The S1 and LED pathways pursue sustainable development and lifestyles with strong energy efficiency improvements and low energy demand, with the LED pathway avoiding the use of carbon capture and storage altogether. The S2 pathway is a middle-of-the-road scenario which continues historical patterns of societal and technological development with a mix of supply and demand-side measures.

Synergies and trade-offs between climate change mitigation and the SDGs

Specific climate change mitigation options can result in different synergies and trade-offs with UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Pathways can use different strategies and portfolios of mitigation options, for example, focusing more on reducing energy demand or favouring specific supply-side options. The overall synergies and trade-offs in the 1.5°C pathways will depend on the selected technology portfolio, the design of the mitigation policy, and the local circumstances and context.



Alignment of 1.5°C pathways with SDG synergies and trade-offs

Different 1.5°C emission pathways reflect choices about preferred mitigation options and strategies, which can either support the simultaneous achievement of other SDGs or make their achievement relatively harder.

Pathways focussing on SUPPLY-side options
Large land footprint

Pathways focussing on DEMAND-side options
Small land footprint

S5

S2

S1

LED

More TRADE-OFFS
Less SYNERGIES

More SYNERGIES
Less TRADE-OFFS

1 **Figure SPM 4:** Potential positive effects (synergies) and risk of negative effects (trade-offs) between
 2 climate change mitigation measures and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
 3 Potential interactions are indicated for each assessed combination of a mitigation measure
 4 and a SDG. SDG 13 (climate action) is not listed as it is implicitly represented in the
 5 various mitigation measures. The alignment of 1.5°C-consistent pathways with SDG
 6 synergies and trade-offs is based on the relative deployment of specific mitigation measures
 7 in each pathway. Pathway archetypes LED, S1, S2, and S5 are introduced in Figure SPM3.
 8 {2.5.3, Figure 2.28, 5.4, Table 5.3, Figure 5.3}
 9

10 **D. Strengthening the global response in the context of sustainable development and efforts to** 11 **eradicate poverty**

13 **D1. Fulfilling the current pledges under the Paris Agreement (known as Nationally-Determined**
 14 **Contributions or NDCs) will still result in global warming of more than 1.5°C, with associated**
 15 **risks and adaptation challenges. Emissions reductions and action in addition to current NDCs**
 16 **lead to lower overshoot and lower transitional challenges after 2030 and can contribute to the**
 17 **achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (*high confidence*) {1.2, 2.3, 3.3,**
 18 **3.4, 4.2, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}**

20 **D1.1.** Implementation of the conditional and unconditional NDCs is projected to result in global GHG
 21 emissions in 2030 of 50-54 GtCO₂eq/yr and 52-58 GtCO₂eq/yr, respectively (*high confidence*).
 22 {Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

24 **D1.2.** Collectively meeting the current conditional or unconditional NDCs would imply pursuing an
 25 overshoot trajectory to return global warming to 1.5°C. This would result in higher impacts and
 26 adaptation challenges, higher transitional challenges to reduce GHG emissions after 2030 and a higher
 27 reliance on CDR compared to pathways that are consistent with limited or no overshoot and which
 28 have deeper GHG emissions reductions until 2030 (*high confidence*) {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, Cross-
 29 Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3 and 11 in Chapter 4}

31 **D2. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development and poverty**
 32 **eradication requires a portfolio of mitigation and adaptation actions that work across sectors**
 33 **and scales. These actions would face key barriers and are enabled by change, such as finance,**
 34 **technology and behaviour (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6}**

36 **D2.1.** Abatement costs resulting in 1.5°C-consistent pathway modelling are 3-4 times higher, on
 37 average, compared to holding warming to 2°C (*high confidence*). {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5, 5.5.2}

39 **D2.2.** Limiting global warming to 1.5°C requires enhanced action by countries and non-state actors in
 40 the next decade. Stringent near-term policies to support the transitions required to limit warming to
 41 1.5°C are more effective when integrated policy packages are used, involving innovative non-price
 42 and price instruments. {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3 and 11 in Chapter
 43 4}

