Coastal cities and megacities—Coastal cities, especially megacities with over 10 million inhabitants, are at serious risk from climate-related ocean and cryosphere changes (Abadie, 2018). Over half of today’s global population lives in cities and megacities, many of which are located in LLIC, including New York City, Tokyo, Jakarta, Mumbai, Shanghai, Lagos and Cairo (Figure CB9.1). Without substantial adaptation interventions, and based on the compounding effects of future growth in population and assets, sea level rise and continued subsidence, future flood losses in the 136 largest coastal cities are projected to rise from 6 billion USD yr-1 at present to 1 trillion USD yr-1 in 2050 (Hallegatte et al., 2013; Sections 220.127.116.11 and 6.3.3). In addition to important impacts on coastal megacities and large port cities, small and mid-sized cities are also considered highly vulnerable because of fast growth rates and low political, human and financial capacities for risk reduction compared to larger cities (Birkmann et al., 2016; Box 4.2).
At a more local scale, and regardless of the size of the city, coastal property values and development will be affected by sea level changes, storms and other weather and climate-related hazards. Real estate values, and the cost and availability of insurance, will be impacted by actual and perceived flood risks (McNamara and Keeler, 2013; Section 18.104.22.168.1; Putra et al., 2015). Properties are also at risk of losing value due to coastal landscape degradation (McNamara and Keeler, 2013; Fu et al., 2016) and increasing risk aversion. The economic consequences manifest in declining rental incomes, business activities and local employment (Rubin and Hilton, 1996).
Coastal megacities are especially critical nodes for transboundary risks (Atteridge and Remling, 2018; Miller et al., 2018) as they contribute substantially to national economies and serve as a hub for global trade and transportation networks. The 2011 floods in Bangkok, for example, not only resulted in direct losses of 46.5 billion USD (World Bank, 2012; Haraguchi and Lall, 2015), but also in important effects on supply chains across the globe (Abe and Ye, 2013). Urbanisation could, however, also provide opportunities for risk reduction, given that cities are centres of innovation, political attention and private sector investments (Garschagen and Romero-Lankao, 2015).
Small islands—The extreme events occurring today, such as storms, tropical cyclones (TC), droughts, floods and marine heat waves (Herring et al., 2017), provide striking illustrations of the vulnerability of small island systems (high confidence) (Section 6.8.5, Box 4.2, Box 6.1). Societal dimensions can combine with climate changes, e.g., sea level rise, to amplify the impact of TCs, storm surge and ocean acidification in small islands contributing to loss and damage (Moser and Hart, 2015; Noy and Edmonds, 2016). For example, Category 5 TC Pam devastated Vanuatu in 2015 with 449.4 million USD in losses for an economy with a GDP of 758 million USD (Government of Vanuatu, 2015; Handmer and Iveson, 2017). Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu were all impacted by the TC Pam system (IFRC, 2018). In 2016, TC Winston caused 43 deaths in Fiji and losses of more than one third of the GDP (Government of Fiji, 2016; Cox et al., 2018). In 2017, Hurricanes Maria and Irma swept through 15 Caribbean countries, causing major damages and casualties across numerous islands. Rebuilding in three countries alone—Dominica, Barbuda and the British Virgin Islands—will cost an estimated 5 billion USD (UNDP, 2017). The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment for Dominica concluded that hurricane Maria resulted in total damages amounting to 226% of 2016 GDP (The Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017). In 2018, Category 4 TC Gita struck the Pacific islands of Eua and Tongatapu, impacting 80% of the population of Tonga through destruction of buildings, crops and infrastructure, and resulting in 165 million USD of losses with a national GDP of 461 million USD (Government of Tonga, 2018). Effective early warning systems, in some Caribbean islands, have reduced the impact (WMO, 2018). Projected changes in extreme weather include increased intensity of TCs with increased wind speed and rainfall, together with reduced translational speed creating greater destruction from individual storms and counteracting the decreased frequency of occurrence (Sections 6.3 and 6.8).