45 **D2.3.** Global investments in energy, transportation, buildings, and water and sanitation infrastructure
 46 are higher in most 1.5°C-consistent pathways compared to today, with an additional 1.7% to 2.5% of
 47 annual economy-wide investment required from the present to 2035. Such changes can be enabled by
 48 a portfolio of policies and measures, including pricing instruments, fiscal policies, technology policies,
 49 performance standards and reforming of energy subsidies. In the next two decades, investments in
 50 low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency is expected to roughly double in 1.5°C-
 51 consistent pathways, while fossil-fuel extraction decreases by about a quarter (*medium confidence*).
 52 {2.5.2, 4.4.5, Box 4.8}

1 **D2.4.** Effective innovation policies combine support for research and development and incentives for
2 market uptake, as well as on the degree of cooperation between governments and the private sector.
3 Both national and international innovation policies can contribute to the commercialisation and
4 widespread adoption of new technologies {4.4.4}

5
6 **D2.5.** Public acceptability can enable or inhibit the implementation of policy to limit global warming
7 to 1.5°C and to adapt to the consequences, and depends on the evaluation and distribution of expected
8 policy consequences and perceived fairness of decision procedures. {4.4.3}

9
10 **D2.6.** Education, information and feedback, and community approaches that rely on Indigenous and
11 local knowledge, when combined with the policies mentioned in D2.3 and tailored to motivations and
12 circumstances of specific actors and contexts, can accelerate the wide scale behaviour changes
13 assumed in 1.5°C-consistent pathways to adapt to and limit global warming to 1.5°C (*high*
14 *confidence*). {1.1, 1.5, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Box 4.3, 5.5.3, 5.6.5}

15
16 **D3. Adaptation can reduce vulnerability to global warming of 1.5°C and is mostly beneficial for**
17 **sustainable development and poverty reduction. There can also be negative consequences (trade-**
18 **offs) with some of the UN SDGs if actions are not context-specific and managed carefully (*high***
19 ***confidence*).** {1.4, 4.5, 5.3}

20
21 **D3.1.** Both incremental and transformational adaptation are needed to reduce vulnerability with 1.5°C
22 global warming involving deep and long-term societal changes that influence sustainable
23 development, poverty reduction and foster equity (*high confidence*). {1.4.3, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.3,
24 5.3.1}

25
26 **D3.2.** Adaptation options to reduce vulnerability at 1.5°C global warming, have significant synergies
27 with SDGs for agriculture, health, urban sectors, and ecosystems (*high confidence*). Investments in
28 health and social security can be cost effective measures for adaptation with potential for scaling up
29 (*medium confidence*). {4.3.3, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2}

30
31 **D3.3.** Agricultural adaptation and securing provision of food security with 1.5°C global warming can
32 result in trade-offs with seven SDGs, including health and wellbeing, gender equality, climate action,
33 water, resilient infrastructure, marine and terrestrial ecosystem (*high confidence*). {4.3.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2;
34 Cross-Chapter Boxes 6, 7 and 8 in Chapter 3}

35
36 **D4. Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C global warming pathways is associated with multiple**
37 **synergies and trade-offs across a range of UN SDGs, depending on the pace and magnitude of**
38 **changes and the management of the transition (*high confidence*).** (SPM Figure 4) {2.5, 4.5, 5.4}

39
40 **D4.1.** Pathways consistent with 1.5°C global warming indicate robust synergies particularly for the
41 SDGs 3 (health), 7 (sub goal of clean energy), 11 (cities and communities), 12 (responsible
42 consumption and production), and 14 (oceans) (*very high confidence*). For SDGs 1 (poverty), 2
43 (hunger), 6 (water), and 7 (sub-goal of energy access), stringent mitigation actions compatible with
44 1.5°C can have trade-offs or negative side-effects if not carefully managed (*high confidence*) (Figures
45 SPM2 and SPM4). {4.3.1, 4.5.2, 5.4.2; Figure 5.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3}

46
47 **D4.2.** 1.5°C-consistent pathways that achieve low carbon energy and material consumption, and low
48 GHG-intensive food consumption have most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-
49 offs with respect to sustainable development and the SDGs (*high confidence*) and can be achieved
50 with high economic growth (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM4). {2.4.3, 2.5.1, 2.5.3, Figure 2.4, Figure
51 2.28, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, Figure 5.4}

1 **D4.3.** Mitigation measures of 1.5°C-consistent pathways can create risks for development, for
2 example as a result of the economic losses from the projected decline in the use of coal, oil and gas
3 (*high confidence*). Policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector can
4 facilitate this transition (*high confidence*). {5.4.1, Box 5.2}

5
6 **D4.4.** Redistributive policies that shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-offs for a range of
7 SDGs particularly hunger, poverty and energy access. Investment needs for such complementary
8 policies are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation investments in 1.5°C-consistent pathways
9 (*high confidence*). {2.4.3, 4.2.1, Box 4.8, 5.4.2, Figure 5.5}

10
11 **D5. Pursuing climate-resilient development pathways can limit warming to 1.5°C while adapting**
12 **to its consequences and simultaneously achieving sustainable development (*high confidence*).**
13 **{Box 1.1, 1.4, 2.5, 4.4, Box 4.6, 5.5.3, Box 5.3}**

14
15 **D5.1.** Sustainable development can enable societal and systems transformations that can help limit
16 warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Pathways that are consistent with sustainable development are
17 associated with reduced mitigation and adaptation challenges, and limit warming to 1.5°C at
18 comparatively lower mitigation costs as compared to development pathways that have high inequality
19 and poverty (*high confidence*). {2.5.3, 5.5.2}.

20
21 **D5.2.** The integration between adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development requires a systemic
22 approach to reconciling trade-offs and exploiting synergies across sectors and spatial scales (*very high*
23 *confidence*). The potential for climate-resilient development pathways differs between and within
24 regions and nations, due to different development contexts and starting points (*very high confidence*).
25 {4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.4, 5.5.1, 5.5.3, Figure 5.1}

26
27 **D5.3.** 1.5°C-consistent development pathways that encompass joint, iterative planning and
28 transformative visions and consider power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development at
29 multiple levels show potential for sustainable futures and benefit for all affected populations (*high*
30 *confidence*). {5.5.3, Figure 5.6, 5.6.4, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5}

31
32 **D6. Policy implementation to successfully limit warming to 1.5°C and to adapt to global**
33 **warming of 1.5°C implies international cooperation and strengthening institutional capacity of**
34 **national and sub-national authorities from civil society, the private sector, cities, local**
35 **communities and Indigenous peoples (*high confidence*). {4.4, 4.2}**

36
37 **D6.1** Transformational adaptation implies deep and long-term societal changes linked to poverty
38 reduction and promoting equity with benefits for sustainable development goals. These changes can be
39 enabled by multi-level governance, coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral policies, collaborative
40 stakeholder partnerships and innovative financing mechanisms that provide greater access to financing
41 and technology. (*high confidence*). {4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4,
42 5.3.1}

43
44 **D6.2.** Implementing 1.5°C-consistent climate responses in developing countries and for poor and
45 vulnerable people requires international resources supporting access to finance, technology and
46 capacity building (*high confidence*). Financial, institutional and innovation capabilities currently fall
47 short of implementing far-reaching measures at scale in all countries (*high confidence*). Enhanced
48 capacities of local public and private sectors support the deployment of context-specific climate
49 responses and hence support systems' transitions to limiting warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*).
50 {2.5.2, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5}

51
52 **D6.3.** International funding and technology transfer can support fast and profound local transformation
53 when they consider the context-specific needs of recipients (*high confidence*). Strengthened global-to-

1 local structures enable inclusive access to finance and technology and ensure participation,
2 transparency, capacity building, and learning among different players (*high confidence*) {4.4.1, 4.4.4,
3 5.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5, 5.6.1, 5.6.3}
4
5 **D6.4.** International agreements that are sensitive to equity and the SDGs enable transformation
6 consistent with a 1.5°C warmer world. The governance of global partnerships involving non-state
7 actors including public and private sectors, civil society and scientific institutions supporting
8 sustainable development and poverty eradication would facilitate actions and responses consistent
9 with constraining global warming to 1.5°C (*very high confidence*). {1.4, 4.4, 4.4.1, 4.2.2, 4.4.3, 4.5.3,
10 5.3.1, 5.6.2, Box 5.3}