SIDS are home to 65 million people (UN-OHRLLS, 2015). More than 80% of small island residents live near the coast where flooding and coastal erosion already pose serious problems (Nurse et al., 2014) and since the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5) and the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5), there is consensus on the increasing threats to island sustainability in terms of land, soils and freshwater availability. As a result, there is growing concern that some island nations as a whole may become uninhabitable due to rising sea levels and climate change, with implications for relocation, sovereignty and statehood (Burkett, 2011; Gerrard and Wannier, 2013; Yamamoto and Esteban, 2014; Donner, 2015). For example, at the island scale, recent studies (e.g., on Roi-Namur Island, Marshall Islands; Storlazzi et al., 2018) estimate some atoll islands to become uninhabitable before the middle of the 21st century due to the exacerbation of wave-driven flooding by sea level rise, compromising soil fertility and the integrity of freshwater lenses (Cheriton et al., 2016). The literature also discusses the future of atoll island shoreline. Atoll islands are not ‘static landforms’ (high confidence) and they experience both erosion (Section 22.214.171.124) and accretion of land. In the Solomon Islands, where rates of sea level rise exceed the global average at 7–10 mm yr-1 (Becker et al., 2012), a study of 33 reef islands showed five vegetated islands had disappeared and six islands were concerned with severe shoreline erosion (Albert et al., 2016). In Micronesia, a study showed the disappearance of several reef islands, severe erosion in leeward reef edge islands and coastal expansion in mangrove areas (Nunn et al., 2017). In Tuvalu, with sea level rise of ~15 cm between 1971 and 2014, small islands decreased in land area while larger populated islands maintained or increased land area with the exception of the remote island of Nanumea (Kench et al., 2018). Positive shoreline and surface area changes over the recent decades to century have been observed for atoll islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans (McLean and Kench, 2015; Albert et al., 2016; Kench et al., 2018; Duvat, 2019). Out of 709 islands studied, 73.1% had stable surface area, 15.5% increased and 11.4% decreased in size over the last 40–70 years (Duvat, 2019). It has, however, been argued that the capacity of some atoll islands to maintain their land area by naturally adjusting to sea level rise could be reduced in the coming decades (low evidence, high agreement). Indeed, the projected combination of higher rates of sea level rise (Sections 126.96.36.199, 188.8.131.52 and 184.108.40.206), increased wave energy (Albert et al., 2016; see also Section 6.3), changes in storm wave direction (Harley et al., 2017), as well as the impacts of ocean warming and acidification on the reef system (Quataert et al., 2015; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018), is expected to shift the balance towards more frequent flooding and increased erosion (Sections 4.3.3, 5.3.3).
Deltas—In a context of natural subsidence exacerbated by high human disturbances to sediment supply, for example, due to fresh water exploitation or damming and land use change upstream from the coast (Kondolf et al., 2014), marine flooding is already affecting deltas around the world (Brown et al., 2018; Section 220.127.116.11, Box 4.1). An estimated 260,000 km2 of delta area have been temporarily submerged over the 1990s–2000s (Syvitski et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2014). The recurrence of El Niño associated floods in the San Juan River delta, Colombia, led to the relocation of several villages, including El Choncho, San Juan de la Costa, Charambira and Togoroma (Correa and Gonzalez, 2000). The intrusion of saline or brackish water due to relative sea level rise in combination with storm surges and natural and human-induced subsidence, results in increasing residual salinity, as already reported in the Delaware Estuary, USA (Ross et al., 2015), in the Ebro Delta, Spain (Genua-Olmedo et al., 2016) and in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam (Smajgl et al., 2015; Gugliotta et al., 2017). This affects livelihoods, for example., freshwater fish habitat in Bangladesh (Dasgupta et al., 2017; Section 18.104.22.168.2). Increased salinity limits drinking water supply (Wilbers et al., 2014), with associated repercussions for the abundance and toxicity of cholera vibrio (Vibrio cholerae) as shown in the Ganges Delta (Batabyal et al., 2014). Local agriculture is also at risk. Oilseed, sugarcane and jute cultivation have already ceased due to high salinity levels in coastal Bangladesh (Khanom, 2016) and dry-season crops are projected to decline over the next 15 to 45 years, especially in the Southwest (Kabir et al., 2018). In the Ebro delta, Spain, Genua-Olmedo et al. (2016) anticipate a decrease of the rice production index from 61.2% in 2010 to 33.8% by 2100 for a 1.8 m sea level rise scenario, far above the upper end of the RCP8.5 likely range (Section 22.214.171.124, Table 4.3).
Arctic coasts—Climate-related ocean and cryosphere changes combine to negatively impact not only the economy and life-styles of the Arctic coastal communities, but also the local cultural identity, self-sufficiency, IK and LK and related skills (Lacher, 2015; Sections 3.4.3, 126.96.36.199.2). Changes in fish and seabird populations amplified by climate change have an impact on ecosystems and livelihoods in Arctic island communities such as in Norway’s Lofoten archipelago (Dannevig and Hovelsrud, 2016; Kaltenborn et al., 2017). Another concern relates to coastal erosion, for example triggered by permafrost thaw (Günther et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2018), and which already affects 178 Alaskan communities, with 26 in a very critical situation, such as Newtok, Shishmaref, Kivilina and northwestern coastal communities on the Chukchi Sea (Bronen and Chapin III, 2013). Noteworthy, erosion does not affect all Arctic coastlines: many of them are located in areas that experience rapid glacial-isostatic adjustment (GIA) uplift (James et al., 2015; Forbes et al., 2018) and have low sensitivity to extreme sea levels and sea level rise. An additional factor unique to the Arctic coasts compared to other LLIC is the decrease in seasonal sea ice extent (Section 3.2.1, 188.8.131.52.1), that both reduces the physical protection of the land (Overeem et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2018), for example, from wave action, and allows for greater open water fetch producing stronger wind-generated waves in the open water (Lantuit et al., 2011). In combination with a decreased stability of permafrost—another specificity of polar regions (Romanovsky et al., 2010)—and sea level rise, seasonal sea ice extent reduction results in shoreline erosion (Gibbs and Richmond, 2017; Jones et al., 2018), with associated impacts on coastal settlements (Table 3.4). However, as mentioned above, local geomorphology and geology in the Arctic is as important as permafrost and sea ice extent for determining current and future erosion (Lantuit et al., 2011).
Risks to Arctic coasts will be reinforced by anthropogenic drivers originating in the recent decades of history (e.g., socioeconomic adjustments after government policies requiring children to attend school) which resulted in the construction of infrastructure in near-shore areas. While risk levels vary by village, in several cases infrastructure has been lost and subsistence use areas modified (Gorokhovich et al., 2013; Marino, 2015). More broadly, in the Arctic, ‘indigenous peoples (…) have been pushed into marginalised territories that are more sensitive to climate impacts’ (Ford et al., 2016: 350), with consequences in terms of undermining aspects of socio-cultural resilience.
Impacts on critical sectors and livelihoods—Economic impacts for LLIC are expected to be significant in the course of the century due to the convergence of the anticipated increase in the number of LECZ inhabitants (Jones and O’Neill, 2016; Merkens et al., 2016), the high dependency of societies on ocean and marine ecosystems and services (Section 5.4.1, 5.4.2), and increased detrimental effects of climate-related ocean and cryosphere changes on natural and human systems (medium evidence, high agreement) (Hsiang et al., 2017; United Nations, 2017). However, the degree of impacts on the economy and related dimensions—for example, on employment, livelihood, poverty, health (Kim et al., 2014; Weatherdon et al., 2016), well-being and food security (Sections 1.1 and 5.4.2, FAQ 1.2 in Chapter 1) and public budgets and investments—will vary across context-specific physical settings and exposure and vulnerability levels.
Considering a sea level rise scenario range of 25–123 cm—all RCPs; wider range of sea level rise scenarios than the likely range of AR5 but relatively consistent with the range of projections assessed in this report (Section 184.108.40.206)—and no adaptation, Hinkel et al. (2014) estimated annual losses from future marine flooding to amount to 0.3–9.3% of global GDP in 2100. Noteworthy, coastal protection will inevitably have economic costs (DiSegni and Shechter, 2013), whether it involves hard coastal protection (Hinkel et al., 2018), ecosystem-based approaches (Narayan et al., 2016; Pontee et al., 2016) or a combination of both (Schoonees et al., 2019). Coastal agriculture (e.g., rice crops; Smajgl et al., 2015; Genua-Olmedo et al., 2016), and fisheries and aquaculture will also be seriously impacted (Sections 220.127.116.11.1, 18.104.22.168.3, 5.4.1). For example, it is expected that the marine fisheries revenues of 89% of the world’s fishing countries will be negatively affected by mid-century under RCP8.5 (Hilmi et al., 2015). The fact that more than 90% of the world’s rural poor are located in the LECZ of 15 developing countries (Barbier, 2015) and that these regions are highly dependent on fish for their dietary consumption, raises a serious concern about future food security (FAO et al., 2017; Section 22.214.171.124.2). But not all regions are equally threatened, with Lam et al. (2016) estimating that the impacts on fisheries will be more important in SIDS, Africa and Southeast Asia. Cascading effects are also expected from risks to coral reefs and associated living resources, both on direct consumption by local communities and through disturbances to the broader food web chains (Sections 5.4.2, 6.5 and Box 6.1).
Coastal tourism could be affected in various ways by ocean- and cryosphere-related changes (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Sections 126.96.36.199.2, 188.8.131.52.3). Coastal infrastructure and facilities, such as harbours and resorts (e.g., in Ghana; Sagoe-Addy and Appeaning Addo, 2013), are prone to storm waves. For coral reefs for recreational activities and tourism (especially diving and snorkelling), Chen et al. (2015) estimated that the global economic impact of the expected decline in reef coverage (between 6.6 and 27.6% under RCPs 2.6 and 8.5, respectively) will range from 1.9 to 12.0 billion USD yr-1. The future appeal of tourism destinations will partly depend on sea surface temperature, including induced effects such as an increase in invasive species, e.g., jellyfishes (Burge et al., 2014; Weatherdon et al., 2016) and lion fish in the Northwest Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean (Albins, 2015; Johnston et al., 2015; Holdschlag and Ratter, 2016). It will also depend on how tourists and tourism developers perceive the risks induced by ocean-related changes (e.g., Shakeela et al., 2013; Davidson and Sahli, 2015). This will combine with the influence of changes in climatic conditions in tourists’ areas of origin (Bujosa and Rosselló, 2013; Amelung and Nicholls, 2014; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018) and of non-climatic components such as accommodation and travel prices. Importantly, estimating the effects on global-to-local tourism flows remains challenging (Rosselló-Nadal, 2014; Wong et al., 2014).
Recent studies provide further empirical evidence that people are rarely moving exclusively due to changes in ocean- and cryosphere-based conditions, and that migration as a result of disasters and increasing hazards strongly interact with other drivers, especially economic and political motivations (high confidence) (Kelman, 2015; Marino and Lazrus, 2015; Hamilton et al., 2016; Bettini, 2017; Stojanov et al., 2017; Perumal, 2018). While significantly higher risks of human displacement are expected in low-income LLIC, for example in Guatemala (Milan and Ruano, 2014) and Myanmar (Brakenridge et al., 2017), the issue also concerns developed countries. For example, Logan et al. (2016) show that people temporarily or permanently displaced by hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, USA, create a significant economic burden to tourism-dependent coastal cities and harbours.